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On 8 April 2026, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) communicated the application of K.P. v. Cyprus (Application no. 30430/25). The case concerns the alleged unlawfulness of the applicant’s detention pending deportation and the risk of ill-treatment if returned to Iran.

The applicant, an Iranian national recognised as refugee in Cyprus, was arrested in November 2023 on suspicion of involvement in terrorist activities. He was subsequently classified as a ‘’prohibited migrant’’ and placed in detention pending his deportation to Iran. The applicant challenged the detention and deportation decisions before the Administrative Court, which held that it lacked jurisdiction to examine the deportation decision and dismissed the recourse, finding the detention lawful, necessary and proportionate. The applicant subsequently lodged three habeas corpus applications before the Supreme Court, all of which were unsuccessful. The applicant complains under Article 3 of the risk of ill-treatment upon return to Iran as well as the conditions of his detention, under Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3 of the lack of an effective remedy to challenge his expulsion, and under Articles 5 §§ 1 and 4 ECHR regarding the lawfulness of his detention and access to legal aid.

On 9 April 2026, the First Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in H.D. v. Italy (Application no. 41645/23). The case concerned the placement and prolonged stay of an unaccompanied child in an adult reception centre in Italy, as well as the lawfulness of his deprivation of liberty and the adequacy of available remedies.

The applicant, a Burkinabe national, was placed in the adult reception and asylum centre in Isola di Capo Rizzuto (Crotone). Despite being soon recognised as a minor and granted a residence permit, he remained in the centre for more than five months without being allowed to leave. During that time, he challenged his situation before the domestic courts and subsequently requested an interim measure under Rule 39, which led to his transfer to a facility for unaccompanied children.

The Court found that the applicant’s deprivation of liberty lacked any legal basis and could not be justified under Article 5 § 1 (f) ECHR. It examined both limbs of that provision and noted that no removal or refusal of entry procedure had been initiated. On the contrary, the applicant had been formally recognised as a child and granted a residence permit to stay in Italy. The Court therefore concluded that his detention could not be justified under Article 5 § 1 (f). It also rejected the Government’s reliance on subsequent legislative amendments allowing the temporary accommodation of minors in adult centres, noting that these provisions entered into force after the applicant’s placement and did not provide a legal basis for deprivation of liberty. Furthermore, the Court held that the authorities failed to inform the applicant of the reasons for his detention, in breach of Article 5 § 2. Regarding Article 5 § 4, the Court recalled the requirement of a speedy judicial review and found that the domestic proceedings lasted several months and only concluded after the applicant’s transfer following an interim measure, therefore finding a violation of Article 5 § 4.

In relation to the complaint under Article 3, the Court reiterated the principles applicable to the treatment of persons held in immigration detention and emphasized the particular vulnerability of children. It found that the applicant had been held for over five months in an adult reception centre characterised by overcrowding, poor material and hygienic conditions, and a lack of appropriate services. Although children were nominally placed in a separate area, the evidence showed that separation from adults was ineffective in practice and that they lived in close contact. Moreover, no specific educational, recreational or psychosocial support adapted to minors was provided, and the applicant was not allowed to leave the centre. The Court concluded that the applicant had been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment in violation of Article 3 ECHR.

The Court also found that Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 3 had been violated. The applicant’s complaint concerned not only the material conditions of detention but also his placement in an adult facility, which required an effective remedy capable of securing his prompt transfer to a suitable centre for children. Although a domestic remedy was available, the Court considered that the delays in the proceedings rendered it ineffective in practice.

On 2 April 2026, the Human Rights Committee (CCPR) published its Views in the communication No. 3742/2020 submitted by Gentilmen Issa Magumba against the Republic of Korea, concerning the refusal to process an asylum application lodged in an airport transit zone and the applicant’s prolonged confinement in that zone.

The author, a national of the Democratic Republic of Congo, was held for approximately 14 months in the transit area of Incheon International Airport after being denied the possibility to apply for refugee status on the ground that he was a transit passenger and not subject to entry inspection. He claimed that this refusal exposed him to a risk of refoulement and that his confinement amounted to arbitrary detention and inhuman treatment.

The Committee found a violation of Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights due to the denial of access to the asylum procedure. It reiterated that States must not remove individuals where there are substantial grounds for believing that they face a real risk of irreparable harm and must ensure access to an effective and independent review with suspensive effect. In the present case, the author’s asylum request was rejected solely on formal grounds linked to his status as a transit passenger, depriving him of any opportunity to seek protection against refoulement. The Committee held that domestic legal provisions cannot be applied in a manner that undermines obligations under the Covenant.

The Committee further found a violation of Article 9(1), holding that the author’s confinement in the airport transit area constituted a deprivation of liberty. It recalled that such deprivation may arise from confinement in a restricted airport area without free consent, and that prolonged and indefinite detention of asylum seekers may be arbitrary. The Committee noted that the author was subjected to de facto detention for approximately 14 months within a space under the State party’s jurisdiction, without any legal basis, as no formal detention order had been issued. His confinement was of indefinite duration, lacked appropriate justification, and was not based on an assessment of necessity or proportionality. The Committee therefore concluded that the author’s detention was arbitrary and constituted a violation of Article 9(1) of the Covenant.

Finally, the Committee found the conditions of detention and the prolonged exposure to inadequate living conditions such as lack of privacy, insufficient access to food, medical care and sanitary facilities and constant lighting during COVID-19 pandemic, to be incompatible with human dignity, therefore finding a violation of Article 10(1) of the Covenant.

The Committee concluded that the State party violated Articles 7, 9(1) and 10(1) of the Covenant and held that it is under an obligation to provide the author with an effective remedy, including compensation, and to take measures to prevent similar violations in the future.
 

On 16 April 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in joined Cases C‑50/24 to C‑56/24 (Danané and Others), originating from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Belgian Council for asylum and immigration proceedings (Conseil du contentieux des étrangers). The cases concerned the interpretation of Directive 2013/32/EU (Asylum Procedures Directive) and Directive 2013/33/EU (Reception Conditions Directive), in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in the context of asylum applications lodged at Brussels airport by third-country nationals who were detained in facilities situated within Belgian territory but legally treated as border facilities.

The Court clarified that Article 43 of Directive 2013/32 does not require border procedures to be carried out at geographically defined border locations. A procedure may fall within the scope of that provision even where the applicant is detained in a facility located within the territory of the Member State, as long as those facilities are legally treated as border or transit zones. The Court emphasised that neither the wording nor the objectives of the provision impose a geographical requirement and that a restrictive interpretation could render border procedures ineffective and undermine fundamental rights.

The CJEU further held that, once the four-week period laid down in Article 43(2) of Directive 2013/32 has expired, the examination of the application can no longer be carried out under the border procedure and must continue under the ordinary procedural framework of the Directive. However, EU law does not preclude the same detention facility from being reclassified from a “place at the border” to a “place in the territory”. In such circumstances, the Member State must ensure that applicants are informed of the change in their legal situation, including their authorisation to enter the territory.

The Court confirmed that applicants may remain detained after the expiry of the four-week period on a different legal basis, in particular under Article 8(3)(b) of Directive 2013/33. It held that the continuation of detention is permissible where necessary to determine elements of the application, insofar as it complies with the requirements of necessity, proportionality and individual assessment. It stressed that detention must remain exceptional and cannot be applied automatically or systematically.

It also ruled that, after the expiry of the four-week period, the determining authority may continue examining the application as a matter of priority under Article 31(7) of Directive 2013/32. It clarified that investigative steps carried out during the border procedure may be relied upon in subsequent procedures, provided that they comply with the basic principles and guarantees laid down in EU law.

Finally, it held that the expiry of the four-week period and the continued detention of the applicant do not affect the competence of the determining authority. The expiry of that period merely entails a shift from the border procedure to another procedural framework and the cessation of the specific temporal and material limitations applicable to border procedures.

On 17 March 2026, the Court of Cassation (Hof van Cassatie) dismissed an appeal against a judgment of the Brussels Court of Appeal (Hof van beroep te Brussel) upholding the detention of an asylum applicant at the border following the use of forged travel documents.

The applicant, a third-country national, attempted to enter Belgium using false travel documents and applied for international protection upon arrival at the border. He was consecutively placed in detention in a border facility pending a decision on his entry or possible return. The applicant challenged his detention, arguing that the use of false documents is inherent to the situation of asylum applicants and should be regarded as a failure to comply with entry formalities, which cannot itself justify detention under the Directive 2013/33/EU (the Reception Directive). He also requested to refer a preliminary question on this matter to the Court of Justice of European Union.

The Court of Cassation rejected those arguments and confirmed that, while under Article 8(1) of the Reception Directive an applicant for international protection may not be detained solely because of their asylum application, detention is permitted where necessary, including in order to decide on the right to enter the territory in the context of a border procedure (Article 8(3)(c)). The Court held that, in assessing the lawfulness of detention, national authorities may take into account the use of false documents and that they are not required to treat such conduct as merely a failure to comply with entry formalities or as inherent to the status of an asylum applicant. The Court further upheld the findings of the lower court that the detention was based on an individual assessment and was necessary to ensure the effectiveness of border control and the possibility of return. Finally, it found that the request for a preliminary ruling was not relevant and it dismissed the cassation appeal.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 5 March 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in the case C-150/34 (Aroja). The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Supreme Court of Finland (Korkein oikeus) regarding the calculation of detention periods for the purpose of removal of illegally staying third-country nationals under the Directive 2008/115/EC (the Return Directive).

The Court clarified that Article 15(5) and (6) of the Return Directive must be interpreted as meaning that to determine whether the maximum detention period of an illegally staying third-country national has been reached, all periods of detention completed in the same Member State under Article 15 for the purpose of enforcing the same return decision must be taken to account. To reach this conclusion, the Court noted the serious interference with the right to liberty protected by Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the fact that detention under the Return Directive does not have punitive aims but seeks to secure the Directive's return-related objectives within strictly defined time limits. This requirement applies even where the detention periods are separated by intervals during which the person concerned was not detained, otherwise the authorities could circumvent those limits by releasing and subsequently re-detaining the individual based on the same return decision, likely resulting in a breach of the principle of proportionality.

The Court also recalled its previous case law and held that, under the second sentence of Article 15(3) of the Return Directive, any prolonged detention exceeding the initial maximum period of detention must, in all cases, be subject to review by a judicial authority, regardless of whether the detained person has requested it.  The Court further clarified that, in the absence of EU rules on the procedure of detention reviews in the event of prolonged detention periods, the review of an administrative decision extending detention beyond the initial maximum six-month period does not have to take place before that period is reached. However, it must be carried out as speedily as possible after the adoption of that decision.

Finally, the Court held that, in the event of a late judicial review of a decision extending detention beyond the initial six-month period, EU law does not automatically require, on that ground alone, the release of the detained person. Where the substantive conditions for detention remain satisfied and the maximum period of detention under Article 15(6) of the directive has not been reached, detention may continue.

On 5 March 2026, the Court of Justice of the European  Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in the case C-489/24 (Safita). The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Council of the State of The Netherlands (Raad van State) concerning the interpretation of Directive 2013/32/EU (the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (rAPD)), in particular about the possibility for Member States to adopt several successive decisions extending the time limit for examining applications for international protection where a large number of applications are lodged within a short period.

The Court clarified that, under point (b) of the third subparagraph of Article 31(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU, a Member State may decide on several occasions and consecutively to extend the time limit for the examination procedure. However, the Court emphasised that the application of that provision is subject to three cumulative conditions: (i) applications for international protection must be lodged simultaneously, (ii) they must be lodged by a large number of applicants, and (iii) the situation must make it very difficult in practice to conclude the examination within the initial six-month period. Referring to its previous case law, the Court recalled that such extensions are justified only in the event of a significant increase in applications occurring within a short period, compared with the normal and foreseeable trend in the Member State concerned, and not in situations characterised by a gradual increase of applications over an extended period.

Furthermore, the Court held that under Article 4(1) rAPD, where the number of applications for international protection remains continuously high over an extended period, Member States are obliged to allocate appropriate and sufficient means to the determining authority to enable it to process those applications. A Member State may therefore rely on consecutive extensions only if it demonstrates, with sufficient reasons and evidence, that despite the efforts to address the simultaneous lodging of applications, it did not have sufficient time to allocate the necessary resources. In any case, the duration of successive extensions must not exceed either the time necessary to comply with that obligation or a maximum overall period of 21 months from the lodging of the application.

On 16 February 2026, the Second Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) published the communicated cases of M.R. v. Türkiye (Application no. 12965/21), and M.S. v. Türkiye (Application no. 20148/25), concerning the removal of Syrian nationals from Türkiye.

The case of M.R. v. Türkiye concerns a Syrian national who arrived in Türkiye in 2011 and was granted temporary protection. In August 2019, he was apprehended and placed in police custody and later in immigration detention. On 24 August 2019, he was returned to Syria under the voluntary repatriation scheme. The applicant alleges that his removal was a de facto deportation disguised as voluntary return and that it exposed him to a real risk of ill-treatment. He further complains of unlawful deprivation of liberty, lack of procedural safeguards, the absence of an effective remedy to challenge his detention and removal, and impact on his private and family life, invoking articles 2,3,5,8,13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No.7 thereof. 

The Court asked the parties to clarify the applicant’s alleged minor status, the voluntariness of his return and the prior assessment of the risk under Articles 2 and 3 ECHR, as well as the lawfulness of his detention and the availability of effective remedies.

The case of M.S. v. Türkiye concerns three Syrian nationals who fled to Türkiye in 2013–2014 and were granted temporary protection. The applicants were issued deportation orders to designated safe third countries or to return voluntarily to Syria. Two of the applicants were subject to security restrictions, and one was alleged to have links with terrorist organisations. Following these orders, all applicants were placed in administrative detention. The applicants challenge the deportation orders, arguing that the domestic authorities failed to conduct an adequate “safe third country” assessment, particularly regarding the risk of chain refoulement to Syria, and claim that removal would disproportionately interfere with their established family and private life in Türkiye. The first applicant also raises concerns about the lack of effective remedies to challenge the lack of assessment of his alleged risk of ill-treatment and the interference with his family life.

The Court asked the parties to clarify, inter alia, whether the planned expulsions would expose the applicants to a real risk of treatment contrary to Articles 2 and 3 ECHR.

On 30 January 2026, the Second Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) communicatedthe application of D.J. v Türkiye (Application no. 37547/22). The case concerns the alleged unlawfulness of the applicant’s deprivation of liberty and his removal to Uzbekistan.

The applicant, an Uzbek national of Turkmen ethnic origin who identifies as an activist for the independence of Karakalpakstan, was arrested during a demonstration in Istanbul in 2020. Removal orders were issued after that but later annulled due to the lack of a proper risk assessment. He subsequently lodged an application for international protection and, in December 2021, informed the authorities that he had been subjected to harassment, surveillance and death threats, prompting a criminal investigation. In January 2022, he was allegedly apprehended by undercover police officers, held without access to his lawyer or relatives and without being informed of the reasons for his apprehension, before being placed in immigration detention and deported to Uzbekistan on the same day. The Constitutional Court later declared his complaints inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies.

The applicant submitted complaints under  Articles 2, 3, 5 and 13 of the Convention, as well as Article 1 of Protocol No. 7. The Court asked the parties to clarify whether the domestic authorities conducted an adequate assessment of the alleged risk of death or ill-treatment prior to the applicant’s removal, whether he had access to an effective remedy capable of preventing his deportation, and whether his apprehension and deprivation of liberty complied with the requirements of Article 5 of the Convention.

On 23 January 2026, the Committee Against Torture of the United Nations (CAT) published its decision in the Communication No. 1079/2021 submitted by A.A. against Australia. The communication concerns the lawfulness of prolonged detention in Australia and at the Manus Regional Processing Centre in Papua New Guinea, and the possible accountability of Australia for alleged violations of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (hereinafter, the Convention).

The complainant, an Iranian national, arrived in Australia in July 2013 and was transferred under a migration cooperation agreement to the Manus Detention Centre in Papua New Guinea, where he was subjected to harsh detention conditions and torture. He was temporarily returned to Australia in 2019 for medical treatment but remained detained administratively until 2022. The applicant claimed that his detention in both Australia and Papua New Guinea was inhuman and degrading and caused him severe physical and mental suffering.

The Committee found that the complainant suffered torture and inhuman treatment while detained at the Manus Regional Processing Centre in Papua New Guinea. Although these acts occurred outside Australian territory, the Committee noted that Australia exercised effective control over the detention system through its central role in designing the migration arrangements, providing full funding, and establishing the overall framework and operational structure of the centre. Even if direct operational control by Australian agents was absent, the Committee held that Australia remained responsible, reflecting both the principle of effective control and the doctrine of joint responsibility under international law. It further observed that Australia failed to take measures to prevent acts of torture, to investigate and punish abuses, and to ensure adequate medical care during his detention, hence constituting a violation of Article 2(1), read in conjunction with Article 1(1) of the Convention.

The Committee also found that the complainant’s administrative detention in Australia was not justified, necessary, or proportionate, and lacked adequate review, thereby amounting to inhuman and degrading treatment, in violation of Article 16(1) of the Convention.
Finally, the Committee recommended that Australia provide the complainant with redress, including compensation, rehabilitation, and guarantees of non-repetition, and take measures to prevent similar violations in the future.

On 3 February 2026, the Third Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) published its judgment on the case of O.H. and Others v. Serbia (Application no. 57185/17). The case concerned the removal of Afghan applicants to Bulgaria after they had expressed their intention to seek asylum in Serbia.

On the 3 February 2017, the applicants were arrested and detained at the Gradina Border Police Station on the grounds of illegal border crossing. However, the Pirot Misdemeanour Court discontinued the proceedings recognising the intention of the applicants to seek asylum and issued asylum-intention certificates to them, serving as temporary residence permits. Despite this, the police transported the applicants to the Bulgarian border, confiscated their documents, and forced them to collectively cross the border at night.

In relation to the complaints under Article 4 Protocol 4, the Court recalled the two-tier test established in N.D. and N.T. v. Spain for assessing collective expulsions following unauthorised border crossings. It emphasised, however, that the present case differed. The applicants’ arbitrary removal by the police was entirely unrelated to their initial unauthorised entry into Serbian territory. Moreover, the Constitutional Court already found that the domestic authorities had expelled the applicants without a prior examination of their removal on an individual basis, which had violated the prohibition of collective expulsion in respect of the applicants. The Court therefore agreed with this assessment and found a violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4.

Regarding the removal of the applicants from Serbia under Article 3, the Court recalled the principle of non-refoulement inherent in Article 3 ECHR and reiterated that, where an asylum seeker is removed to a third country without an examination of the asylum claim on the merits, the authorities must assess whether the person will have access to an adequate asylum procedure there. As the Serbian authorities expelled the applicants without such assessment, the Court found a violation of the procedural limb of Article 3. It further noted that the manner of their removal, including being taken to the border during freezing conditions, amounted to a violation of the substantive limb of Article 3. By contrast, it found that, although the applicants had been held in inadequate detention conditions, the short duration of their detention did not reach the threshold of severity required under Article 3 and found this complaint manifestly ill-founded.

Concerning the lawfulness of the their detention under Article 5(1) ECHR, the Court noted that the applicants’ initial detention during the misdemeanour proceedings was lawful. However, their continued detention from the end of those proceedings until their expulsion from Serbia had no legal basis, as the applicants should have been taken to an asylum reception facility, but were instead driven to the border and expelled in an arbitrary manner. Hence, the Court found a violation of Article 5(1) of the Convention. Finally, the Court found a violation of Article 5(4) of the Convention, since the police failed to provide them with legal assistance effectively, hence, deprived them of the possibility to challenge the lawfulness of their detention.

The Court also decided not to examine the admissibility and merits of the complaints under Article 13, in conjunction with Articles 3 and Article 4 Protocol 4 of the Convention.

On the 1st of December 2025, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) communicated the application of O.M. v. Greece (Application no. 14354/21), concerning the lawfulness of the detention of an Afghan national who arrived on Lesvos on 30 August 2019 and was detained with a view to his readmission to Türkiye .

The applicant alleged that he was subjected to unlawful and arbitrary detention under the Greek authorities, that he was not promptly informed of the reasons for his detention in a language he could understand, and that the judicial revision of his detention was ineffective. The applicant also raised concerns under Article 8 regarding the prolonged uncertainty and vulnerability caused by the delays in processing his international protection request, which he argued had significant negative consequences on his mental health and well-being.

The Court asked the parties to clarify whether the applicant’s detention complied with the requirements of the Convention and domestic law, including the availability of effective judicial review (Arts. 5(1) and 5(4)). It also raised questions as to whether the length of detention and delays in examining the asylum claim affected the applicant’s private life (Art. 8), and whether an effective remedy was available to challenge the situation (Art. 13). The parties were further invited to provide information on the handling of the asylum procedure during and after the period of detention.