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On 24 June 2026, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) communicated the application Ali Khaledi Batrashi and Others v. Cyprus (Application no. 29564/25). The case concerns the alleged unlawful deportation of the first applicant to Iran without an adequate assessment of the risk of ill-treatment upon return, as well as the alleged lack of procedural safeguards in the deportation and detention proceedings.

The first applicant had lived in Cyprus since 2007 and remained there on humanitarian grounds after his asylum application was rejected, owing to the severe disability of one of his daughters. Following his arrest in 2023 on suspicion of involvement in terrorist activities, he was detained several times and was deported to Iran in May 2025. The first applicant alleges that his deportation exposed him to a real risk of ill-treatment in Iran and that he was subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 during his deportation. He further complains that his detention was unlawful and arbitrary and that the judicial review proceedings concerning his detention did not comply with the requirements of Article 5 ECHR. The remaining applicants complain that the first applicant’s deportation interfered with their right to respect for family life.

The Court asked the parties, inter alia, whether the Cypriot authorities carried out a thorough assessment of the alleged risk of ill-treatment before deporting the first applicant, whether his detention complied with the requirements of Article 5 ECHR and whether his deportation disproportionately interfered with the applicants’ right to respect for family life under Article 8 ECHR.

On 18 June 2026, the First Instance Administrative Court of Thessaloniki published its decision to refer a preliminary question to the Court of Justice of the EU regarding the compatibility with EU law of electronic notification of decisions on asylum applications.

The applicant, a Chinese citizen, applied for international protection in 2023, which was rejected as manifestly unfounded. She was informed of the rejection decision when she sought to renew her asylum applicant’s card at the Asylum Office. The applicant claimed she did not receive any email and submitted an appeal. That appeal was dismissed by the Appeals Authority because it was not submitted within the foreseen deadline under national law. She applied to annul the decision of the Appeals Authority and alleged that the calculation of the appeal deadline on the basis of the electronic notification violated her right to effective judicial protection under Article 46 of the Asylum Procedures Directive (APD) and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFREU).

The Court noted that there are no rules in the APD regarding the notification of decisions so the matter can be arranged within the procedural autonomy of each Member State with respect to effective judicial protection and the principle of equivalence. It went on to analyse the national asylum law, national legal instruments with equivalent forms of notification, the APD and CJEU case law and decided to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling:

1.      whether Greece's rule deeming asylum rejection decisions served 48 hours after an email is sent - with no way to verify actual receipt or access, and no means of rebutting that presumption - is compatible with Article 47 CFREU and Article 46 APD, given that this notification date starts the appeal deadline;

2.      whether this violates the principle of equivalence since electronic tax notifications in Greece do include a verification system and courts have rejected an analogous presumption where receipt of a registered letter is disputed.

3.      what is the role of consent to electronic notification in such disputes;

4.      whether the national measure in question creates an irrebuttable presumption of notification;

5.      whether her claim that the message went to spam, should affect the analysis.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 16 July 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in Case C‑26/25 (Bukla) following a request for a preliminary ruling from the Szeged High Court of Hungary (Szegedi Törvényszék). The case concerned the interpretation of Article 20 TFEU and Directive 2008/115/EC (the ‘Return Directive’) regarding the adoption of a return decision on national security grounds against a third-country national who is a family member of Union citizens and the procedural safeguards applicable where such decisions are based on classified information.

The Court held that Article 20 TFEU and Article 5 of Directive 2008/115 require Member States, before adopting a return decision concerning a third-country national whose family members are Union citizens, to examine the consequences of that decision for the person’s family life and for the situation of the minor children concerned, where the authorities are aware of the existence of those family ties. It reiterated that they must assess if a relationship of dependency exists between the third-country national and the Union citizen family members, whether the removal decision could effectively compel the Union citizen to leave the territory of the European Union.

It further held that Article 20 TFEU, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, precludes national rules preventing courts from examining a derived right of residence during return proceedings where the relevant family ties are known to the competent authorities, including where the relevant facts emerge only during the judicial stage or where the return decision follows a previous refusal of residence.

The Court also clarified that national security risks do not justify the adoption of a return decision solely on the basis of a binding and non-reasoned opinion issued by a specialised national security authority. Under Article 20 TFEU and Articles 5, 12 and 13 of Directive 2008/115, read in conjunction with Articles 7 and 24 of the Charter, the competent authorities must carry out an individual assessment of all relevant circumstances and verify that the measure complies with the principle of proportionality, including its impact on the person’s family life and the best interests of the children concerned.

Regarding classified information, the Court held that Articles 12 and 13 of Directive 2008/115, read in conjunction with Article 5 thereof, Article 20 TFEU, the principle of good administration and Article 47 of the Charter, preclude national legislation preventing a third-country national from being informed of the essence of the grounds underlying a return decision and an entry ban based on confidential information, or from using such information in administrative or judicial proceedings. It clarified that the intervention of a public prosecutor who has access to the classified material but cannot disclose it to the person concerned is not sufficient to safeguard the rights of defence and an effective remedy. However, where disclosure of these grounds would jeopardise national security, such information may be withheld, provided that the national court reviewing the decision can draw the appropriate conclusions from that refusal and ensure effective judicial review of the lawfulness of the measure.

On 4 June 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union delivered its judgment in Case C‑198/25  (Quotal), originating from a request for a preliminary ruling by the District Court of The Hague, sitting in Zwolle (rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats Zwolle). The case concerned the interpretation of Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU (the recast ‘Asylum Procedures Directive’ (rAPD)), read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union on whether a first-instance court hearing an appeal against a rejection of an application for international protection is able to fully reassess the merits of the application, or whether that assessment may be reserved to the determining authority.

The Court recalled that Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32 requires Member States to ensure that a first-instance court or tribunal before which a decision relating to an application for international protection is contested, carries out a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law. The review must allow an up-to-date assessment of the case, taking into account all necessary factual and legal elements, including any evidence arising after the adoption of the decision under appeal. The Court clarified that such an examination allows the application to be dealt exhaustively at judicial level, without the need to refer the case back to the determining authority.

It further held that Article 46(3) confers on the first-instance court or tribunal, where it has all necessary elements of fact and law, the power to give a binding ruling on whether the applicant satisfies the conditions for international protection. Under EU law Member States may not restrict the scope of that judicial review. 

Finally, the Court held that national courts must set aside any national legislative provisions that prevent EU rules from producing their full effect. It therefore clarified that Article 46(3) requires a system of judicial protection in which first-instance courts or tribunals are empowered to carry out a full and up-to-date factual reassessment of the application for international protection and, where they have all necessary elements, to give a binding ruling on the merits of the claim, including the grant of international protection, thereby ensuring the effectiveness of EU law.

On 26 May 2026, the Third Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in J.B. v. Greece (Application no. 54796/16). The case concerns the potential return of the applicant from Greece to Türkiye under the EU-Türkiye Statement of 18 March 2016.

The applicant left Syria in April 2015 due to the armed conflict and alleged risks of persecution on account of his ethnic and religious background. He travelled to Türkiye, where he remained for approximately one year under temporary protection. In May 2016 he arrived in Greece, where he was arrested on grounds of unlawful entry. He applied for international protection claiming that he faced a risk of ill-treatment in Türkiye due to his Armenian origin and his Christian faith. His application for international protection was declared inadmissible on the basis that Türkiye constituted a “first country of asylum” or a “safe third country”, a decision upheld on appeal by the domestic authorities. The applicant complained before the ECtHR about deficiencies on the examination of his asylum application by the Greek authorities, as well as the risk he entailed if returned to Türkiye, including the chain refoulement to Syria, and about the conditions of his detention in Greece.

In regard to the complaint under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights concerning the risk of ill-treatment upon removal, the Court found that since the applicant had in the meantime obtained refugee status in France, the risk of ill-treatment if returned to Türkiye and subsequently to Syria has ceased to exist. Therefore, it considered unjustified to continue the examination of that complaint.

In relation to Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3, the Court found that the applicant’s asylum claim had been examined through a multi-layered procedure before the asylum authorities and domestic courts, during which he was interviewed with interpretation, able to present his individual circumstances and challenge the application of the ‘’safe third country’’ concept. It also held that the authorities assessed both his personal situation and relevant country information concerning Türkiye through reports, statistics and objective material, including the alleged risk of onward refoulement to Syria and the assurances provided within the framework of the EU-Türkiye Statement. Therefore, the Court concluded that the Greek authorities could reasonably rely on those assurances and supporting material and that the applicant had been afforded effective safeguards against arbitrary removal contrary to Article 3, finding no violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3.

Finally, regarding to the complaint under Article 3 ECHR concerning the conditions of detention pending removal, the Court reiterated that Greek police stations are facilities designed only for short periods of confinement and that detention therein for periods ranging from one to three months have consistently been found contrary to Article 3, particularly in view of deficiencies such as overcrowding, poor sanitary conditions and lack of outdoor exercise. Since the applicant had been detained in Mytilene police station for one month and nineteen days, the Court found that the conditions of his detention amounted to degrading treatment contrary to Article 3

On 23 April 2026, the Advocate General Emiliou delivered his opinion in Case C‑414/25 (Sedrata) following a request for a preliminary ruling by the Supreme Court of Cassation, Italy (Corte suprema di cassazione). The case concerned the compatibility of the Italian legislation implementing the Italy-Albania bilateral agreement, which allows the transfer of third-country nationals to facilities located in Albanian territory for the purposes of border and return procedures, with EU law, in particular with the provisions of Directive 2008/115/EC (the Return Directive) and of Directive 2013/32/EU (the recast Asylum Procedures Directive).

The Advocate General considered that the Return Directive does not, in principle, preclude national legislation permitting the transfer of third-country nationals to detention facilities located in a third State, provided that those facilities remain under the jurisdiction of the Member State concerned and that EU law continues to apply in full. However, he stressed that such arrangements are compatible with the Return Directive only insofar as they do not undermine its effectiveness or the rights it guarantees. In particular, the competent authorities must ensure access to legal assistance and communication with legal representatives and family members, guarantee that detention is ended without undue delay where the legal conditions are no longer met and comply with the specific safeguards applicable to children and other vulnerable persons. He further noted that the geographical location of detention facilities may require appropriate organisational and logistical measures to ensure that these guarantees are effectively secured in practice.

Furthermore, the Advocate General considered that Article 9 (1) of the rAPD does not, in principle, preclude national legislation allowing the detention of a third-country national subject to return procedures in facilities located in a third State, where that person lodges an application for international protection while being held there. He explained that EU law does not require Member States to organise border or return procedures exclusively within their territory. For that reason, the requirement that applicants must be allowed to “remain in the Member State” must be understood in a way that it covers situations falling under the jurisdiction of the Member State, even if they take place outside its physical territory. However, he stressed that this approach is only acceptable if the national legislation ensures full respect for the procedural guarantees laid down in the Directive, especially that applicants must have access to information and legal assistance, be able to participate effectively in the procedure and, where necessary, appear before the competent authorities, while also benefiting from the specific safeguards applicable to vulnerable persons. He also stressed that detention-related guarantees, including judicial review, must be fully respected.

Finally, the Advocate General emphasised that Member States cannot circumvent their obligations under EU law by transferring individuals to facilities outside their territory, and that they remain fully responsible for ensuring compliance with EU rules and fundamental rights, including those guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

On 16 April 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in joined Cases C‑50/24 to C‑56/24 (Danané and Others), originating from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Belgian Council for asylum and immigration proceedings (Conseil du contentieux des étrangers). The cases concerned the interpretation of Directive 2013/32/EU (Asylum Procedures Directive) and Directive 2013/33/EU (Reception Conditions Directive), in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in the context of asylum applications lodged at Brussels airport by third-country nationals who were detained in facilities situated within Belgian territory but legally treated as border facilities.

The Court clarified that Article 43 of Directive 2013/32 does not require border procedures to be carried out at geographically defined border locations. A procedure may fall within the scope of that provision even where the applicant is detained in a facility located within the territory of the Member State, as long as those facilities are legally treated as border or transit zones. The Court emphasised that neither the wording nor the objectives of the provision impose a geographical requirement and that a restrictive interpretation could render border procedures ineffective and undermine fundamental rights.

The CJEU further held that, once the four-week period laid down in Article 43(2) of Directive 2013/32 has expired, the examination of the application can no longer be carried out under the border procedure and must continue under the ordinary procedural framework of the Directive. However, EU law does not preclude the same detention facility from being reclassified from a “place at the border” to a “place in the territory”. In such circumstances, the Member State must ensure that applicants are informed of the change in their legal situation, including their authorisation to enter the territory.

The Court confirmed that applicants may remain detained after the expiry of the four-week period on a different legal basis, in particular under Article 8(3)(b) of Directive 2013/33. It held that the continuation of detention is permissible where necessary to determine elements of the application, insofar as it complies with the requirements of necessity, proportionality and individual assessment. It stressed that detention must remain exceptional and cannot be applied automatically or systematically.

It also ruled that, after the expiry of the four-week period, the determining authority may continue examining the application as a matter of priority under Article 31(7) of Directive 2013/32. It clarified that investigative steps carried out during the border procedure may be relied upon in subsequent procedures, provided that they comply with the basic principles and guarantees laid down in EU law.

Finally, it held that the expiry of the four-week period and the continued detention of the applicant do not affect the competence of the determining authority. The expiry of that period merely entails a shift from the border procedure to another procedural framework and the cessation of the specific temporal and material limitations applicable to border procedures.

On 19 March 2026, the Administrative Court of First Instance of Thessaloniki published a decision referring a preliminary question to the CJEU regarding the interpretation of Article 46 of Directive 2013/32 (the Asylum Procedures Directive – APD). The case concerned an application for annulment lodged by a Guinean national against a decision of the Appeals Committee which had rejected his asylum appeal as inadmissible due to late submission.

The applicant applied for international protection in 2018, but his application was rejected at first instance. He promptly requested free legal aid and a lawyer was appointed, however, his appeal was lodged after the statutory deadline, and the Appeals Committee dismissed the appeal as inadmissible. Before the Administrative Court, the applicant argued that the late submission was not attributable to him but to failures in the provision of legal aid and claimed he was deprived of an effective remedy, in breach of Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The Court reviewed the EU and national legal framework and noted that while national law provides strict deadlines for appeals, these must not render the exercise of the right to an effective remedy impossible or excessively difficult. It also acknowledged the established national case law that, in principle, applicants bear the consequences of their lawyer’s errors, unless force majeure is established. According to domestic case law, force majeure does not include negligence on behalf of an appointed lawyer that results in missed deadlines. However, the Court identified a legal uncertainty as to whether this approach is compatible with EU law in situations where the legal representative is appointed by the State and the applicant has acted diligently.

Considering the importance of the right to an effective remedy and the potential consequences for asylum seekers, including the risk of refoulement, the Court decided to refer the following preliminary question to the Court of Justice of the European Union:

“Is it compatible with Article 46 of Directive 2013/32/EU and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to reject, pursuant to Articles 92(1)(a) and 95(8) of Law 4636/2019, an administrative appeal against a first-instance decision rejecting an application for international protection, due to late submission? Such rejection occurs in a situation where the requirements laid down in Article 71 of Law 4636/2019 (Articles 19 to 23 of the Directive) and in the implementing Ministerial Decision No 3449/2021 have not been complied with, namely the obligation to inform the appellant of the lawyer appointed to their case, to ensure communication between the appellant and that lawyer, and where the latter has not handled the case with the required diligence under Article 5 of that Ministerial Decision.  More specifically, it concerns  a case where, although the appellant requested within the statutory time limit the appointment of a lawyer by the Asylum Service to assist them and demonstrated due diligence in pursuing their case and in taking the necessary steps for the proper lodging of the appeal, the lawyer appointed by the Service failed to communicate with the applicant and to lodge the appeal in due time, without any proven case of force majeure affecting the lawyer?”

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team
EWLU team would like to thank Equal Legal Aid for bringing this case to our attention

On 19 March 2026, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Dutch Council of State (Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State) delivered its judgments nos. 202600650/2/V6 and 202600651/2/V6 on applications for interim relief submitted by two students residing in Gaza. The cases concerned the requests for consular assistance from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to allow the students to leave Gaza and collect their provisional residence permits (mvv) at the Dutch embassy in Jordan in order to commence their studies in the Netherlands.

Both students had already been admitted to a Dutch university, and the Minister of Asylum and Migration had no objection to issuing them a residence permit. However, the students could not cross the border in Gaza and requested the Minister’s assistance. The Minister rejected their requests because they did not belong to a group normally eligible for such assistance and declared the applicants’ objections inadmissible, a decision upheld by the District Court of The Hague. The students appealed against this decision and sought interim relief from the Council of State.

The Council of State stressed that the judgments were limited to interim relief excluding the main legal questions. It confirmed that there is no legal right to consular assistance under Dutch law and that the Minister enjoys broad discretion in this domain. Nevertheless, the interim relief judge of the Council of State found that the applicants’ inability to leave Gaza and collect their mvvs is due to the harrowing situation in Gaza. The risk that, due to the duration of the proceedings, they might no longer be able to collect those permits, outweighed the Minister’s interests. The judge further observed that the measure sought involved only limited efforts through diplomatic channels, and not an obligation to ensure evacuation or issue residence documents. The Minister’s concerns regarding identity verification were insufficiently substantiated. In light of these very special circumstances, it ordered the Minister to make every effort to facilitate the applicants’ departure from Gaza, without prejudging the outcome of the main proceedings.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team
 

On 24 March 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in the Case C‑767/23 (Remling). The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State, Netherlands (Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State) regarding the interpretation of Article 267 TFEU in the light of Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, on whether a court of last instance may refuse to make a reference for a preliminary ruling by means of summary reasoning without specifying the applicable exceptions.

The Court reiterated that, where there is no judicial remedy under national law against the decisions of a court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal are in principle obliged, under the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, to refer questions concerning the interpretation or validity of EU law to the Court of Justice. That obligation may be relieved only in a situation corresponding to one of the Cilfit exceptions: (i) where the question of EU law is irrelevant to the resolution of the dispute, (ii) where the provision of EU law has already been interpreted by the Court, or (iii) where the correct interpretation of EU law is so obvious as to leave no scope for reasonable doubt.

Thus, the Court held that where a court of last instance considers that one of those exceptions applies, it must, in accordance with Article 267 TFEU read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, state the reasons for its decision by setting out specifically and concretely, why the relevant exception is applicable in the circumstances of the case. That obligation applies irrespective of whether the parties have expressly requested a preliminary ruling as long as a question of EU law is raised. National legislation permitting courts to decide by means of summary reasoning for the sound administration of justice does not relieve them of the obligation to provide specific and concrete reasons. A decision merely stating that the conditions for summary reasoning are satisfied is insufficient. However, a court of last instance may, where appropriate, rely on the reasoning of a lower court, provided that the latter has set out the grounds justifying the application of one of the Cilfit exceptions.

On 26 March 2026, the CJEU delivered its judgment in the case  C-819/25 (PPU) [Gonrieh] originating from the preliminary reference by the French-speaking Brussels Court of First Instance (Tribunal de première instance francophone de Bruxelles) regarding the scope of the Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification (the FRD), concerning the Member States’ obligations in the context of issuing family reunification visas, in particular where the beneficiary is required to appear in person but is unable to leave a third country due to life-threatening situation.

The Court clarified that Article 13(1) FRD, read in conjunction with Articles 2, 4, 7 and 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, requires Member States, after accepting an application for family reunification, to authorise the entry of the family member and to grant “every facility for obtaining the required visas.” This obligation entails removing unjustified administrative obstacles and applying rapid and efficient administrative procedures to enable the issuance of visas, including, inter alia, facilitating personal appearances through accessible consular services, issuing emergency travel documents, and minimizing the number of appearances required.

However, the Court held that Article 13(1) does not impose obligations extending to diplomatic or consular relations with third countries. In particular, a Member State is not required to organise or ensure the transfer of a third-country national to its consular post, nor to contact third countries to facilitate that transfer, in situations where the person is unable to travel. Such measures would fall outside the scope of the Directive and concern matters which are not covered by EU law under Article 51 of the Charter. It further clarified that provisions concerning diplomatic and consular protection, including Article 20(2)(c) and Article 23 TFEU and Article 46 of the Charter, apply only to Union citizens and, in certain cases, their family members, and not to third-country nationals seeking family reunification under Directive 2003/86.

The Court emphasised that this interpretation is consistent with the objective of Directive 2003/86, which is to promote family reunification and protect third-country nationals, including minors, while distinguishing between administrative facilitation and measures requiring external intervention. Therefore, the refusal to provide evacuation or diplomatic assistance does not constitute a failure to implement EU law, and the obligations under Article 13(1) are limited to the administrative sphere.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 5 March 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in the Case C-458/24 (Daraa). The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Administrative Court of Sigmaringen, Germany (Verwaltungsgericht Sigmaringen) concerning the interpretation of the Dublin III Regulation and Directive 2013/32 in a situation where the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application unilaterally suspends transfers.

The Court held that the second and third subparagraphs of Article 3(2) of the Dublin Regulation should be interpreted as meaning that a unilateral suspension by the Member State responsible of take-charge or take-back procedures does not require the determining Member State to continue applying the Charter III criteria, nor to assume responsibility itself. Article 3(2) applies only where two cumulative conditions are met: (i) the existence of systemic flaws in the asylum procedure or reception conditions and (ii) a resulting risk of inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. A unilateral suspension does not, in itself, satisfy those conditions and cannot be treated as evidence of such flaws. Consequently, no additional or implicit condition relating to the willingness of the responsible Member State may be inferred from that provision.

As regards Article 29(1) and (2) of the Dublin Regulation, the Court held that the six-month time limit for carrying out a transfer continues to apply irrespective of the reasons preventing the transfer. Under Article 29(2), where the transfer is not carried out within that period, responsibility automatically passes to the requesting Member State. That transfer of responsibility is unconditional and does not depend on the conduct of the Member State initially responsible, including situations where the failure to transfer results from that State’s unilateral suspension of cooperation. The Regulation does not provide for suspension or interruption of that time limit, and extensions are limited to the situations expressly provided for in Article 29(2). The Court further clarified that, during the running of the transfer period, the Member State initially designated as responsible remains bound by its obligations under the Regulation, and Member States must cooperate to carry out the transfer. However, a failure by one Member State to comply with its obligations cannot justify non-compliance by another; remedies lie in infringement proceedings under Articles 258 and 259 TFEU.

Finally, the Court interpreted Article 33(1) and (2) of Directive 2013/32 as precluding a Member State from rejecting an application for international protection as inadmissible on the ground that the Member State responsible is unwilling to take charge or take back the applicant. The grounds for inadmissibility listed in Article 33(2) are exhaustive and must be interpreted strictly, and such a situation is not included among them.

On 28 November 2025, the High Court of Justice of Andalusia, Ceuta and Melilla – Málaga Administrative Chamber (Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Andalucía, Ceuta y Melilla - Sala de lo Contencioso Administrativo de Málaga) issued the judgment No. 2434/2025, annulling the return of applicants who had attempted to access the Spanish territory via the Chafarinas Islands.

The applicants, Syrian nationals, arrived at Isla del Congreso on 3 January 2022 and expressed their intention to apply for international protection. The authorities nevertheless proceeded with their immediate return to the Moroccan authorities without initiating an individual administrative procedure or allowing them to apply for asylum. The lower court upheld the authorities’ actions, considering that the applicants’ conduct constituted an abuse of law and justified their immediate return.

The High Court found that the special border regime established in the tenth additional provision of the Spanish Immigration Law (LOEX 4/2000) allowing summary expulsions at the borders of Ceuta and Melilla, does not apply to the Chafarinas Islands and cannot be extended by analogy. The Court further held that the applicants’ conduct did not constitute an abuse of law and emphasised that access to the asylum procedure must be guaranteed in accordance with Directive 2013/32/EU on asylum procedures, Article 18 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the principle of non-refoulement under Article 3 ECHR, and Article 33 of the Refugee Convention. It therefore concluded that the repatriation measures had been adopted in breach of the applicable procedural guarantees and it annulled the contested decision.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 27 February 2026, the Court of First Instance of Antwerp, Family Court Section (Rechtbank van eerste aanleg Antwerpen, familierechtbank) annulled a decision of the civil registrar of the City of Antwerp revoking the Belgian nationality of a child born in Belgium of Palestinian parents recognised as refugees.

The child had initially been granted Belgian nationality pursuant to Article 10§1 of the Belgian Nationality Code to prevent statelessness. On 5 March 2024, the registrar of Antwerp revoked the child’s nationality on the grounds that the child could acquire Palestinian nationality through the parents or via the Palestinian mission. As a result, the child’s Belgian passport and Kids-ID were annulled. The parents contested the revocation, maintaining that as recognised refugees it was not feasible for them to secure Palestinian nationality for their child. The City of Antwerp and the Public Prosecutor’s Office argued that the claim should be dismissed, citing a potential “pull effect” and alleged abuse of the nationality rules.

The Court of First Instance annulled the revocation holding that under Article 10§3 of the Belgian Nationality Code (WBN) nationality may only be withdrawn if it is established beyond doubt that the child possesses another nationality. Hence, given the absence of formal Palestinian nationality legislation and the impossibility for refugees to register remotely, the child could not realistically acquire another nationality. The court further held that any alleged abuse of Belgian nationality rules by the parents could not justify the deprivation of the child’s nationality, highlighting that the best interests of the child (Article 22bis of the Constitution) must prevail.

According to the Court’s press release, five similar decisions from the city register were annulled by the Court on the same grounds.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 5 March 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in the case C-150/34 (Aroja). The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Supreme Court of Finland (Korkein oikeus) regarding the calculation of detention periods for the purpose of removal of illegally staying third-country nationals under the Directive 2008/115/EC (the Return Directive).

The Court clarified that Article 15(5) and (6) of the Return Directive must be interpreted as meaning that to determine whether the maximum detention period of an illegally staying third-country national has been reached, all periods of detention completed in the same Member State under Article 15 for the purpose of enforcing the same return decision must be taken to account. To reach this conclusion, the Court noted the serious interference with the right to liberty protected by Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the fact that detention under the Return Directive does not have punitive aims but seeks to secure the Directive's return-related objectives within strictly defined time limits. This requirement applies even where the detention periods are separated by intervals during which the person concerned was not detained, otherwise the authorities could circumvent those limits by releasing and subsequently re-detaining the individual based on the same return decision, likely resulting in a breach of the principle of proportionality.

The Court also recalled its previous case law and held that, under the second sentence of Article 15(3) of the Return Directive, any prolonged detention exceeding the initial maximum period of detention must, in all cases, be subject to review by a judicial authority, regardless of whether the detained person has requested it.  The Court further clarified that, in the absence of EU rules on the procedure of detention reviews in the event of prolonged detention periods, the review of an administrative decision extending detention beyond the initial maximum six-month period does not have to take place before that period is reached. However, it must be carried out as speedily as possible after the adoption of that decision.

Finally, the Court held that, in the event of a late judicial review of a decision extending detention beyond the initial six-month period, EU law does not automatically require, on that ground alone, the release of the detained person. Where the substantive conditions for detention remain satisfied and the maximum period of detention under Article 15(6) of the directive has not been reached, detention may continue.

On 5 March 2026, the Court of Justice of the European  Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in the case C-489/24 (Safita). The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Council of the State of The Netherlands (Raad van State) concerning the interpretation of Directive 2013/32/EU (the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (rAPD)), in particular about the possibility for Member States to adopt several successive decisions extending the time limit for examining applications for international protection where a large number of applications are lodged within a short period.

The Court clarified that, under point (b) of the third subparagraph of Article 31(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU, a Member State may decide on several occasions and consecutively to extend the time limit for the examination procedure. However, the Court emphasised that the application of that provision is subject to three cumulative conditions: (i) applications for international protection must be lodged simultaneously, (ii) they must be lodged by a large number of applicants, and (iii) the situation must make it very difficult in practice to conclude the examination within the initial six-month period. Referring to its previous case law, the Court recalled that such extensions are justified only in the event of a significant increase in applications occurring within a short period, compared with the normal and foreseeable trend in the Member State concerned, and not in situations characterised by a gradual increase of applications over an extended period.

Furthermore, the Court held that under Article 4(1) rAPD, where the number of applications for international protection remains continuously high over an extended period, Member States are obliged to allocate appropriate and sufficient means to the determining authority to enable it to process those applications. A Member State may therefore rely on consecutive extensions only if it demonstrates, with sufficient reasons and evidence, that despite the efforts to address the simultaneous lodging of applications, it did not have sufficient time to allocate the necessary resources. In any case, the duration of successive extensions must not exceed either the time necessary to comply with that obligation or a maximum overall period of 21 months from the lodging of the application.

On 29 January 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in the case C-431/24 (Multan). The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the District Court of The Hague, Netherlands (Rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats Roermond) regarding the scope of access to information in an asylum applicant’s file under Article 23 (1) Directive 2013/32 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (rAPD)).

The Court of Justice clarified that Article 23 (1) rAPD, read in conjunction with Article 46 thereof and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, requires that both the applicant and the national court must be able to access information in the applicant’s file that is likely to be relevant for the proceedings. This includes supporting documents such as investigation reports prepared by the authorities of the host Member State concerning the applicant’s country of origin on which the rejection of international protection and the return decision are based, when they are relevant for: (i) the applicant to exercise his or her rights of defence, (ii) for the court to review compliance with Article 30 rAPD and, ultimately, (iii) to assess whether the principle of non-refoulement has been respected.

The Court recalled its case law and reiterated that, under Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU, national courts must conduct a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law, including the manner in which investigations were carried out and the evidence considered by the determining authority, to ensure effective judicial review of decisions rejecting international protection. At the same time, the Court confirmed that the applicant’s right to a fair trial, as guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter, reinforces this requirement. Access to the file is therefore essential for both the court’s assessment and the applicant’s rights of defence, although it may be limited in specific cases in line with Article 52(1) of the Charter.

On 22 January 2026, the Advocate General Spielmann issues his opinion in the case C-877/24 (Shamsi). The case related to the preliminary reference by the  Council of State of the Netherlands regarding the scope of Directive 2008/115/EC (Returns Directive (RD) concerning third-country nationals who have been sentenced to life or long-term sentences in prison, for crimes which are not related to the illegal nature of their stay. The questions enquired under what conditions, a Member State remains obliged to adopt a return decision against them when, owing to the execution of those sentences, neither voluntary departure nor forced removal will be possible in the near future.

The Advocate General Spielmann examined whether Member States may issue return decisions under the Returns Directive to third-country nationals who are serving long prison sentences and cannot be removed in the foreseeable future. The Opinion concludes that the Returns Directive does not preclude the adoption of a return decision against an illegally staying third-country national whose removal will take place only after the completion of the imprisonment. However, in such cases, national authorities must periodically assess whether removal remains feasible. By contrast, when illegally staying third-country nationals are serving a life sentence and removal is permanently impossible in practice, the adoption of a return decision is incompatible with the Directive. Finally, the Advocate General found that Directive 2008/115 does not require Member States to grant a temporary residence permit to illegally staying third-country nationals during the execution of a prison sentence.