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On 3 September 2026, the Fifth Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in B.C. v. Italy (Application no. 42909/23) concerning the deprivation of liberty of an unaccompanied child in a reception centre in Brindisi, Italy.

The applicant, an Ivoirian national, arrived in Italy in August 2023 and expressed his intention to apply for international protection. After being recognised as a minor, he was placed in the C.A.R.A. centre for asylum applicants, which had initially been intended for adults but was subsequently used exclusively to accommodate children. He remained there for approximately two and a half months before being transferred to a facility specifically designated for unaccompanied children. He complained that he had been unlawfully deprived of his liberty and had been unable to challenge his detention, as well as about the conditions of his stay at the C.A.R.A. centre.

In regard to Article 5 ECHR, the Court noted that the applicant was unable to leave the centre and had been placed there without a clear and accessible legal basis or reasoned decision ordering his detention. It therefore found that his deprivation of liberty had been arbitrary. The absence of a legal basis also meant that he could not be properly informed of the reasons for his detention or provided sufficient information to be able to challenge the decision before a court. Consequently, the Court found a violation of Articles 5 §§ 1, 2 and 4 ECHR.

Regarding the conditions at the centre, the applicant complained under Articles 3 and 8 ECHR about the poor material and hygienic conditions, insufficient educational and recreational activities, lack of socialisation and restrictions on leaving the centre. The Court examined these complaints under Article 3 alone and found that the available evidence did not show that the applicant’s situation had reached the level of severity required to constitute inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3 and declared this complaint manifestly ill-founded.

On 16 June 2026, the Administrative Court of Gelsenkirchen delivered its judgment in case no. 19a K 5383/23.A, concerning the application of Regulation (EU) 2024/1347 (the ''Qualification Regulation'') to pending asylum procedures.
 

The case concerned a mother and daughter from Iran whose asylum applications had been rejected in November 2023. The daughter had entered Germany in 2022 at the age of 14 and reached the age of majority during the proceedings. The case was still pending when the Qualification Regulation became applicable on 12 June 2026.

The Court held that the Regulation applies not only to asylum applications lodged from 12 June 2026, but also to asylum procedures that remained pending on that date. It found that Section 87e (2) of the German Asylum Act, which restricted its application to applications lodged from 12 June 2026, was therefore incompatible with EU law and had to be disapplied pursuant to the primacy of EU law. It further held that the temporal limitation provided in Article 79(3) of the Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 (the ''Asylum Procedure Regulation'') applies only to that Regulation and cannot be extended to the substantive provisions of the Qualification  Regulation.

Applying the Qualification Regulation, the Court granted the daughter refugee status. It found that feminist Iranian women may constitute a particular social group and, based on the daughter’s individual circumstances, considered that her commitment to gender equality and a self-determined life formed an integral part of her identity. The Court concluded that she faced a risk of gender-specific persecution in Iran on account of her membership of that group and could not be required to exercise restraint to avoid such persecution.

The Court further held that the mother fulfilled the requirements for family status under Section 26(2) of the Asylum Act and Article 23 of the Qualification Regulation. Although the daughter had reached adulthood during the proceedings, the Court held that the relevant point in time for determining her minority was when the mother lodged her application. It considered that determining minority at a later stage, when the competent authorities decide on the derived status, would be incompatible with the protection of private and family life and the rights of the child under Articles 7 and 24(2) and (3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

On 25 June 2026, the Constitutional Court of Belgium (Grondwettelijk Hof) delivered its judgment no. 78/2026, concerning the procedure introduced by the Act of 10 March 2024 for granting a residence permit to stateless persons. The applicants challenged several provisions, arguing that the procedure applicable to stateless persons provided less favourable guarantees than those available to beneficiaries of international protection and was therefore discriminatory.

The Court held that the legislature is not required to treat stateless persons in the same way as refugees or beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, as stateless persons are not subject to European legislation. However, it found that several conditions and procedural rules imposed disproportionate limitations on applicants for residence on grounds of statelessness.

It considered that the requirement that applicants must be unable to acquire or regain the nationality of another State was incompatible with the concept of statelessness under the 1954 New York Convention, as a person is stateless when they do not possess any nationality, regardless of whether they may subsequently obtain or recover one. It therefore annulled this condition. The Court also annulled the exclusion of applications where applicants had not previously held lawful residence for more than three months or had not previously applied for international protection, finding that this could disproportionately affect stateless persons who may never have held a residence permit.

The Court held that a personal hearing constitutes an essential procedural safeguard in statelessness proceedings and therefore annulled the provision making such a hearing optional. It also ruled that the five-year residence period must begin once the judgment recognising statelessness becomes final. Finally, it required applicants to receive proof of submission of their application and to be protected, in principle, from enforcement of removal measures during the proceedings, except on grounds of national security or public order.

The Court rejected the remaining complaints, holding that statelessness applicants were not required to benefit from all procedural guarantees applicable to asylum applicants, including an appeal with full jurisdiction and suspensive effect.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 5 March 2026, the Court of Justice of the European  Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in the case C-489/24 (Safita). The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Council of the State of The Netherlands (Raad van State) concerning the interpretation of Directive 2013/32/EU (the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (rAPD)), in particular about the possibility for Member States to adopt several successive decisions extending the time limit for examining applications for international protection where a large number of applications are lodged within a short period.

The Court clarified that, under point (b) of the third subparagraph of Article 31(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU, a Member State may decide on several occasions and consecutively to extend the time limit for the examination procedure. However, the Court emphasised that the application of that provision is subject to three cumulative conditions: (i) applications for international protection must be lodged simultaneously, (ii) they must be lodged by a large number of applicants, and (iii) the situation must make it very difficult in practice to conclude the examination within the initial six-month period. Referring to its previous case law, the Court recalled that such extensions are justified only in the event of a significant increase in applications occurring within a short period, compared with the normal and foreseeable trend in the Member State concerned, and not in situations characterised by a gradual increase of applications over an extended period.

Furthermore, the Court held that under Article 4(1) rAPD, where the number of applications for international protection remains continuously high over an extended period, Member States are obliged to allocate appropriate and sufficient means to the determining authority to enable it to process those applications. A Member State may therefore rely on consecutive extensions only if it demonstrates, with sufficient reasons and evidence, that despite the efforts to address the simultaneous lodging of applications, it did not have sufficient time to allocate the necessary resources. In any case, the duration of successive extensions must not exceed either the time necessary to comply with that obligation or a maximum overall period of 21 months from the lodging of the application.

On 26 February 2026, the Belgian Constitutional Court delivered its judgments nos. 23/2026 and 24/2026, suspending, respectively, provisions of two Laws of 14 July 2025 reforming the reception regime for asylum applicants, and provisions of the Act of 18 of July 2025 introducing stricter conditions for family reunification between beneficiaries of subsidiary protection and their family members. In both cases, the Court considered that the immediate application of the contested measures was likely to cause an irreparable harm and raised doubts as to their compatibility with EU law and fundamental rights. It therefore referred several preliminary questions to the CJEU and ordered the suspension of the provisions pending the CJEU judgment.

In judgment No. 23/2026, the Court suspended provisions of two Laws of 14 July 2025 which allow Fedasil (Belgian Federal Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers) to refuse material assistance to asylum applicants  who already enjoy international protection in another EU Member State, and which cancel  the possibility of granting reception support in the form of financial assistance in special circumstances. The Court considered that the immediate application of these provisions could cause serious and irreparable harm, and referred to the CJEU the question on whether EU law allows an application by a person already granted protection in another Member State, to be treated as a “subsequent application” under Directive 2013/32/EU, thereby permitting refusal of material assistance under Directive 2013/33/EU.

In judgment No. 24/2026, the Court examined provisions of the Act of 18 July 2025 introducing stricter requirements for family reunification between beneficiaries of subsidiary protection and their family members, departing from the more favourable regime applicable to refugees. The Court considered that the immediate application of these provisions was likely to cause serious and irreparable harm.

It therefore suspended them and referred five preliminary questions to the CJEU, asking in particular: (1) whether the Directive 2003/86/EC is valid insofar as it excludes beneficiaries of subsidiary protection from its more favourable family reunification regime; (2) if so, whether the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights precludes national measures subjecting beneficiaries of subsidiary protection to less favourable conditions than refugees; (3) whether the Directive 2011/95/EU is valid insofar as it limits the concept of “family members” to those present in the same Member State; and (4-5) whether the Charter precludes national measures imposing stricter family reunification conditions on beneficiaries of subsidiary protection if their  family members are not present in Belgium, in light of the right to respect for family life and the best interests of the child.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team