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On 10 July 2026, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) communicated the case Jovanovic v. Denmark (Application no. 24677/26), concerning the residence and reporting obligations imposed on the applicant following an expulsion order that could not be implemented, and their alleged incompatibility with Articles 5 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

The applicant, who is apparently stateless, has lived in Denmark since arriving there with his mother at the age of three. Following previous criminal proceedings, in 2023 he was ordered to be expelled with a six-year re-entry ban. As his removal could not be carried out, the Return Agency subsequently required him to stay at the Kærshovedgård return centre and to report to the police there three times per week. He was later sentenced to ten months’ imprisonment for failing to comply with those requirements between January and April 2025. The High Court upheld his conviction and permission to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused.

The Court asked the parties whether those obligations amounted to a deprivation of liberty under Article 5 of the Convention, and to an unjustified interference with the applicant’s private life under Article 8 ECHR.

On 16 July 2026, the Belgian Constitutional Court delivered its judgment no. 89/2026 concerning two actions for annulment brought by several organisations against provisions of the Act of 12 May 2024, which introduced measures aimed at strengthening the removal of third-country nationals staying irregularly in Belgium. The contested measures concerned mandatory medical examinations for the purpose of removal, presumptions of absconding in Dublin transfer procedures, the obligation to cooperate with return procedures and alternatives to detention.

First, the Court raised doubts as to whether mandatory medical examinations imposed for the purpose of enforcing return decisions are compatible with Directive 2008/115/EC (the ''Return Directive''). It observed that a compulsory examination may affect human dignity and interfere with physical integrity, particularly where it can be imposed against the person's will for non-therapeutic purposes and without requiring the authorities to provide alternatives. It therefore referred two questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) concerning the compatibility of the measure with the Return Directive and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

Second, the Court distinguished between circumstances indicating an intention to abscond from the authorities and a failure to cooperate with the transfer procedure. It considered that a presumption of absconding may be justified where a person fails to report to the assigned reception facility or leaves it without notifying the Immigration Office of an address within three working days, while allowing the person to subsequently demonstrate that they did not intend to abscond from the authorities. By contrast, failure to cooperate with a mandatory medical examination or an intensive support programme does not justify such a presumption where the person remains at their place of residence. The Court therefore annulled the relevant provisions.

Third, the Court clarified that the obligation to cooperate does not apply to a person who has lodged an appeal with suspensive effect against a return decision and is consequently entitled to remain in Belgium pending that appeal.

Lastly, the Court held that even where alternatives to detention are presumed to be ineffective, the authorities must carry out a specific and individual assessment before resorting to detention. It further annulled the legislation insofar as it provided for only two types of alternative measures and did not include the possibility of requiring the person concerned to surrender their identity or travel documents.
 

On 29 June 2026, the Spanish Supreme Court delivered its judgment no. 814/2026 in cassation proceedings no. 3795/2025, concerning the scope of the special rejection at the border (rechazo en frontera) regime under Additional Provision 10 of Organic Law 4/2000 on the rights and freedoms of foreigners in Spain (LOEX) in the context of irregular entry at the border of Ceuta and Melilla.

The case concerned an Algerian national who was intercepted by the Spanish authorities at sea while attempting to enter Ceuta by swimming and was subsequently handed over to the Moroccan authorities. He challenged that action on the grounds that it had been carried out without an administrative procedure or decision and without legal assistance or access to international protection. The Administrative Court no. 2 of Ceuta partially upheld his action and annulled the administrative measure, while rejecting his claim for compensation. The High Court of Justice of Andalusia subsequently upheld that judgment. The State Administration subsequently lodged an appeal in cassation before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court examined whether Additional Provision 10 LOEX, which allows persons detected at the border of Ceuta or Melilla while attempting to overcome border-containment elements to be rejected in order to prevent their irregular entry, also applies to persons intercepted at sea while attempting to reach those cities by swimming. Referring to Constitutional Court judgments 172/2020 and 13/2021, it held that the special regime is not generally applicable to every person attempting to cross the borders of Ceuta or Melilla irregularly. Rather, it applies where a person attempts to cross the border by overcoming border-containment elements, such as the border fences.
It held that technological border-control devices, such as drones, thermal cameras or sensors, cannot be equated with border-containment elements because their function is to monitor, detect or provide alerts rather than physically prevent border crossings. However, the Court clarified that Additional Provision 10 is not limited to terrestrial measures and that, if border-containment elements were established at sea, the special border rejection regime could apply to persons attempting to cross the border by overcoming such elements.

The Supreme Court distinguished rejection at the border (rechazo en frontera) from other measures regulated by the LOEX, including return to the point of origin (retorno al punto de origen), expulsion (expulsión) and return (devolución). It noted that the return (devolución) procedure applies, inter alia, to persons attempting to enter Spain irregularly, including those intercepted at the border or in its vicinity. Accordingly, persons intercepted at sea while attempting to enter Ceuta or Melilla by swimming are subject to the return (devolución) procedure rather than rejection at the border (rechazo en frontera). The Court therefore dismissed the State Administration’s appeal in cassation and upheld the judgment under appeal.

On 10 July 2026, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) communicated the applications of Mohseni v. Denmark (Application no. 17821/26) and Alazem v. Denmark (Application no. 18315/26).

Both applicants had entered Denmark as children and were subsequently convicted of criminal offences and issued expulsion orders combined with time-limited re-entry bans. The applicant in Mohseni, an Afghan national who entered Denmark at the age of two, was convicted of assault with aggravating circumstances and offences under the Controlled Substances Act, sentenced to one year and six months’ imprisonment and issued a four-year re-entry ban. The applicant in Alazem, a Syrian national who entered Denmark at the age of nine, was convicted of assault with aggravating circumstances, sentenced to one year’s imprisonment and issued a six-year re-entry ban. Both applicants complained that their expulsion from Denmark was in breach of Article 8 ECHR.

In both cases, the Court asked the parties whether the expulsion orders combined with the respective re-entry bans would be in breach of Article 8 ECHR, and about the applicants’ possibilities of re-entering Denmark after the expiry of those bans.

On 2 July 2026, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) communicated the case Akkaoui v. Denmark (Application no. 21546/26) concerning the residence and reporting obligations imposed on the applicant at a return centre following an expulsion order that could not be implemented, and their alleged incompatibility with Articles 3, 5 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

The applicant, a stateless Palestinian from Lebanon, entered Denmark with his parents in 1986 at the age of eight. He was ordered to be expelled with a permanent re-entry ban in 2014, but the Danish authorities were unable to implement the expulsion order as it had not been possible to deport him to Lebanon. In 2018, the Aliens Board ordered him to reside at the return centre (Kærshovedgård) during the night and to report to the police at the centre three times per week. Following further criminal convictions and expulsion orders, the applicant was convicted in April 2025 for failing to comply with the residence and reporting obligations between 2020 and 2024 and was sentenced to three years and nine months’ imprisonment. The conviction was upheld by the High Court, and permission to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused in January 2026.

The Court asked the parties whether the applicant had exhausted domestic remedies in respect of his complaint and if the High Court’s judgment was in breach of Articles 3, 5 and 8 ECHR.
 

On 24 June 2026, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) communicated the application of G.B. v. the Netherlands (Application no. 7740/26). The case concerns the alleged risk of ill-treatment of the applicant if returned to her country of origin, and the Dutch authorities’ alleged failure to properly assess her asylum application.

The applicant, a national of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), applied for international protection in the Netherlands, alleging that she had been subjected to repeated sexual violence in the DRC and during her journey to the Netherlands. Her asylum application was rejected after the domestic authorities considered her account to be inconsistent, incoherent and vague. The applicant argued that these inconsistencies resulted from trauma caused by rape and abuse and submitted medical records documenting psychological and physical symptoms consistent with her allegations. Although she requested a forensic medical examination in accordance with the Istanbul Protocol, the domestic authorities considered such an examination unnecessary.

The Court asked the parties, inter alia, whether the Dutch authorities complied with their procedural obligations under Article 3 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) when assessing the applicant’s asylum claim, and whether they adequately took into account the possible impact of trauma on her ability to provide credible, consistent and detailed statements.

On 4 June 2026, Advocate General Jean Richard de la Tour delivered his opinion in Case C-182/26 PPU (Hardeker), concerning the interpretation of Directive 2008/115/EC (the ‘Return Directive’), including whether a return decision may designate more than one country of destination.

The Advocate General considered that Article 6(1) of the Return Directive requires a return decision to indicate a country of destination but does not exclude the possibility of designating several destinations. This follows from Article 3(3) of the Directive, which defines “return” broadly without establishing any hierarchy between categories of destination, meaning that more than one third country may simultaneously satisfy the conditions for removal. He added that such an approach does not, in itself, weaken fundamental rights protection, since each designation can be challenged and the principle of non-refoulement under Article 5 of the Return Directive, read with Article 19(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be assessed in relation to all listed countries. However, he emphasized that each designated country must be individually justified by concrete factual elements meeting the requirements of Article 3(3) of the Return Directive and remain subject to judicial review.

The Advocate General further held that a court reviewing detention cannot, of its own motion, examine whether the return decision complied with the principle of non-refoulement, nor can it treat any alleged defect in that regard as affecting the validity of the return decision serving as the legal basis for detention. He clarified that the Return Directive distinguishes return decisions (Articles 6, 12 and 13) from detention (Article 15), and that judicial review in detention proceedings is limited to verifying the existence of the “constituent elements” of a return decision, such as the identity of the person concerned, the obligation to return and the designation of a country of destination. Compliance with non-refoulement under Article 5 of the Directive and Articles 4 and 19(2) of the Charter forms part of the substantive assessment of the return decision and does not constitute one of its constituent elements for the purposes of detention control. Hence, during the detention review courts may not review the legality of the return decision itself, but they must still ensure that removal is not carried out in breach of non-refoulement.

The obligation to assess compliance with the principle of non-refoulement under Article 5 of Directive 2008/115, read in light of Article 19(2) of the Charter, must be carried out independently by both the administrative authority and the court reviewing detention on the basis of all available information. Where several countries of destination are designated, the assessment must be carried out separately for each of them. Detention is precluded where removal to all designated countries would expose the person to a real risk of prohibited treatment, but it may be maintained where at least one designated country allows removal in compliance with non-refoulement. The court reviewing detention cannot modify or annul the return decision, as its role is limited to verifying whether detention remains legally justified in light of the possibility of lawful removal.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 8 April 2026, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) communicated the application of K.P. v. Cyprus (Application no. 30430/25). The case concerns the alleged unlawfulness of the applicant’s detention pending deportation and the risk of ill-treatment if returned to Iran.

The applicant, an Iranian national recognised as refugee in Cyprus, was arrested in November 2023 on suspicion of involvement in terrorist activities. He was subsequently classified as a ‘’prohibited migrant’’ and placed in detention pending his deportation to Iran. The applicant challenged the detention and deportation decisions before the Administrative Court, which held that it lacked jurisdiction to examine the deportation decision and dismissed the recourse, finding the detention lawful, necessary and proportionate. The applicant subsequently lodged three habeas corpus applications before the Supreme Court, all of which were unsuccessful. The applicant complains under Article 3 of the risk of ill-treatment upon return to Iran as well as the conditions of his detention, under Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3 of the lack of an effective remedy to challenge his expulsion, and under Articles 5 §§ 1 and 4 ECHR regarding the lawfulness of his detention and access to legal aid.

On 26 March 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in the Case C-202/25 (Tadmur), following a request for a preliminary ruling from the District Court of The Hague, sitting in Roermond (Den Haag, zittingsplaats Roermond). The case concerned the interpretation of the Directive 2008/115/EC (the “Return Directive’’) in conjunction with the Directive 2011/95/EU (the “Qualification Directive’’), on whether a Member State is required to adopt a return decision in respect of a third-country national whose subsidiary protection status has been revoked and where removal is precluded by virtue of the principle of non-refoulement.

The Court held that Article 6(1) of Directive 2008/115 requires Member States, in principle, to issue a return decision once the unlawful stay of a third-country national has been established. However, that obligation must comply with Article 5 of the Return Directive, which requires respect for the principle of non-refoulement, as guaranteed by Article19(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In that regard, the Court clarified that Article 5 precludes not only the removal of a third-country national, but also the adoption of a return decision where such decision is contrary to the principle of non-refoulement. That obligation applies at the stage of adopting the return decision and cannot be remedied by merely postponing removal pursuant to Article 9(1)(a) of the Return Directive.

The Court further held that a return decision necessarily entails the designation of a country of destination, within the meaning of Article 3 of Directive 2008/115, and that it is therefore legally impossible to adopt such a decision where no destination can be identified in compliance with Article 5 thereof. Consequently, Member States may not circumvent those requirements by adopting under national law a decision obliging the person concerned to leave the territory without designating a country of destination or permitting removal, since such a measure constitutes an ‘obligation to return’ within the meaning of that directive.

The Court also noted that, while the revocation of subsidiary protection under Article 19(3)(a) of Directive 2011/95/EU, read in conjunction with Article 17(1) thereof, results in the loss of the rights attached to international protection, it does not in itself justify removal in breach of the principle of non-refoulement. However, a return decision may be adopted where a lawful alternative country of destination, within the meaning of Article 3(3) of Directive 2008/115, is identified, including a country of transit or another third country to which the person may voluntarily return, provided that such return complies with Article 5 of Return Directive and with the EU Charter.

On 28 November 2025, the High Court of Justice of Andalusia, Ceuta and Melilla – Málaga Administrative Chamber (Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Andalucía, Ceuta y Melilla - Sala de lo Contencioso Administrativo de Málaga) issued the judgment No. 2434/2025, annulling the return of applicants who had attempted to access the Spanish territory via the Chafarinas Islands.

The applicants, Syrian nationals, arrived at Isla del Congreso on 3 January 2022 and expressed their intention to apply for international protection. The authorities nevertheless proceeded with their immediate return to the Moroccan authorities without initiating an individual administrative procedure or allowing them to apply for asylum. The lower court upheld the authorities’ actions, considering that the applicants’ conduct constituted an abuse of law and justified their immediate return.

The High Court found that the special border regime established in the tenth additional provision of the Spanish Immigration Law (LOEX 4/2000) allowing summary expulsions at the borders of Ceuta and Melilla, does not apply to the Chafarinas Islands and cannot be extended by analogy. The Court further held that the applicants’ conduct did not constitute an abuse of law and emphasised that access to the asylum procedure must be guaranteed in accordance with Directive 2013/32/EU on asylum procedures, Article 18 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the principle of non-refoulement under Article 3 ECHR, and Article 33 of the Refugee Convention. It therefore concluded that the repatriation measures had been adopted in breach of the applicable procedural guarantees and it annulled the contested decision.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 5 March 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in the case C-150/34 (Aroja). The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Supreme Court of Finland (Korkein oikeus) regarding the calculation of detention periods for the purpose of removal of illegally staying third-country nationals under the Directive 2008/115/EC (the Return Directive).

The Court clarified that Article 15(5) and (6) of the Return Directive must be interpreted as meaning that to determine whether the maximum detention period of an illegally staying third-country national has been reached, all periods of detention completed in the same Member State under Article 15 for the purpose of enforcing the same return decision must be taken to account. To reach this conclusion, the Court noted the serious interference with the right to liberty protected by Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the fact that detention under the Return Directive does not have punitive aims but seeks to secure the Directive's return-related objectives within strictly defined time limits. This requirement applies even where the detention periods are separated by intervals during which the person concerned was not detained, otherwise the authorities could circumvent those limits by releasing and subsequently re-detaining the individual based on the same return decision, likely resulting in a breach of the principle of proportionality.

The Court also recalled its previous case law and held that, under the second sentence of Article 15(3) of the Return Directive, any prolonged detention exceeding the initial maximum period of detention must, in all cases, be subject to review by a judicial authority, regardless of whether the detained person has requested it.  The Court further clarified that, in the absence of EU rules on the procedure of detention reviews in the event of prolonged detention periods, the review of an administrative decision extending detention beyond the initial maximum six-month period does not have to take place before that period is reached. However, it must be carried out as speedily as possible after the adoption of that decision.

Finally, the Court held that, in the event of a late judicial review of a decision extending detention beyond the initial six-month period, EU law does not automatically require, on that ground alone, the release of the detained person. Where the substantive conditions for detention remain satisfied and the maximum period of detention under Article 15(6) of the directive has not been reached, detention may continue.

On 16 February 2026, the Second Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) published the communicated cases of M.R. v. Türkiye (Application no. 12965/21), and M.S. v. Türkiye (Application no. 20148/25), concerning the removal of Syrian nationals from Türkiye.

The case of M.R. v. Türkiye concerns a Syrian national who arrived in Türkiye in 2011 and was granted temporary protection. In August 2019, he was apprehended and placed in police custody and later in immigration detention. On 24 August 2019, he was returned to Syria under the voluntary repatriation scheme. The applicant alleges that his removal was a de facto deportation disguised as voluntary return and that it exposed him to a real risk of ill-treatment. He further complains of unlawful deprivation of liberty, lack of procedural safeguards, the absence of an effective remedy to challenge his detention and removal, and impact on his private and family life, invoking articles 2,3,5,8,13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No.7 thereof. 

The Court asked the parties to clarify the applicant’s alleged minor status, the voluntariness of his return and the prior assessment of the risk under Articles 2 and 3 ECHR, as well as the lawfulness of his detention and the availability of effective remedies.

The case of M.S. v. Türkiye concerns three Syrian nationals who fled to Türkiye in 2013–2014 and were granted temporary protection. The applicants were issued deportation orders to designated safe third countries or to return voluntarily to Syria. Two of the applicants were subject to security restrictions, and one was alleged to have links with terrorist organisations. Following these orders, all applicants were placed in administrative detention. The applicants challenge the deportation orders, arguing that the domestic authorities failed to conduct an adequate “safe third country” assessment, particularly regarding the risk of chain refoulement to Syria, and claim that removal would disproportionately interfere with their established family and private life in Türkiye. The first applicant also raises concerns about the lack of effective remedies to challenge the lack of assessment of his alleged risk of ill-treatment and the interference with his family life.

The Court asked the parties to clarify, inter alia, whether the planned expulsions would expose the applicants to a real risk of treatment contrary to Articles 2 and 3 ECHR.

On 22 January 2026, the Advocate General Spielmann issues his opinion in the case C-877/24 (Shamsi). The case related to the preliminary reference by the  Council of State of the Netherlands regarding the scope of Directive 2008/115/EC (Returns Directive (RD) concerning third-country nationals who have been sentenced to life or long-term sentences in prison, for crimes which are not related to the illegal nature of their stay. The questions enquired under what conditions, a Member State remains obliged to adopt a return decision against them when, owing to the execution of those sentences, neither voluntary departure nor forced removal will be possible in the near future.

The Advocate General Spielmann examined whether Member States may issue return decisions under the Returns Directive to third-country nationals who are serving long prison sentences and cannot be removed in the foreseeable future. The Opinion concludes that the Returns Directive does not preclude the adoption of a return decision against an illegally staying third-country national whose removal will take place only after the completion of the imprisonment. However, in such cases, national authorities must periodically assess whether removal remains feasible. By contrast, when illegally staying third-country nationals are serving a life sentence and removal is permanently impossible in practice, the adoption of a return decision is incompatible with the Directive. Finally, the Advocate General found that Directive 2008/115 does not require Member States to grant a temporary residence permit to illegally staying third-country nationals during the execution of a prison sentence.