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On 23 April 2026, the Advocate General Emiliou delivered his opinion in Case C‑414/25 (Sedrata) following a request for a preliminary ruling by the Supreme Court of Cassation, Italy (Corte suprema di cassazione). The case concerned the compatibility of the Italian legislation implementing the Italy-Albania bilateral agreement, which allows the transfer of third-country nationals to facilities located in Albanian territory for the purposes of border and return procedures, with EU law, in particular with the provisions of Directive 2008/115/EC (the Return Directive) and of Directive 2013/32/EU (the recast Asylum Procedures Directive).

The Advocate General considered that the Return Directive does not, in principle, preclude national legislation permitting the transfer of third-country nationals to detention facilities located in a third State, provided that those facilities remain under the jurisdiction of the Member State concerned and that EU law continues to apply in full. However, he stressed that such arrangements are compatible with the Return Directive only insofar as they do not undermine its effectiveness or the rights it guarantees. In particular, the competent authorities must ensure access to legal assistance and communication with legal representatives and family members, guarantee that detention is ended without undue delay where the legal conditions are no longer met and comply with the specific safeguards applicable to children and other vulnerable persons. He further noted that the geographical location of detention facilities may require appropriate organisational and logistical measures to ensure that these guarantees are effectively secured in practice.

Furthermore, the Advocate General considered that Article 9 (1) of the rAPD does not, in principle, preclude national legislation allowing the detention of a third-country national subject to return procedures in facilities located in a third State, where that person lodges an application for international protection while being held there. He explained that EU law does not require Member States to organise border or return procedures exclusively within their territory. For that reason, the requirement that applicants must be allowed to “remain in the Member State” must be understood in a way that it covers situations falling under the jurisdiction of the Member State, even if they take place outside its physical territory. However, he stressed that this approach is only acceptable if the national legislation ensures full respect for the procedural guarantees laid down in the Directive, especially that applicants must have access to information and legal assistance, be able to participate effectively in the procedure and, where necessary, appear before the competent authorities, while also benefiting from the specific safeguards applicable to vulnerable persons. He also stressed that detention-related guarantees, including judicial review, must be fully respected.

Finally, the Advocate General emphasised that Member States cannot circumvent their obligations under EU law by transferring individuals to facilities outside their territory, and that they remain fully responsible for ensuring compliance with EU rules and fundamental rights, including those guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

On 9 April 2026, the First Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in H.D. v. Italy (Application no. 41645/23). The case concerned the placement and prolonged stay of an unaccompanied child in an adult reception centre in Italy, as well as the lawfulness of his deprivation of liberty and the adequacy of available remedies.

The applicant, a Burkinabe national, was placed in the adult reception and asylum centre in Isola di Capo Rizzuto (Crotone). Despite being soon recognised as a minor and granted a residence permit, he remained in the centre for more than five months without being allowed to leave. During that time, he challenged his situation before the domestic courts and subsequently requested an interim measure under Rule 39, which led to his transfer to a facility for unaccompanied children.

The Court found that the applicant’s deprivation of liberty lacked any legal basis and could not be justified under Article 5 § 1 (f) ECHR. It examined both limbs of that provision and noted that no removal or refusal of entry procedure had been initiated. On the contrary, the applicant had been formally recognised as a child and granted a residence permit to stay in Italy. The Court therefore concluded that his detention could not be justified under Article 5 § 1 (f). It also rejected the Government’s reliance on subsequent legislative amendments allowing the temporary accommodation of minors in adult centres, noting that these provisions entered into force after the applicant’s placement and did not provide a legal basis for deprivation of liberty. Furthermore, the Court held that the authorities failed to inform the applicant of the reasons for his detention, in breach of Article 5 § 2. Regarding Article 5 § 4, the Court recalled the requirement of a speedy judicial review and found that the domestic proceedings lasted several months and only concluded after the applicant’s transfer following an interim measure, therefore finding a violation of Article 5 § 4.

In relation to the complaint under Article 3, the Court reiterated the principles applicable to the treatment of persons held in immigration detention and emphasized the particular vulnerability of children. It found that the applicant had been held for over five months in an adult reception centre characterised by overcrowding, poor material and hygienic conditions, and a lack of appropriate services. Although children were nominally placed in a separate area, the evidence showed that separation from adults was ineffective in practice and that they lived in close contact. Moreover, no specific educational, recreational or psychosocial support adapted to minors was provided, and the applicant was not allowed to leave the centre. The Court concluded that the applicant had been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment in violation of Article 3 ECHR.

The Court also found that Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 3 had been violated. The applicant’s complaint concerned not only the material conditions of detention but also his placement in an adult facility, which required an effective remedy capable of securing his prompt transfer to a suitable centre for children. Although a domestic remedy was available, the Court considered that the delays in the proceedings rendered it ineffective in practice.

On 16 April 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in joined Cases C‑50/24 to C‑56/24 (Danané and Others), originating from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Belgian Council for asylum and immigration proceedings (Conseil du contentieux des étrangers). The cases concerned the interpretation of Directive 2013/32/EU (Asylum Procedures Directive) and Directive 2013/33/EU (Reception Conditions Directive), in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in the context of asylum applications lodged at Brussels airport by third-country nationals who were detained in facilities situated within Belgian territory but legally treated as border facilities.

The Court clarified that Article 43 of Directive 2013/32 does not require border procedures to be carried out at geographically defined border locations. A procedure may fall within the scope of that provision even where the applicant is detained in a facility located within the territory of the Member State, as long as those facilities are legally treated as border or transit zones. The Court emphasised that neither the wording nor the objectives of the provision impose a geographical requirement and that a restrictive interpretation could render border procedures ineffective and undermine fundamental rights.

The CJEU further held that, once the four-week period laid down in Article 43(2) of Directive 2013/32 has expired, the examination of the application can no longer be carried out under the border procedure and must continue under the ordinary procedural framework of the Directive. However, EU law does not preclude the same detention facility from being reclassified from a “place at the border” to a “place in the territory”. In such circumstances, the Member State must ensure that applicants are informed of the change in their legal situation, including their authorisation to enter the territory.

The Court confirmed that applicants may remain detained after the expiry of the four-week period on a different legal basis, in particular under Article 8(3)(b) of Directive 2013/33. It held that the continuation of detention is permissible where necessary to determine elements of the application, insofar as it complies with the requirements of necessity, proportionality and individual assessment. It stressed that detention must remain exceptional and cannot be applied automatically or systematically.

It also ruled that, after the expiry of the four-week period, the determining authority may continue examining the application as a matter of priority under Article 31(7) of Directive 2013/32. It clarified that investigative steps carried out during the border procedure may be relied upon in subsequent procedures, provided that they comply with the basic principles and guarantees laid down in EU law.

Finally, it held that the expiry of the four-week period and the continued detention of the applicant do not affect the competence of the determining authority. The expiry of that period merely entails a shift from the border procedure to another procedural framework and the cessation of the specific temporal and material limitations applicable to border procedures.

On 9 April 2026, the First Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in M.V. and Others v. Belgium (Applications nos. 52836/22 and three others). The case concerned the failure of the Belgian authorities to provide accommodation and material support to applicants for international protection. 

The asylum applicants were left without access to accommodation or material support in Belgium for several months. During this period, they allegedly lived in extremely precarious conditions on the street in Brussels, including during winter, without shelter, sanitation, or means to meet their basic needs. This situation persisted despite the final decisions by the Brussels Employment Tribunal ordering the Belgian State to provide them with reception conditions, and despite interim measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court.

In relation to the complains under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Court observed that Belgium was responsible for providing reception conditions to the applicants, to which they were entitled under national legislation transposing European Union law for as long as they were authorised to remain on the territory. It held that this obligation was not diminished by any assistance potentially received from humanitarian organizations, and reiterated that constraints linked to a migration crisis cannot exempt Contracting States from their obligations under Article 3 ECHR. The Court found that the authorities’ failure to provide reception conditions resulted in the applicants’ prolonged homelessness and deprivation of basic necessities, which amounted to degrading treatment under Article 3 ECHR.

In regard to Article 6 § 1 ECHR, the Court noted that the domestic judgments in favour of the applicants were not enforced promptly, but only following the indication of interim measures by the ECtHR and with significant delays and incomplete execution. It held that structural pressure on the reception system could not justify such delays and found no indication that the applicants had contributed to them. The Court therefore concluded that the time taken to enforce the domestic judgments was not reasonable and that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

The Court also found that the Belgian authorities had failed to comply with the interim measures indicated under Rule 39. Neither the prompt action had been taken, nor the Government had demonstrated the existence of objective obstacles or that all reasonable steps had been taken to comply, thereby breaching its obligations under Article 34.

Finally, under Article 46 ECHR, the Court reiterated the existence of a systemic deficiencies in Belgium’s asylum reception system, previously identified in Camara v. Belgium. It emphasised that the persistent failure to provide accommodation and to comply with final domestic court decisions was incompatible with the rule of law and requires the adoption of general measures to ensure effective access to reception conditions for applicants for international protection.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team
 

On 19 March 2026, the Administrative Court of First Instance of Thessaloniki published a decision referring a preliminary question to the CJEU regarding the interpretation of Article 46 of Directive 2013/32 (the Asylum Procedures Directive – APD). The case concerned an application for annulment lodged by a Guinean national against a decision of the Appeals Committee which had rejected his asylum appeal as inadmissible due to late submission.

The applicant applied for international protection in 2018, but his application was rejected at first instance. He promptly requested free legal aid and a lawyer was appointed, however, his appeal was lodged after the statutory deadline, and the Appeals Committee dismissed the appeal as inadmissible. Before the Administrative Court, the applicant argued that the late submission was not attributable to him but to failures in the provision of legal aid and claimed he was deprived of an effective remedy, in breach of Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The Court reviewed the EU and national legal framework and noted that while national law provides strict deadlines for appeals, these must not render the exercise of the right to an effective remedy impossible or excessively difficult. It also acknowledged the established national case law that, in principle, applicants bear the consequences of their lawyer’s errors, unless force majeure is established. According to domestic case law, force majeure does not include negligence on behalf of an appointed lawyer that results in missed deadlines. However, the Court identified a legal uncertainty as to whether this approach is compatible with EU law in situations where the legal representative is appointed by the State and the applicant has acted diligently.

Considering the importance of the right to an effective remedy and the potential consequences for asylum seekers, including the risk of refoulement, the Court decided to refer the following preliminary question to the Court of Justice of the European Union:

“Is it compatible with Article 46 of Directive 2013/32/EU and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to reject, pursuant to Articles 92(1)(a) and 95(8) of Law 4636/2019, an administrative appeal against a first-instance decision rejecting an application for international protection, due to late submission? Such rejection occurs in a situation where the requirements laid down in Article 71 of Law 4636/2019 (Articles 19 to 23 of the Directive) and in the implementing Ministerial Decision No 3449/2021 have not been complied with, namely the obligation to inform the appellant of the lawyer appointed to their case, to ensure communication between the appellant and that lawyer, and where the latter has not handled the case with the required diligence under Article 5 of that Ministerial Decision.  More specifically, it concerns  a case where, although the appellant requested within the statutory time limit the appointment of a lawyer by the Asylum Service to assist them and demonstrated due diligence in pursuing their case and in taking the necessary steps for the proper lodging of the appeal, the lawyer appointed by the Service failed to communicate with the applicant and to lodge the appeal in due time, without any proven case of force majeure affecting the lawyer?”

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team
EWLU team would like to thank Equal Legal Aid for bringing this case to our attention

On 19 March 2026, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Dutch Council of State (Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State) delivered its judgments nos. 202600650/2/V6 and 202600651/2/V6 on applications for interim relief submitted by two students residing in Gaza. The cases concerned the requests for consular assistance from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to allow the students to leave Gaza and collect their provisional residence permits (mvv) at the Dutch embassy in Jordan in order to commence their studies in the Netherlands.

Both students had already been admitted to a Dutch university, and the Minister of Asylum and Migration had no objection to issuing them a residence permit. However, the students could not cross the border in Gaza and requested the Minister’s assistance. The Minister rejected their requests because they did not belong to a group normally eligible for such assistance and declared the applicants’ objections inadmissible, a decision upheld by the District Court of The Hague. The students appealed against this decision and sought interim relief from the Council of State.

The Council of State stressed that the judgments were limited to interim relief excluding the main legal questions. It confirmed that there is no legal right to consular assistance under Dutch law and that the Minister enjoys broad discretion in this domain. Nevertheless, the interim relief judge of the Council of State found that the applicants’ inability to leave Gaza and collect their mvvs is due to the harrowing situation in Gaza. The risk that, due to the duration of the proceedings, they might no longer be able to collect those permits, outweighed the Minister’s interests. The judge further observed that the measure sought involved only limited efforts through diplomatic channels, and not an obligation to ensure evacuation or issue residence documents. The Minister’s concerns regarding identity verification were insufficiently substantiated. In light of these very special circumstances, it ordered the Minister to make every effort to facilitate the applicants’ departure from Gaza, without prejudging the outcome of the main proceedings.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team
 

On 24 March 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in the Case C‑767/23 (Remling). The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State, Netherlands (Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State) regarding the interpretation of Article 267 TFEU in the light of Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, on whether a court of last instance may refuse to make a reference for a preliminary ruling by means of summary reasoning without specifying the applicable exceptions.

The Court reiterated that, where there is no judicial remedy under national law against the decisions of a court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal are in principle obliged, under the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, to refer questions concerning the interpretation or validity of EU law to the Court of Justice. That obligation may be relieved only in a situation corresponding to one of the Cilfit exceptions: (i) where the question of EU law is irrelevant to the resolution of the dispute, (ii) where the provision of EU law has already been interpreted by the Court, or (iii) where the correct interpretation of EU law is so obvious as to leave no scope for reasonable doubt.

Thus, the Court held that where a court of last instance considers that one of those exceptions applies, it must, in accordance with Article 267 TFEU read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, state the reasons for its decision by setting out specifically and concretely, why the relevant exception is applicable in the circumstances of the case. That obligation applies irrespective of whether the parties have expressly requested a preliminary ruling as long as a question of EU law is raised. National legislation permitting courts to decide by means of summary reasoning for the sound administration of justice does not relieve them of the obligation to provide specific and concrete reasons. A decision merely stating that the conditions for summary reasoning are satisfied is insufficient. However, a court of last instance may, where appropriate, rely on the reasoning of a lower court, provided that the latter has set out the grounds justifying the application of one of the Cilfit exceptions.

On 28 November 2025, the High Court of Justice of Andalusia, Ceuta and Melilla – Málaga Administrative Chamber (Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Andalucía, Ceuta y Melilla - Sala de lo Contencioso Administrativo de Málaga) issued the judgment No. 2434/2025, annulling the return of applicants who had attempted to access the Spanish territory via the Chafarinas Islands.

The applicants, Syrian nationals, arrived at Isla del Congreso on 3 January 2022 and expressed their intention to apply for international protection. The authorities nevertheless proceeded with their immediate return to the Moroccan authorities without initiating an individual administrative procedure or allowing them to apply for asylum. The lower court upheld the authorities’ actions, considering that the applicants’ conduct constituted an abuse of law and justified their immediate return.

The High Court found that the special border regime established in the tenth additional provision of the Spanish Immigration Law (LOEX 4/2000) allowing summary expulsions at the borders of Ceuta and Melilla, does not apply to the Chafarinas Islands and cannot be extended by analogy. The Court further held that the applicants’ conduct did not constitute an abuse of law and emphasised that access to the asylum procedure must be guaranteed in accordance with Directive 2013/32/EU on asylum procedures, Article 18 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the principle of non-refoulement under Article 3 ECHR, and Article 33 of the Refugee Convention. It therefore concluded that the repatriation measures had been adopted in breach of the applicable procedural guarantees and it annulled the contested decision.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 27 February 2026, the Court of First Instance of Antwerp, Family Court Section (Rechtbank van eerste aanleg Antwerpen, familierechtbank) annulled a decision of the civil registrar of the City of Antwerp revoking the Belgian nationality of a child born in Belgium of Palestinian parents recognised as refugees.

The child had initially been granted Belgian nationality pursuant to Article 10§1 of the Belgian Nationality Code to prevent statelessness. On 5 March 2024, the registrar of Antwerp revoked the child’s nationality on the grounds that the child could acquire Palestinian nationality through the parents or via the Palestinian mission. As a result, the child’s Belgian passport and Kids-ID were annulled. The parents contested the revocation, maintaining that as recognised refugees it was not feasible for them to secure Palestinian nationality for their child. The City of Antwerp and the Public Prosecutor’s Office argued that the claim should be dismissed, citing a potential “pull effect” and alleged abuse of the nationality rules.

The Court of First Instance annulled the revocation holding that under Article 10§3 of the Belgian Nationality Code (WBN) nationality may only be withdrawn if it is established beyond doubt that the child possesses another nationality. Hence, given the absence of formal Palestinian nationality legislation and the impossibility for refugees to register remotely, the child could not realistically acquire another nationality. The court further held that any alleged abuse of Belgian nationality rules by the parents could not justify the deprivation of the child’s nationality, highlighting that the best interests of the child (Article 22bis of the Constitution) must prevail.

According to the Court’s press release, five similar decisions from the city register were annulled by the Court on the same grounds.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 5 March 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in the case C-150/34 (Aroja). The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Supreme Court of Finland (Korkein oikeus) regarding the calculation of detention periods for the purpose of removal of illegally staying third-country nationals under the Directive 2008/115/EC (the Return Directive).

The Court clarified that Article 15(5) and (6) of the Return Directive must be interpreted as meaning that to determine whether the maximum detention period of an illegally staying third-country national has been reached, all periods of detention completed in the same Member State under Article 15 for the purpose of enforcing the same return decision must be taken to account. To reach this conclusion, the Court noted the serious interference with the right to liberty protected by Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the fact that detention under the Return Directive does not have punitive aims but seeks to secure the Directive's return-related objectives within strictly defined time limits. This requirement applies even where the detention periods are separated by intervals during which the person concerned was not detained, otherwise the authorities could circumvent those limits by releasing and subsequently re-detaining the individual based on the same return decision, likely resulting in a breach of the principle of proportionality.

The Court also recalled its previous case law and held that, under the second sentence of Article 15(3) of the Return Directive, any prolonged detention exceeding the initial maximum period of detention must, in all cases, be subject to review by a judicial authority, regardless of whether the detained person has requested it.  The Court further clarified that, in the absence of EU rules on the procedure of detention reviews in the event of prolonged detention periods, the review of an administrative decision extending detention beyond the initial maximum six-month period does not have to take place before that period is reached. However, it must be carried out as speedily as possible after the adoption of that decision.

Finally, the Court held that, in the event of a late judicial review of a decision extending detention beyond the initial six-month period, EU law does not automatically require, on that ground alone, the release of the detained person. Where the substantive conditions for detention remain satisfied and the maximum period of detention under Article 15(6) of the directive has not been reached, detention may continue.

On 10 February 2026, the Fifth Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) communicated the application of C.I. v. Cyprus (Application no. 12347/25). The case concerns the alleged unlawfulness of the applicant’s detention pending deportation and the risk of death or ill-treatment if returned to Burundi.

The applicant, a Burundian national, lodged an asylum application in Cyprus on the grounds that he would face serious threats to his life and a real risk of ill-treatment upon return to Burundi. His claim was rejected, and he was detained as a “prohibited immigrant” on 22 February 2025. His deportation was suspended following interim measures by the Court, and he remained in detention until 15 December 2025, when he was released after successful habeas corpus proceedings. He complains under Articles 2 and 3 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) concerning the risk of ill-treatment upon return, under Article 13 in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3 for the lack of an effective domestic remedy, and under Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 ECHR regarding the lawfulness of his detention and access to legal aid.

The Court asked the parties to clarify, inter alia, whether the applicant had exhausted all effective domestic remedies, whether he faced a real risk of ill-treatment upon return to Burundi, and whether he had access to effective remedies to challenge his deportation and detention.

On 16 February 2026, the Second Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) published the communicated cases of M.R. v. Türkiye (Application no. 12965/21), and M.S. v. Türkiye (Application no. 20148/25), concerning the removal of Syrian nationals from Türkiye.

The case of M.R. v. Türkiye concerns a Syrian national who arrived in Türkiye in 2011 and was granted temporary protection. In August 2019, he was apprehended and placed in police custody and later in immigration detention. On 24 August 2019, he was returned to Syria under the voluntary repatriation scheme. The applicant alleges that his removal was a de facto deportation disguised as voluntary return and that it exposed him to a real risk of ill-treatment. He further complains of unlawful deprivation of liberty, lack of procedural safeguards, the absence of an effective remedy to challenge his detention and removal, and impact on his private and family life, invoking articles 2,3,5,8,13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No.7 thereof. 

The Court asked the parties to clarify the applicant’s alleged minor status, the voluntariness of his return and the prior assessment of the risk under Articles 2 and 3 ECHR, as well as the lawfulness of his detention and the availability of effective remedies.

The case of M.S. v. Türkiye concerns three Syrian nationals who fled to Türkiye in 2013–2014 and were granted temporary protection. The applicants were issued deportation orders to designated safe third countries or to return voluntarily to Syria. Two of the applicants were subject to security restrictions, and one was alleged to have links with terrorist organisations. Following these orders, all applicants were placed in administrative detention. The applicants challenge the deportation orders, arguing that the domestic authorities failed to conduct an adequate “safe third country” assessment, particularly regarding the risk of chain refoulement to Syria, and claim that removal would disproportionately interfere with their established family and private life in Türkiye. The first applicant also raises concerns about the lack of effective remedies to challenge the lack of assessment of his alleged risk of ill-treatment and the interference with his family life.

The Court asked the parties to clarify, inter alia, whether the planned expulsions would expose the applicants to a real risk of treatment contrary to Articles 2 and 3 ECHR.

On 30 January 2026, the Second Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) communicatedthe application of D.J. v Türkiye (Application no. 37547/22). The case concerns the alleged unlawfulness of the applicant’s deprivation of liberty and his removal to Uzbekistan.

The applicant, an Uzbek national of Turkmen ethnic origin who identifies as an activist for the independence of Karakalpakstan, was arrested during a demonstration in Istanbul in 2020. Removal orders were issued after that but later annulled due to the lack of a proper risk assessment. He subsequently lodged an application for international protection and, in December 2021, informed the authorities that he had been subjected to harassment, surveillance and death threats, prompting a criminal investigation. In January 2022, he was allegedly apprehended by undercover police officers, held without access to his lawyer or relatives and without being informed of the reasons for his apprehension, before being placed in immigration detention and deported to Uzbekistan on the same day. The Constitutional Court later declared his complaints inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies.

The applicant submitted complaints under  Articles 2, 3, 5 and 13 of the Convention, as well as Article 1 of Protocol No. 7. The Court asked the parties to clarify whether the domestic authorities conducted an adequate assessment of the alleged risk of death or ill-treatment prior to the applicant’s removal, whether he had access to an effective remedy capable of preventing his deportation, and whether his apprehension and deprivation of liberty complied with the requirements of Article 5 of the Convention.

On 22 January 2026, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) communicated the application of D.A. v. Türkiye (Application no. 5393/25). The case concerns the alleged failure of the domestic authorities to duly assess the risk of death or ill-treatment in the event of the removal of a Turkmenistan national, who claimed that she had been persecuted in Turkmenistan on account of her political opinions and professional activities as a journalist.

The applicant challenged the removal order issued by the Trabzon Provincial Directorate of Migration Management in May 2023, but the removal was subsequently upheld by the Trabzon Administrative Court in September 2023. The Constitutional Court later examined her complaints under the prohibition of ill-treatment and declared them inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. The applicant invokes Articles 2, 3, and 13 of ECHR.

The Court asked the parties to clarify, inter alia, whether the applicant faces a real risk of treatment contrary to Articles 2 and 3 ECHR if removed to Turkmenistan.

On 3 February 2026, the Third Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) published its judgment on the case of O.H. and Others v. Serbia (Application no. 57185/17). The case concerned the removal of Afghan applicants to Bulgaria after they had expressed their intention to seek asylum in Serbia.

On the 3 February 2017, the applicants were arrested and detained at the Gradina Border Police Station on the grounds of illegal border crossing. However, the Pirot Misdemeanour Court discontinued the proceedings recognising the intention of the applicants to seek asylum and issued asylum-intention certificates to them, serving as temporary residence permits. Despite this, the police transported the applicants to the Bulgarian border, confiscated their documents, and forced them to collectively cross the border at night.

In relation to the complaints under Article 4 Protocol 4, the Court recalled the two-tier test established in N.D. and N.T. v. Spain for assessing collective expulsions following unauthorised border crossings. It emphasised, however, that the present case differed. The applicants’ arbitrary removal by the police was entirely unrelated to their initial unauthorised entry into Serbian territory. Moreover, the Constitutional Court already found that the domestic authorities had expelled the applicants without a prior examination of their removal on an individual basis, which had violated the prohibition of collective expulsion in respect of the applicants. The Court therefore agreed with this assessment and found a violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4.

Regarding the removal of the applicants from Serbia under Article 3, the Court recalled the principle of non-refoulement inherent in Article 3 ECHR and reiterated that, where an asylum seeker is removed to a third country without an examination of the asylum claim on the merits, the authorities must assess whether the person will have access to an adequate asylum procedure there. As the Serbian authorities expelled the applicants without such assessment, the Court found a violation of the procedural limb of Article 3. It further noted that the manner of their removal, including being taken to the border during freezing conditions, amounted to a violation of the substantive limb of Article 3. By contrast, it found that, although the applicants had been held in inadequate detention conditions, the short duration of their detention did not reach the threshold of severity required under Article 3 and found this complaint manifestly ill-founded.

Concerning the lawfulness of the their detention under Article 5(1) ECHR, the Court noted that the applicants’ initial detention during the misdemeanour proceedings was lawful. However, their continued detention from the end of those proceedings until their expulsion from Serbia had no legal basis, as the applicants should have been taken to an asylum reception facility, but were instead driven to the border and expelled in an arbitrary manner. Hence, the Court found a violation of Article 5(1) of the Convention. Finally, the Court found a violation of Article 5(4) of the Convention, since the police failed to provide them with legal assistance effectively, hence, deprived them of the possibility to challenge the lawfulness of their detention.

The Court also decided not to examine the admissibility and merits of the complaints under Article 13, in conjunction with Articles 3 and Article 4 Protocol 4 of the Convention.

On 22 January 2026, the Advocate General Spielmann issues his opinion in the case C-877/24 (Shamsi). The case related to the preliminary reference by the  Council of State of the Netherlands regarding the scope of Directive 2008/115/EC (Returns Directive (RD) concerning third-country nationals who have been sentenced to life or long-term sentences in prison, for crimes which are not related to the illegal nature of their stay. The questions enquired under what conditions, a Member State remains obliged to adopt a return decision against them when, owing to the execution of those sentences, neither voluntary departure nor forced removal will be possible in the near future.

The Advocate General Spielmann examined whether Member States may issue return decisions under the Returns Directive to third-country nationals who are serving long prison sentences and cannot be removed in the foreseeable future. The Opinion concludes that the Returns Directive does not preclude the adoption of a return decision against an illegally staying third-country national whose removal will take place only after the completion of the imprisonment. However, in such cases, national authorities must periodically assess whether removal remains feasible. By contrast, when illegally staying third-country nationals are serving a life sentence and removal is permanently impossible in practice, the adoption of a return decision is incompatible with the Directive. Finally, the Advocate General found that Directive 2008/115 does not require Member States to grant a temporary residence permit to illegally staying third-country nationals during the execution of a prison sentence.

On the 1st of December 2025, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) communicated the application of O.M. v. Greece (Application no. 14354/21), concerning the lawfulness of the detention of an Afghan national who arrived on Lesvos on 30 August 2019 and was detained with a view to his readmission to Türkiye .

The applicant alleged that he was subjected to unlawful and arbitrary detention under the Greek authorities, that he was not promptly informed of the reasons for his detention in a language he could understand, and that the judicial revision of his detention was ineffective. The applicant also raised concerns under Article 8 regarding the prolonged uncertainty and vulnerability caused by the delays in processing his international protection request, which he argued had significant negative consequences on his mental health and well-being.

The Court asked the parties to clarify whether the applicant’s detention complied with the requirements of the Convention and domestic law, including the availability of effective judicial review (Arts. 5(1) and 5(4)). It also raised questions as to whether the length of detention and delays in examining the asylum claim affected the applicant’s private life (Art. 8), and whether an effective remedy was available to challenge the situation (Art. 13). The parties were further invited to provide information on the handling of the asylum procedure during and after the period of detention.