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On 7 September 2026, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) communicated the case M.A. v. Poland (Application no. 7829/23), concerning the expulsion of a lawfully resident on national security grounds and the procedural safeguards available to him.

The applicant, a stateless of Palestinian origin, had legally resided in Poland since 2016 with his Polish wife and their child, who has disabilities. In 2020, his details were entered in the Register of Undesirable Foreigners without his knowledge and he was denied access to the information underlying that decision. In separate proceedings, he was ordered in 2021 to return to the Palestinian Authority and prohibited from entering Poland and other Schengen States for five years. He challenged both decisions unsuccessfully and left for Belgium in 2023, where he obtained international protection in 2026.

The applicant complains that he could not effectively challenge the undisclosed national security grounds for his inclusion in the Register, that his family life was affected and that the risks associated with his return were inadequately assessed. He also alleges a lack of effective remedies. The Court asked the parties, inter alia, whether the Register proceedings complied with Article 1 § 1 of Protocol No. 7 and whether the authorities had adequately and rigorously assessed the risk of ill-treatment upon return under Article 3 ECHR.
 

On 24 June 2026, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) communicated the application of G.B. v. the Netherlands (Application no. 7740/26). The case concerns the alleged risk of ill-treatment of the applicant if returned to her country of origin, and the Dutch authorities’ alleged failure to properly assess her asylum application.

The applicant, a national of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), applied for international protection in the Netherlands, alleging that she had been subjected to repeated sexual violence in the DRC and during her journey to the Netherlands. Her asylum application was rejected after the domestic authorities considered her account to be inconsistent, incoherent and vague. The applicant argued that these inconsistencies resulted from trauma caused by rape and abuse and submitted medical records documenting psychological and physical symptoms consistent with her allegations. Although she requested a forensic medical examination in accordance with the Istanbul Protocol, the domestic authorities considered such an examination unnecessary.

The Court asked the parties, inter alia, whether the Dutch authorities complied with their procedural obligations under Article 3 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) when assessing the applicant’s asylum claim, and whether they adequately took into account the possible impact of trauma on her ability to provide credible, consistent and detailed statements.

On 14 April 2026, the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) promulgated its country guidance judgment in AH, AK & AJ (Identity documentation; returns to the KRI)Iraq CG UKUT 00150 (IAC), replacing all previous Iraq country guidance, including SMO & KSP. The decision provides updated binding guidance on returns via the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), identity documentation, internal travel and Article 3 ECHR risk.

The case concerned three Iraqi nationals of Kurdish ethnicity from the Disputed Territories, who were challenging their removal from the UK to Iraq on the basis that they lacked the identity documents needed to return and travel safely and therefore would face a real risk of ill-treatment upon return.

The Tribunal held that despite there continues to be an internal armed conflict in parts of Iraq, the level of indiscriminate violence does not reach the threshold to constitute serious harm under Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive, and that the general living conditions in Iraq do not in itself reach the threshold of Article 3 ECHR.

Regarding the Iraqi identity documentation system, the Tribunal held that the Civil Status Identity Document (CSID) is no longer issued and has been replaced by the biometric Iraqi National Identity Document (INID), and that, in principle, an INID is necessary in order to live and travel within Iraq without encountering treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR.

In relation to return, the Tribunal confirmed that Iraqi nationals may in principle be returned to Erbil or Sulaymaniyah, including former residents of the Disputed Territories, and that individuals lacking CSID or INID documentation may receive a temporary airport letter to facilitate onward travel for re-documentation. It held that the real risk under Article 3 ECHR arises primarily during internal travel within Iraq, particularly at checkpoints, and depends on the route taken, available documentation, and access to family or local support. The absence of recognised identity documents may, in certain circumstances, create a real risk of ill-treatment. It further held that the feasibility of internal relocation must be assessed on an individual basis, and while relocation within the Kurdistan Region of Iraq may be viable for returnees with adequate documentation and family support, it may be unduly harsh where such factors are lacking.  

The Tribunal ultimately dismissed the appeals, finding that the appellants could in principle obtain identity documentation through family assistance or Embassy procedures, and that return and internal movement would not necessarily give rise to a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR.

On 26 May 2026, the Third Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in J.B. v. Greece (Application no. 54796/16). The case concerns the potential return of the applicant from Greece to Türkiye under the EU-Türkiye Statement of 18 March 2016.

The applicant left Syria in April 2015 due to the armed conflict and alleged risks of persecution on account of his ethnic and religious background. He travelled to Türkiye, where he remained for approximately one year under temporary protection. In May 2016 he arrived in Greece, where he was arrested on grounds of unlawful entry. He applied for international protection claiming that he faced a risk of ill-treatment in Türkiye due to his Armenian origin and his Christian faith. His application for international protection was declared inadmissible on the basis that Türkiye constituted a “first country of asylum” or a “safe third country”, a decision upheld on appeal by the domestic authorities. The applicant complained before the ECtHR about deficiencies on the examination of his asylum application by the Greek authorities, as well as the risk he entailed if returned to Türkiye, including the chain refoulement to Syria, and about the conditions of his detention in Greece.

In regard to the complaint under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights concerning the risk of ill-treatment upon removal, the Court found that since the applicant had in the meantime obtained refugee status in France, the risk of ill-treatment if returned to Türkiye and subsequently to Syria has ceased to exist. Therefore, it considered unjustified to continue the examination of that complaint.

In relation to Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3, the Court found that the applicant’s asylum claim had been examined through a multi-layered procedure before the asylum authorities and domestic courts, during which he was interviewed with interpretation, able to present his individual circumstances and challenge the application of the ‘’safe third country’’ concept. It also held that the authorities assessed both his personal situation and relevant country information concerning Türkiye through reports, statistics and objective material, including the alleged risk of onward refoulement to Syria and the assurances provided within the framework of the EU-Türkiye Statement. Therefore, the Court concluded that the Greek authorities could reasonably rely on those assurances and supporting material and that the applicant had been afforded effective safeguards against arbitrary removal contrary to Article 3, finding no violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3.

Finally, regarding to the complaint under Article 3 ECHR concerning the conditions of detention pending removal, the Court reiterated that Greek police stations are facilities designed only for short periods of confinement and that detention therein for periods ranging from one to three months have consistently been found contrary to Article 3, particularly in view of deficiencies such as overcrowding, poor sanitary conditions and lack of outdoor exercise. Since the applicant had been detained in Mytilene police station for one month and nineteen days, the Court found that the conditions of his detention amounted to degrading treatment contrary to Article 3

On 9 February 2026, the Swiss Federal Administrative Court (FAC) delivered the judgment no. D-4601/2025 clarifying the scope of the principle of subsidiarity in the context of temporary protection for persons from Ukraine. The case concerned the refusal by the State Secretariat for Migration (SEM) to grant temporary protection in Switzerland to a Ukrainian national who had previously benefited from temporary protection in Italy.

The applicant had obtained temporary protection in Italy in March 2022, which remained valid until March 2023, and thereafter she returned to Ukraine. In April 2025, she entered Switzerland and applied for temporary protection. The SEM rejected her application and ordered her removal, considering that she could rely on protection previously granted in Italy. The applicant challenged this decision, arguing that her Italian protection status had expired and that Switzerland should have sought assurances of readmission from Italy before refusing protection. The Federal Administrative Court (FAC) dismissed the appeal and confirmed that, under the principle of subsidiarity, temporary protection in Switzerland may be refused where the applicant already has, or can reasonably obtain, a valid protection status in an EU/EFTA Member State. It clarified that no formal readmission agreement or prior assurance from the other State is required in such circumstances.

The Court found that Italy constituted a valid alternative protection country, as it had granted the applicant temporary protection equivalent to the Swiss “S” status and remains obliged under EU law to continue providing such protection to Ukrainian nationals. The expiry of the applicant’s previous Italian status, resulting from her voluntary departure, did not alter this assessment, as she could lawfully return and reobtain protection in Italy. Accordingly, the Court held that the existence of a valid alternative protection status excludes entitlement to Swiss temporary protection, without the need for prior confirmation of readmission, provided that the person concerned can lawfully return to the third State. The judgment was final and not subject to appeal before the Swiss Federal Supreme Court.
 

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

We would like to thank Helen Zemp for bringing this case to our attention

On 16 April 2026, the Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona delivered his opinion in Case C-249/25 (Jilin) following a request for a preliminary reference by the Council of State, Netherlands (Raad van State). The case concerned the interpretation of Article 17(2) of Directive 2001/55/EC (Temporary Protection Directive (TPD)) and Article 31 of Directive 2013/32/EU (recast Asylum Procedures Directive (rAPD)). The questions involved a situation where a third-country national benefiting from temporary protection had also applied for international protection and enquired whether Member States may suspend the examination of such an application for the duration of temporary protection.

The Advocate General considered that EU law does not permit Member States to suspend automatically and indefinitely the examination of applications for international protection solely on the ground that the applicant enjoys temporary protection. Referring to the Court of Justice’s judgment in Framholm, he emphasised that the system of temporary protection is not intended to replace the system of international protection, ensuring that beneficiaries of temporary protection still have a real opportunity to obtain refugee or subsidiary protection status. An automatic suspension of the asylum procedures for the entire duration of temporary protection would be, in practice, equivalent to a refusal to examine the application.

He further noted that the TPD contains no provision allowing for such a suspension and that the preparatory documents of that directive indicate that the possibility of suspending the examination of asylum applications had been deliberately excluded for reasons of compliance with the 1951 Geneva Convention. Although Member States may, in situations involving the simultaneous lodging of a large number of applications, adjust the pace of their examination in order to preserve the functioning of their asylum systems, such flexibility cannot justify a general, automatic and indefinite suspension. He emphasized that a suspension which is not subject to any time limit and is detached from any specific impact which it may have on the operation of the asylum system in each Member State is incompatible with the Temporary Protection Directive.

Finally, the Advocate General highlighted that the rAPD allows for limited extensions of the time limit for examining applications, including in situations involving a large number of applicants, but sets a maximum overall duration of 21 months. It does not allow Member States to suspend procedures indefinitely. In addition, he stressed that such a suspension would be incompatible with Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which guarantees the right to seek asylum. A prolonged delay of several years before the examination of an application would deprive its effectiveness and would not meet the requirements for lawful limitations under Article 52(1) of the Charter.
 

On 26 March 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in the Case C-202/25 (Tadmur), following a request for a preliminary ruling from the District Court of The Hague, sitting in Roermond (Den Haag, zittingsplaats Roermond). The case concerned the interpretation of the Directive 2008/115/EC (the “Return Directive’’) in conjunction with the Directive 2011/95/EU (the “Qualification Directive’’), on whether a Member State is required to adopt a return decision in respect of a third-country national whose subsidiary protection status has been revoked and where removal is precluded by virtue of the principle of non-refoulement.

The Court held that Article 6(1) of Directive 2008/115 requires Member States, in principle, to issue a return decision once the unlawful stay of a third-country national has been established. However, that obligation must comply with Article 5 of the Return Directive, which requires respect for the principle of non-refoulement, as guaranteed by Article19(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In that regard, the Court clarified that Article 5 precludes not only the removal of a third-country national, but also the adoption of a return decision where such decision is contrary to the principle of non-refoulement. That obligation applies at the stage of adopting the return decision and cannot be remedied by merely postponing removal pursuant to Article 9(1)(a) of the Return Directive.

The Court further held that a return decision necessarily entails the designation of a country of destination, within the meaning of Article 3 of Directive 2008/115, and that it is therefore legally impossible to adopt such a decision where no destination can be identified in compliance with Article 5 thereof. Consequently, Member States may not circumvent those requirements by adopting under national law a decision obliging the person concerned to leave the territory without designating a country of destination or permitting removal, since such a measure constitutes an ‘obligation to return’ within the meaning of that directive.

The Court also noted that, while the revocation of subsidiary protection under Article 19(3)(a) of Directive 2011/95/EU, read in conjunction with Article 17(1) thereof, results in the loss of the rights attached to international protection, it does not in itself justify removal in breach of the principle of non-refoulement. However, a return decision may be adopted where a lawful alternative country of destination, within the meaning of Article 3(3) of Directive 2008/115, is identified, including a country of transit or another third country to which the person may voluntarily return, provided that such return complies with Article 5 of Return Directive and with the EU Charter.

On 18 March 2026, the Migration Court of Appeal (Migrationsöverdomstolen) annulled the decisions of the Malmö Administrative Court and the Swedish Migration Agency which had rejected a refugee’s application for long-term resident status on the grounds that he had not proven his identity.

The applicant, already granted refugee status, a permanent residence permit, and a Swedish travel document, had applied for long-term resident status in June 2023. The Swedish Migration Agency and the Administrative Court in Malmö had both found that he had not submitted sufficient documentation to prove his identity. The applicant challenged this requirement, noting that, as a refugee, he could not return to his home country to obtain identity documents.

The Migration Court of Appeal held that Swedish law and the EU Long-Term Residents Directive 2003/109/EC do not impose a requirement of proven identity for refugees who already hold a permanent residence permit and a travel document. It clarified that Member States may grant long-term residence permits on more favourable terms than those provided for in the Directive. However, such permits do not confer a right of residence in other Member States. Therefore, the Court annulled the previous decisions and referred the case back to the Migration Agency for further consideration.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team. We would like to thank Michael Williams for bringing this case to our attention.

On 5 March 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in the Case C-458/24 (Daraa). The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Administrative Court of Sigmaringen, Germany (Verwaltungsgericht Sigmaringen) concerning the interpretation of the Dublin III Regulation and Directive 2013/32 in a situation where the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application unilaterally suspends transfers.

The Court held that the second and third subparagraphs of Article 3(2) of the Dublin Regulation should be interpreted as meaning that a unilateral suspension by the Member State responsible of take-charge or take-back procedures does not require the determining Member State to continue applying the Charter III criteria, nor to assume responsibility itself. Article 3(2) applies only where two cumulative conditions are met: (i) the existence of systemic flaws in the asylum procedure or reception conditions and (ii) a resulting risk of inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. A unilateral suspension does not, in itself, satisfy those conditions and cannot be treated as evidence of such flaws. Consequently, no additional or implicit condition relating to the willingness of the responsible Member State may be inferred from that provision.

As regards Article 29(1) and (2) of the Dublin Regulation, the Court held that the six-month time limit for carrying out a transfer continues to apply irrespective of the reasons preventing the transfer. Under Article 29(2), where the transfer is not carried out within that period, responsibility automatically passes to the requesting Member State. That transfer of responsibility is unconditional and does not depend on the conduct of the Member State initially responsible, including situations where the failure to transfer results from that State’s unilateral suspension of cooperation. The Regulation does not provide for suspension or interruption of that time limit, and extensions are limited to the situations expressly provided for in Article 29(2). The Court further clarified that, during the running of the transfer period, the Member State initially designated as responsible remains bound by its obligations under the Regulation, and Member States must cooperate to carry out the transfer. However, a failure by one Member State to comply with its obligations cannot justify non-compliance by another; remedies lie in infringement proceedings under Articles 258 and 259 TFEU.

Finally, the Court interpreted Article 33(1) and (2) of Directive 2013/32 as precluding a Member State from rejecting an application for international protection as inadmissible on the ground that the Member State responsible is unwilling to take charge or take back the applicant. The grounds for inadmissibility listed in Article 33(2) are exhaustive and must be interpreted strictly, and such a situation is not included among them.

On 5 March 2026, the Court of Justice of the European  Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in the case C-489/24 (Safita). The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Council of the State of The Netherlands (Raad van State) concerning the interpretation of Directive 2013/32/EU (the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (rAPD)), in particular about the possibility for Member States to adopt several successive decisions extending the time limit for examining applications for international protection where a large number of applications are lodged within a short period.

The Court clarified that, under point (b) of the third subparagraph of Article 31(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU, a Member State may decide on several occasions and consecutively to extend the time limit for the examination procedure. However, the Court emphasised that the application of that provision is subject to three cumulative conditions: (i) applications for international protection must be lodged simultaneously, (ii) they must be lodged by a large number of applicants, and (iii) the situation must make it very difficult in practice to conclude the examination within the initial six-month period. Referring to its previous case law, the Court recalled that such extensions are justified only in the event of a significant increase in applications occurring within a short period, compared with the normal and foreseeable trend in the Member State concerned, and not in situations characterised by a gradual increase of applications over an extended period.

Furthermore, the Court held that under Article 4(1) rAPD, where the number of applications for international protection remains continuously high over an extended period, Member States are obliged to allocate appropriate and sufficient means to the determining authority to enable it to process those applications. A Member State may therefore rely on consecutive extensions only if it demonstrates, with sufficient reasons and evidence, that despite the efforts to address the simultaneous lodging of applications, it did not have sufficient time to allocate the necessary resources. In any case, the duration of successive extensions must not exceed either the time necessary to comply with that obligation or a maximum overall period of 21 months from the lodging of the application.

On 10 February 2026, the Fifth Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) communicated the application of C.I. v. Cyprus (Application no. 12347/25). The case concerns the alleged unlawfulness of the applicant’s detention pending deportation and the risk of death or ill-treatment if returned to Burundi.

The applicant, a Burundian national, lodged an asylum application in Cyprus on the grounds that he would face serious threats to his life and a real risk of ill-treatment upon return to Burundi. His claim was rejected, and he was detained as a “prohibited immigrant” on 22 February 2025. His deportation was suspended following interim measures by the Court, and he remained in detention until 15 December 2025, when he was released after successful habeas corpus proceedings. He complains under Articles 2 and 3 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) concerning the risk of ill-treatment upon return, under Article 13 in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3 for the lack of an effective domestic remedy, and under Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 ECHR regarding the lawfulness of his detention and access to legal aid.

The Court asked the parties to clarify, inter alia, whether the applicant had exhausted all effective domestic remedies, whether he faced a real risk of ill-treatment upon return to Burundi, and whether he had access to effective remedies to challenge his deportation and detention.

On 5th of February 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in case C-718/24 (Aleb). The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Administrative Court of Sofia, Bulgaria (Administrativen sad Sofia-grad) regarding the application of the concept ‘safe third country’ under the Directive 2013/32 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (rAPD)).

The Court of Justice clarified that the ‘safe third country’ concept under Article 33(2)(c) rAPD does not necessarily have to be applied when examining the merits of an application for international protection. An application under substantive examination may be rejected as inadmissible on the grounds that a third country is considered to be a safe third country for the applicant, even when the competent authority has found that the applicant meets the conditions for granting international protection laid down in recast Qualification Directive. By contrast, such an application may be rejected as unfounded, or even manifestly unfounded, only under the conditions set out in Article 32 rAPD and may not, in any event, be rejected as unfounded on the grounds of inadmissibility.

The Court further reiterated that, while national authorities may rely on publicly available information and on executive decisions designating certain countries as safe, the application of the “safe third country” must be based on an individual assessment. Member States must ensure that national law provides clear methods to assess, in light of the applicant’s personal circumstances, whether the third country can be considered safe for that applicant.
In addition, Member States are required to lay down, in their national law, criteria for establishing a sufficient connection between the applicant and the third country. That connection must be strong enough to make it reasonable to expect the applicant to travel to that country and cannot be presumed.

Finally, the Court emphasised the requirement of effective judicial protection. National courts must be able to review whether a genuine connection exists between the applicant and the third country relied upon, even where national law does not expressly grant courts the power to carry out such an examination.