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On 23 April 2026, the Advocate General Emiliou delivered his opinion in Case C‑414/25 (Sedrata) following a request for a preliminary ruling by the Supreme Court of Cassation, Italy (Corte suprema di cassazione). The case concerned the compatibility of the Italian legislation implementing the Italy-Albania bilateral agreement, which allows the transfer of third-country nationals to facilities located in Albanian territory for the purposes of border and return procedures, with EU law, in particular with the provisions of Directive 2008/115/EC (the Return Directive) and of Directive 2013/32/EU (the recast Asylum Procedures Directive).

The Advocate General considered that the Return Directive does not, in principle, preclude national legislation permitting the transfer of third-country nationals to detention facilities located in a third State, provided that those facilities remain under the jurisdiction of the Member State concerned and that EU law continues to apply in full. However, he stressed that such arrangements are compatible with the Return Directive only insofar as they do not undermine its effectiveness or the rights it guarantees. In particular, the competent authorities must ensure access to legal assistance and communication with legal representatives and family members, guarantee that detention is ended without undue delay where the legal conditions are no longer met and comply with the specific safeguards applicable to children and other vulnerable persons. He further noted that the geographical location of detention facilities may require appropriate organisational and logistical measures to ensure that these guarantees are effectively secured in practice.

Furthermore, the Advocate General considered that Article 9 (1) of the rAPD does not, in principle, preclude national legislation allowing the detention of a third-country national subject to return procedures in facilities located in a third State, where that person lodges an application for international protection while being held there. He explained that EU law does not require Member States to organise border or return procedures exclusively within their territory. For that reason, the requirement that applicants must be allowed to “remain in the Member State” must be understood in a way that it covers situations falling under the jurisdiction of the Member State, even if they take place outside its physical territory. However, he stressed that this approach is only acceptable if the national legislation ensures full respect for the procedural guarantees laid down in the Directive, especially that applicants must have access to information and legal assistance, be able to participate effectively in the procedure and, where necessary, appear before the competent authorities, while also benefiting from the specific safeguards applicable to vulnerable persons. He also stressed that detention-related guarantees, including judicial review, must be fully respected.

Finally, the Advocate General emphasised that Member States cannot circumvent their obligations under EU law by transferring individuals to facilities outside their territory, and that they remain fully responsible for ensuring compliance with EU rules and fundamental rights, including those guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

On 16 April 2026, the Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona delivered his opinion in Case C-249/25 (Jilin) following a request for a preliminary reference by the Council of State, Netherlands (Raad van State). The case concerned the interpretation of Article 17(2) of Directive 2001/55/EC (Temporary Protection Directive (TPD)) and Article 31 of Directive 2013/32/EU (recast Asylum Procedures Directive (rAPD)). The questions involved a situation where a third-country national benefiting from temporary protection had also applied for international protection and enquired whether Member States may suspend the examination of such an application for the duration of temporary protection.

The Advocate General considered that EU law does not permit Member States to suspend automatically and indefinitely the examination of applications for international protection solely on the ground that the applicant enjoys temporary protection. Referring to the Court of Justice’s judgment in Framholm, he emphasised that the system of temporary protection is not intended to replace the system of international protection, ensuring that beneficiaries of temporary protection still have a real opportunity to obtain refugee or subsidiary protection status. An automatic suspension of the asylum procedures for the entire duration of temporary protection would be, in practice, equivalent to a refusal to examine the application.

He further noted that the TPD contains no provision allowing for such a suspension and that the preparatory documents of that directive indicate that the possibility of suspending the examination of asylum applications had been deliberately excluded for reasons of compliance with the 1951 Geneva Convention. Although Member States may, in situations involving the simultaneous lodging of a large number of applications, adjust the pace of their examination in order to preserve the functioning of their asylum systems, such flexibility cannot justify a general, automatic and indefinite suspension. He emphasized that a suspension which is not subject to any time limit and is detached from any specific impact which it may have on the operation of the asylum system in each Member State is incompatible with the Temporary Protection Directive.

Finally, the Advocate General highlighted that the rAPD allows for limited extensions of the time limit for examining applications, including in situations involving a large number of applicants, but sets a maximum overall duration of 21 months. It does not allow Member States to suspend procedures indefinitely. In addition, he stressed that such a suspension would be incompatible with Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which guarantees the right to seek asylum. A prolonged delay of several years before the examination of an application would deprive its effectiveness and would not meet the requirements for lawful limitations under Article 52(1) of the Charter.
 

On 16 April 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in joined Cases C‑50/24 to C‑56/24 (Danané and Others), originating from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Belgian Council for asylum and immigration proceedings (Conseil du contentieux des étrangers). The cases concerned the interpretation of Directive 2013/32/EU (Asylum Procedures Directive) and Directive 2013/33/EU (Reception Conditions Directive), in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in the context of asylum applications lodged at Brussels airport by third-country nationals who were detained in facilities situated within Belgian territory but legally treated as border facilities.

The Court clarified that Article 43 of Directive 2013/32 does not require border procedures to be carried out at geographically defined border locations. A procedure may fall within the scope of that provision even where the applicant is detained in a facility located within the territory of the Member State, as long as those facilities are legally treated as border or transit zones. The Court emphasised that neither the wording nor the objectives of the provision impose a geographical requirement and that a restrictive interpretation could render border procedures ineffective and undermine fundamental rights.

The CJEU further held that, once the four-week period laid down in Article 43(2) of Directive 2013/32 has expired, the examination of the application can no longer be carried out under the border procedure and must continue under the ordinary procedural framework of the Directive. However, EU law does not preclude the same detention facility from being reclassified from a “place at the border” to a “place in the territory”. In such circumstances, the Member State must ensure that applicants are informed of the change in their legal situation, including their authorisation to enter the territory.

The Court confirmed that applicants may remain detained after the expiry of the four-week period on a different legal basis, in particular under Article 8(3)(b) of Directive 2013/33. It held that the continuation of detention is permissible where necessary to determine elements of the application, insofar as it complies with the requirements of necessity, proportionality and individual assessment. It stressed that detention must remain exceptional and cannot be applied automatically or systematically.

It also ruled that, after the expiry of the four-week period, the determining authority may continue examining the application as a matter of priority under Article 31(7) of Directive 2013/32. It clarified that investigative steps carried out during the border procedure may be relied upon in subsequent procedures, provided that they comply with the basic principles and guarantees laid down in EU law.

Finally, it held that the expiry of the four-week period and the continued detention of the applicant do not affect the competence of the determining authority. The expiry of that period merely entails a shift from the border procedure to another procedural framework and the cessation of the specific temporal and material limitations applicable to border procedures.

On 9 April 2026, the First Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in M.V. and Others v. Belgium (Applications nos. 52836/22 and three others). The case concerned the failure of the Belgian authorities to provide accommodation and material support to applicants for international protection. 

The asylum applicants were left without access to accommodation or material support in Belgium for several months. During this period, they allegedly lived in extremely precarious conditions on the street in Brussels, including during winter, without shelter, sanitation, or means to meet their basic needs. This situation persisted despite the final decisions by the Brussels Employment Tribunal ordering the Belgian State to provide them with reception conditions, and despite interim measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court.

In relation to the complains under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Court observed that Belgium was responsible for providing reception conditions to the applicants, to which they were entitled under national legislation transposing European Union law for as long as they were authorised to remain on the territory. It held that this obligation was not diminished by any assistance potentially received from humanitarian organizations, and reiterated that constraints linked to a migration crisis cannot exempt Contracting States from their obligations under Article 3 ECHR. The Court found that the authorities’ failure to provide reception conditions resulted in the applicants’ prolonged homelessness and deprivation of basic necessities, which amounted to degrading treatment under Article 3 ECHR.

In regard to Article 6 § 1 ECHR, the Court noted that the domestic judgments in favour of the applicants were not enforced promptly, but only following the indication of interim measures by the ECtHR and with significant delays and incomplete execution. It held that structural pressure on the reception system could not justify such delays and found no indication that the applicants had contributed to them. The Court therefore concluded that the time taken to enforce the domestic judgments was not reasonable and that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

The Court also found that the Belgian authorities had failed to comply with the interim measures indicated under Rule 39. Neither the prompt action had been taken, nor the Government had demonstrated the existence of objective obstacles or that all reasonable steps had been taken to comply, thereby breaching its obligations under Article 34.

Finally, under Article 46 ECHR, the Court reiterated the existence of a systemic deficiencies in Belgium’s asylum reception system, previously identified in Camara v. Belgium. It emphasised that the persistent failure to provide accommodation and to comply with final domestic court decisions was incompatible with the rule of law and requires the adoption of general measures to ensure effective access to reception conditions for applicants for international protection.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team
 

On 19 March 2026, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Dutch Council of State (Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State) delivered its judgments nos. 202600650/2/V6 and 202600651/2/V6 on applications for interim relief submitted by two students residing in Gaza. The cases concerned the requests for consular assistance from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to allow the students to leave Gaza and collect their provisional residence permits (mvv) at the Dutch embassy in Jordan in order to commence their studies in the Netherlands.

Both students had already been admitted to a Dutch university, and the Minister of Asylum and Migration had no objection to issuing them a residence permit. However, the students could not cross the border in Gaza and requested the Minister’s assistance. The Minister rejected their requests because they did not belong to a group normally eligible for such assistance and declared the applicants’ objections inadmissible, a decision upheld by the District Court of The Hague. The students appealed against this decision and sought interim relief from the Council of State.

The Council of State stressed that the judgments were limited to interim relief excluding the main legal questions. It confirmed that there is no legal right to consular assistance under Dutch law and that the Minister enjoys broad discretion in this domain. Nevertheless, the interim relief judge of the Council of State found that the applicants’ inability to leave Gaza and collect their mvvs is due to the harrowing situation in Gaza. The risk that, due to the duration of the proceedings, they might no longer be able to collect those permits, outweighed the Minister’s interests. The judge further observed that the measure sought involved only limited efforts through diplomatic channels, and not an obligation to ensure evacuation or issue residence documents. The Minister’s concerns regarding identity verification were insufficiently substantiated. In light of these very special circumstances, it ordered the Minister to make every effort to facilitate the applicants’ departure from Gaza, without prejudging the outcome of the main proceedings.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team
 

On 24 March 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in the Case C‑767/23 (Remling). The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State, Netherlands (Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State) regarding the interpretation of Article 267 TFEU in the light of Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, on whether a court of last instance may refuse to make a reference for a preliminary ruling by means of summary reasoning without specifying the applicable exceptions.

The Court reiterated that, where there is no judicial remedy under national law against the decisions of a court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal are in principle obliged, under the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, to refer questions concerning the interpretation or validity of EU law to the Court of Justice. That obligation may be relieved only in a situation corresponding to one of the Cilfit exceptions: (i) where the question of EU law is irrelevant to the resolution of the dispute, (ii) where the provision of EU law has already been interpreted by the Court, or (iii) where the correct interpretation of EU law is so obvious as to leave no scope for reasonable doubt.

Thus, the Court held that where a court of last instance considers that one of those exceptions applies, it must, in accordance with Article 267 TFEU read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, state the reasons for its decision by setting out specifically and concretely, why the relevant exception is applicable in the circumstances of the case. That obligation applies irrespective of whether the parties have expressly requested a preliminary ruling as long as a question of EU law is raised. National legislation permitting courts to decide by means of summary reasoning for the sound administration of justice does not relieve them of the obligation to provide specific and concrete reasons. A decision merely stating that the conditions for summary reasoning are satisfied is insufficient. However, a court of last instance may, where appropriate, rely on the reasoning of a lower court, provided that the latter has set out the grounds justifying the application of one of the Cilfit exceptions.

On 26 March 2026, the CJEU delivered its judgment in the case  C-819/25 (PPU) [Gonrieh] originating from the preliminary reference by the French-speaking Brussels Court of First Instance (Tribunal de première instance francophone de Bruxelles) regarding the scope of the Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification (the FRD), concerning the Member States’ obligations in the context of issuing family reunification visas, in particular where the beneficiary is required to appear in person but is unable to leave a third country due to life-threatening situation.

The Court clarified that Article 13(1) FRD, read in conjunction with Articles 2, 4, 7 and 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, requires Member States, after accepting an application for family reunification, to authorise the entry of the family member and to grant “every facility for obtaining the required visas.” This obligation entails removing unjustified administrative obstacles and applying rapid and efficient administrative procedures to enable the issuance of visas, including, inter alia, facilitating personal appearances through accessible consular services, issuing emergency travel documents, and minimizing the number of appearances required.

However, the Court held that Article 13(1) does not impose obligations extending to diplomatic or consular relations with third countries. In particular, a Member State is not required to organise or ensure the transfer of a third-country national to its consular post, nor to contact third countries to facilitate that transfer, in situations where the person is unable to travel. Such measures would fall outside the scope of the Directive and concern matters which are not covered by EU law under Article 51 of the Charter. It further clarified that provisions concerning diplomatic and consular protection, including Article 20(2)(c) and Article 23 TFEU and Article 46 of the Charter, apply only to Union citizens and, in certain cases, their family members, and not to third-country nationals seeking family reunification under Directive 2003/86.

The Court emphasised that this interpretation is consistent with the objective of Directive 2003/86, which is to promote family reunification and protect third-country nationals, including minors, while distinguishing between administrative facilitation and measures requiring external intervention. Therefore, the refusal to provide evacuation or diplomatic assistance does not constitute a failure to implement EU law, and the obligations under Article 13(1) are limited to the administrative sphere.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 28 November 2025, the High Court of Justice of Andalusia, Ceuta and Melilla – Málaga Administrative Chamber (Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Andalucía, Ceuta y Melilla - Sala de lo Contencioso Administrativo de Málaga) issued the judgment No. 2434/2025, annulling the return of applicants who had attempted to access the Spanish territory via the Chafarinas Islands.

The applicants, Syrian nationals, arrived at Isla del Congreso on 3 January 2022 and expressed their intention to apply for international protection. The authorities nevertheless proceeded with their immediate return to the Moroccan authorities without initiating an individual administrative procedure or allowing them to apply for asylum. The lower court upheld the authorities’ actions, considering that the applicants’ conduct constituted an abuse of law and justified their immediate return.

The High Court found that the special border regime established in the tenth additional provision of the Spanish Immigration Law (LOEX 4/2000) allowing summary expulsions at the borders of Ceuta and Melilla, does not apply to the Chafarinas Islands and cannot be extended by analogy. The Court further held that the applicants’ conduct did not constitute an abuse of law and emphasised that access to the asylum procedure must be guaranteed in accordance with Directive 2013/32/EU on asylum procedures, Article 18 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the principle of non-refoulement under Article 3 ECHR, and Article 33 of the Refugee Convention. It therefore concluded that the repatriation measures had been adopted in breach of the applicable procedural guarantees and it annulled the contested decision.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 27 February 2026, the Court of First Instance of Antwerp, Family Court Section (Rechtbank van eerste aanleg Antwerpen, familierechtbank) annulled a decision of the civil registrar of the City of Antwerp revoking the Belgian nationality of a child born in Belgium of Palestinian parents recognised as refugees.

The child had initially been granted Belgian nationality pursuant to Article 10§1 of the Belgian Nationality Code to prevent statelessness. On 5 March 2024, the registrar of Antwerp revoked the child’s nationality on the grounds that the child could acquire Palestinian nationality through the parents or via the Palestinian mission. As a result, the child’s Belgian passport and Kids-ID were annulled. The parents contested the revocation, maintaining that as recognised refugees it was not feasible for them to secure Palestinian nationality for their child. The City of Antwerp and the Public Prosecutor’s Office argued that the claim should be dismissed, citing a potential “pull effect” and alleged abuse of the nationality rules.

The Court of First Instance annulled the revocation holding that under Article 10§3 of the Belgian Nationality Code (WBN) nationality may only be withdrawn if it is established beyond doubt that the child possesses another nationality. Hence, given the absence of formal Palestinian nationality legislation and the impossibility for refugees to register remotely, the child could not realistically acquire another nationality. The court further held that any alleged abuse of Belgian nationality rules by the parents could not justify the deprivation of the child’s nationality, highlighting that the best interests of the child (Article 22bis of the Constitution) must prevail.

According to the Court’s press release, five similar decisions from the city register were annulled by the Court on the same grounds.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 5 March 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in the case C-150/34 (Aroja). The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Supreme Court of Finland (Korkein oikeus) regarding the calculation of detention periods for the purpose of removal of illegally staying third-country nationals under the Directive 2008/115/EC (the Return Directive).

The Court clarified that Article 15(5) and (6) of the Return Directive must be interpreted as meaning that to determine whether the maximum detention period of an illegally staying third-country national has been reached, all periods of detention completed in the same Member State under Article 15 for the purpose of enforcing the same return decision must be taken to account. To reach this conclusion, the Court noted the serious interference with the right to liberty protected by Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the fact that detention under the Return Directive does not have punitive aims but seeks to secure the Directive's return-related objectives within strictly defined time limits. This requirement applies even where the detention periods are separated by intervals during which the person concerned was not detained, otherwise the authorities could circumvent those limits by releasing and subsequently re-detaining the individual based on the same return decision, likely resulting in a breach of the principle of proportionality.

The Court also recalled its previous case law and held that, under the second sentence of Article 15(3) of the Return Directive, any prolonged detention exceeding the initial maximum period of detention must, in all cases, be subject to review by a judicial authority, regardless of whether the detained person has requested it.  The Court further clarified that, in the absence of EU rules on the procedure of detention reviews in the event of prolonged detention periods, the review of an administrative decision extending detention beyond the initial maximum six-month period does not have to take place before that period is reached. However, it must be carried out as speedily as possible after the adoption of that decision.

Finally, the Court held that, in the event of a late judicial review of a decision extending detention beyond the initial six-month period, EU law does not automatically require, on that ground alone, the release of the detained person. Where the substantive conditions for detention remain satisfied and the maximum period of detention under Article 15(6) of the directive has not been reached, detention may continue.

On 30 December 2025, the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania published its judgment on the case No eA-820-552/2025 ,  ruling that the denial of the right to seek for international protection violates international and EU Law.

On 23 October 2023, the applicant was forcibly returned to the Belarus border by the Lithuanian authorities, denying him the right to seek asylum. The applicant was provided with water, food, warm clothes, footwear, and hygiene products, but he was not allowed to enter the territory of the Republic of Lithuania.

The Supreme Administrative Court held that ambiguities regarding the request for asylum must be interpreted in favour of the applicant and shifted the burden of proof to the authorities. Furthermore, having regard to the jurisprudence of the CJEU, the Supreme Court held that the officials acted unlawfully by forcibly removing the applicant from Lithuanian territory and denying him an opportunity to apply for international protection. The Court also recognised that there was a causal link between the suffering of the applicant and the actions of the Lithuanian authorities and found Lithuanian authorities responsible for this. However, it considered that there is no evidence that the violation of the applicant’s rights resulted in non-pecuniary damage within the meaning of Article 3 ECHR, leaving the question of the compensation to be decided. Finally, the Court held that national border regulations, including measures designed to prevent ‘instrumentalisation’, cannot legitimize state conduct that breach international obligations. It reaffirmed that duties under both international and EU law prevail over national law.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team.

On 29 January 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in the case C-431/24 (Multan). The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the District Court of The Hague, Netherlands (Rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats Roermond) regarding the scope of access to information in an asylum applicant’s file under Article 23 (1) Directive 2013/32 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (rAPD)).

The Court of Justice clarified that Article 23 (1) rAPD, read in conjunction with Article 46 thereof and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, requires that both the applicant and the national court must be able to access information in the applicant’s file that is likely to be relevant for the proceedings. This includes supporting documents such as investigation reports prepared by the authorities of the host Member State concerning the applicant’s country of origin on which the rejection of international protection and the return decision are based, when they are relevant for: (i) the applicant to exercise his or her rights of defence, (ii) for the court to review compliance with Article 30 rAPD and, ultimately, (iii) to assess whether the principle of non-refoulement has been respected.

The Court recalled its case law and reiterated that, under Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU, national courts must conduct a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law, including the manner in which investigations were carried out and the evidence considered by the determining authority, to ensure effective judicial review of decisions rejecting international protection. At the same time, the Court confirmed that the applicant’s right to a fair trial, as guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter, reinforces this requirement. Access to the file is therefore essential for both the court’s assessment and the applicant’s rights of defence, although it may be limited in specific cases in line with Article 52(1) of the Charter.

On 22 January 2026, the Advocate General Spielmann issues his opinion in the case C-877/24 (Shamsi). The case related to the preliminary reference by the  Council of State of the Netherlands regarding the scope of Directive 2008/115/EC (Returns Directive (RD) concerning third-country nationals who have been sentenced to life or long-term sentences in prison, for crimes which are not related to the illegal nature of their stay. The questions enquired under what conditions, a Member State remains obliged to adopt a return decision against them when, owing to the execution of those sentences, neither voluntary departure nor forced removal will be possible in the near future.

The Advocate General Spielmann examined whether Member States may issue return decisions under the Returns Directive to third-country nationals who are serving long prison sentences and cannot be removed in the foreseeable future. The Opinion concludes that the Returns Directive does not preclude the adoption of a return decision against an illegally staying third-country national whose removal will take place only after the completion of the imprisonment. However, in such cases, national authorities must periodically assess whether removal remains feasible. By contrast, when illegally staying third-country nationals are serving a life sentence and removal is permanently impossible in practice, the adoption of a return decision is incompatible with the Directive. Finally, the Advocate General found that Directive 2008/115 does not require Member States to grant a temporary residence permit to illegally staying third-country nationals during the execution of a prison sentence.