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On 24 September 2026, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in A.M. and Others v. Greece, concerning the reception and living conditions of several asylum applicants accommodated in different facilities in Greece.

The Court reiterated that asylum applicants constitute a particularly vulnerable group requiring special protection and that the conditions of their detention must be compatible with human dignity. It further held that the assessment of ill-treatment under Article 3 ECHR must take into consideration all the circumstances of the case including the duration and effects of the treatment and the personal circumstances of the individuals concerned.

Relying on its previous case-law, the Court found that the applicants who had stayed in Ritsona camp and in the Moria Reception and Identification Centre on Lesvos, had been subjected to extremely poor living conditions and therefore found a violation of Article 3 ECHR. By contrast, it rejected the complaints concerning certain other facilities and it held that the applicants had not sufficiently substantiated their individual circumstances or shown that the conditions reached the minimum level of severity required under Article 3.

It also rejected the Government’s objections concerning the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, finding that it had not demonstrated the existence of an effective remedy accessible in practice, capable of addressing the applicants' complaints concerning inadequate reception conditions.

On 25 June 2026, the Constitutional Court of Belgium (Grondwettelijk Hof) delivered its judgment no. 78/2026, concerning the procedure introduced by the Act of 10 March 2024 for granting a residence permit to stateless persons. The applicants challenged several provisions, arguing that the procedure applicable to stateless persons provided less favourable guarantees than those available to beneficiaries of international protection and was therefore discriminatory.

The Court held that the legislature is not required to treat stateless persons in the same way as refugees or beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, as stateless persons are not subject to European legislation. However, it found that several conditions and procedural rules imposed disproportionate limitations on applicants for residence on grounds of statelessness.

It considered that the requirement that applicants must be unable to acquire or regain the nationality of another State was incompatible with the concept of statelessness under the 1954 New York Convention, as a person is stateless when they do not possess any nationality, regardless of whether they may subsequently obtain or recover one. It therefore annulled this condition. The Court also annulled the exclusion of applications where applicants had not previously held lawful residence for more than three months or had not previously applied for international protection, finding that this could disproportionately affect stateless persons who may never have held a residence permit.

The Court held that a personal hearing constitutes an essential procedural safeguard in statelessness proceedings and therefore annulled the provision making such a hearing optional. It also ruled that the five-year residence period must begin once the judgment recognising statelessness becomes final. Finally, it required applicants to receive proof of submission of their application and to be protected, in principle, from enforcement of removal measures during the proceedings, except on grounds of national security or public order.

The Court rejected the remaining complaints, holding that statelessness applicants were not required to benefit from all procedural guarantees applicable to asylum applicants, including an appeal with full jurisdiction and suspensive effect.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 28 May 2026, the High Court of Justice (King’s Bench Division, Administrative Court) delivered its judgment in Freedom from Torture & Anor v Secretary of State for the Home Department (2026 EWHC 1278 (Admin)). The case concerned the challenge to the Secretary of State’s amendments “Allocation of Asylum Accommodation” policy (Versions 11–13), which significantly altered long-standing protective provisions for a particularly vulnerable group of asylum applicants, namely survivors of torture, trafficking and other serious violence victims receiving support from specialist organisations.

The Court held that there had been a long-standing practice of consultation with the Claimants in relation to relevant policy changes and found that the Defendant acted unlawfully by introducing the amendments without prior consultation. It considered that consultation would have been an obvious and reasonable means of assessing the likely impact of the changes on a vulnerable group of asylum applicants.

The Court further held that the Defendant breached the Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED) under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 (“EA 2010”). The Equality Impact Assessments were materially inadequate, as they failed to properly assess the potential disproportionate harm that the policy changes would have on survivors of torture, trafficking and other serious violence, did not engage with relevant evidence of risk, and lacked adequate monitoring.

Finally, the Court held that the Defendant also breached the Tameside duty by introducing fundamental policy changes without adequately investigating their impact on survivors of torture, trafficking and other serious violence despite longstanding evidence of the serious risks faced by this vulnerable group. It held that the Secretary of State failed to undertake inquiry, engage with relevant expert sources, or consider relevant material before adopting the amendments.

Therefore, the Court concluded that the challenged amendments to the Allocation of Asylum Accommodation policy were unlawful.

On 4 June 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in Case C-621/24 (Landkreis Schweinfurt v FB), following a request for a preliminary ruling from the German Federal Social Court (Bundessozialgericht). The case concerned the interpretation of Article 17(2) and (5) and Article 20(1)(c) of Directive 2013/33/EU (Reception Conditions Directive), regarding the reduction of material reception conditions for an applicant whose application for international protection had been declared inadmissible and who was awaiting transfer to a Member State responsible for examining the application.

The Court held that Article 17(2), read in conjunction with Article 2(g) of Directive 2013/33, requires Member States to ensure material reception conditions that provide an adequate standard of living, guaranteeing applicants’ subsistence and protecting their physical and mental health. It clarified that this requirement establishes a minimum threshold which must include, at least, housing, food, clothing and a daily expenses allowance, whether provided in kind, through financial allowances or vouchers, or a combination thereof. It further stated that an adequate standard of living cannot be ensured where support for clothing or the daily expenses allowance is excluded. It also held that the Reception Conditions Directive continues to apply until the applicant has actually been transferred to the responsible Member State. Article 17(2) does not allow Member States to distinguish between applicants subject to a Dublin transfer decision and other applicants as regards access to material reception conditions. Article 20 of Directive 2013/33 exhaustively lists the circumstances in which material reception conditions may be reduced or withdrawn, and a Dublin transfer situation is not among them.

The Court therefore concluded that Article 17(2), read in conjunction with Article 2(g) of Directive 2013/33, precludes national legislation which reduces material reception conditions to an applicant following the rejection of his or her application as inadmissible and pending transfer to another Member State.

Furthermore, the Court recalled that a “subsequent application” under Article 2(q) of Directive 2013/32/EU (rAPD) refers to a further application for international protection made after a final decision on a previous application, which may be declared inadmissible under Article 33(2)(d) rAPD where no new elements are presented. This concept applies where the previous application has been finally decided in another Member State. That situation is distinguished from cases governed by the Dublin III Regulation, where responsibility for examining the application lies with another Member State and the Member State concerned only applies the responsibility criteria without examining the substance of the claim. It therefore held that an application rejected as inadmissible solely on the ground that another Member State is responsible to examine the application and accompanied by a transfer decision does not constitute a “subsequent application”, thus, it does not fall within the scope of Article 20(1)(c) of Directive 2013/33.

On 21 May 2026, the Belgian Constitutional Court delivered its judgment no. 66/2026 . The case concerned legislative amendments to the asylum reception regime introduced by two Laws of 14 July 2025: (i) the limitation of material assistance for asylum applicants already benefiting from protection in another EU Member State, and (ii) the abolition of the possibility to grant reception in the form of financial assistance in exceptional circumstances. In its previous judgment no. 23/2026, the Constitutional Court suspended both measures and referred a preliminary question to the Court of Justice of the European Union. In the present judgment, the Court ruled only on the second measure, while the first measure remains pending before the Court of Justice.

The Court recalled that Directive 2013/33/EU on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (rAPD)) grants Member States a margin of discretion as regards the form and level of reception provided to asylum applicants, including the possibility to only provide material reception in accommodation centres. It held that where the system is saturated and there is no place available in reception centres, or where material assistance is unavailable or inadequate, the exclusion of any possibility of financial assistance creates a risk of substantial impairment of the right to human dignity. Therefore, the contested provisions would constitute a breach of EU law.

The Court further held that the abolition of financial assistance in exceptional circumstances resulted in a significant and unjustified deterioration in the level of protection of the rights to human dignity, social assistance and adequate housing under Article 23 of the Constitution. It also found that the measure was incompatible with the right to respect for private and family life under Article 22 of the Constitution.

The Court therefore annulled the provisions abolishing the possibility to provide asylum applicants s with reception in the form of financial assistance in exceptional circumstances.

On 9 April 2026, the First Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in M.V. and Others v. Belgium (Applications nos. 52836/22 and three others). The case concerned the failure of the Belgian authorities to provide accommodation and material support to applicants for international protection. 

The asylum applicants were left without access to accommodation or material support in Belgium for several months. During this period, they allegedly lived in extremely precarious conditions on the street in Brussels, including during winter, without shelter, sanitation, or means to meet their basic needs. This situation persisted despite the final decisions by the Brussels Employment Tribunal ordering the Belgian State to provide them with reception conditions, and despite interim measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court.

In relation to the complains under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Court observed that Belgium was responsible for providing reception conditions to the applicants, to which they were entitled under national legislation transposing European Union law for as long as they were authorised to remain on the territory. It held that this obligation was not diminished by any assistance potentially received from humanitarian organizations, and reiterated that constraints linked to a migration crisis cannot exempt Contracting States from their obligations under Article 3 ECHR. The Court found that the authorities’ failure to provide reception conditions resulted in the applicants’ prolonged homelessness and deprivation of basic necessities, which amounted to degrading treatment under Article 3 ECHR.

In regard to Article 6 § 1 ECHR, the Court noted that the domestic judgments in favour of the applicants were not enforced promptly, but only following the indication of interim measures by the ECtHR and with significant delays and incomplete execution. It held that structural pressure on the reception system could not justify such delays and found no indication that the applicants had contributed to them. The Court therefore concluded that the time taken to enforce the domestic judgments was not reasonable and that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

The Court also found that the Belgian authorities had failed to comply with the interim measures indicated under Rule 39. Neither the prompt action had been taken, nor the Government had demonstrated the existence of objective obstacles or that all reasonable steps had been taken to comply, thereby breaching its obligations under Article 34.

Finally, under Article 46 ECHR, the Court reiterated the existence of a systemic deficiencies in Belgium’s asylum reception system, previously identified in Camara v. Belgium. It emphasised that the persistent failure to provide accommodation and to comply with final domestic court decisions was incompatible with the rule of law and requires the adoption of general measures to ensure effective access to reception conditions for applicants for international protection.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team
 

On 5 March 2026, the Court of Justice of the European  Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in the case C-489/24 (Safita). The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Council of the State of The Netherlands (Raad van State) concerning the interpretation of Directive 2013/32/EU (the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (rAPD)), in particular about the possibility for Member States to adopt several successive decisions extending the time limit for examining applications for international protection where a large number of applications are lodged within a short period.

The Court clarified that, under point (b) of the third subparagraph of Article 31(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU, a Member State may decide on several occasions and consecutively to extend the time limit for the examination procedure. However, the Court emphasised that the application of that provision is subject to three cumulative conditions: (i) applications for international protection must be lodged simultaneously, (ii) they must be lodged by a large number of applicants, and (iii) the situation must make it very difficult in practice to conclude the examination within the initial six-month period. Referring to its previous case law, the Court recalled that such extensions are justified only in the event of a significant increase in applications occurring within a short period, compared with the normal and foreseeable trend in the Member State concerned, and not in situations characterised by a gradual increase of applications over an extended period.

Furthermore, the Court held that under Article 4(1) rAPD, where the number of applications for international protection remains continuously high over an extended period, Member States are obliged to allocate appropriate and sufficient means to the determining authority to enable it to process those applications. A Member State may therefore rely on consecutive extensions only if it demonstrates, with sufficient reasons and evidence, that despite the efforts to address the simultaneous lodging of applications, it did not have sufficient time to allocate the necessary resources. In any case, the duration of successive extensions must not exceed either the time necessary to comply with that obligation or a maximum overall period of 21 months from the lodging of the application.

On 18 December the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in Case C‑184/24 (Sidi Bouzid). The case concerns AF and his minor child BF, applicants for international protection in Milan, who challenge the withdrawal of their material reception conditions following AF’s refusal to be transferred to another accommodation centre. The national authorities justified the withdrawal under Article 23(1)(a) of Legislative Decree No 142 as an administrative measure related to the organization of reception centres, while AF argues it violates his and his child’s rights to basic needs and protection as vulnerable persons under Directive 2013/33 (the recast RCD). The regional administrative court for Lombardia has referred a preliminary question to the Court of Justice asking whether EU law precludes withdrawal of reception conditions, not as a sanction but because of a refusal to transfer, where this leaves applicants unable to meet basic needs, provided the authority ensures equivalent conditions at another centre. 

While referring to the relevant case-law (Haqbin, Ministero dell’Interno), the Court emphasized that “material reception conditions” include housing, food, clothing, and daily expenses allowances. These conditions must guarantee a dignified standard of living, particularly for vulnerable persons such as minors or single parents, in accordance with Articles 17 and 21 of the recast RCD. While Article 20 permits withdrawal or reduction of reception conditions in cases of abuse, including when an applicant abandons the designated place of residence without informing the authorities, a refusal to transfer to another accommodation centre does not constitute “abandonment,” as the applicant remains present and traceable, and therefore the withdrawal of all material reception conditions is not allowed under Article 20(1)(a).  

The Court confirmed that repeated refusal to comply with a transfer decision may constitute a serious breach of the rules of an accommodation centre under Article 20(4), which can justify the imposition of proportionate sanctions, including partial reduction of material reception conditions, provided that the applicant’s dignity and fundamental rights are respected. In assessing such breaches, Member States must consider the nature and persistence of the conduct, its impact on the management of reception centres, and the applicant’s particular circumstances. The Court stressed that the competent authorities retain the power to implement necessary transfers to ensure the effective management of reception facilities, while upholding the applicant’s fundamental rights and maintaining equivalent reception conditions in the new centre. 

On that basis, the Court concluded that the national legislation at issue precludes the competent authority from withdrawing all material reception conditions from an applicant who refuses transfer to another accommodation centre, while confirming that partial sanctions may be imposed if the conditions of Article 20(4) and (5) are met.