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On 9 April 2026, the First Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in M.V. and Others v. Belgium (Applications nos. 52836/22 and three others). The case concerned the failure of the Belgian authorities to provide accommodation and material support to applicants for international protection. 

The asylum applicants were left without access to accommodation or material support in Belgium for several months. During this period, they allegedly lived in extremely precarious conditions on the street in Brussels, including during winter, without shelter, sanitation, or means to meet their basic needs. This situation persisted despite the final decisions by the Brussels Employment Tribunal ordering the Belgian State to provide them with reception conditions, and despite interim measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court.

In relation to the complains under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Court observed that Belgium was responsible for providing reception conditions to the applicants, to which they were entitled under national legislation transposing European Union law for as long as they were authorised to remain on the territory. It held that this obligation was not diminished by any assistance potentially received from humanitarian organizations, and reiterated that constraints linked to a migration crisis cannot exempt Contracting States from their obligations under Article 3 ECHR. The Court found that the authorities’ failure to provide reception conditions resulted in the applicants’ prolonged homelessness and deprivation of basic necessities, which amounted to degrading treatment under Article 3 ECHR.

In regard to Article 6 § 1 ECHR, the Court noted that the domestic judgments in favour of the applicants were not enforced promptly, but only following the indication of interim measures by the ECtHR and with significant delays and incomplete execution. It held that structural pressure on the reception system could not justify such delays and found no indication that the applicants had contributed to them. The Court therefore concluded that the time taken to enforce the domestic judgments was not reasonable and that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

The Court also found that the Belgian authorities had failed to comply with the interim measures indicated under Rule 39. Neither the prompt action had been taken, nor the Government had demonstrated the existence of objective obstacles or that all reasonable steps had been taken to comply, thereby breaching its obligations under Article 34.

Finally, under Article 46 ECHR, the Court reiterated the existence of a systemic deficiencies in Belgium’s asylum reception system, previously identified in Camara v. Belgium. It emphasised that the persistent failure to provide accommodation and to comply with final domestic court decisions was incompatible with the rule of law and requires the adoption of general measures to ensure effective access to reception conditions for applicants for international protection.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team
 

On 5 March 2026, the Court of Justice of the European  Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in the case C-489/24 (Safita). The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Council of the State of The Netherlands (Raad van State) concerning the interpretation of Directive 2013/32/EU (the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (rAPD)), in particular about the possibility for Member States to adopt several successive decisions extending the time limit for examining applications for international protection where a large number of applications are lodged within a short period.

The Court clarified that, under point (b) of the third subparagraph of Article 31(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU, a Member State may decide on several occasions and consecutively to extend the time limit for the examination procedure. However, the Court emphasised that the application of that provision is subject to three cumulative conditions: (i) applications for international protection must be lodged simultaneously, (ii) they must be lodged by a large number of applicants, and (iii) the situation must make it very difficult in practice to conclude the examination within the initial six-month period. Referring to its previous case law, the Court recalled that such extensions are justified only in the event of a significant increase in applications occurring within a short period, compared with the normal and foreseeable trend in the Member State concerned, and not in situations characterised by a gradual increase of applications over an extended period.

Furthermore, the Court held that under Article 4(1) rAPD, where the number of applications for international protection remains continuously high over an extended period, Member States are obliged to allocate appropriate and sufficient means to the determining authority to enable it to process those applications. A Member State may therefore rely on consecutive extensions only if it demonstrates, with sufficient reasons and evidence, that despite the efforts to address the simultaneous lodging of applications, it did not have sufficient time to allocate the necessary resources. In any case, the duration of successive extensions must not exceed either the time necessary to comply with that obligation or a maximum overall period of 21 months from the lodging of the application.

On 18 December the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in Case C‑184/24 (Sidi Bouzid). The case concerns AF and his minor child BF, applicants for international protection in Milan, who challenge the withdrawal of their material reception conditions following AF’s refusal to be transferred to another accommodation centre. The national authorities justified the withdrawal under Article 23(1)(a) of Legislative Decree No 142 as an administrative measure related to the organization of reception centres, while AF argues it violates his and his child’s rights to basic needs and protection as vulnerable persons under Directive 2013/33 (the recast RCD). The regional administrative court for Lombardia has referred a preliminary question to the Court of Justice asking whether EU law precludes withdrawal of reception conditions, not as a sanction but because of a refusal to transfer, where this leaves applicants unable to meet basic needs, provided the authority ensures equivalent conditions at another centre. 

While referring to the relevant case-law (Haqbin, Ministero dell’Interno), the Court emphasized that “material reception conditions” include housing, food, clothing, and daily expenses allowances. These conditions must guarantee a dignified standard of living, particularly for vulnerable persons such as minors or single parents, in accordance with Articles 17 and 21 of the recast RCD. While Article 20 permits withdrawal or reduction of reception conditions in cases of abuse, including when an applicant abandons the designated place of residence without informing the authorities, a refusal to transfer to another accommodation centre does not constitute “abandonment,” as the applicant remains present and traceable, and therefore the withdrawal of all material reception conditions is not allowed under Article 20(1)(a).  

The Court confirmed that repeated refusal to comply with a transfer decision may constitute a serious breach of the rules of an accommodation centre under Article 20(4), which can justify the imposition of proportionate sanctions, including partial reduction of material reception conditions, provided that the applicant’s dignity and fundamental rights are respected. In assessing such breaches, Member States must consider the nature and persistence of the conduct, its impact on the management of reception centres, and the applicant’s particular circumstances. The Court stressed that the competent authorities retain the power to implement necessary transfers to ensure the effective management of reception facilities, while upholding the applicant’s fundamental rights and maintaining equivalent reception conditions in the new centre. 

On that basis, the Court concluded that the national legislation at issue precludes the competent authority from withdrawing all material reception conditions from an applicant who refuses transfer to another accommodation centre, while confirming that partial sanctions may be imposed if the conditions of Article 20(4) and (5) are met.