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On 4 June 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in Case C-621/24 (Landkreis Schweinfurt v FB), following a request for a preliminary ruling from the German Federal Social Court (Bundessozialgericht). The case concerned the interpretation of Article 17(2) and (5) and Article 20(1)(c) of Directive 2013/33/EU (Reception Conditions Directive), regarding the reduction of material reception conditions for an applicant whose application for international protection had been declared inadmissible and who was awaiting transfer to a Member State responsible for examining the application.

The Court held that Article 17(2), read in conjunction with Article 2(g) of Directive 2013/33, requires Member States to ensure material reception conditions that provide an adequate standard of living, guaranteeing applicants’ subsistence and protecting their physical and mental health. It clarified that this requirement establishes a minimum threshold which must include, at least, housing, food, clothing and a daily expenses allowance, whether provided in kind, through financial allowances or vouchers, or a combination thereof. It further stated that an adequate standard of living cannot be ensured where support for clothing or the daily expenses allowance is excluded. It also held that the Reception Conditions Directive continues to apply until the applicant has actually been transferred to the responsible Member State. Article 17(2) does not allow Member States to distinguish between applicants subject to a Dublin transfer decision and other applicants as regards access to material reception conditions. Article 20 of Directive 2013/33 exhaustively lists the circumstances in which material reception conditions may be reduced or withdrawn, and a Dublin transfer situation is not among them.

The Court therefore concluded that Article 17(2), read in conjunction with Article 2(g) of Directive 2013/33, precludes national legislation which reduces material reception conditions to an applicant following the rejection of his or her application as inadmissible and pending transfer to another Member State.

Furthermore, the Court recalled that a “subsequent application” under Article 2(q) of Directive 2013/32/EU (rAPD) refers to a further application for international protection made after a final decision on a previous application, which may be declared inadmissible under Article 33(2)(d) rAPD where no new elements are presented. This concept applies where the previous application has been finally decided in another Member State. That situation is distinguished from cases governed by the Dublin III Regulation, where responsibility for examining the application lies with another Member State and the Member State concerned only applies the responsibility criteria without examining the substance of the claim. It therefore held that an application rejected as inadmissible solely on the ground that another Member State is responsible to examine the application and accompanied by a transfer decision does not constitute a “subsequent application”, thus, it does not fall within the scope of Article 20(1)(c) of Directive 2013/33.

On 21 May 2026, the Belgian Constitutional Court delivered its judgment no. 66/2026 . The case concerned legislative amendments to the asylum reception regime introduced by two Laws of 14 July 2025: (i) the limitation of material assistance for asylum applicants already benefiting from protection in another EU Member State, and (ii) the abolition of the possibility to grant reception in the form of financial assistance in exceptional circumstances. In its previous judgment no. 23/2026, the Constitutional Court suspended both measures and referred a preliminary question to the Court of Justice of the European Union. In the present judgment, the Court ruled only on the second measure, while the first measure remains pending before the Court of Justice.

The Court recalled that Directive 2013/33/EU on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (rAPD)) grants Member States a margin of discretion as regards the form and level of reception provided to asylum applicants, including the possibility to only provide material reception in accommodation centres. It held that where the system is saturated and there is no place available in reception centres, or where material assistance is unavailable or inadequate, the exclusion of any possibility of financial assistance creates a risk of substantial impairment of the right to human dignity. Therefore, the contested provisions would constitute a breach of EU law.

The Court further held that the abolition of financial assistance in exceptional circumstances resulted in a significant and unjustified deterioration in the level of protection of the rights to human dignity, social assistance and adequate housing under Article 23 of the Constitution. It also found that the measure was incompatible with the right to respect for private and family life under Article 22 of the Constitution.

The Court therefore annulled the provisions abolishing the possibility to provide asylum applicants s with reception in the form of financial assistance in exceptional circumstances.

On 2 April 2026, the Human Rights Committee (CCPR) published its Views in the communication No. 3742/2020 submitted by Gentilmen Issa Magumba against the Republic of Korea, concerning the refusal to process an asylum application lodged in an airport transit zone and the applicant’s prolonged confinement in that zone.

The author, a national of the Democratic Republic of Congo, was held for approximately 14 months in the transit area of Incheon International Airport after being denied the possibility to apply for refugee status on the ground that he was a transit passenger and not subject to entry inspection. He claimed that this refusal exposed him to a risk of refoulement and that his confinement amounted to arbitrary detention and inhuman treatment.

The Committee found a violation of Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights due to the denial of access to the asylum procedure. It reiterated that States must not remove individuals where there are substantial grounds for believing that they face a real risk of irreparable harm and must ensure access to an effective and independent review with suspensive effect. In the present case, the author’s asylum request was rejected solely on formal grounds linked to his status as a transit passenger, depriving him of any opportunity to seek protection against refoulement. The Committee held that domestic legal provisions cannot be applied in a manner that undermines obligations under the Covenant.

The Committee further found a violation of Article 9(1), holding that the author’s confinement in the airport transit area constituted a deprivation of liberty. It recalled that such deprivation may arise from confinement in a restricted airport area without free consent, and that prolonged and indefinite detention of asylum seekers may be arbitrary. The Committee noted that the author was subjected to de facto detention for approximately 14 months within a space under the State party’s jurisdiction, without any legal basis, as no formal detention order had been issued. His confinement was of indefinite duration, lacked appropriate justification, and was not based on an assessment of necessity or proportionality. The Committee therefore concluded that the author’s detention was arbitrary and constituted a violation of Article 9(1) of the Covenant.

Finally, the Committee found the conditions of detention and the prolonged exposure to inadequate living conditions such as lack of privacy, insufficient access to food, medical care and sanitary facilities and constant lighting during COVID-19 pandemic, to be incompatible with human dignity, therefore finding a violation of Article 10(1) of the Covenant.

The Committee concluded that the State party violated Articles 7, 9(1) and 10(1) of the Covenant and held that it is under an obligation to provide the author with an effective remedy, including compensation, and to take measures to prevent similar violations in the future.