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On 4 June 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in Case C-621/24 (Landkreis Schweinfurt v FB), following a request for a preliminary ruling from the German Federal Social Court (Bundessozialgericht). The case concerned the interpretation of Article 17(2) and (5) and Article 20(1)(c) of Directive 2013/33/EU (Reception Conditions Directive), regarding the reduction of material reception conditions for an applicant whose application for international protection had been declared inadmissible and who was awaiting transfer to a Member State responsible for examining the application.

The Court held that Article 17(2), read in conjunction with Article 2(g) of Directive 2013/33, requires Member States to ensure material reception conditions that provide an adequate standard of living, guaranteeing applicants’ subsistence and protecting their physical and mental health. It clarified that this requirement establishes a minimum threshold which must include, at least, housing, food, clothing and a daily expenses allowance, whether provided in kind, through financial allowances or vouchers, or a combination thereof. It further stated that an adequate standard of living cannot be ensured where support for clothing or the daily expenses allowance is excluded. It also held that the Reception Conditions Directive continues to apply until the applicant has actually been transferred to the responsible Member State. Article 17(2) does not allow Member States to distinguish between applicants subject to a Dublin transfer decision and other applicants as regards access to material reception conditions. Article 20 of Directive 2013/33 exhaustively lists the circumstances in which material reception conditions may be reduced or withdrawn, and a Dublin transfer situation is not among them.

The Court therefore concluded that Article 17(2), read in conjunction with Article 2(g) of Directive 2013/33, precludes national legislation which reduces material reception conditions to an applicant following the rejection of his or her application as inadmissible and pending transfer to another Member State.

Furthermore, the Court recalled that a “subsequent application” under Article 2(q) of Directive 2013/32/EU (rAPD) refers to a further application for international protection made after a final decision on a previous application, which may be declared inadmissible under Article 33(2)(d) rAPD where no new elements are presented. This concept applies where the previous application has been finally decided in another Member State. That situation is distinguished from cases governed by the Dublin III Regulation, where responsibility for examining the application lies with another Member State and the Member State concerned only applies the responsibility criteria without examining the substance of the claim. It therefore held that an application rejected as inadmissible solely on the ground that another Member State is responsible to examine the application and accompanied by a transfer decision does not constitute a “subsequent application”, thus, it does not fall within the scope of Article 20(1)(c) of Directive 2013/33.

On 26 May 2026, the Third Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in J.B. v. Greece (Application no. 54796/16). The case concerns the potential return of the applicant from Greece to Türkiye under the EU-Türkiye Statement of 18 March 2016.

The applicant left Syria in April 2015 due to the armed conflict and alleged risks of persecution on account of his ethnic and religious background. He travelled to Türkiye, where he remained for approximately one year under temporary protection. In May 2016 he arrived in Greece, where he was arrested on grounds of unlawful entry. He applied for international protection claiming that he faced a risk of ill-treatment in Türkiye due to his Armenian origin and his Christian faith. His application for international protection was declared inadmissible on the basis that Türkiye constituted a “first country of asylum” or a “safe third country”, a decision upheld on appeal by the domestic authorities. The applicant complained before the ECtHR about deficiencies on the examination of his asylum application by the Greek authorities, as well as the risk he entailed if returned to Türkiye, including the chain refoulement to Syria, and about the conditions of his detention in Greece.

In regard to the complaint under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights concerning the risk of ill-treatment upon removal, the Court found that since the applicant had in the meantime obtained refugee status in France, the risk of ill-treatment if returned to Türkiye and subsequently to Syria has ceased to exist. Therefore, it considered unjustified to continue the examination of that complaint.

In relation to Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3, the Court found that the applicant’s asylum claim had been examined through a multi-layered procedure before the asylum authorities and domestic courts, during which he was interviewed with interpretation, able to present his individual circumstances and challenge the application of the ‘’safe third country’’ concept. It also held that the authorities assessed both his personal situation and relevant country information concerning Türkiye through reports, statistics and objective material, including the alleged risk of onward refoulement to Syria and the assurances provided within the framework of the EU-Türkiye Statement. Therefore, the Court concluded that the Greek authorities could reasonably rely on those assurances and supporting material and that the applicant had been afforded effective safeguards against arbitrary removal contrary to Article 3, finding no violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3.

Finally, regarding to the complaint under Article 3 ECHR concerning the conditions of detention pending removal, the Court reiterated that Greek police stations are facilities designed only for short periods of confinement and that detention therein for periods ranging from one to three months have consistently been found contrary to Article 3, particularly in view of deficiencies such as overcrowding, poor sanitary conditions and lack of outdoor exercise. Since the applicant had been detained in Mytilene police station for one month and nineteen days, the Court found that the conditions of his detention amounted to degrading treatment contrary to Article 3

On 2 April 2026, the Human Rights Committee (CCPR) published its Views in the communication No. 3742/2020 submitted by Gentilmen Issa Magumba against the Republic of Korea, concerning the refusal to process an asylum application lodged in an airport transit zone and the applicant’s prolonged confinement in that zone.

The author, a national of the Democratic Republic of Congo, was held for approximately 14 months in the transit area of Incheon International Airport after being denied the possibility to apply for refugee status on the ground that he was a transit passenger and not subject to entry inspection. He claimed that this refusal exposed him to a risk of refoulement and that his confinement amounted to arbitrary detention and inhuman treatment.

The Committee found a violation of Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights due to the denial of access to the asylum procedure. It reiterated that States must not remove individuals where there are substantial grounds for believing that they face a real risk of irreparable harm and must ensure access to an effective and independent review with suspensive effect. In the present case, the author’s asylum request was rejected solely on formal grounds linked to his status as a transit passenger, depriving him of any opportunity to seek protection against refoulement. The Committee held that domestic legal provisions cannot be applied in a manner that undermines obligations under the Covenant.

The Committee further found a violation of Article 9(1), holding that the author’s confinement in the airport transit area constituted a deprivation of liberty. It recalled that such deprivation may arise from confinement in a restricted airport area without free consent, and that prolonged and indefinite detention of asylum seekers may be arbitrary. The Committee noted that the author was subjected to de facto detention for approximately 14 months within a space under the State party’s jurisdiction, without any legal basis, as no formal detention order had been issued. His confinement was of indefinite duration, lacked appropriate justification, and was not based on an assessment of necessity or proportionality. The Committee therefore concluded that the author’s detention was arbitrary and constituted a violation of Article 9(1) of the Covenant.

Finally, the Committee found the conditions of detention and the prolonged exposure to inadequate living conditions such as lack of privacy, insufficient access to food, medical care and sanitary facilities and constant lighting during COVID-19 pandemic, to be incompatible with human dignity, therefore finding a violation of Article 10(1) of the Covenant.

The Committee concluded that the State party violated Articles 7, 9(1) and 10(1) of the Covenant and held that it is under an obligation to provide the author with an effective remedy, including compensation, and to take measures to prevent similar violations in the future.