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On 2 April 2026, the Human Rights Committee (CCPR) published its Views in the communication No. 3742/2020 submitted by Gentilmen Issa Magumba against the Republic of Korea, concerning the refusal to process an asylum application lodged in an airport transit zone and the applicant’s prolonged confinement in that zone.

The author, a national of the Democratic Republic of Congo, was held for approximately 14 months in the transit area of Incheon International Airport after being denied the possibility to apply for refugee status on the ground that he was a transit passenger and not subject to entry inspection. He claimed that this refusal exposed him to a risk of refoulement and that his confinement amounted to arbitrary detention and inhuman treatment.

The Committee found a violation of Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights due to the denial of access to the asylum procedure. It reiterated that States must not remove individuals where there are substantial grounds for believing that they face a real risk of irreparable harm and must ensure access to an effective and independent review with suspensive effect. In the present case, the author’s asylum request was rejected solely on formal grounds linked to his status as a transit passenger, depriving him of any opportunity to seek protection against refoulement. The Committee held that domestic legal provisions cannot be applied in a manner that undermines obligations under the Covenant.

The Committee further found a violation of Article 9(1), holding that the author’s confinement in the airport transit area constituted a deprivation of liberty. It recalled that such deprivation may arise from confinement in a restricted airport area without free consent, and that prolonged and indefinite detention of asylum seekers may be arbitrary. The Committee noted that the author was subjected to de facto detention for approximately 14 months within a space under the State party’s jurisdiction, without any legal basis, as no formal detention order had been issued. His confinement was of indefinite duration, lacked appropriate justification, and was not based on an assessment of necessity or proportionality. The Committee therefore concluded that the author’s detention was arbitrary and constituted a violation of Article 9(1) of the Covenant.

Finally, the Committee found the conditions of detention and the prolonged exposure to inadequate living conditions such as lack of privacy, insufficient access to food, medical care and sanitary facilities and constant lighting during COVID-19 pandemic, to be incompatible with human dignity, therefore finding a violation of Article 10(1) of the Covenant.

The Committee concluded that the State party violated Articles 7, 9(1) and 10(1) of the Covenant and held that it is under an obligation to provide the author with an effective remedy, including compensation, and to take measures to prevent similar violations in the future.
 

On 5th of February 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in case C-718/24 (Aleb). The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Administrative Court of Sofia, Bulgaria (Administrativen sad Sofia-grad) regarding the application of the concept ‘safe third country’ under the Directive 2013/32 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (rAPD)).

The Court of Justice clarified that the ‘safe third country’ concept under Article 33(2)(c) rAPD does not necessarily have to be applied when examining the merits of an application for international protection. An application under substantive examination may be rejected as inadmissible on the grounds that a third country is considered to be a safe third country for the applicant, even when the competent authority has found that the applicant meets the conditions for granting international protection laid down in recast Qualification Directive. By contrast, such an application may be rejected as unfounded, or even manifestly unfounded, only under the conditions set out in Article 32 rAPD and may not, in any event, be rejected as unfounded on the grounds of inadmissibility.

The Court further reiterated that, while national authorities may rely on publicly available information and on executive decisions designating certain countries as safe, the application of the “safe third country” must be based on an individual assessment. Member States must ensure that national law provides clear methods to assess, in light of the applicant’s personal circumstances, whether the third country can be considered safe for that applicant.
In addition, Member States are required to lay down, in their national law, criteria for establishing a sufficient connection between the applicant and the third country. That connection must be strong enough to make it reasonable to expect the applicant to travel to that country and cannot be presumed.

Finally, the Court emphasised the requirement of effective judicial protection. National courts must be able to review whether a genuine connection exists between the applicant and the third country relied upon, even where national law does not expressly grant courts the power to carry out such an examination.