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On 25 June 2026, the Constitutional Court of Belgium (Grondwettelijk Hof) delivered its judgment no. 78/2026, concerning the procedure introduced by the Act of 10 March 2024 for granting a residence permit to stateless persons. The applicants challenged several provisions, arguing that the procedure applicable to stateless persons provided less favourable guarantees than those available to beneficiaries of international protection and was therefore discriminatory.

The Court held that the legislature is not required to treat stateless persons in the same way as refugees or beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, as stateless persons are not subject to European legislation. However, it found that several conditions and procedural rules imposed disproportionate limitations on applicants for residence on grounds of statelessness.

It considered that the requirement that applicants must be unable to acquire or regain the nationality of another State was incompatible with the concept of statelessness under the 1954 New York Convention, as a person is stateless when they do not possess any nationality, regardless of whether they may subsequently obtain or recover one. It therefore annulled this condition. The Court also annulled the exclusion of applications where applicants had not previously held lawful residence for more than three months or had not previously applied for international protection, finding that this could disproportionately affect stateless persons who may never have held a residence permit.

The Court held that a personal hearing constitutes an essential procedural safeguard in statelessness proceedings and therefore annulled the provision making such a hearing optional. It also ruled that the five-year residence period must begin once the judgment recognising statelessness becomes final. Finally, it required applicants to receive proof of submission of their application and to be protected, in principle, from enforcement of removal measures during the proceedings, except on grounds of national security or public order.

The Court rejected the remaining complaints, holding that statelessness applicants were not required to benefit from all procedural guarantees applicable to asylum applicants, including an appeal with full jurisdiction and suspensive effect.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 28 May 2026, the High Court of Justice (King’s Bench Division, Administrative Court) delivered its judgment in Freedom from Torture & Anor v Secretary of State for the Home Department (2026 EWHC 1278 (Admin)). The case concerned the challenge to the Secretary of State’s amendments “Allocation of Asylum Accommodation” policy (Versions 11–13), which significantly altered long-standing protective provisions for a particularly vulnerable group of asylum applicants, namely survivors of torture, trafficking and other serious violence victims receiving support from specialist organisations.

The Court held that there had been a long-standing practice of consultation with the Claimants in relation to relevant policy changes and found that the Defendant acted unlawfully by introducing the amendments without prior consultation. It considered that consultation would have been an obvious and reasonable means of assessing the likely impact of the changes on a vulnerable group of asylum applicants.

The Court further held that the Defendant breached the Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED) under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 (“EA 2010”). The Equality Impact Assessments were materially inadequate, as they failed to properly assess the potential disproportionate harm that the policy changes would have on survivors of torture, trafficking and other serious violence, did not engage with relevant evidence of risk, and lacked adequate monitoring.

Finally, the Court held that the Defendant also breached the Tameside duty by introducing fundamental policy changes without adequately investigating their impact on survivors of torture, trafficking and other serious violence despite longstanding evidence of the serious risks faced by this vulnerable group. It held that the Secretary of State failed to undertake inquiry, engage with relevant expert sources, or consider relevant material before adopting the amendments.

Therefore, the Court concluded that the challenged amendments to the Allocation of Asylum Accommodation policy were unlawful.

On 5 March 2026, the Court of Justice of the European  Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in the case C-489/24 (Safita). The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Council of the State of The Netherlands (Raad van State) concerning the interpretation of Directive 2013/32/EU (the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (rAPD)), in particular about the possibility for Member States to adopt several successive decisions extending the time limit for examining applications for international protection where a large number of applications are lodged within a short period.

The Court clarified that, under point (b) of the third subparagraph of Article 31(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU, a Member State may decide on several occasions and consecutively to extend the time limit for the examination procedure. However, the Court emphasised that the application of that provision is subject to three cumulative conditions: (i) applications for international protection must be lodged simultaneously, (ii) they must be lodged by a large number of applicants, and (iii) the situation must make it very difficult in practice to conclude the examination within the initial six-month period. Referring to its previous case law, the Court recalled that such extensions are justified only in the event of a significant increase in applications occurring within a short period, compared with the normal and foreseeable trend in the Member State concerned, and not in situations characterised by a gradual increase of applications over an extended period.

Furthermore, the Court held that under Article 4(1) rAPD, where the number of applications for international protection remains continuously high over an extended period, Member States are obliged to allocate appropriate and sufficient means to the determining authority to enable it to process those applications. A Member State may therefore rely on consecutive extensions only if it demonstrates, with sufficient reasons and evidence, that despite the efforts to address the simultaneous lodging of applications, it did not have sufficient time to allocate the necessary resources. In any case, the duration of successive extensions must not exceed either the time necessary to comply with that obligation or a maximum overall period of 21 months from the lodging of the application.