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On 8 September 2026, the Fourth Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in A.A. v. the Netherlands (Application no. 7481/23), concerning the refusal of family reunification with five of the applicant’s minor children born of his second and third polygamous marriages.

The applicant, a Yemeni national with refugee status in the Netherlands, had contracted three polygamous marriages in Yemen and had thirteen children. The Dutch authorities granted family reunification with his first wife and their eight children, but refused it in respect of the five children born of his second and third marriages on the grounds that polygamy was contrary to public order in the Netherlands. The authorities found that the children lived with their mothers in Türkiye where they had access to housing, education and healthcare. The applicant complained that the refusal violated his right to respect for his family life under Article 8 ECHR.

 In its assessment, the Court reiterated that the protection of family life applies to both “legitimate” and “illegitimate” families, and that the concept of family is not limited to marriage-based relationships. It therefore accepted that family life existed between the applicant and his five children, irrespective of the fact that his second and third polygamous marriages were not recognised in the Netherlands.

The Court then considered whether the Netherlands had complied with its positive obligation to allow the requested family reunification, rather than whether there had been an interference with the applicant’s family life. It noted the strong European consensus prohibiting polygamy and that the applicant had chosen to maintain all three marriages despite having been given the possibility of regularising his situation under Dutch law. It therefore considered that Member States enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation in deciding whether to allow family reunification between fathers and children born of polygamous marriages.

Within that margin of appreciation, the Court found that the Dutch authorities had carried out an individual assessment of the applicant’s circumstances and balanced his right to family life against the interests of immigration control and public order. Although there were ''insurmountable obstacles'' to the family living together in Yemen, the children lived with their mothers in Türkiye where they had access to education and healthcare, and there was no evidence that they faced violence there. They had no ties to the Netherlands other than their relationship with the applicant, who could maintain contact with and visit them, and no particular dependence on him beyond financial support. It further held that, while the best interests of the children must be given significant weight, they do not in themselves require their admission to a Contracting State.

The Court therefore concluded that the domestic authorities had struck a fair balance between the applicant’s right to respect his family life and the State’s interests in enforcing immigration controls and upholding public order, and found no violation of Article 8 ECHR.
 

On 25 June 2026, the Constitutional Court of Belgium (Grondwettelijk Hof) delivered its judgment no. 78/2026, concerning the procedure introduced by the Act of 10 March 2024 for granting a residence permit to stateless persons. The applicants challenged several provisions, arguing that the procedure applicable to stateless persons provided less favourable guarantees than those available to beneficiaries of international protection and was therefore discriminatory.

The Court held that the legislature is not required to treat stateless persons in the same way as refugees or beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, as stateless persons are not subject to European legislation. However, it found that several conditions and procedural rules imposed disproportionate limitations on applicants for residence on grounds of statelessness.

It considered that the requirement that applicants must be unable to acquire or regain the nationality of another State was incompatible with the concept of statelessness under the 1954 New York Convention, as a person is stateless when they do not possess any nationality, regardless of whether they may subsequently obtain or recover one. It therefore annulled this condition. The Court also annulled the exclusion of applications where applicants had not previously held lawful residence for more than three months or had not previously applied for international protection, finding that this could disproportionately affect stateless persons who may never have held a residence permit.

The Court held that a personal hearing constitutes an essential procedural safeguard in statelessness proceedings and therefore annulled the provision making such a hearing optional. It also ruled that the five-year residence period must begin once the judgment recognising statelessness becomes final. Finally, it required applicants to receive proof of submission of their application and to be protected, in principle, from enforcement of removal measures during the proceedings, except on grounds of national security or public order.

The Court rejected the remaining complaints, holding that statelessness applicants were not required to benefit from all procedural guarantees applicable to asylum applicants, including an appeal with full jurisdiction and suspensive effect.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 5 March 2026, the Court of Justice of the European  Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in the case C-489/24 (Safita). The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Council of the State of The Netherlands (Raad van State) concerning the interpretation of Directive 2013/32/EU (the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (rAPD)), in particular about the possibility for Member States to adopt several successive decisions extending the time limit for examining applications for international protection where a large number of applications are lodged within a short period.

The Court clarified that, under point (b) of the third subparagraph of Article 31(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU, a Member State may decide on several occasions and consecutively to extend the time limit for the examination procedure. However, the Court emphasised that the application of that provision is subject to three cumulative conditions: (i) applications for international protection must be lodged simultaneously, (ii) they must be lodged by a large number of applicants, and (iii) the situation must make it very difficult in practice to conclude the examination within the initial six-month period. Referring to its previous case law, the Court recalled that such extensions are justified only in the event of a significant increase in applications occurring within a short period, compared with the normal and foreseeable trend in the Member State concerned, and not in situations characterised by a gradual increase of applications over an extended period.

Furthermore, the Court held that under Article 4(1) rAPD, where the number of applications for international protection remains continuously high over an extended period, Member States are obliged to allocate appropriate and sufficient means to the determining authority to enable it to process those applications. A Member State may therefore rely on consecutive extensions only if it demonstrates, with sufficient reasons and evidence, that despite the efforts to address the simultaneous lodging of applications, it did not have sufficient time to allocate the necessary resources. In any case, the duration of successive extensions must not exceed either the time necessary to comply with that obligation or a maximum overall period of 21 months from the lodging of the application.