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On 18 June 2026, the First Instance Administrative Court of Thessaloniki published its decision to refer a preliminary question to the Court of Justice of the EU regarding the compatibility with EU law of electronic notification of decisions on asylum applications.

The applicant, a Chinese citizen, applied for international protection in 2023, which was rejected as manifestly unfounded. She was informed of the rejection decision when she sought to renew her asylum applicant’s card at the Asylum Office. The applicant claimed she did not receive any email and submitted an appeal. That appeal was dismissed by the Appeals Authority because it was not submitted within the foreseen deadline under national law. She applied to annul the decision of the Appeals Authority and alleged that the calculation of the appeal deadline on the basis of the electronic notification violated her right to effective judicial protection under Article 46 of the Asylum Procedures Directive (APD) and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFREU).

The Court noted that there are no rules in the APD regarding the notification of decisions so the matter can be arranged within the procedural autonomy of each Member State with respect to effective judicial protection and the principle of equivalence. It went on to analyse the national asylum law, national legal instruments with equivalent forms of notification, the APD and CJEU case law and decided to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling:

1.      whether Greece's rule deeming asylum rejection decisions served 48 hours after an email is sent - with no way to verify actual receipt or access, and no means of rebutting that presumption - is compatible with Article 47 CFREU and Article 46 APD, given that this notification date starts the appeal deadline;

2.      whether this violates the principle of equivalence since electronic tax notifications in Greece do include a verification system and courts have rejected an analogous presumption where receipt of a registered letter is disputed.

3.      what is the role of consent to electronic notification in such disputes;

4.      whether the national measure in question creates an irrebuttable presumption of notification;

5.      whether her claim that the message went to spam, should affect the analysis.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 26 May 2026, the Third Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in J.B. v. Greece (Application no. 54796/16). The case concerns the potential return of the applicant from Greece to Türkiye under the EU-Türkiye Statement of 18 March 2016.

The applicant left Syria in April 2015 due to the armed conflict and alleged risks of persecution on account of his ethnic and religious background. He travelled to Türkiye, where he remained for approximately one year under temporary protection. In May 2016 he arrived in Greece, where he was arrested on grounds of unlawful entry. He applied for international protection claiming that he faced a risk of ill-treatment in Türkiye due to his Armenian origin and his Christian faith. His application for international protection was declared inadmissible on the basis that Türkiye constituted a “first country of asylum” or a “safe third country”, a decision upheld on appeal by the domestic authorities. The applicant complained before the ECtHR about deficiencies on the examination of his asylum application by the Greek authorities, as well as the risk he entailed if returned to Türkiye, including the chain refoulement to Syria, and about the conditions of his detention in Greece.

In regard to the complaint under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights concerning the risk of ill-treatment upon removal, the Court found that since the applicant had in the meantime obtained refugee status in France, the risk of ill-treatment if returned to Türkiye and subsequently to Syria has ceased to exist. Therefore, it considered unjustified to continue the examination of that complaint.

In relation to Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3, the Court found that the applicant’s asylum claim had been examined through a multi-layered procedure before the asylum authorities and domestic courts, during which he was interviewed with interpretation, able to present his individual circumstances and challenge the application of the ‘’safe third country’’ concept. It also held that the authorities assessed both his personal situation and relevant country information concerning Türkiye through reports, statistics and objective material, including the alleged risk of onward refoulement to Syria and the assurances provided within the framework of the EU-Türkiye Statement. Therefore, the Court concluded that the Greek authorities could reasonably rely on those assurances and supporting material and that the applicant had been afforded effective safeguards against arbitrary removal contrary to Article 3, finding no violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3.

Finally, regarding to the complaint under Article 3 ECHR concerning the conditions of detention pending removal, the Court reiterated that Greek police stations are facilities designed only for short periods of confinement and that detention therein for periods ranging from one to three months have consistently been found contrary to Article 3, particularly in view of deficiencies such as overcrowding, poor sanitary conditions and lack of outdoor exercise. Since the applicant had been detained in Mytilene police station for one month and nineteen days, the Court found that the conditions of his detention amounted to degrading treatment contrary to Article 3

On 2 April 2026, the Human Rights Committee (CCPR) published its Views in the communication No. 3742/2020 submitted by Gentilmen Issa Magumba against the Republic of Korea, concerning the refusal to process an asylum application lodged in an airport transit zone and the applicant’s prolonged confinement in that zone.

The author, a national of the Democratic Republic of Congo, was held for approximately 14 months in the transit area of Incheon International Airport after being denied the possibility to apply for refugee status on the ground that he was a transit passenger and not subject to entry inspection. He claimed that this refusal exposed him to a risk of refoulement and that his confinement amounted to arbitrary detention and inhuman treatment.

The Committee found a violation of Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights due to the denial of access to the asylum procedure. It reiterated that States must not remove individuals where there are substantial grounds for believing that they face a real risk of irreparable harm and must ensure access to an effective and independent review with suspensive effect. In the present case, the author’s asylum request was rejected solely on formal grounds linked to his status as a transit passenger, depriving him of any opportunity to seek protection against refoulement. The Committee held that domestic legal provisions cannot be applied in a manner that undermines obligations under the Covenant.

The Committee further found a violation of Article 9(1), holding that the author’s confinement in the airport transit area constituted a deprivation of liberty. It recalled that such deprivation may arise from confinement in a restricted airport area without free consent, and that prolonged and indefinite detention of asylum seekers may be arbitrary. The Committee noted that the author was subjected to de facto detention for approximately 14 months within a space under the State party’s jurisdiction, without any legal basis, as no formal detention order had been issued. His confinement was of indefinite duration, lacked appropriate justification, and was not based on an assessment of necessity or proportionality. The Committee therefore concluded that the author’s detention was arbitrary and constituted a violation of Article 9(1) of the Covenant.

Finally, the Committee found the conditions of detention and the prolonged exposure to inadequate living conditions such as lack of privacy, insufficient access to food, medical care and sanitary facilities and constant lighting during COVID-19 pandemic, to be incompatible with human dignity, therefore finding a violation of Article 10(1) of the Covenant.

The Committee concluded that the State party violated Articles 7, 9(1) and 10(1) of the Covenant and held that it is under an obligation to provide the author with an effective remedy, including compensation, and to take measures to prevent similar violations in the future.
 

Belgium: Council for Aliens' Law Litigation annuls inadmissibility decisions for beneficiaries of international protection in Greece

On 20 February 2026, the United Chambers of the Council for Aliens’ Law Litigation (RvV-CCE) (CALL) annulled three inadmissibility decisions of the Commissioner-General for Refugees and Stateless Persons (CGRS) concerning applications for international protection lodged by Palestinians who had been granted international protection in Greece. The three cases were examined together in the same proceedings (Nos. 341 503, 341 504, and 341 505 CR).

The cases concerned beneficiaries of international protection whose Greek residence permits had expired. During the waiting period for the renewal of these permits, the applicants lacked access to the rights and benefits associated with their status, including employment, housing, healthcare, and social assistance. The CALL  found that, in the absence of these benefits to meet their basic needs during the waiting  period, the applicants risked falling into extreme material deprivation incompatible with human dignity under Article 4 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Therefore, the Council annulled the three inadmissibility decisions on the ground that the CGRS had failed to sufficiently examine whether the applicants would be able to remain in Greece and meet their basic needs pending the renewal of their residence permits. In doing so, the CALL confirmed its previous case law on the precarious situation of beneficiaries of international protection in Greece (RvV‑CCE 22 January 2024, No. 300 342 CR).

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 5th of February 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in case C-718/24 (Aleb). The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Administrative Court of Sofia, Bulgaria (Administrativen sad Sofia-grad) regarding the application of the concept ‘safe third country’ under the Directive 2013/32 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (rAPD)).

The Court of Justice clarified that the ‘safe third country’ concept under Article 33(2)(c) rAPD does not necessarily have to be applied when examining the merits of an application for international protection. An application under substantive examination may be rejected as inadmissible on the grounds that a third country is considered to be a safe third country for the applicant, even when the competent authority has found that the applicant meets the conditions for granting international protection laid down in recast Qualification Directive. By contrast, such an application may be rejected as unfounded, or even manifestly unfounded, only under the conditions set out in Article 32 rAPD and may not, in any event, be rejected as unfounded on the grounds of inadmissibility.

The Court further reiterated that, while national authorities may rely on publicly available information and on executive decisions designating certain countries as safe, the application of the “safe third country” must be based on an individual assessment. Member States must ensure that national law provides clear methods to assess, in light of the applicant’s personal circumstances, whether the third country can be considered safe for that applicant.
In addition, Member States are required to lay down, in their national law, criteria for establishing a sufficient connection between the applicant and the third country. That connection must be strong enough to make it reasonable to expect the applicant to travel to that country and cannot be presumed.

Finally, the Court emphasised the requirement of effective judicial protection. National courts must be able to review whether a genuine connection exists between the applicant and the third country relied upon, even where national law does not expressly grant courts the power to carry out such an examination.