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On 25 June 2026, the Constitutional Court of Belgium (Grondwettelijk Hof) delivered its judgment no. 78/2026, concerning the procedure introduced by the Act of 10 March 2024 for granting a residence permit to stateless persons. The applicants challenged several provisions, arguing that the procedure applicable to stateless persons provided less favourable guarantees than those available to beneficiaries of international protection and was therefore discriminatory.

The Court held that the legislature is not required to treat stateless persons in the same way as refugees or beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, as stateless persons are not subject to European legislation. However, it found that several conditions and procedural rules imposed disproportionate limitations on applicants for residence on grounds of statelessness.

It considered that the requirement that applicants must be unable to acquire or regain the nationality of another State was incompatible with the concept of statelessness under the 1954 New York Convention, as a person is stateless when they do not possess any nationality, regardless of whether they may subsequently obtain or recover one. It therefore annulled this condition. The Court also annulled the exclusion of applications where applicants had not previously held lawful residence for more than three months or had not previously applied for international protection, finding that this could disproportionately affect stateless persons who may never have held a residence permit.

The Court held that a personal hearing constitutes an essential procedural safeguard in statelessness proceedings and therefore annulled the provision making such a hearing optional. It also ruled that the five-year residence period must begin once the judgment recognising statelessness becomes final. Finally, it required applicants to receive proof of submission of their application and to be protected, in principle, from enforcement of removal measures during the proceedings, except on grounds of national security or public order.

The Court rejected the remaining complaints, holding that statelessness applicants were not required to benefit from all procedural guarantees applicable to asylum applicants, including an appeal with full jurisdiction and suspensive effect.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 26 June 2026, the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) published its decision on the case Amnesty International and Médecins du Monde – International v. Sweden (Complaint No. 227/2023).

The complaint concerned access to healthcare for vulnerable EU nationals in Sweden who due to the lack of health insurance in their country of origin were excluded from subsidised healthcare and, in some cases, unable to access necessary treatment because of the costs involved.  The complainant alleged that this situation resulted in a denial of access to healthcare and discriminatory treatment, in breach of Articles 11 and 13 of the European Social Charter, read alone and in conjunction with Article E.

The Committee recalled that Article 11§1 requires access to healthcare to be effective, affordable and without discrimination, with particular protection for vulnerable groups. It noted that vulnerable EU nationals without healthcare insurance were excluded from subsidised healthcare in Sweden, which in practice prevented access to necessary treatment, including emergency and serious care. While the Government did not dispute these findings, it argued that extending subsidised healthcare to persons exercising free movement rights who lacked healthcare coverage in their country of origin would have significant policy consequences for Sweden. The Committee nevertheless found that excluding persons unable to obtain alternative coverage undermined the effective enjoyment of the right to health and failed to protect a particularly vulnerable group, in violation of Article 11§1 of the Charter.

It found that the rules governing access to healthcare were applied inconsistently across Swedish regions, resulting in unequal treatment of vulnerable EU nationals, who were also treated less favourably than undocumented persons without sufficient justification. The Committee considered that the Government’s arguments based on public health and policy considerations did not justify this difference in treatment and that, in any event, the effects of the measures were disproportionate, as they prevented access to necessary healthcare. It also noted that, although all vulnerable EU nationals seem to not have access to healthcare, the situation had a disproportionate impact on Roma, constituting indirect discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin, in violation of Article E in conjunction with Article 11§1.

With regard to Article 13§1, the Committee recalled that it guarantees a subjective right to social and medical assistance for persons without adequate resources, including urgent care and basic needs. It considered that the issues raised under this provision overlapped with those already examined under Article 11§1 and Article E and therefore found that no separate examination was necessary.

The Committee concluded that there was a violation of Article 11§1 of the Charter, a violation of Article E taken in conjunction with Article 11§1 with respect to the difference in treatment between regions and in comparison, with undocumented persons, and a violation of Article E taken in conjunction with Article 11§1 with respect to indirect discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin.

On 28 May 2026, the High Court of Justice (King’s Bench Division, Administrative Court) delivered its judgment in Freedom from Torture & Anor v Secretary of State for the Home Department (2026 EWHC 1278 (Admin)). The case concerned the challenge to the Secretary of State’s amendments “Allocation of Asylum Accommodation” policy (Versions 11–13), which significantly altered long-standing protective provisions for a particularly vulnerable group of asylum applicants, namely survivors of torture, trafficking and other serious violence victims receiving support from specialist organisations.

The Court held that there had been a long-standing practice of consultation with the Claimants in relation to relevant policy changes and found that the Defendant acted unlawfully by introducing the amendments without prior consultation. It considered that consultation would have been an obvious and reasonable means of assessing the likely impact of the changes on a vulnerable group of asylum applicants.

The Court further held that the Defendant breached the Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED) under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 (“EA 2010”). The Equality Impact Assessments were materially inadequate, as they failed to properly assess the potential disproportionate harm that the policy changes would have on survivors of torture, trafficking and other serious violence, did not engage with relevant evidence of risk, and lacked adequate monitoring.

Finally, the Court held that the Defendant also breached the Tameside duty by introducing fundamental policy changes without adequately investigating their impact on survivors of torture, trafficking and other serious violence despite longstanding evidence of the serious risks faced by this vulnerable group. It held that the Secretary of State failed to undertake inquiry, engage with relevant expert sources, or consider relevant material before adopting the amendments.

Therefore, the Court concluded that the challenged amendments to the Allocation of Asylum Accommodation policy were unlawful.

On 5 March 2026, the Court of Justice of the European  Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in the case C-489/24 (Safita). The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Council of the State of The Netherlands (Raad van State) concerning the interpretation of Directive 2013/32/EU (the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (rAPD)), in particular about the possibility for Member States to adopt several successive decisions extending the time limit for examining applications for international protection where a large number of applications are lodged within a short period.

The Court clarified that, under point (b) of the third subparagraph of Article 31(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU, a Member State may decide on several occasions and consecutively to extend the time limit for the examination procedure. However, the Court emphasised that the application of that provision is subject to three cumulative conditions: (i) applications for international protection must be lodged simultaneously, (ii) they must be lodged by a large number of applicants, and (iii) the situation must make it very difficult in practice to conclude the examination within the initial six-month period. Referring to its previous case law, the Court recalled that such extensions are justified only in the event of a significant increase in applications occurring within a short period, compared with the normal and foreseeable trend in the Member State concerned, and not in situations characterised by a gradual increase of applications over an extended period.

Furthermore, the Court held that under Article 4(1) rAPD, where the number of applications for international protection remains continuously high over an extended period, Member States are obliged to allocate appropriate and sufficient means to the determining authority to enable it to process those applications. A Member State may therefore rely on consecutive extensions only if it demonstrates, with sufficient reasons and evidence, that despite the efforts to address the simultaneous lodging of applications, it did not have sufficient time to allocate the necessary resources. In any case, the duration of successive extensions must not exceed either the time necessary to comply with that obligation or a maximum overall period of 21 months from the lodging of the application.

On 22 January 2026, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) published  its judgment in the case of A.N. and Others v. Greece (Applications nos. 65267/19 and two others) finding that Greece violated Article 3 of the Convention due to inadequate living conditions at the Samos Reception and Identification Centre (RIC).

The case concerned seven unaccompanied children accommodated at the Samos RIC for four to ten months, facing severe overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, inadequate medical and psychosocial support, an insufficient "safe zone" for minors, and an ineffective guardianship system (§§72-79).

The Court emphasised that unaccompanied minors constituted a particularly vulnerable group and that credible allegations of poor conditions can shift the burden of proof to the State (§120). The ECtHR further highlighted that the situation of vulnerable persons, and particularly unaccompanied minors, requires special protection (§124).

Recalling its case-law on the vulnerability of  asylum seeking children and reception conditions in Samos RIC, the ECtHR concluded that, considering their age and their particular vulnerability as unaccompanied minors,  the reception conditions to which they were subjected in and around the Samos RIC amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. (§134). The Court also decided that there is no need to examine the admissibility and merits of the complaints under Article 13, in conjunction with Articles 3 and 8 as well as the complaint under Article 8 of the Convention.