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On 23 April 2026, the Advocate General Emiliou delivered his opinion in Case C‑414/25 (Sedrata) following a request for a preliminary ruling by the Supreme Court of Cassation, Italy (Corte suprema di cassazione). The case concerned the compatibility of the Italian legislation implementing the Italy-Albania bilateral agreement, which allows the transfer of third-country nationals to facilities located in Albanian territory for the purposes of border and return procedures, with EU law, in particular with the provisions of Directive 2008/115/EC (the Return Directive) and of Directive 2013/32/EU (the recast Asylum Procedures Directive).

The Advocate General considered that the Return Directive does not, in principle, preclude national legislation permitting the transfer of third-country nationals to detention facilities located in a third State, provided that those facilities remain under the jurisdiction of the Member State concerned and that EU law continues to apply in full. However, he stressed that such arrangements are compatible with the Return Directive only insofar as they do not undermine its effectiveness or the rights it guarantees. In particular, the competent authorities must ensure access to legal assistance and communication with legal representatives and family members, guarantee that detention is ended without undue delay where the legal conditions are no longer met and comply with the specific safeguards applicable to children and other vulnerable persons. He further noted that the geographical location of detention facilities may require appropriate organisational and logistical measures to ensure that these guarantees are effectively secured in practice.

Furthermore, the Advocate General considered that Article 9 (1) of the rAPD does not, in principle, preclude national legislation allowing the detention of a third-country national subject to return procedures in facilities located in a third State, where that person lodges an application for international protection while being held there. He explained that EU law does not require Member States to organise border or return procedures exclusively within their territory. For that reason, the requirement that applicants must be allowed to “remain in the Member State” must be understood in a way that it covers situations falling under the jurisdiction of the Member State, even if they take place outside its physical territory. However, he stressed that this approach is only acceptable if the national legislation ensures full respect for the procedural guarantees laid down in the Directive, especially that applicants must have access to information and legal assistance, be able to participate effectively in the procedure and, where necessary, appear before the competent authorities, while also benefiting from the specific safeguards applicable to vulnerable persons. He also stressed that detention-related guarantees, including judicial review, must be fully respected.

Finally, the Advocate General emphasised that Member States cannot circumvent their obligations under EU law by transferring individuals to facilities outside their territory, and that they remain fully responsible for ensuring compliance with EU rules and fundamental rights, including those guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

On 24 March 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in the Case C‑767/23 (Remling). The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State, Netherlands (Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State) regarding the interpretation of Article 267 TFEU in the light of Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, on whether a court of last instance may refuse to make a reference for a preliminary ruling by means of summary reasoning without specifying the applicable exceptions.

The Court reiterated that, where there is no judicial remedy under national law against the decisions of a court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal are in principle obliged, under the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, to refer questions concerning the interpretation or validity of EU law to the Court of Justice. That obligation may be relieved only in a situation corresponding to one of the Cilfit exceptions: (i) where the question of EU law is irrelevant to the resolution of the dispute, (ii) where the provision of EU law has already been interpreted by the Court, or (iii) where the correct interpretation of EU law is so obvious as to leave no scope for reasonable doubt.

Thus, the Court held that where a court of last instance considers that one of those exceptions applies, it must, in accordance with Article 267 TFEU read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, state the reasons for its decision by setting out specifically and concretely, why the relevant exception is applicable in the circumstances of the case. That obligation applies irrespective of whether the parties have expressly requested a preliminary ruling as long as a question of EU law is raised. National legislation permitting courts to decide by means of summary reasoning for the sound administration of justice does not relieve them of the obligation to provide specific and concrete reasons. A decision merely stating that the conditions for summary reasoning are satisfied is insufficient. However, a court of last instance may, where appropriate, rely on the reasoning of a lower court, provided that the latter has set out the grounds justifying the application of one of the Cilfit exceptions.

On 5 March 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in the Case C-458/24 (Daraa). The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Administrative Court of Sigmaringen, Germany (Verwaltungsgericht Sigmaringen) concerning the interpretation of the Dublin III Regulation and Directive 2013/32 in a situation where the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application unilaterally suspends transfers.

The Court held that the second and third subparagraphs of Article 3(2) of the Dublin Regulation should be interpreted as meaning that a unilateral suspension by the Member State responsible of take-charge or take-back procedures does not require the determining Member State to continue applying the Charter III criteria, nor to assume responsibility itself. Article 3(2) applies only where two cumulative conditions are met: (i) the existence of systemic flaws in the asylum procedure or reception conditions and (ii) a resulting risk of inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. A unilateral suspension does not, in itself, satisfy those conditions and cannot be treated as evidence of such flaws. Consequently, no additional or implicit condition relating to the willingness of the responsible Member State may be inferred from that provision.

As regards Article 29(1) and (2) of the Dublin Regulation, the Court held that the six-month time limit for carrying out a transfer continues to apply irrespective of the reasons preventing the transfer. Under Article 29(2), where the transfer is not carried out within that period, responsibility automatically passes to the requesting Member State. That transfer of responsibility is unconditional and does not depend on the conduct of the Member State initially responsible, including situations where the failure to transfer results from that State’s unilateral suspension of cooperation. The Regulation does not provide for suspension or interruption of that time limit, and extensions are limited to the situations expressly provided for in Article 29(2). The Court further clarified that, during the running of the transfer period, the Member State initially designated as responsible remains bound by its obligations under the Regulation, and Member States must cooperate to carry out the transfer. However, a failure by one Member State to comply with its obligations cannot justify non-compliance by another; remedies lie in infringement proceedings under Articles 258 and 259 TFEU.

Finally, the Court interpreted Article 33(1) and (2) of Directive 2013/32 as precluding a Member State from rejecting an application for international protection as inadmissible on the ground that the Member State responsible is unwilling to take charge or take back the applicant. The grounds for inadmissibility listed in Article 33(2) are exhaustive and must be interpreted strictly, and such a situation is not included among them.

On 5 March 2026, the Advocate General Rimvydas Norkus issued his opinion in the case C-819/25 (PPU) [Gonrieh]. The case related to the preliminary reference by the French-speaking Brussels Court of First Instance (Tribunal de première instance francophone de Bruxelles) regarding the scope of the Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification (the FRD), concerning the granting of a visa for family reunification which requires the beneficiary to appear in person for its issuance, while the person is unable to leave the third country where they reside and is facing life-threatening conditions. The questions referred enquired whether EU law applies only to the decision to grant the visa, or also to ensure that the person can effectively receive it and, whether Member States are obliged to provide assistance to enable the beneficiary to obtain the visa under such circumstances, including where their physical departure from the third country is impossible due to imminent danger.

The Advocate General considers that the implementation of EU law does not conclude with the decision of granting the visa. Relying on Article 13(1) of the FRD, which requires Member States to authorise entry and to grant “every facility for obtaining the required visas”, he concludes that the obligation extends until the issuance of the visa. That provision, read in light of the objective of the Directive to ensure the effectiveness of family reunification and recital 13 requiring efficient procedures, imposes a duty of active and continuous administrative cooperation. Accordingly, where a Member State requires the beneficiary’s personal appearance to verify identity, EU law and therefore the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, pursuant to Article 51(1) thereof, applies until the administrative formalities necessary for issuing the visa are completed. Limiting EU law to the mere approval of the visa would undermine the effectiveness of the right to family reunification.

However, the Advocate General makes a distinction between administrative facilitation and diplomatic or consular intervention. He considers that Article 13(1) does not require a Member State which has granted visas to nationals of a third country in the context of family reunification to include them in an evacuation process put in place by that Member State or to inform the authorities of any third country preventing these beneficiaries from travelling to the Union that the latter have a visa to stay in the Member State in question.  Accordingly, while Article 13(1) of Directive 2003/86 requires Member States to grant every facility for obtaining the required visas and to ensure through effective administrative measures that the visa is actually issued, it does not impose an obligation to adopt external, diplomatic or evacuation measures to secure the beneficiaries’ departure from a third country.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 23 January 2026, the Committee Against Torture of the United Nations (CAT) published its decision in the Communication No. 1079/2021 submitted by A.A. against Australia. The communication concerns the lawfulness of prolonged detention in Australia and at the Manus Regional Processing Centre in Papua New Guinea, and the possible accountability of Australia for alleged violations of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (hereinafter, the Convention).

The complainant, an Iranian national, arrived in Australia in July 2013 and was transferred under a migration cooperation agreement to the Manus Detention Centre in Papua New Guinea, where he was subjected to harsh detention conditions and torture. He was temporarily returned to Australia in 2019 for medical treatment but remained detained administratively until 2022. The applicant claimed that his detention in both Australia and Papua New Guinea was inhuman and degrading and caused him severe physical and mental suffering.

The Committee found that the complainant suffered torture and inhuman treatment while detained at the Manus Regional Processing Centre in Papua New Guinea. Although these acts occurred outside Australian territory, the Committee noted that Australia exercised effective control over the detention system through its central role in designing the migration arrangements, providing full funding, and establishing the overall framework and operational structure of the centre. Even if direct operational control by Australian agents was absent, the Committee held that Australia remained responsible, reflecting both the principle of effective control and the doctrine of joint responsibility under international law. It further observed that Australia failed to take measures to prevent acts of torture, to investigate and punish abuses, and to ensure adequate medical care during his detention, hence constituting a violation of Article 2(1), read in conjunction with Article 1(1) of the Convention.

The Committee also found that the complainant’s administrative detention in Australia was not justified, necessary, or proportionate, and lacked adequate review, thereby amounting to inhuman and degrading treatment, in violation of Article 16(1) of the Convention.
Finally, the Committee recommended that Australia provide the complainant with redress, including compensation, rehabilitation, and guarantees of non-repetition, and take measures to prevent similar violations in the future.