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On 15 January 2026, the Court of Justice of the EU ruled in case C-742/24 [Havvitt] concerning the reasons to refuse access to labour market for an applicant for international protection. 

The case concerned an asylum applicant’s delay in submitting the required international protection questionnaire to the competent Irish authorities despite receiving several extensions due to COVID-19 related disruptions. Due to this delay, the authorities rejected his request to access the labour market on the grounds of his alleged non-cooperation. Following domestic litigation, the Supreme Court of Ireland decided to ask the CJEU whether “delay” under Article 15(1) of Directive 2013/33/EU (RCD) must be a delay caused solely by the asylum applicant, or whether any material delay that can be partly attributed to the applicant, such as a ninemonth failure to answer an international protection questionnaire, counts as “noncooperation” even when the Member State or external factors (e.g., COVID19) also contribute. The national court also sought to determine whether the wording “attributed in part” in Ireland’s Reception Conditions Regulations 2018 is compatible with the RCD’s transposition requirements, given the discretion Member States have in implementing the rules. 

The Court recalled that access to the labour market must be granted if no first-instance decision is taken within nine months from the lodging of the application, unless the delay is attributable to the applicant. Drawing on Directive 2013/32 (APD) and the relationship between attribution of delay and obligation to cooperate under Articles 31 (3) and 13 APD, as well as its own case-law, the Court held that delays are attributable to the applicant where they result from a failure to cooperate with the authorities, including the obligation to provide information and documents necessary to examine the application. A total lack of cooperation throughout the relevant period may prevent the nine-month period from running at all, whereas partial failures to cooperate should result in the nine-month period being extended only by the time corresponding to the applicant’s failure to cooperate; any delays attributable solely to other causes should be excluded from that extension. 

Where delays have mixed causes, attributable both to the applicant and to the Member State or external factors such as a pandemic, these delay may be attributed to the applicant only where a causal link is established between the applicant’s conduct and the delay, and only to the extent of the applicant’s share of responsibility. Where it is possible to determine that share, the competent authorities may extend the nine-month period only by the fraction of time corresponding to the applicant’s contribution to the delay, not by the entire period affected by mixed causes.  

Finally, the Court found that Article 15(1) RCD allows a Member State to refuse labour market access where the application has been pending for at least nine months and the delay is partly attributable to the applicant, provided the refusal is based only on the period or proportion of delay causally linked to the applicant’s conduct. 

On 18 December, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) published its judgment in the case C-560/23 Tang regarding a preliminary question submitted by the Danish Refugee Board (Copenhagen) on the interpretation of the time limits for carrying out a Dublin transfer under Article 29 (1) and (2) of the Dublin III Regulation. 

The case concerns situations where a national judicial body makes a final decision on the substantive legality of a second transfer decision, adopted after a first transfer decision has been annulled, and remits the case to the competent administrative authority for re-examination. The Board asked the CJEU whether the six-month transfer time limit starts to run on the date of the final decision on the legality of the second transfer or on the date on which the first transfer decision was annulled. 

The Court first noted that under Article 29 (1) DRIII, the time limit starts to run from the acceptance of the take charge or take back request by the other Member State or, where an appeal with suspensive effect has been lodged against the transfer decision, from the moment the judicial decision on the appeal has become final. According to its previous case law, the second situation in the provision ensures equality of arms and the effectiveness of the appeal procedures. The Court referred to the Opinion of Advocate General Richard de la Tour and his observation that the provision gives no specific rule for calculating the time limit when a court annuls a first transfer decision, sends the case back for reexamination due to a decisive change in circumstances, and then decides on a second transfer decision for the same person.

However, it’s clear that Article 27 (1) confers a right to an effective remedy against a transfer decision and earlier jurisprudence confirmed that the starting point of the transfer time limit is the final judicial decision on the merits that can no longer block implementation and not the provisional decision suspending the implementation of the transfer. Where national legislation allows annulment of a transfer decision and remittal for re-examination following new decisive circumstances, it is possible to have two transfer decisions and two separate appeals. In such cases, because both decisions relate to the same applicant’s transfer after the responsible Member State accepted the take-back or take-charge request, they belong to a single procedural process. Therefore, the decision that annuls the first transfer decision must be understood as an interim decision that allows the authorities to examine the new circumstances but does not terminate the transfer procedure in a final manner.  

Finally, the Court stressed that, in the absence of specific EU rules, Member States can organise their national laws in line with the principle of procedural autonomy, but Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU must be observed in every case. Therefore, Member States are required to provide rapid and effective remedies, respecting both the purpose of swift processing of the Regulation and Article 47 of the Charter. While the deadline promotes speedy transfers, it cannot override the necessity of a thorough, timely appeal process. Consequently, the Court found that the sixmonth period begins on the date of the final decision on the substantive legality of the second transfer decision, and both the second decision and the subsequent annulment must be rendered promptly to avoid unnecessary delays in the overall transfer procedure. 

On 18 December 2025, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) delivered its judgment in case C-417/23 (Slagelse Almennyttige Boligselskab, Afdeling Schackenborgvænge).  
 

The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Østre Landsret (High Court of Eastern Denmark) on whether Danish legislation requiring development plans to reduce the proportion of public family housing in designated “transformation areas” is compatible with the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin under Directive 2000/43. The request stemmed from five sets of proceedings relating to housing estates in Ringparken (Slagelse) and Mjølnerparken (Copenhagen), in which tenants contested lease terminations and development plans based, inter alia, on the fact that more than 50% of residents were classified as “immigrants from non-Western countries and their descendants”. The referring court asked whether that classification falls within the concept of “ethnic origin” and whether the national scheme constitutes direct or indirect discrimination within the meaning of Article 2(2) of the Directive.  

The CJEU held that Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2000/43 must be interpreted as meaning that national legislation requiring the adoption of development plans to reduce the proportion of public family housing in residential areas where more than 50% of residents are “immigrants from non-Western countries and their descendants” may constitute direct discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin. Although nationality and country of birth are neutral criteria taken in isolation, the Court found that the Danish criterion is based on a complex combination of such factors which may, in context, amount to a distinction based on ethnic origin. The decisive role played by that criterion in classifying areas as “transformation areas” can result in less favourable treatment, since all residents of such areas are exposed to an increased risk of lease termination and loss of home compared with residents of similarly disadvantaged areas not meeting the 50% threshold. The Court underlined that it is for the referring court to verify whether the legislation was in fact adopted on the basis of ethnic origin, in which case the burden shifts to the authorities to demonstrate that the scheme is justified by objective factors unrelated to discrimination. 

As regards indirect discrimination under Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/43, the CJEU held that, even in the absence of direct discrimination, Danish legislation may still constitute indirect discrimination if an apparently neutral criterion places persons of certain ethnic origins at a particular disadvantage compared with others. The Court clarified that indirect discrimination may arise even where several ethnic groups are affected, unless the measure is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and complies with the principle of proportionality. While objectives such as social cohesion, integration and public housing policy may, in principle, constitute overriding reasons in the public interest, the measures adopted must be appropriate, necessary and proportionate, and must strike a fair balance with the fundamental right to respect for the home under Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. The Court held that it is for the referring court to verify, in particular, whether the obligation to adopt development plans genuinely and consistently contributes to those objectives, whether less restrictive alternatives exist, and whether the increased risk of lease termination and loss of housing for residents of “transformation areas” leads to disproportionate disadvantages. 

On 18 December the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in Case C‑184/24 (Sidi Bouzid). The case concerns AF and his minor child BF, applicants for international protection in Milan, who challenge the withdrawal of their material reception conditions following AF’s refusal to be transferred to another accommodation centre. The national authorities justified the withdrawal under Article 23(1)(a) of Legislative Decree No 142 as an administrative measure related to the organization of reception centres, while AF argues it violates his and his child’s rights to basic needs and protection as vulnerable persons under Directive 2013/33 (the recast RCD). The regional administrative court for Lombardia has referred a preliminary question to the Court of Justice asking whether EU law precludes withdrawal of reception conditions, not as a sanction but because of a refusal to transfer, where this leaves applicants unable to meet basic needs, provided the authority ensures equivalent conditions at another centre. 

While referring to the relevant case-law (Haqbin, Ministero dell’Interno), the Court emphasized that “material reception conditions” include housing, food, clothing, and daily expenses allowances. These conditions must guarantee a dignified standard of living, particularly for vulnerable persons such as minors or single parents, in accordance with Articles 17 and 21 of the recast RCD. While Article 20 permits withdrawal or reduction of reception conditions in cases of abuse, including when an applicant abandons the designated place of residence without informing the authorities, a refusal to transfer to another accommodation centre does not constitute “abandonment,” as the applicant remains present and traceable, and therefore the withdrawal of all material reception conditions is not allowed under Article 20(1)(a).  

The Court confirmed that repeated refusal to comply with a transfer decision may constitute a serious breach of the rules of an accommodation centre under Article 20(4), which can justify the imposition of proportionate sanctions, including partial reduction of material reception conditions, provided that the applicant’s dignity and fundamental rights are respected. In assessing such breaches, Member States must consider the nature and persistence of the conduct, its impact on the management of reception centres, and the applicant’s particular circumstances. The Court stressed that the competent authorities retain the power to implement necessary transfers to ensure the effective management of reception facilities, while upholding the applicant’s fundamental rights and maintaining equivalent reception conditions in the new centre. 

On that basis, the Court concluded that the national legislation at issue precludes the competent authority from withdrawing all material reception conditions from an applicant who refuses transfer to another accommodation centre, while confirming that partial sanctions may be imposed if the conditions of Article 20(4) and (5) are met.  

On 19 January 2026, the Fifth Section of the European Court of Human Rights (the “Court”) published the communicated case of  K.A. v. Türkiye (Application no. 13754/25) and the case of  A.H. v. Türkiye (Application no. 20237/25). The case of K.A. concerns a Syrian national facing expulsion from Türkiye on national-security grounds, either to Ecuador as a designated safe third country or through ‘voluntary return’ to Syria. The applicant challenges the deportation order and the imposition of a security code, arguing that he faces a real risk of death or ill-treatment if removed and that the authorities failed to conduct an adequate safe third country assessment, particularly regarding the risk of chain refoulement to Syria.  

The applicant complains under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention that he would be subjected to death or inhumane and degrading treatment, if deported and that the domestic authorities failed to conduct an adequate “safe third country” assessment, particularly with regard to the risk of chain refoulement to Syria. 

The case of A.H. concerns a Syrian national under temporary protection in Türkiye who faces expulsion to Malaysia as a designated safe third country or ‘voluntary return’ to Syria following his release from prison after a conviction for membership of a terrorist organisation. The removal order was upheld by the administrative courts and the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s individual application as manifestly ill-founded. 

The applicant complains under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention that the domestic authorities failed to conduct an adequate “safe third country” assessment, particularly concerning the risk of chain refoulement to Syria. He further alleges a violation of Article 8 of the Convention on the basis that his removal to Malaysia, a country with which he has no established ties, would disproportionately interfere with his established family and private life in Türkiye. 

On 19 January 2026, the Fifth Section of the European Court of Human Rights (the “Court”) published the communicated case of H.K.T. and I.T. v. Türkiye (Application no. 36370/21). The case concerns an Iranian couple who claim a risk of persecution in Iran due to their political activities. Although previously recognised as refugees by UNHCR and granted international protection applicant status in Türkiye, their protection was withdrawn in 2016 for leaving their assigned city without authorisation. The applicants’ appeal against this decision was dismissed by the administrative courts. 

The applicants later lodged a request for an interim measure with the Constitutional Court, which was dismissed on the ground that the applicants’ removal had not yet been ordered by the domestic authorities. 

In April 2017, the first applicant was deported to Iran without prior notification of any official decision ordering his removal. The applicants’ representative filed an additional unsuccessful submission with the Constitutional Court. The applicants allege violations of Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention, arguing that the authorities failed to assess the risk of ill-treatment and to provide an effective remedy. 

The Court has requested clarification on the legal basis and lawfulness of the first applicant’s removal, the adequacy of risk assessments and remedies, and the second applicant’s current status and potential risk of refoulement.