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On 16 July 2026, the Belgian Constitutional Court delivered its judgment no. 89/2026 concerning two actions for annulment brought by several organisations against provisions of the Act of 12 May 2024, which introduced measures aimed at strengthening the removal of third-country nationals staying irregularly in Belgium. The contested measures concerned mandatory medical examinations for the purpose of removal, presumptions of absconding in Dublin transfer procedures, the obligation to cooperate with return procedures and alternatives to detention.

First, the Court raised doubts as to whether mandatory medical examinations imposed for the purpose of enforcing return decisions are compatible with Directive 2008/115/EC (the ''Return Directive''). It observed that a compulsory examination may affect human dignity and interfere with physical integrity, particularly where it can be imposed against the person's will for non-therapeutic purposes and without requiring the authorities to provide alternatives. It therefore referred two questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) concerning the compatibility of the measure with the Return Directive and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

Second, the Court distinguished between circumstances indicating an intention to abscond from the authorities and a failure to cooperate with the transfer procedure. It considered that a presumption of absconding may be justified where a person fails to report to the assigned reception facility or leaves it without notifying the Immigration Office of an address within three working days, while allowing the person to subsequently demonstrate that they did not intend to abscond from the authorities. By contrast, failure to cooperate with a mandatory medical examination or an intensive support programme does not justify such a presumption where the person remains at their place of residence. The Court therefore annulled the relevant provisions.

Third, the Court clarified that the obligation to cooperate does not apply to a person who has lodged an appeal with suspensive effect against a return decision and is consequently entitled to remain in Belgium pending that appeal.

Lastly, the Court held that even where alternatives to detention are presumed to be ineffective, the authorities must carry out a specific and individual assessment before resorting to detention. It further annulled the legislation insofar as it provided for only two types of alternative measures and did not include the possibility of requiring the person concerned to surrender their identity or travel documents.
 

On 29 June 2026, the Spanish Supreme Court delivered its judgment no. 814/2026 in cassation proceedings no. 3795/2025, concerning the scope of the special rejection at the border (rechazo en frontera) regime under Additional Provision 10 of Organic Law 4/2000 on the rights and freedoms of foreigners in Spain (LOEX) in the context of irregular entry at the border of Ceuta and Melilla.

The case concerned an Algerian national who was intercepted by the Spanish authorities at sea while attempting to enter Ceuta by swimming and was subsequently handed over to the Moroccan authorities. He challenged that action on the grounds that it had been carried out without an administrative procedure or decision and without legal assistance or access to international protection. The Administrative Court no. 2 of Ceuta partially upheld his action and annulled the administrative measure, while rejecting his claim for compensation. The High Court of Justice of Andalusia subsequently upheld that judgment. The State Administration subsequently lodged an appeal in cassation before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court examined whether Additional Provision 10 LOEX, which allows persons detected at the border of Ceuta or Melilla while attempting to overcome border-containment elements to be rejected in order to prevent their irregular entry, also applies to persons intercepted at sea while attempting to reach those cities by swimming. Referring to Constitutional Court judgments 172/2020 and 13/2021, it held that the special regime is not generally applicable to every person attempting to cross the borders of Ceuta or Melilla irregularly. Rather, it applies where a person attempts to cross the border by overcoming border-containment elements, such as the border fences.
It held that technological border-control devices, such as drones, thermal cameras or sensors, cannot be equated with border-containment elements because their function is to monitor, detect or provide alerts rather than physically prevent border crossings. However, the Court clarified that Additional Provision 10 is not limited to terrestrial measures and that, if border-containment elements were established at sea, the special border rejection regime could apply to persons attempting to cross the border by overcoming such elements.

The Supreme Court distinguished rejection at the border (rechazo en frontera) from other measures regulated by the LOEX, including return to the point of origin (retorno al punto de origen), expulsion (expulsión) and return (devolución). It noted that the return (devolución) procedure applies, inter alia, to persons attempting to enter Spain irregularly, including those intercepted at the border or in its vicinity. Accordingly, persons intercepted at sea while attempting to enter Ceuta or Melilla by swimming are subject to the return (devolución) procedure rather than rejection at the border (rechazo en frontera). The Court therefore dismissed the State Administration’s appeal in cassation and upheld the judgment under appeal.

On 16 June 2026, the Administrative Court of Gelsenkirchen delivered its judgment in case no. 19a K 5383/23.A, concerning the application of Regulation (EU) 2024/1347 (the ''Qualification Regulation'') to pending asylum procedures.
 

The case concerned a mother and daughter from Iran whose asylum applications had been rejected in November 2023. The daughter had entered Germany in 2022 at the age of 14 and reached the age of majority during the proceedings. The case was still pending when the Qualification Regulation became applicable on 12 June 2026.

The Court held that the Regulation applies not only to asylum applications lodged from 12 June 2026, but also to asylum procedures that remained pending on that date. It found that Section 87e (2) of the German Asylum Act, which restricted its application to applications lodged from 12 June 2026, was therefore incompatible with EU law and had to be disapplied pursuant to the primacy of EU law. It further held that the temporal limitation provided in Article 79(3) of the Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 (the ''Asylum Procedure Regulation'') applies only to that Regulation and cannot be extended to the substantive provisions of the Qualification  Regulation.

Applying the Qualification Regulation, the Court granted the daughter refugee status. It found that feminist Iranian women may constitute a particular social group and, based on the daughter’s individual circumstances, considered that her commitment to gender equality and a self-determined life formed an integral part of her identity. The Court concluded that she faced a risk of gender-specific persecution in Iran on account of her membership of that group and could not be required to exercise restraint to avoid such persecution.

The Court further held that the mother fulfilled the requirements for family status under Section 26(2) of the Asylum Act and Article 23 of the Qualification Regulation. Although the daughter had reached adulthood during the proceedings, the Court held that the relevant point in time for determining her minority was when the mother lodged her application. It considered that determining minority at a later stage, when the competent authorities decide on the derived status, would be incompatible with the protection of private and family life and the rights of the child under Articles 7 and 24(2) and (3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

On 10 July 2026, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) communicated the applications of Mohseni v. Denmark (Application no. 17821/26) and Alazem v. Denmark (Application no. 18315/26).

Both applicants had entered Denmark as children and were subsequently convicted of criminal offences and issued expulsion orders combined with time-limited re-entry bans. The applicant in Mohseni, an Afghan national who entered Denmark at the age of two, was convicted of assault with aggravating circumstances and offences under the Controlled Substances Act, sentenced to one year and six months’ imprisonment and issued a four-year re-entry ban. The applicant in Alazem, a Syrian national who entered Denmark at the age of nine, was convicted of assault with aggravating circumstances, sentenced to one year’s imprisonment and issued a six-year re-entry ban. Both applicants complained that their expulsion from Denmark was in breach of Article 8 ECHR.

In both cases, the Court asked the parties whether the expulsion orders combined with the respective re-entry bans would be in breach of Article 8 ECHR, and about the applicants’ possibilities of re-entering Denmark after the expiry of those bans.

On 2 July 2026, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) communicated the case Akkaoui v. Denmark (Application no. 21546/26) concerning the residence and reporting obligations imposed on the applicant at a return centre following an expulsion order that could not be implemented, and their alleged incompatibility with Articles 3, 5 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

The applicant, a stateless Palestinian from Lebanon, entered Denmark with his parents in 1986 at the age of eight. He was ordered to be expelled with a permanent re-entry ban in 2014, but the Danish authorities were unable to implement the expulsion order as it had not been possible to deport him to Lebanon. In 2018, the Aliens Board ordered him to reside at the return centre (Kærshovedgård) during the night and to report to the police at the centre three times per week. Following further criminal convictions and expulsion orders, the applicant was convicted in April 2025 for failing to comply with the residence and reporting obligations between 2020 and 2024 and was sentenced to three years and nine months’ imprisonment. The conviction was upheld by the High Court, and permission to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused in January 2026.

The Court asked the parties whether the applicant had exhausted domestic remedies in respect of his complaint and if the High Court’s judgment was in breach of Articles 3, 5 and 8 ECHR.
 

On 24 June 2026, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) communicated the application Ali Khaledi Batrashi and Others v. Cyprus (Application no. 29564/25). The case concerns the alleged unlawful deportation of the first applicant to Iran without an adequate assessment of the risk of ill-treatment upon return, as well as the alleged lack of procedural safeguards in the deportation and detention proceedings.

The first applicant had lived in Cyprus since 2007 and remained there on humanitarian grounds after his asylum application was rejected, owing to the severe disability of one of his daughters. Following his arrest in 2023 on suspicion of involvement in terrorist activities, he was detained several times and was deported to Iran in May 2025. The first applicant alleges that his deportation exposed him to a real risk of ill-treatment in Iran and that he was subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 during his deportation. He further complains that his detention was unlawful and arbitrary and that the judicial review proceedings concerning his detention did not comply with the requirements of Article 5 ECHR. The remaining applicants complain that the first applicant’s deportation interfered with their right to respect for family life.

The Court asked the parties, inter alia, whether the Cypriot authorities carried out a thorough assessment of the alleged risk of ill-treatment before deporting the first applicant, whether his detention complied with the requirements of Article 5 ECHR and whether his deportation disproportionately interfered with the applicants’ right to respect for family life under Article 8 ECHR.

On 24 June 2026, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) communicated the application of G.B. v. the Netherlands (Application no. 7740/26). The case concerns the alleged risk of ill-treatment of the applicant if returned to her country of origin, and the Dutch authorities’ alleged failure to properly assess her asylum application.

The applicant, a national of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), applied for international protection in the Netherlands, alleging that she had been subjected to repeated sexual violence in the DRC and during her journey to the Netherlands. Her asylum application was rejected after the domestic authorities considered her account to be inconsistent, incoherent and vague. The applicant argued that these inconsistencies resulted from trauma caused by rape and abuse and submitted medical records documenting psychological and physical symptoms consistent with her allegations. Although she requested a forensic medical examination in accordance with the Istanbul Protocol, the domestic authorities considered such an examination unnecessary.

The Court asked the parties, inter alia, whether the Dutch authorities complied with their procedural obligations under Article 3 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) when assessing the applicant’s asylum claim, and whether they adequately took into account the possible impact of trauma on her ability to provide credible, consistent and detailed statements.

On 25 June 2026, the Constitutional Court of Belgium (Grondwettelijk Hof) delivered its judgment no. 78/2026, concerning the procedure introduced by the Act of 10 March 2024 for granting a residence permit to stateless persons. The applicants challenged several provisions, arguing that the procedure applicable to stateless persons provided less favourable guarantees than those available to beneficiaries of international protection and was therefore discriminatory.

The Court held that the legislature is not required to treat stateless persons in the same way as refugees or beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, as stateless persons are not subject to European legislation. However, it found that several conditions and procedural rules imposed disproportionate limitations on applicants for residence on grounds of statelessness.

It considered that the requirement that applicants must be unable to acquire or regain the nationality of another State was incompatible with the concept of statelessness under the 1954 New York Convention, as a person is stateless when they do not possess any nationality, regardless of whether they may subsequently obtain or recover one. It therefore annulled this condition. The Court also annulled the exclusion of applications where applicants had not previously held lawful residence for more than three months or had not previously applied for international protection, finding that this could disproportionately affect stateless persons who may never have held a residence permit.

The Court held that a personal hearing constitutes an essential procedural safeguard in statelessness proceedings and therefore annulled the provision making such a hearing optional. It also ruled that the five-year residence period must begin once the judgment recognising statelessness becomes final. Finally, it required applicants to receive proof of submission of their application and to be protected, in principle, from enforcement of removal measures during the proceedings, except on grounds of national security or public order.

The Court rejected the remaining complaints, holding that statelessness applicants were not required to benefit from all procedural guarantees applicable to asylum applicants, including an appeal with full jurisdiction and suspensive effect.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 18 June 2026, the First Instance Administrative Court of Thessaloniki published its decision to refer a preliminary question to the Court of Justice of the EU regarding the compatibility with EU law of electronic notification of decisions on asylum applications.

The applicant, a Chinese citizen, applied for international protection in 2023, which was rejected as manifestly unfounded. She was informed of the rejection decision when she sought to renew her asylum applicant’s card at the Asylum Office. The applicant claimed she did not receive any email and submitted an appeal. That appeal was dismissed by the Appeals Authority because it was not submitted within the foreseen deadline under national law. She applied to annul the decision of the Appeals Authority and alleged that the calculation of the appeal deadline on the basis of the electronic notification violated her right to effective judicial protection under Article 46 of the Asylum Procedures Directive (APD) and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFREU).

The Court noted that there are no rules in the APD regarding the notification of decisions so the matter can be arranged within the procedural autonomy of each Member State with respect to effective judicial protection and the principle of equivalence. It went on to analyse the national asylum law, national legal instruments with equivalent forms of notification, the APD and CJEU case law and decided to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling:

1.      whether Greece's rule deeming asylum rejection decisions served 48 hours after an email is sent - with no way to verify actual receipt or access, and no means of rebutting that presumption - is compatible with Article 47 CFREU and Article 46 APD, given that this notification date starts the appeal deadline;

2.      whether this violates the principle of equivalence since electronic tax notifications in Greece do include a verification system and courts have rejected an analogous presumption where receipt of a registered letter is disputed.

3.      what is the role of consent to electronic notification in such disputes;

4.      whether the national measure in question creates an irrebuttable presumption of notification;

5.      whether her claim that the message went to spam, should affect the analysis.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 1 June 2026, entered into force the abolition of mandatory legal representation in deportation detention proceedings in Germany, which was regulated in Section 62d of the Residence Act (Aufenthaltsgesetz). The amendment was introduced by the Act on the Determination of Safe Countries of Origin by Ordinance and on the Abolition of the Legal Representative in Deportation Detention of 22 December 2025 (Federal Law Gazette 2025 I No. 364). The corresponding reference in Section 2(14) of the Residence Act, relating to Dublin transfer detention proceedings, was also removed.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 16 July 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in Case C‑26/25 (Bukla) following a request for a preliminary ruling from the Szeged High Court of Hungary (Szegedi Törvényszék). The case concerned the interpretation of Article 20 TFEU and Directive 2008/115/EC (the ‘Return Directive’) regarding the adoption of a return decision on national security grounds against a third-country national who is a family member of Union citizens and the procedural safeguards applicable where such decisions are based on classified information.

The Court held that Article 20 TFEU and Article 5 of Directive 2008/115 require Member States, before adopting a return decision concerning a third-country national whose family members are Union citizens, to examine the consequences of that decision for the person’s family life and for the situation of the minor children concerned, where the authorities are aware of the existence of those family ties. It reiterated that they must assess if a relationship of dependency exists between the third-country national and the Union citizen family members, whether the removal decision could effectively compel the Union citizen to leave the territory of the European Union.

It further held that Article 20 TFEU, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, precludes national rules preventing courts from examining a derived right of residence during return proceedings where the relevant family ties are known to the competent authorities, including where the relevant facts emerge only during the judicial stage or where the return decision follows a previous refusal of residence.

The Court also clarified that national security risks do not justify the adoption of a return decision solely on the basis of a binding and non-reasoned opinion issued by a specialised national security authority. Under Article 20 TFEU and Articles 5, 12 and 13 of Directive 2008/115, read in conjunction with Articles 7 and 24 of the Charter, the competent authorities must carry out an individual assessment of all relevant circumstances and verify that the measure complies with the principle of proportionality, including its impact on the person’s family life and the best interests of the children concerned.

Regarding classified information, the Court held that Articles 12 and 13 of Directive 2008/115, read in conjunction with Article 5 thereof, Article 20 TFEU, the principle of good administration and Article 47 of the Charter, preclude national legislation preventing a third-country national from being informed of the essence of the grounds underlying a return decision and an entry ban based on confidential information, or from using such information in administrative or judicial proceedings. It clarified that the intervention of a public prosecutor who has access to the classified material but cannot disclose it to the person concerned is not sufficient to safeguard the rights of defence and an effective remedy. However, where disclosure of these grounds would jeopardise national security, such information may be withheld, provided that the national court reviewing the decision can draw the appropriate conclusions from that refusal and ensure effective judicial review of the lawfulness of the measure.

On 26 June 2026, the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) published its decision on the case Amnesty International and Médecins du Monde – International v. Sweden (Complaint No. 227/2023).

The complaint concerned access to healthcare for vulnerable EU nationals in Sweden who due to the lack of health insurance in their country of origin were excluded from subsidised healthcare and, in some cases, unable to access necessary treatment because of the costs involved.  The complainant alleged that this situation resulted in a denial of access to healthcare and discriminatory treatment, in breach of Articles 11 and 13 of the European Social Charter, read alone and in conjunction with Article E.

The Committee recalled that Article 11§1 requires access to healthcare to be effective, affordable and without discrimination, with particular protection for vulnerable groups. It noted that vulnerable EU nationals without healthcare insurance were excluded from subsidised healthcare in Sweden, which in practice prevented access to necessary treatment, including emergency and serious care. While the Government did not dispute these findings, it argued that extending subsidised healthcare to persons exercising free movement rights who lacked healthcare coverage in their country of origin would have significant policy consequences for Sweden. The Committee nevertheless found that excluding persons unable to obtain alternative coverage undermined the effective enjoyment of the right to health and failed to protect a particularly vulnerable group, in violation of Article 11§1 of the Charter.

It found that the rules governing access to healthcare were applied inconsistently across Swedish regions, resulting in unequal treatment of vulnerable EU nationals, who were also treated less favourably than undocumented persons without sufficient justification. The Committee considered that the Government’s arguments based on public health and policy considerations did not justify this difference in treatment and that, in any event, the effects of the measures were disproportionate, as they prevented access to necessary healthcare. It also noted that, although all vulnerable EU nationals seem to not have access to healthcare, the situation had a disproportionate impact on Roma, constituting indirect discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin, in violation of Article E in conjunction with Article 11§1.

With regard to Article 13§1, the Committee recalled that it guarantees a subjective right to social and medical assistance for persons without adequate resources, including urgent care and basic needs. It considered that the issues raised under this provision overlapped with those already examined under Article 11§1 and Article E and therefore found that no separate examination was necessary.

The Committee concluded that there was a violation of Article 11§1 of the Charter, a violation of Article E taken in conjunction with Article 11§1 with respect to the difference in treatment between regions and in comparison, with undocumented persons, and a violation of Article E taken in conjunction with Article 11§1 with respect to indirect discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin.

On 15 May 2026, the Administrative Court of Hanover (Verwaltungsgericht Hannover) delivered its judgment in case 3 A 739/24, concerning the recognition of refugee status based on ‘’Westernised’’ identity and gender-based persecution in Iraq.

The first applicant, an Iraqi national, left Iraq in 2022 and applied for asylum in Germany in 2023 together with her two minor children. The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees rejected the application, finding that the requirements for international protection were not met. The applicant claimed that she had adopted “Western” values during her time abroad, had distanced herself from the Yazidi faith and converted to Christianity, and that, as a result, she and her children would face a risk of persecution on grounds of gender and religion if returned to Iraq.

The Court held that Iraqi women whose identity is shaped by “Western’’ values may constitute a social group within the meaning of asylum law where their identity is characterised by a self-determined lifestyle and a commitment to gender equality that is incompatible with prevailing Iraqi patriarchal norms. It found that such women are perceived as distinct in Iraqi society and may face a considerable risk of persecution, including serious forms of gender-based violence in a context where effective state protection is not available. It further held that the assessment of “Westernisation” depends on whether this identity is so deeply rooted that the person cannot reasonably be expected to abandon it or adapt their conduct upon return.

The Court considered that the applicant’s account of her personal development was credible and found that her “Westernised” identity had become an essential part of her personality, which she could not reasonably be required to renounce. It held that reliance on family protection could not be required where this would entail subordination to male authority or the abandonment of her autonomous way of life. Internal protection alternative is not a viable as the risks for women with such an identity exist throughout Iraq and effective state protection is lacking.

The Court therefore annulled the contested decisions of the Federal Office and ordered the defendant to grant refugee status to the applicant as well as to her children.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 24 March 2026, the Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) delivered its decision in case BVerwG 1 C 6.25. The case concerned whether Germany was required to grant a residence permit to a person who had previously been recognised as a refugee by another EU Member State following a transfer of responsibility.

The applicant, an Ethiopian national recognised as a refugee in Italy, entered Germany in 2019 and applied for asylum. The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees rejected the application as inadmissible and ordered her return to Italy. Since the applicant could not be returned to Italy, the domestic courts ordered the defendant State to issue a new refugee travel document and to grant her a residence permit.

The question before the Federal Administrative Court was whether Germany was also obliged to grant a residence permit under national law in light of the prior recognition of refugee status in Italy. The Court upheld the Government’s appeal against the decision of the Bavarian Administrative Court of Appeal ordering the authorities to grant a residence permit and considered that neither national law nor international and EU law imposes an obligation on Germany to grant a residence permit in such circumstances. It found that the conditions for issuing a residence permit under § 25(2) sentence 1 alternative 1 of the Residence Act were not met, as refugee status had been granted by Italy and not by German authorities.

It considered that the legal framework of the Geneva Refugee Convention and Directive 2011/95/EU does not require a Member State to grant a residence permit to a person recognised as a refugee by another Member State, as responsibility for residence rights remains with the recognising State.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 23 June 2026, the Third Section of the European Court of Human Rights delivered three judgments concerning the prolonged failure by the Greek authorities to decide on family reunification applications lodged by recognised refugees in Greece: T.N. v. Greece (Application no. 41855/23), Dotani v. Greece (Application no. 31077/23) and Suji v. Greece (Application no. 13250/23).

In T.N., the applicant, a Burundian refugee, sought reunification with his wife and two minor children residing in South Africa, but the Greek Asylum Service failed to issue a decision for more than five years. In Dotani, the applicant, an Afghan refugee, applied for reunification with his wife and five children in Afghanistan, yet no decision was taken for over seven years. In Suji, the applicant was a stateless Rohingya, whose reunification request with his wife and two minor children residing in Bangladesh was granted four years after it had been lodged.

The Court assessed the cases from the perspective of the respondent State’s positive obligations under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights as the applicant’s family members had never resided in Greece. It recalled that the assessment of family reunification requests must take into account both the (i) substantive requirements, including the existence of insurmountable or major obstacles to the family living together in the country of origin and the best interests of the children, and (ii) the procedural guarantees, requiring a decision-making process that is sufficiently flexible, prompt and effective and an individual assessment of the need to preserve family unity. The Court also emphasised that family unity constitutes an essential right of refugees and that they cannot be required to "do the impossible" in order to exercise that right.

It further stressed that, under Article 14 § 1 (b) of Presidential Decree No. 131/2006 and Article 11(2) of Directive 2003/86/EC (the ‘Family Reunification Directive’), where a recognised refugee is unable to produce official documents proving family ties, the authorities must consider other evidence and may not reject the application solely because such documents are unavailable. Although neither provision expressly provides the same flexibility in relation to travel documents, the Court found no reason to exclude an analogous approach, given that the Greek case-law draws no distinction between documents establishing family relationships and travel documents. Accordingly, the authorities were required to explore alternative means of establishing the family links and facilitating reunification rather than insisting on documentary requirements.

In T.N., the Court emphasised that the applicant had fully complied with his duty to cooperate by providing available evidence and explaining why neither additional civil-status documents nor travel documents could be obtained. Nevertheless, the authorities displayed a manifest lack of flexibility by refusing to consider the evidence already submitted, failing to investigate the claimed family links through other available means and disregarding possible alternatives for the issuance of travel documents.

In Dotani, the Court likewise found that the authorities failed to carry out a proper examination of the applicant’s request despite more than seven years of administrative inaction. Although it acknowledged the practical difficulties arising from the change of regime in Afghanistan, it clarified that Greece’s policy of non-recognition of the Taliban authorities could not, in itself, prevent the competent authorities from taking account of documents or information emanating from de facto authorities where necessary to protect Convention rights, nor could it relieve them of their obligation to seek alternative solutions.
In both cases, the Court concluded that the Greek authorities had failed to carry out the individualised and balanced assessment required under Article 8 ECHR. By insisting on documentary requirements despite the applicants' objective inability to comply and failing to consider alternative solutions, the authorities did not strike a fair balance between the applicants' interest in family reunification and the interests of the State. Consequently, the decision-making process lacked the flexibility, promptness and effectiveness required under Article 8. The Court also found a violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 8, as no effective domestic remedy existed to challenge the prolonged failure to decide on the applications.

By contrast, in Suji v. Greece, the Court noted that although the applicant’s request for family reunification was ultimately granted, this occurred only after more than four years of administrative delay. Applying the same principles under Article 8, it held that the authorities recognised from the outset that, as a stateless Rohingya refugee, the applicant was objectively unable to obtain the required civil-status and travel documents. Instead, they failed to carry out the individualised and flexible assessment required by Article 8 by not adequately considering alternative means of proof, the applicant's statelessness and the best interests of the children. In the absence of any convincing justification for the delay, the Court found violations of Article 8 and of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 8 due to the lack of an effective domestic remedy against the prolonged failure to decide on the application.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 21 April 2026, the Council of State ruled on the lawfulness of the prohibition of access to classified information in the case of a Syrian national who was granted refugee status in 2017 and was later subject to a revocation procedure based on classified information indicating that the applicant posed danger to the national security of the country.

In the context of the revocation procedure that was initiated, the applicant submitted a request to access the relevant document on the basis of Article 23 (1) of the Asylum Procedures Directive (APD) and Article 76 (4) of Law 4939/2022. The request was rejected due to the confidential nature of the information the document contained. Eventually, the relevant department of the Asylum Authority issued a decision revoking the person’s refugee status. Following an appeal against the revocation decision, the Appeals Committee was able to examine the classified document and confirmed the existence of revocation grounds rejecting the appeal. The applicant sought to annul that second decision before the Athens Administrative Court and the annulment application was referred to the Council of State as it concerned a matter of general interest that affects many individuals. 

The Council of State examined the relevant provisions of EU primary law, including Articles 78, 72 and 73 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, in particular Articles 18, 19, and 47. It emphasised the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the EU which has found that the right of defence is not absolute but any limitations to it may not nullify the very essence of Article 47. Referring to Case C-159/21, the Council of State held that, although Member States may withhold classified information where disclosure would endanger national security, they must nevertheless ensure respect for the rights of defence. At a minimum, the person concerned must be informed of the substance of the reasons underlying the decision so that they can effectively challenge it. Therefore, the provision of Article 76 (4) of Law 4939/2022, which allows the relevant authority to prohibit access to classified information where national security grounds exist, cannot be interpreted as precluding access to the essence of the grounds that justified the revocation decision.

The Council of State also held that refugee status may be withdrawn on national security grounds and accompanied by a return decision, but the two assessments remain legally distinct. Even after the withdrawal of status, the person may still qualify as a refugee under international and EU law and therefore continue to benefit from the principle of non-refoulement under Article 18 and 19 CFREU and Article 5 of the Return Directive. Accordingly, the national authorities must ensure at every stage of the return process that the individual is not returned to a country where they face a real risk of persecution, torture, or inhuman or degrading treatment, on the basis of an individualised and up-to-date assessment.

On 28 May 2026, the High Court of Justice (King’s Bench Division, Administrative Court) delivered its judgment in Freedom from Torture & Anor v Secretary of State for the Home Department (2026 EWHC 1278 (Admin)). The case concerned the challenge to the Secretary of State’s amendments “Allocation of Asylum Accommodation” policy (Versions 11–13), which significantly altered long-standing protective provisions for a particularly vulnerable group of asylum applicants, namely survivors of torture, trafficking and other serious violence victims receiving support from specialist organisations.

The Court held that there had been a long-standing practice of consultation with the Claimants in relation to relevant policy changes and found that the Defendant acted unlawfully by introducing the amendments without prior consultation. It considered that consultation would have been an obvious and reasonable means of assessing the likely impact of the changes on a vulnerable group of asylum applicants.

The Court further held that the Defendant breached the Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED) under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 (“EA 2010”). The Equality Impact Assessments were materially inadequate, as they failed to properly assess the potential disproportionate harm that the policy changes would have on survivors of torture, trafficking and other serious violence, did not engage with relevant evidence of risk, and lacked adequate monitoring.

Finally, the Court held that the Defendant also breached the Tameside duty by introducing fundamental policy changes without adequately investigating their impact on survivors of torture, trafficking and other serious violence despite longstanding evidence of the serious risks faced by this vulnerable group. It held that the Secretary of State failed to undertake inquiry, engage with relevant expert sources, or consider relevant material before adopting the amendments.

Therefore, the Court concluded that the challenged amendments to the Allocation of Asylum Accommodation policy were unlawful.

On 12 May 2026, the National Court of Asylum (CNDA) delivered its decision N°26006334 concerning the protection status to be granted to a Sudanese national of Fur ethnic origin from North Darfur, in light of the situation of persecution affecting that ethnic group.

The applicant challenged the decision of the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA) which granted him subsidiary protection, arguing that he should be recognised as a refugee under the 1951 Geneva Convention. The CNDA was required to assess whether the situation in North Darfur amounted to persecution of the Fur ethnic group and whether this justified refugee status rather than subsidiary protection.

The Court found that the Fur ethnic group is subject to systematic and targeted persecution in North Darfur by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and allied forces, who control the region without effective protection from the Sudanese authorities. Relying on the EUAA Guidance Note on Sudan (23 June 2025) and the UN Fact-Finding Mission report of 19 February 2026, the Court highlighted serious ethnically motivated abuses, including massacres, summary executions, torture, forced displacement, and destruction of communities, with acts described as having “hallmarks of genocide”.

The CNDA held that the existence of indiscriminate violence in North Darfur does not exclude the recognition of targeted persecution where a specific ethnic group is individually and systematically affected. It therefore found that the applicant had a well-founded fear of being persecuted on grounds of ethnicity within the meaning of the 1951 Geneva Convention and recognised refugee status accordingly.

On 11 June 2026, the Advocate General Laila Medina delivered her opinion in the Joined Cases C-706/25 and C-707/25 (Comeri and Sidilli). The cases concerned the compatibility of the Italian legislation implementing the Italy–Albania bilateral agreement, which allows the transfer of third-country nationals to detention facilities located in Albanian territory for the purposes of asylum border and return procedures, with EU law, in particular with Directive 2013/32/EU (the recast ‘Asylum Procedures Directive’ (APD)), Directive 2013/33/EU (the recast Reception Conditions Directive (RCD)), and Article 3(2) TFEU.

The Advocate General considered that EU law does not preclude Member States from locating detention facilities for asylum applicants outside the territory of the European Union, provided that those facilities are under the effective and exclusive jurisdiction of that Member State. In such circumstances, the areas concerned must be regarded as falling within the “territory of a Member State” for the purposes of Directives 2013/32 and 2013/33, which therefore apply in full.

She recalled that the grounds for detention listed in Article 8(3) of RCD are exhaustive, and Member States may not introduce additional grounds for detention. She considered that the Italian legislation relied on grounds already recognised by EU law and therefore did not infringe that requirement. However, the Protocol and the implementing legislation are liable to alter the effectiveness of several procedural guarantees harmonised by EU law. In particular, concerns arise regarding the access to legal assistance and judicial protection because of the geographical separation between lawyers and applicants and the systematic use of remote hearings, the confidentiality of lawyer–client communications, the reimbursement for lawyers’ travel costs to Albania, and the rights of communication and visiting for family members.  The Advocate General noted that applicants cannot leave the Albanian facilities by their own means and the legislation does not regulate their return transfer to Italy. This is at odds with the requirement under Directive 2013/33 that detention ceases immediately once its validity ends.

She therefore concluded that detention outside EU territory is not, in itself, incompatible with EU law. However, Article 3(2) TFEU precludes Member States from concluding  international agreements and adopting national ratification and enforcement measures which alter the practical scope of the minimum procedural guarantees harmonised by Article 9(3), (4) and (6) of Directive 2013/33, read in conjunction with Article 22(1) of Directive 2013/32, interpreted in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union.

On 4 June 2026, Advocate General Jean Richard de la Tour delivered his opinion in Case C-182/26 PPU (Hardeker), concerning the interpretation of Directive 2008/115/EC (the ‘Return Directive’), including whether a return decision may designate more than one country of destination.

The Advocate General considered that Article 6(1) of the Return Directive requires a return decision to indicate a country of destination but does not exclude the possibility of designating several destinations. This follows from Article 3(3) of the Directive, which defines “return” broadly without establishing any hierarchy between categories of destination, meaning that more than one third country may simultaneously satisfy the conditions for removal. He added that such an approach does not, in itself, weaken fundamental rights protection, since each designation can be challenged and the principle of non-refoulement under Article 5 of the Return Directive, read with Article 19(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be assessed in relation to all listed countries. However, he emphasized that each designated country must be individually justified by concrete factual elements meeting the requirements of Article 3(3) of the Return Directive and remain subject to judicial review.

The Advocate General further held that a court reviewing detention cannot, of its own motion, examine whether the return decision complied with the principle of non-refoulement, nor can it treat any alleged defect in that regard as affecting the validity of the return decision serving as the legal basis for detention. He clarified that the Return Directive distinguishes return decisions (Articles 6, 12 and 13) from detention (Article 15), and that judicial review in detention proceedings is limited to verifying the existence of the “constituent elements” of a return decision, such as the identity of the person concerned, the obligation to return and the designation of a country of destination. Compliance with non-refoulement under Article 5 of the Directive and Articles 4 and 19(2) of the Charter forms part of the substantive assessment of the return decision and does not constitute one of its constituent elements for the purposes of detention control. Hence, during the detention review courts may not review the legality of the return decision itself, but they must still ensure that removal is not carried out in breach of non-refoulement.

The obligation to assess compliance with the principle of non-refoulement under Article 5 of Directive 2008/115, read in light of Article 19(2) of the Charter, must be carried out independently by both the administrative authority and the court reviewing detention on the basis of all available information. Where several countries of destination are designated, the assessment must be carried out separately for each of them. Detention is precluded where removal to all designated countries would expose the person to a real risk of prohibited treatment, but it may be maintained where at least one designated country allows removal in compliance with non-refoulement. The court reviewing detention cannot modify or annul the return decision, as its role is limited to verifying whether detention remains legally justified in light of the possibility of lawful removal.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 4 June 2026 the Advocate General delivered her opinion on Case C-553/24, (Assemblée nationale v Parliament and Council), arising from an action brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) by the National Assembly of the French Parliament seeking annulment of Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 on asylum and migration management in whole or, in the alternative, in the section which concerns the solidarity mechanism.

The National Assembly argued that the relocation regime under the solidarity mechanism of that Regulation exceeds the competences of the EU and infringes the principle of subsidiarity enshrined in Articles 4 and 5 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU).

The Advocate General recalls that an action under Article 8 of Protocol No 2 is strictly limited to alleged infringements of the principle of subsidiarity, which must be distinguished from the principles of conferral and proportionality governing the division and exercise of EU competences. Applying this distinction, she considers that the first four claims of the National Assembly are inadmissible as they fall within the scope of conferral and proportionality rather than subsidiarity. By contrast, the fifth claim is admissible as it concerns whether Member States could have sufficiently addressed migratory pressure on their own and whether EU-level action was therefore necessary.

As regards the substance of the case, the Advocate General considers that the National Assembly’s subsidiarity claim is unfounded. She notes that Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 seeks to address cross-border challenges relating to asylum and migration management, including migratory pressure on certain Member States and the absence of an effective mechanism for the fair sharing of responsibility required under Article 80 TFEU. In her view, the introduction of a mandatory solidarity mechanism could only be effectively achieved at EU level. She further finds that the Regulation, the Commission proposal and the accompanying legislative materials provide sufficient justification for EU intervention, demonstrating that the objectives pursued could not be satisfactorily achieved by Member States acting alone. Accordingly, she concludes that the Regulation complies with the principle of subsidiarity and proposes that the Court dismiss the National Assembly’s sole admissible claim as unfounded.

On 4 June 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in Case C-621/24 (Landkreis Schweinfurt v FB), following a request for a preliminary ruling from the German Federal Social Court (Bundessozialgericht). The case concerned the interpretation of Article 17(2) and (5) and Article 20(1)(c) of Directive 2013/33/EU (Reception Conditions Directive), regarding the reduction of material reception conditions for an applicant whose application for international protection had been declared inadmissible and who was awaiting transfer to a Member State responsible for examining the application.

The Court held that Article 17(2), read in conjunction with Article 2(g) of Directive 2013/33, requires Member States to ensure material reception conditions that provide an adequate standard of living, guaranteeing applicants’ subsistence and protecting their physical and mental health. It clarified that this requirement establishes a minimum threshold which must include, at least, housing, food, clothing and a daily expenses allowance, whether provided in kind, through financial allowances or vouchers, or a combination thereof. It further stated that an adequate standard of living cannot be ensured where support for clothing or the daily expenses allowance is excluded. It also held that the Reception Conditions Directive continues to apply until the applicant has actually been transferred to the responsible Member State. Article 17(2) does not allow Member States to distinguish between applicants subject to a Dublin transfer decision and other applicants as regards access to material reception conditions. Article 20 of Directive 2013/33 exhaustively lists the circumstances in which material reception conditions may be reduced or withdrawn, and a Dublin transfer situation is not among them.

The Court therefore concluded that Article 17(2), read in conjunction with Article 2(g) of Directive 2013/33, precludes national legislation which reduces material reception conditions to an applicant following the rejection of his or her application as inadmissible and pending transfer to another Member State.

Furthermore, the Court recalled that a “subsequent application” under Article 2(q) of Directive 2013/32/EU (rAPD) refers to a further application for international protection made after a final decision on a previous application, which may be declared inadmissible under Article 33(2)(d) rAPD where no new elements are presented. This concept applies where the previous application has been finally decided in another Member State. That situation is distinguished from cases governed by the Dublin III Regulation, where responsibility for examining the application lies with another Member State and the Member State concerned only applies the responsibility criteria without examining the substance of the claim. It therefore held that an application rejected as inadmissible solely on the ground that another Member State is responsible to examine the application and accompanied by a transfer decision does not constitute a “subsequent application”, thus, it does not fall within the scope of Article 20(1)(c) of Directive 2013/33.

On 4 July 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union delivered its judgment in Case C‑440/25 (Ebilum), following a request for a preliminary ruling by the District Court of The Hague, sitting in Zwolle (rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats Zwolle). The case concerned the interpretation of Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU (the recast ‘Asylum Procedures Directive’ (rAPD) and Article 2(d) of Directive 2011/95/EU regarding the scope of judicial review in asylum appeals and the meaning of “well-founded fear of persecution’’.

The Court reiterated that Article 46(3) require Member States to ensure that a first-instance court or tribunal before which a decision relating to an application for international protection is contested, carries out a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law. This requires an up-to-date assessment of the case based on all relevant factual and legal elements, including evidence arising after the adoption of the decision under appeal, insofar as the parties are given the opportunity to submit observations in accordance with the principle of audi alteram partem and Article 47 of the EU Charter. Such an examination must allow the court to assess the application exhaustively at judicial level, without any need to refer the case back to the determining authority.  It further held that the judicial review required under Article 46(3) entails a full factual and legal reassessment of the applicant’s international protection needs. This includes, where necessary, the assessment of facts and credibility and the possibility for the court or tribunal to reach its own findings on the merits of the application.

The Court recalled that while Article 46(3) rAPD only concerns the judicial appeal stage and not what happens after any annulment, where a court has carried out a full assessment and found that international protection must be granted, the administrative authority is bound to comply when the case is referred back, unless new circumstances require assessment. If the administration subsequently adopts a contrary decision without such new elements, the court must be able to replace that decision with its own ruling and disapply any national rules preventing it from doing so, thereby ensuring the effectiveness of EU law. It also clarified that Member States may provide for additional appeal or cassation levels beyond the first-instance judicial remedy required by Article 46(3), but such review cannot alter the characteristics of the full and ex nunc examination required at first instance.

Finally, the Court interpreted Article 2(d) of Directive 2011/95 as meaning that a “well-founded fear of being persecuted” exists where there is a reasonable likelihood that the applicant will be persecuted upon return to his or her country of origin. It held that the competent authorities must carry out an individual, specific and objective assessment of the applicant’s personal situation, the facts and circumstances relating to the application, and the facts and circumstances relating to the situation in the country of origin. That assessment must include the general context of the country of origin, cannot rely solely on the applicant’s subjective fear of being persecuted but must be based on both subjective and objective elements.

On 4 June 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union delivered its judgment in Case C‑198/25  (Quotal), originating from a request for a preliminary ruling by the District Court of The Hague, sitting in Zwolle (rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats Zwolle). The case concerned the interpretation of Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU (the recast ‘Asylum Procedures Directive’ (rAPD)), read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union on whether a first-instance court hearing an appeal against a rejection of an application for international protection is able to fully reassess the merits of the application, or whether that assessment may be reserved to the determining authority.

The Court recalled that Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32 requires Member States to ensure that a first-instance court or tribunal before which a decision relating to an application for international protection is contested, carries out a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law. The review must allow an up-to-date assessment of the case, taking into account all necessary factual and legal elements, including any evidence arising after the adoption of the decision under appeal. The Court clarified that such an examination allows the application to be dealt exhaustively at judicial level, without the need to refer the case back to the determining authority.

It further held that Article 46(3) confers on the first-instance court or tribunal, where it has all necessary elements of fact and law, the power to give a binding ruling on whether the applicant satisfies the conditions for international protection. Under EU law Member States may not restrict the scope of that judicial review. 

Finally, the Court held that national courts must set aside any national legislative provisions that prevent EU rules from producing their full effect. It therefore clarified that Article 46(3) requires a system of judicial protection in which first-instance courts or tribunals are empowered to carry out a full and up-to-date factual reassessment of the application for international protection and, where they have all necessary elements, to give a binding ruling on the merits of the claim, including the grant of international protection, thereby ensuring the effectiveness of EU law.

On 21 May 2026, the Belgian Constitutional Court delivered its judgment no. 66/2026 . The case concerned legislative amendments to the asylum reception regime introduced by two Laws of 14 July 2025: (i) the limitation of material assistance for asylum applicants already benefiting from protection in another EU Member State, and (ii) the abolition of the possibility to grant reception in the form of financial assistance in exceptional circumstances. In its previous judgment no. 23/2026, the Constitutional Court suspended both measures and referred a preliminary question to the Court of Justice of the European Union. In the present judgment, the Court ruled only on the second measure, while the first measure remains pending before the Court of Justice.

The Court recalled that Directive 2013/33/EU on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (rAPD)) grants Member States a margin of discretion as regards the form and level of reception provided to asylum applicants, including the possibility to only provide material reception in accommodation centres. It held that where the system is saturated and there is no place available in reception centres, or where material assistance is unavailable or inadequate, the exclusion of any possibility of financial assistance creates a risk of substantial impairment of the right to human dignity. Therefore, the contested provisions would constitute a breach of EU law.

The Court further held that the abolition of financial assistance in exceptional circumstances resulted in a significant and unjustified deterioration in the level of protection of the rights to human dignity, social assistance and adequate housing under Article 23 of the Constitution. It also found that the measure was incompatible with the right to respect for private and family life under Article 22 of the Constitution.

The Court therefore annulled the provisions abolishing the possibility to provide asylum applicants s with reception in the form of financial assistance in exceptional circumstances.

On 14 April 2026, the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) promulgated its country guidance judgment in AH, AK & AJ (Identity documentation; returns to the KRI)Iraq CG UKUT 00150 (IAC), replacing all previous Iraq country guidance, including SMO & KSP. The decision provides updated binding guidance on returns via the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), identity documentation, internal travel and Article 3 ECHR risk.

The case concerned three Iraqi nationals of Kurdish ethnicity from the Disputed Territories, who were challenging their removal from the UK to Iraq on the basis that they lacked the identity documents needed to return and travel safely and therefore would face a real risk of ill-treatment upon return.

The Tribunal held that despite there continues to be an internal armed conflict in parts of Iraq, the level of indiscriminate violence does not reach the threshold to constitute serious harm under Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive, and that the general living conditions in Iraq do not in itself reach the threshold of Article 3 ECHR.

Regarding the Iraqi identity documentation system, the Tribunal held that the Civil Status Identity Document (CSID) is no longer issued and has been replaced by the biometric Iraqi National Identity Document (INID), and that, in principle, an INID is necessary in order to live and travel within Iraq without encountering treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR.

In relation to return, the Tribunal confirmed that Iraqi nationals may in principle be returned to Erbil or Sulaymaniyah, including former residents of the Disputed Territories, and that individuals lacking CSID or INID documentation may receive a temporary airport letter to facilitate onward travel for re-documentation. It held that the real risk under Article 3 ECHR arises primarily during internal travel within Iraq, particularly at checkpoints, and depends on the route taken, available documentation, and access to family or local support. The absence of recognised identity documents may, in certain circumstances, create a real risk of ill-treatment. It further held that the feasibility of internal relocation must be assessed on an individual basis, and while relocation within the Kurdistan Region of Iraq may be viable for returnees with adequate documentation and family support, it may be unduly harsh where such factors are lacking.  

The Tribunal ultimately dismissed the appeals, finding that the appellants could in principle obtain identity documentation through family assistance or Embassy procedures, and that return and internal movement would not necessarily give rise to a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR.

On 26 May 2026, the Third Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in J.B. v. Greece (Application no. 54796/16). The case concerns the potential return of the applicant from Greece to Türkiye under the EU-Türkiye Statement of 18 March 2016.

The applicant left Syria in April 2015 due to the armed conflict and alleged risks of persecution on account of his ethnic and religious background. He travelled to Türkiye, where he remained for approximately one year under temporary protection. In May 2016 he arrived in Greece, where he was arrested on grounds of unlawful entry. He applied for international protection claiming that he faced a risk of ill-treatment in Türkiye due to his Armenian origin and his Christian faith. His application for international protection was declared inadmissible on the basis that Türkiye constituted a “first country of asylum” or a “safe third country”, a decision upheld on appeal by the domestic authorities. The applicant complained before the ECtHR about deficiencies on the examination of his asylum application by the Greek authorities, as well as the risk he entailed if returned to Türkiye, including the chain refoulement to Syria, and about the conditions of his detention in Greece.

In regard to the complaint under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights concerning the risk of ill-treatment upon removal, the Court found that since the applicant had in the meantime obtained refugee status in France, the risk of ill-treatment if returned to Türkiye and subsequently to Syria has ceased to exist. Therefore, it considered unjustified to continue the examination of that complaint.

In relation to Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3, the Court found that the applicant’s asylum claim had been examined through a multi-layered procedure before the asylum authorities and domestic courts, during which he was interviewed with interpretation, able to present his individual circumstances and challenge the application of the ‘’safe third country’’ concept. It also held that the authorities assessed both his personal situation and relevant country information concerning Türkiye through reports, statistics and objective material, including the alleged risk of onward refoulement to Syria and the assurances provided within the framework of the EU-Türkiye Statement. Therefore, the Court concluded that the Greek authorities could reasonably rely on those assurances and supporting material and that the applicant had been afforded effective safeguards against arbitrary removal contrary to Article 3, finding no violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3.

Finally, regarding to the complaint under Article 3 ECHR concerning the conditions of detention pending removal, the Court reiterated that Greek police stations are facilities designed only for short periods of confinement and that detention therein for periods ranging from one to three months have consistently been found contrary to Article 3, particularly in view of deficiencies such as overcrowding, poor sanitary conditions and lack of outdoor exercise. Since the applicant had been detained in Mytilene police station for one month and nineteen days, the Court found that the conditions of his detention amounted to degrading treatment contrary to Article 3

On 7 May 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in Case C-747/22 (KH v Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS)), following a request for a preliminary ruling from the District Court, Bergamo, Italy (Tribunale ordinario di Bergamo). The case concerned the interpretation of Articles 26 and 29 of  Directive 2011/95/EU (the recast Qualification Directive) regarding the compatibility with EU law of a national residence requirement imposing a minimum period of 10 years’ residence for access to a social assistance measure granted to beneficiaries of international protection.

The Court clarified that the Italian “citizens’ income” falls within the scope of Articles 26 and 29 of Directive 2011/95, as it constitutes both a measure facilitating access to employment and integration into the labour market, and a core social assistance benefit ensuring a minimum income. Member States must ensure that beneficiaries of international protection have effective access to such measures under equivalent conditions as nationals and must facilitate that access by removing obstacles that may hinder their participation.

The Court further found that a residence condition of 10 years, although formally applicable without distinction to nationals and non-nationals, constitutes indirect discrimination against beneficiaries of international protection. It held that Articles 26 and 29 of Directive 2011/95 reflect the principle of equal treatment laid down in Article 20 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and  reiterated that that principle prohibits not only discrimination but also forms of discrimination which, although based on apparently neutral criteria, may produce the same discriminatory effects.

Furthermore, the Court rejected the justification based on administrative and financial costs, holding that the costs of granting social benefits are the same regardless of nationality. It emphasised that EU law guarantees beneficiaries of international protection equal treatment in access to employment measures and core social benefits and does not permit Member States to impose additional conditions not provided for by EU law, like a length of residence requirement. It further held that making entitlement subject to a 10 years’ residence requirement undermines the objective of ensuring a minimum level of benefits for beneficiaries of international protection, whose status is not permanent and may be revoked, potentially leading to return to the country of origin.

On 23 April 2026 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in Case C-446/24 (Freie Hansestadt Bremen v DT) originating from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Higher Administrative Court, Land of Bremen, Germany (Oberverwaltungsgericht der Freien Hansestadt Bremen). The case concerned the interpretation of Article 3(6) and Article 11(2) of Directive 2008/115/EC (the Return Directive) and whether EU law precludes national legislation which requires the imposition of an indefinite entry ban on third-country nationals subject to a return decision based on a terrorist threat.

The Court held that Article 11(2) of Directive 2008/115 establishes that in principle, the duration of an entry ban must not exceed five years. However, it observed that the second sentence of that provision expressly allows entry bans exceeding five years where the third-country national represents a serious threat to public policy, public security or national security, without laying down a maximum duration in such cases.

The Court further clarified that the reference in Article 3(6) of the Return Directive to a “specified period” does not necessarily require entry bans to be limited in time. Rather, that provision requires national authorities to determine the duration of the entry ban in a precise and reasoned manner in each individual case, whether the duration imposed is limited or unlimited.

The Court held that an indefinite entry ban may be compatible with EU law where national authorities are able to carry out an individualised assessment justifying both the existence of the threat and the duration of the ban in the particular case.

Finally, the Court noted that such an interpretation is consistent with the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, according to which a terrorist threat may justify not only expulsion measures but also re-entry bans of unlimited duration, as long as the individual circumstances of the person concerned are properly assessed.

On 27 April, the First Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) published the communicated cases of S.H. v. Sweden (Application no. 38099/25) and A.G. v. Sweden (Application no. 38572/25), concerning the removal of Afghan nationals from Sweden following the rejection of their asylum claims.

Both applicants allege that their removal to Afghanistan would expose them to a real risk of treatment contrary to Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, relying on factors such as ethnicity, religious and political beliefs, and “westernisation”. In the case S.H. v. Sweden, the applicant additionally invokes Article 14, arguing that his disabilities were not properly considered in the asylum procedure.

In both cases, the Court granted interim measures under Rule 39 and asked the parties whether removal would expose the applicants to a real risk of ill-treatment and whether the Swedish authorities fulfilled their procedural obligations under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention.

On 5 May 2026 the Second Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in Z.A. and K.S. v. Türkiye (Applications nos. 36449/17). The two applicants, nationals from Kyrgyzstan and Russia, entered Türkiye and subsequently applied for international protection. Following their arrest on the grounds of irregular entry, both applicants were placed under administrative detention in police facilities, removal centres and reception and accommodation centres for periods of approximately five and four months respectively. They complained before the ECtHR that their detention and its conditions were contrary to Articles 3, 5 and 13 of the Convention.

In relation to Article 3 of the Convention, the Court examined the conditions of the first applicant’s detention in the Sakarya police headquarters, the Kocaeli Removal Centre and the Adana Reception and Accommodation Centre. It observed that the Government did not submit specific evidence capable of rebutting the applicant’s claims, in particular as regards access to outdoor exercise. Referring to the Constitutional Court’s findings, the Court found that the conditions of the first applicant’s detention caused him distress exceeding the unavoidable level inherent in detention and thus amounted to degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3.

In relation to the complaint of the first applicant under Article 5 § 1, the Court held that his detention at Sakarya police headquarters between 14 and 17 April 2014 was not based on any legal provision governing or authorising such a form of deprivation of liberty and was therefore not in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law. It further found that his continued detention following a judicial release order of 25 July 2014 until 23 August 2014 amounted to arbitrary detention. Accordingly, it found a violation of Article 5 § 1 in respect of both periods.

The Court declared the complaints of the second applicant inadmissible.

On 21 April 2026, the Fourth Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) published its judgment on the case Y.F.C. and Others v. The Netherlands (Application no. 21325/19). The applicants, a group of Venezuelan nationals, arrived at Curaçao by boat in April 2019 to apply for international protection and were arrested upon entry. Subsequently, they were placed in immigration detention and orders of removal were issued against them. They were held in several facilities, including the aliens’ barracks immigration detention facility and the SDKK prison. In June 2019, during the transfer of some applicants from one facility to another, a scuffle broke out between them and the authorities intervened using rubber bullets at close range. Several applicants alleged that they suffered injuries and that no independent investigation on the use of force was carried out. They also complained about the conditions of their detention and the lack of access to effective remedies. 

In relation to the complaints under the procedural limb of Article 3 ECHR, the Court reiterated that an investigation into allegations of ill-treatment must be prompt and thorough in order to be effective. It found that the investigative material only consisted of internal reports drafted by security officials directly involved in the events. Moreover, there was no evidence that the applicants were properly involved in any investigative process or that the authorities took meaningful steps to establish the facts. Therefore, the Court held that the authorities failed to conduct an effective and independent investigation into the applicants’ allegations of ill-treatment and found a violation of Article 3 under its procedural limb in respect of applicants 1, 2, 3, and 6. Regarding the substantive limb of Article 3, the Court recalled that any use of force against persons in custody must be strictly necessary in light of their conduct.  In the absence of an effective investigation clarifying the events, the Court found that the Government had failed to show that the use of rubber bullets was strictly necessary and that there were not clear domestic safeguards governing the deployment of kinetic impact projectiles in such circumstances. Hence, it found a violation of Article 3 under its substantive limb in respect of applicants 1, 2, and 3. The Court declared the complaints concerning the conditions of detention under Article 3 inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.

Concerning Article 5 § 4, the Court found t that remedies under Curaçaoan law were not practically accessible to the applicants, that the detention orders were in a language the applicants did not understand, that they did not mention the possibility of interim relief, and that the applicants had no access to legal assistance or statutory legal aid. The Court therefore concluded that the applicants could not obtain a speedy judicial review of their detention and found a violation of Article 5 § 4 in respect of all applicants. By contrast, it declared the complaints under Articles 5 §§ 1 and 2 inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies available.

The Court therefore found that Netherlands was responsible for the violation of Articles 3 and 5 § 4 of the Convention in respect of Curaçao.

On 9 February 2026, the Swiss Federal Administrative Court (FAC) delivered the judgment no. D-4601/2025 clarifying the scope of the principle of subsidiarity in the context of temporary protection for persons from Ukraine. The case concerned the refusal by the State Secretariat for Migration (SEM) to grant temporary protection in Switzerland to a Ukrainian national who had previously benefited from temporary protection in Italy.

The applicant had obtained temporary protection in Italy in March 2022, which remained valid until March 2023, and thereafter she returned to Ukraine. In April 2025, she entered Switzerland and applied for temporary protection. The SEM rejected her application and ordered her removal, considering that she could rely on protection previously granted in Italy. The applicant challenged this decision, arguing that her Italian protection status had expired and that Switzerland should have sought assurances of readmission from Italy before refusing protection. The Federal Administrative Court (FAC) dismissed the appeal and confirmed that, under the principle of subsidiarity, temporary protection in Switzerland may be refused where the applicant already has, or can reasonably obtain, a valid protection status in an EU/EFTA Member State. It clarified that no formal readmission agreement or prior assurance from the other State is required in such circumstances.

The Court found that Italy constituted a valid alternative protection country, as it had granted the applicant temporary protection equivalent to the Swiss “S” status and remains obliged under EU law to continue providing such protection to Ukrainian nationals. The expiry of the applicant’s previous Italian status, resulting from her voluntary departure, did not alter this assessment, as she could lawfully return and reobtain protection in Italy. Accordingly, the Court held that the existence of a valid alternative protection status excludes entitlement to Swiss temporary protection, without the need for prior confirmation of readmission, provided that the person concerned can lawfully return to the third State. The judgment was final and not subject to appeal before the Swiss Federal Supreme Court.
 

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

We would like to thank Helen Zemp for bringing this case to our attention

On 23 April 2026, the Advocate General Emiliou delivered his opinion in Case C‑414/25 (Sedrata) following a request for a preliminary ruling by the Supreme Court of Cassation, Italy (Corte suprema di cassazione). The case concerned the compatibility of the Italian legislation implementing the Italy-Albania bilateral agreement, which allows the transfer of third-country nationals to facilities located in Albanian territory for the purposes of border and return procedures, with EU law, in particular with the provisions of Directive 2008/115/EC (the Return Directive) and of Directive 2013/32/EU (the recast Asylum Procedures Directive).

The Advocate General considered that the Return Directive does not, in principle, preclude national legislation permitting the transfer of third-country nationals to detention facilities located in a third State, provided that those facilities remain under the jurisdiction of the Member State concerned and that EU law continues to apply in full. However, he stressed that such arrangements are compatible with the Return Directive only insofar as they do not undermine its effectiveness or the rights it guarantees. In particular, the competent authorities must ensure access to legal assistance and communication with legal representatives and family members, guarantee that detention is ended without undue delay where the legal conditions are no longer met and comply with the specific safeguards applicable to children and other vulnerable persons. He further noted that the geographical location of detention facilities may require appropriate organisational and logistical measures to ensure that these guarantees are effectively secured in practice.

Furthermore, the Advocate General considered that Article 9 (1) of the rAPD does not, in principle, preclude national legislation allowing the detention of a third-country national subject to return procedures in facilities located in a third State, where that person lodges an application for international protection while being held there. He explained that EU law does not require Member States to organise border or return procedures exclusively within their territory. For that reason, the requirement that applicants must be allowed to “remain in the Member State” must be understood in a way that it covers situations falling under the jurisdiction of the Member State, even if they take place outside its physical territory. However, he stressed that this approach is only acceptable if the national legislation ensures full respect for the procedural guarantees laid down in the Directive, especially that applicants must have access to information and legal assistance, be able to participate effectively in the procedure and, where necessary, appear before the competent authorities, while also benefiting from the specific safeguards applicable to vulnerable persons. He also stressed that detention-related guarantees, including judicial review, must be fully respected.

Finally, the Advocate General emphasised that Member States cannot circumvent their obligations under EU law by transferring individuals to facilities outside their territory, and that they remain fully responsible for ensuring compliance with EU rules and fundamental rights, including those guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

On 16 April 2026, the Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona delivered his opinion in Case C-249/25 (Jilin) following a request for a preliminary reference by the Council of State, Netherlands (Raad van State). The case concerned the interpretation of Article 17(2) of Directive 2001/55/EC (Temporary Protection Directive (TPD)) and Article 31 of Directive 2013/32/EU (recast Asylum Procedures Directive (rAPD)). The questions involved a situation where a third-country national benefiting from temporary protection had also applied for international protection and enquired whether Member States may suspend the examination of such an application for the duration of temporary protection.

The Advocate General considered that EU law does not permit Member States to suspend automatically and indefinitely the examination of applications for international protection solely on the ground that the applicant enjoys temporary protection. Referring to the Court of Justice’s judgment in Framholm, he emphasised that the system of temporary protection is not intended to replace the system of international protection, ensuring that beneficiaries of temporary protection still have a real opportunity to obtain refugee or subsidiary protection status. An automatic suspension of the asylum procedures for the entire duration of temporary protection would be, in practice, equivalent to a refusal to examine the application.

He further noted that the TPD contains no provision allowing for such a suspension and that the preparatory documents of that directive indicate that the possibility of suspending the examination of asylum applications had been deliberately excluded for reasons of compliance with the 1951 Geneva Convention. Although Member States may, in situations involving the simultaneous lodging of a large number of applications, adjust the pace of their examination in order to preserve the functioning of their asylum systems, such flexibility cannot justify a general, automatic and indefinite suspension. He emphasized that a suspension which is not subject to any time limit and is detached from any specific impact which it may have on the operation of the asylum system in each Member State is incompatible with the Temporary Protection Directive.

Finally, the Advocate General highlighted that the rAPD allows for limited extensions of the time limit for examining applications, including in situations involving a large number of applicants, but sets a maximum overall duration of 21 months. It does not allow Member States to suspend procedures indefinitely. In addition, he stressed that such a suspension would be incompatible with Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which guarantees the right to seek asylum. A prolonged delay of several years before the examination of an application would deprive its effectiveness and would not meet the requirements for lawful limitations under Article 52(1) of the Charter.
 

On 8 April 2026, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) communicated the application of K.P. v. Cyprus (Application no. 30430/25). The case concerns the alleged unlawfulness of the applicant’s detention pending deportation and the risk of ill-treatment if returned to Iran.

The applicant, an Iranian national recognised as refugee in Cyprus, was arrested in November 2023 on suspicion of involvement in terrorist activities. He was subsequently classified as a ‘’prohibited migrant’’ and placed in detention pending his deportation to Iran. The applicant challenged the detention and deportation decisions before the Administrative Court, which held that it lacked jurisdiction to examine the deportation decision and dismissed the recourse, finding the detention lawful, necessary and proportionate. The applicant subsequently lodged three habeas corpus applications before the Supreme Court, all of which were unsuccessful. The applicant complains under Article 3 of the risk of ill-treatment upon return to Iran as well as the conditions of his detention, under Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3 of the lack of an effective remedy to challenge his expulsion, and under Articles 5 §§ 1 and 4 ECHR regarding the lawfulness of his detention and access to legal aid.

On 9 April 2026, the First Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in H.D. v. Italy (Application no. 41645/23). The case concerned the placement and prolonged stay of an unaccompanied child in an adult reception centre in Italy, as well as the lawfulness of his deprivation of liberty and the adequacy of available remedies.

The applicant, a Burkinabe national, was placed in the adult reception and asylum centre in Isola di Capo Rizzuto (Crotone). Despite being soon recognised as a minor and granted a residence permit, he remained in the centre for more than five months without being allowed to leave. During that time, he challenged his situation before the domestic courts and subsequently requested an interim measure under Rule 39, which led to his transfer to a facility for unaccompanied children.

The Court found that the applicant’s deprivation of liberty lacked any legal basis and could not be justified under Article 5 § 1 (f) ECHR. It examined both limbs of that provision and noted that no removal or refusal of entry procedure had been initiated. On the contrary, the applicant had been formally recognised as a child and granted a residence permit to stay in Italy. The Court therefore concluded that his detention could not be justified under Article 5 § 1 (f). It also rejected the Government’s reliance on subsequent legislative amendments allowing the temporary accommodation of minors in adult centres, noting that these provisions entered into force after the applicant’s placement and did not provide a legal basis for deprivation of liberty. Furthermore, the Court held that the authorities failed to inform the applicant of the reasons for his detention, in breach of Article 5 § 2. Regarding Article 5 § 4, the Court recalled the requirement of a speedy judicial review and found that the domestic proceedings lasted several months and only concluded after the applicant’s transfer following an interim measure, therefore finding a violation of Article 5 § 4.

In relation to the complaint under Article 3, the Court reiterated the principles applicable to the treatment of persons held in immigration detention and emphasized the particular vulnerability of children. It found that the applicant had been held for over five months in an adult reception centre characterised by overcrowding, poor material and hygienic conditions, and a lack of appropriate services. Although children were nominally placed in a separate area, the evidence showed that separation from adults was ineffective in practice and that they lived in close contact. Moreover, no specific educational, recreational or psychosocial support adapted to minors was provided, and the applicant was not allowed to leave the centre. The Court concluded that the applicant had been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment in violation of Article 3 ECHR.

The Court also found that Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 3 had been violated. The applicant’s complaint concerned not only the material conditions of detention but also his placement in an adult facility, which required an effective remedy capable of securing his prompt transfer to a suitable centre for children. Although a domestic remedy was available, the Court considered that the delays in the proceedings rendered it ineffective in practice.

On 2 April 2026, the Human Rights Committee (CCPR) published its Views in the communication No. 3742/2020 submitted by Gentilmen Issa Magumba against the Republic of Korea, concerning the refusal to process an asylum application lodged in an airport transit zone and the applicant’s prolonged confinement in that zone.

The author, a national of the Democratic Republic of Congo, was held for approximately 14 months in the transit area of Incheon International Airport after being denied the possibility to apply for refugee status on the ground that he was a transit passenger and not subject to entry inspection. He claimed that this refusal exposed him to a risk of refoulement and that his confinement amounted to arbitrary detention and inhuman treatment.

The Committee found a violation of Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights due to the denial of access to the asylum procedure. It reiterated that States must not remove individuals where there are substantial grounds for believing that they face a real risk of irreparable harm and must ensure access to an effective and independent review with suspensive effect. In the present case, the author’s asylum request was rejected solely on formal grounds linked to his status as a transit passenger, depriving him of any opportunity to seek protection against refoulement. The Committee held that domestic legal provisions cannot be applied in a manner that undermines obligations under the Covenant.

The Committee further found a violation of Article 9(1), holding that the author’s confinement in the airport transit area constituted a deprivation of liberty. It recalled that such deprivation may arise from confinement in a restricted airport area without free consent, and that prolonged and indefinite detention of asylum seekers may be arbitrary. The Committee noted that the author was subjected to de facto detention for approximately 14 months within a space under the State party’s jurisdiction, without any legal basis, as no formal detention order had been issued. His confinement was of indefinite duration, lacked appropriate justification, and was not based on an assessment of necessity or proportionality. The Committee therefore concluded that the author’s detention was arbitrary and constituted a violation of Article 9(1) of the Covenant.

Finally, the Committee found the conditions of detention and the prolonged exposure to inadequate living conditions such as lack of privacy, insufficient access to food, medical care and sanitary facilities and constant lighting during COVID-19 pandemic, to be incompatible with human dignity, therefore finding a violation of Article 10(1) of the Covenant.

The Committee concluded that the State party violated Articles 7, 9(1) and 10(1) of the Covenant and held that it is under an obligation to provide the author with an effective remedy, including compensation, and to take measures to prevent similar violations in the future.
 

On 16 April 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in joined Cases C‑50/24 to C‑56/24 (Danané and Others), originating from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Belgian Council for asylum and immigration proceedings (Conseil du contentieux des étrangers). The cases concerned the interpretation of Directive 2013/32/EU (Asylum Procedures Directive) and Directive 2013/33/EU (Reception Conditions Directive), in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in the context of asylum applications lodged at Brussels airport by third-country nationals who were detained in facilities situated within Belgian territory but legally treated as border facilities.

The Court clarified that Article 43 of Directive 2013/32 does not require border procedures to be carried out at geographically defined border locations. A procedure may fall within the scope of that provision even where the applicant is detained in a facility located within the territory of the Member State, as long as those facilities are legally treated as border or transit zones. The Court emphasised that neither the wording nor the objectives of the provision impose a geographical requirement and that a restrictive interpretation could render border procedures ineffective and undermine fundamental rights.

The CJEU further held that, once the four-week period laid down in Article 43(2) of Directive 2013/32 has expired, the examination of the application can no longer be carried out under the border procedure and must continue under the ordinary procedural framework of the Directive. However, EU law does not preclude the same detention facility from being reclassified from a “place at the border” to a “place in the territory”. In such circumstances, the Member State must ensure that applicants are informed of the change in their legal situation, including their authorisation to enter the territory.

The Court confirmed that applicants may remain detained after the expiry of the four-week period on a different legal basis, in particular under Article 8(3)(b) of Directive 2013/33. It held that the continuation of detention is permissible where necessary to determine elements of the application, insofar as it complies with the requirements of necessity, proportionality and individual assessment. It stressed that detention must remain exceptional and cannot be applied automatically or systematically.

It also ruled that, after the expiry of the four-week period, the determining authority may continue examining the application as a matter of priority under Article 31(7) of Directive 2013/32. It clarified that investigative steps carried out during the border procedure may be relied upon in subsequent procedures, provided that they comply with the basic principles and guarantees laid down in EU law.

Finally, it held that the expiry of the four-week period and the continued detention of the applicant do not affect the competence of the determining authority. The expiry of that period merely entails a shift from the border procedure to another procedural framework and the cessation of the specific temporal and material limitations applicable to border procedures.

On 9 April 2026, the First Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in M.V. and Others v. Belgium (Applications nos. 52836/22 and three others). The case concerned the failure of the Belgian authorities to provide accommodation and material support to applicants for international protection. 

The asylum applicants were left without access to accommodation or material support in Belgium for several months. During this period, they allegedly lived in extremely precarious conditions on the street in Brussels, including during winter, without shelter, sanitation, or means to meet their basic needs. This situation persisted despite the final decisions by the Brussels Employment Tribunal ordering the Belgian State to provide them with reception conditions, and despite interim measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court.

In relation to the complains under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Court observed that Belgium was responsible for providing reception conditions to the applicants, to which they were entitled under national legislation transposing European Union law for as long as they were authorised to remain on the territory. It held that this obligation was not diminished by any assistance potentially received from humanitarian organizations, and reiterated that constraints linked to a migration crisis cannot exempt Contracting States from their obligations under Article 3 ECHR. The Court found that the authorities’ failure to provide reception conditions resulted in the applicants’ prolonged homelessness and deprivation of basic necessities, which amounted to degrading treatment under Article 3 ECHR.

In regard to Article 6 § 1 ECHR, the Court noted that the domestic judgments in favour of the applicants were not enforced promptly, but only following the indication of interim measures by the ECtHR and with significant delays and incomplete execution. It held that structural pressure on the reception system could not justify such delays and found no indication that the applicants had contributed to them. The Court therefore concluded that the time taken to enforce the domestic judgments was not reasonable and that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

The Court also found that the Belgian authorities had failed to comply with the interim measures indicated under Rule 39. Neither the prompt action had been taken, nor the Government had demonstrated the existence of objective obstacles or that all reasonable steps had been taken to comply, thereby breaching its obligations under Article 34.

Finally, under Article 46 ECHR, the Court reiterated the existence of a systemic deficiencies in Belgium’s asylum reception system, previously identified in Camara v. Belgium. It emphasised that the persistent failure to provide accommodation and to comply with final domestic court decisions was incompatible with the rule of law and requires the adoption of general measures to ensure effective access to reception conditions for applicants for international protection.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team
 

On 19 March 2026, the Administrative Court of First Instance of Thessaloniki published a decision referring a preliminary question to the CJEU regarding the interpretation of Article 46 of Directive 2013/32 (the Asylum Procedures Directive – APD). The case concerned an application for annulment lodged by a Guinean national against a decision of the Appeals Committee which had rejected his asylum appeal as inadmissible due to late submission.

The applicant applied for international protection in 2018, but his application was rejected at first instance. He promptly requested free legal aid and a lawyer was appointed, however, his appeal was lodged after the statutory deadline, and the Appeals Committee dismissed the appeal as inadmissible. Before the Administrative Court, the applicant argued that the late submission was not attributable to him but to failures in the provision of legal aid and claimed he was deprived of an effective remedy, in breach of Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The Court reviewed the EU and national legal framework and noted that while national law provides strict deadlines for appeals, these must not render the exercise of the right to an effective remedy impossible or excessively difficult. It also acknowledged the established national case law that, in principle, applicants bear the consequences of their lawyer’s errors, unless force majeure is established. According to domestic case law, force majeure does not include negligence on behalf of an appointed lawyer that results in missed deadlines. However, the Court identified a legal uncertainty as to whether this approach is compatible with EU law in situations where the legal representative is appointed by the State and the applicant has acted diligently.

Considering the importance of the right to an effective remedy and the potential consequences for asylum seekers, including the risk of refoulement, the Court decided to refer the following preliminary question to the Court of Justice of the European Union:

“Is it compatible with Article 46 of Directive 2013/32/EU and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to reject, pursuant to Articles 92(1)(a) and 95(8) of Law 4636/2019, an administrative appeal against a first-instance decision rejecting an application for international protection, due to late submission? Such rejection occurs in a situation where the requirements laid down in Article 71 of Law 4636/2019 (Articles 19 to 23 of the Directive) and in the implementing Ministerial Decision No 3449/2021 have not been complied with, namely the obligation to inform the appellant of the lawyer appointed to their case, to ensure communication between the appellant and that lawyer, and where the latter has not handled the case with the required diligence under Article 5 of that Ministerial Decision.  More specifically, it concerns  a case where, although the appellant requested within the statutory time limit the appointment of a lawyer by the Asylum Service to assist them and demonstrated due diligence in pursuing their case and in taking the necessary steps for the proper lodging of the appeal, the lawyer appointed by the Service failed to communicate with the applicant and to lodge the appeal in due time, without any proven case of force majeure affecting the lawyer?”

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team
EWLU team would like to thank Equal Legal Aid for bringing this case to our attention

On 19 March 2026, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Dutch Council of State (Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State) delivered its judgments nos. 202600650/2/V6 and 202600651/2/V6 on applications for interim relief submitted by two students residing in Gaza. The cases concerned the requests for consular assistance from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to allow the students to leave Gaza and collect their provisional residence permits (mvv) at the Dutch embassy in Jordan in order to commence their studies in the Netherlands.

Both students had already been admitted to a Dutch university, and the Minister of Asylum and Migration had no objection to issuing them a residence permit. However, the students could not cross the border in Gaza and requested the Minister’s assistance. The Minister rejected their requests because they did not belong to a group normally eligible for such assistance and declared the applicants’ objections inadmissible, a decision upheld by the District Court of The Hague. The students appealed against this decision and sought interim relief from the Council of State.

The Council of State stressed that the judgments were limited to interim relief excluding the main legal questions. It confirmed that there is no legal right to consular assistance under Dutch law and that the Minister enjoys broad discretion in this domain. Nevertheless, the interim relief judge of the Council of State found that the applicants’ inability to leave Gaza and collect their mvvs is due to the harrowing situation in Gaza. The risk that, due to the duration of the proceedings, they might no longer be able to collect those permits, outweighed the Minister’s interests. The judge further observed that the measure sought involved only limited efforts through diplomatic channels, and not an obligation to ensure evacuation or issue residence documents. The Minister’s concerns regarding identity verification were insufficiently substantiated. In light of these very special circumstances, it ordered the Minister to make every effort to facilitate the applicants’ departure from Gaza, without prejudging the outcome of the main proceedings.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team
 

On 24 March 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in the Case C‑767/23 (Remling). The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State, Netherlands (Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State) regarding the interpretation of Article 267 TFEU in the light of Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, on whether a court of last instance may refuse to make a reference for a preliminary ruling by means of summary reasoning without specifying the applicable exceptions.

The Court reiterated that, where there is no judicial remedy under national law against the decisions of a court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal are in principle obliged, under the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, to refer questions concerning the interpretation or validity of EU law to the Court of Justice. That obligation may be relieved only in a situation corresponding to one of the Cilfit exceptions: (i) where the question of EU law is irrelevant to the resolution of the dispute, (ii) where the provision of EU law has already been interpreted by the Court, or (iii) where the correct interpretation of EU law is so obvious as to leave no scope for reasonable doubt.

Thus, the Court held that where a court of last instance considers that one of those exceptions applies, it must, in accordance with Article 267 TFEU read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, state the reasons for its decision by setting out specifically and concretely, why the relevant exception is applicable in the circumstances of the case. That obligation applies irrespective of whether the parties have expressly requested a preliminary ruling as long as a question of EU law is raised. National legislation permitting courts to decide by means of summary reasoning for the sound administration of justice does not relieve them of the obligation to provide specific and concrete reasons. A decision merely stating that the conditions for summary reasoning are satisfied is insufficient. However, a court of last instance may, where appropriate, rely on the reasoning of a lower court, provided that the latter has set out the grounds justifying the application of one of the Cilfit exceptions.

On 26 March 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in the Case C-202/25 (Tadmur), following a request for a preliminary ruling from the District Court of The Hague, sitting in Roermond (Den Haag, zittingsplaats Roermond). The case concerned the interpretation of the Directive 2008/115/EC (the “Return Directive’’) in conjunction with the Directive 2011/95/EU (the “Qualification Directive’’), on whether a Member State is required to adopt a return decision in respect of a third-country national whose subsidiary protection status has been revoked and where removal is precluded by virtue of the principle of non-refoulement.

The Court held that Article 6(1) of Directive 2008/115 requires Member States, in principle, to issue a return decision once the unlawful stay of a third-country national has been established. However, that obligation must comply with Article 5 of the Return Directive, which requires respect for the principle of non-refoulement, as guaranteed by Article19(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In that regard, the Court clarified that Article 5 precludes not only the removal of a third-country national, but also the adoption of a return decision where such decision is contrary to the principle of non-refoulement. That obligation applies at the stage of adopting the return decision and cannot be remedied by merely postponing removal pursuant to Article 9(1)(a) of the Return Directive.

The Court further held that a return decision necessarily entails the designation of a country of destination, within the meaning of Article 3 of Directive 2008/115, and that it is therefore legally impossible to adopt such a decision where no destination can be identified in compliance with Article 5 thereof. Consequently, Member States may not circumvent those requirements by adopting under national law a decision obliging the person concerned to leave the territory without designating a country of destination or permitting removal, since such a measure constitutes an ‘obligation to return’ within the meaning of that directive.

The Court also noted that, while the revocation of subsidiary protection under Article 19(3)(a) of Directive 2011/95/EU, read in conjunction with Article 17(1) thereof, results in the loss of the rights attached to international protection, it does not in itself justify removal in breach of the principle of non-refoulement. However, a return decision may be adopted where a lawful alternative country of destination, within the meaning of Article 3(3) of Directive 2008/115, is identified, including a country of transit or another third country to which the person may voluntarily return, provided that such return complies with Article 5 of Return Directive and with the EU Charter.

On 26 March 2026, the First Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) published its judgment in the case of D.M. v. Sweden (Application no. 32694/23). The case concerned the removal of an Afghan national of Hazara ethnicity from Sweden to Afghanistan following the rejection of his applications for asylum.

The applicant applied for asylum in Sweden in 2015 relying on several grounds, including risks arising from his conversion to Christianity, his Hazara ethnicity, and his alleged “westernisation” after a prolonged stay in Sweden. His claims were examined in two separate sets of asylum proceedings, which were ultimately rejected by the Swedish authorities. Following the final rejection of his application, the applicant lodged a complaint before the ECtHR under Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) taken alone or in conjunction with Article 13 ECHR. An interim measure was applied to prevent his removal, and the Court considered that the applicant’s complaints should be examined only under Article 3 of the Convention.

In relation to the complaint under Article 3, the Court emphasised that the assessment must be rigorous and focus on the foreseeable consequences of removal, taking into account both the general situation in the country of destination and the applicant’s personal circumstances. The Court found that the domestic authorities’ assessment of the general situation in Afghanistan was insufficiently reasoned and therefore carried out its own ex nunc examination. It observed that, although the security and human rights situation remained serious and fragile, with widespread abuses and strict social control under the Taliban regime, the level of indiscriminate violence did not reach the threshold necessary to breach Article 3 of the Convention. However, it emphasised that this general situation must be taken into account in the assessment of individual risk. As regards the situation of Hazaras, while acknowledging that Hazaras face discrimination, targeted attacks and a lack of effective protection, the Court did not consider that they are systematically exposed to ill-treatment reaching the threshold of Article 3 ECHR. Nevertheless, it held that Hazara ethnicity constitutes a relevant risk-enhancing factor in relation to other risks.

In assessing the applicant’s individual circumstances, the Court found that the domestic authorities had failed to adequately substantiate their conclusions and, in particular, had not carried out a cumulative assessment of all relevant risk factors. It observed that the applicant’s Hazara ethnicity, combined with his area of origin and intended return (Mazar-e Sharif, Balkh province), exposed him to heightened risks. As regards his alleged conversion, the Court considered that a genuine conversion had not been established but recognised the risk extended to individuals perceived as apostates or as having abandoned Islam. Domestic authorities had also underestimated the risks associated with the applicant’s “westernisation’’. In the context of the current repressive regime in Afghanistan, the Court was not convinced that the applicant would be able to conceal these aspects of his identity having to comply with the extensive rules and restrictions governing almost every aspect of daily life, the active monitoring of compliance by the Taliban and members of Afghan communities, and the arbitrary and unpredictable nature of the authorities’ enforcement.

Thus, having regard to the cumulative effect of the applicant’s personal circumstances assessed in the light of the general human rights situation in Afghanistan, the Court concluded that there are substantial grounds for believing that the applicant would face a real risk of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR upon return to Afghanistan.

On 17 March 2026, the Court of Cassation (Hof van Cassatie) dismissed an appeal against a judgment of the Brussels Court of Appeal (Hof van beroep te Brussel) upholding the detention of an asylum applicant at the border following the use of forged travel documents.

The applicant, a third-country national, attempted to enter Belgium using false travel documents and applied for international protection upon arrival at the border. He was consecutively placed in detention in a border facility pending a decision on his entry or possible return. The applicant challenged his detention, arguing that the use of false documents is inherent to the situation of asylum applicants and should be regarded as a failure to comply with entry formalities, which cannot itself justify detention under the Directive 2013/33/EU (the Reception Directive). He also requested to refer a preliminary question on this matter to the Court of Justice of European Union.

The Court of Cassation rejected those arguments and confirmed that, while under Article 8(1) of the Reception Directive an applicant for international protection may not be detained solely because of their asylum application, detention is permitted where necessary, including in order to decide on the right to enter the territory in the context of a border procedure (Article 8(3)(c)). The Court held that, in assessing the lawfulness of detention, national authorities may take into account the use of false documents and that they are not required to treat such conduct as merely a failure to comply with entry formalities or as inherent to the status of an asylum applicant. The Court further upheld the findings of the lower court that the detention was based on an individual assessment and was necessary to ensure the effectiveness of border control and the possibility of return. Finally, it found that the request for a preliminary ruling was not relevant and it dismissed the cassation appeal.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 18 March 2026, the Migration Court of Appeal (Migrationsöverdomstolen) annulled the decisions of the Malmö Administrative Court and the Swedish Migration Agency which had rejected a refugee’s application for long-term resident status on the grounds that he had not proven his identity.

The applicant, already granted refugee status, a permanent residence permit, and a Swedish travel document, had applied for long-term resident status in June 2023. The Swedish Migration Agency and the Administrative Court in Malmö had both found that he had not submitted sufficient documentation to prove his identity. The applicant challenged this requirement, noting that, as a refugee, he could not return to his home country to obtain identity documents.

The Migration Court of Appeal held that Swedish law and the EU Long-Term Residents Directive 2003/109/EC do not impose a requirement of proven identity for refugees who already hold a permanent residence permit and a travel document. It clarified that Member States may grant long-term residence permits on more favourable terms than those provided for in the Directive. However, such permits do not confer a right of residence in other Member States. Therefore, the Court annulled the previous decisions and referred the case back to the Migration Agency for further consideration.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team. We would like to thank Michael Williams for bringing this case to our attention.

On 26 March 2026, the CJEU delivered its judgment in the case  C-819/25 (PPU) [Gonrieh] originating from the preliminary reference by the French-speaking Brussels Court of First Instance (Tribunal de première instance francophone de Bruxelles) regarding the scope of the Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification (the FRD), concerning the Member States’ obligations in the context of issuing family reunification visas, in particular where the beneficiary is required to appear in person but is unable to leave a third country due to life-threatening situation.

The Court clarified that Article 13(1) FRD, read in conjunction with Articles 2, 4, 7 and 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, requires Member States, after accepting an application for family reunification, to authorise the entry of the family member and to grant “every facility for obtaining the required visas.” This obligation entails removing unjustified administrative obstacles and applying rapid and efficient administrative procedures to enable the issuance of visas, including, inter alia, facilitating personal appearances through accessible consular services, issuing emergency travel documents, and minimizing the number of appearances required.

However, the Court held that Article 13(1) does not impose obligations extending to diplomatic or consular relations with third countries. In particular, a Member State is not required to organise or ensure the transfer of a third-country national to its consular post, nor to contact third countries to facilitate that transfer, in situations where the person is unable to travel. Such measures would fall outside the scope of the Directive and concern matters which are not covered by EU law under Article 51 of the Charter. It further clarified that provisions concerning diplomatic and consular protection, including Article 20(2)(c) and Article 23 TFEU and Article 46 of the Charter, apply only to Union citizens and, in certain cases, their family members, and not to third-country nationals seeking family reunification under Directive 2003/86.

The Court emphasised that this interpretation is consistent with the objective of Directive 2003/86, which is to promote family reunification and protect third-country nationals, including minors, while distinguishing between administrative facilitation and measures requiring external intervention. Therefore, the refusal to provide evacuation or diplomatic assistance does not constitute a failure to implement EU law, and the obligations under Article 13(1) are limited to the administrative sphere.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 5 March 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in the Case C-458/24 (Daraa). The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Administrative Court of Sigmaringen, Germany (Verwaltungsgericht Sigmaringen) concerning the interpretation of the Dublin III Regulation and Directive 2013/32 in a situation where the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application unilaterally suspends transfers.

The Court held that the second and third subparagraphs of Article 3(2) of the Dublin Regulation should be interpreted as meaning that a unilateral suspension by the Member State responsible of take-charge or take-back procedures does not require the determining Member State to continue applying the Charter III criteria, nor to assume responsibility itself. Article 3(2) applies only where two cumulative conditions are met: (i) the existence of systemic flaws in the asylum procedure or reception conditions and (ii) a resulting risk of inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. A unilateral suspension does not, in itself, satisfy those conditions and cannot be treated as evidence of such flaws. Consequently, no additional or implicit condition relating to the willingness of the responsible Member State may be inferred from that provision.

As regards Article 29(1) and (2) of the Dublin Regulation, the Court held that the six-month time limit for carrying out a transfer continues to apply irrespective of the reasons preventing the transfer. Under Article 29(2), where the transfer is not carried out within that period, responsibility automatically passes to the requesting Member State. That transfer of responsibility is unconditional and does not depend on the conduct of the Member State initially responsible, including situations where the failure to transfer results from that State’s unilateral suspension of cooperation. The Regulation does not provide for suspension or interruption of that time limit, and extensions are limited to the situations expressly provided for in Article 29(2). The Court further clarified that, during the running of the transfer period, the Member State initially designated as responsible remains bound by its obligations under the Regulation, and Member States must cooperate to carry out the transfer. However, a failure by one Member State to comply with its obligations cannot justify non-compliance by another; remedies lie in infringement proceedings under Articles 258 and 259 TFEU.

Finally, the Court interpreted Article 33(1) and (2) of Directive 2013/32 as precluding a Member State from rejecting an application for international protection as inadmissible on the ground that the Member State responsible is unwilling to take charge or take back the applicant. The grounds for inadmissibility listed in Article 33(2) are exhaustive and must be interpreted strictly, and such a situation is not included among them.

On 28 November 2025, the High Court of Justice of Andalusia, Ceuta and Melilla – Málaga Administrative Chamber (Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Andalucía, Ceuta y Melilla - Sala de lo Contencioso Administrativo de Málaga) issued the judgment No. 2434/2025, annulling the return of applicants who had attempted to access the Spanish territory via the Chafarinas Islands.

The applicants, Syrian nationals, arrived at Isla del Congreso on 3 January 2022 and expressed their intention to apply for international protection. The authorities nevertheless proceeded with their immediate return to the Moroccan authorities without initiating an individual administrative procedure or allowing them to apply for asylum. The lower court upheld the authorities’ actions, considering that the applicants’ conduct constituted an abuse of law and justified their immediate return.

The High Court found that the special border regime established in the tenth additional provision of the Spanish Immigration Law (LOEX 4/2000) allowing summary expulsions at the borders of Ceuta and Melilla, does not apply to the Chafarinas Islands and cannot be extended by analogy. The Court further held that the applicants’ conduct did not constitute an abuse of law and emphasised that access to the asylum procedure must be guaranteed in accordance with Directive 2013/32/EU on asylum procedures, Article 18 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the principle of non-refoulement under Article 3 ECHR, and Article 33 of the Refugee Convention. It therefore concluded that the repatriation measures had been adopted in breach of the applicable procedural guarantees and it annulled the contested decision.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 27 February 2026, the Court of First Instance of Antwerp, Family Court Section (Rechtbank van eerste aanleg Antwerpen, familierechtbank) annulled a decision of the civil registrar of the City of Antwerp revoking the Belgian nationality of a child born in Belgium of Palestinian parents recognised as refugees.

The child had initially been granted Belgian nationality pursuant to Article 10§1 of the Belgian Nationality Code to prevent statelessness. On 5 March 2024, the registrar of Antwerp revoked the child’s nationality on the grounds that the child could acquire Palestinian nationality through the parents or via the Palestinian mission. As a result, the child’s Belgian passport and Kids-ID were annulled. The parents contested the revocation, maintaining that as recognised refugees it was not feasible for them to secure Palestinian nationality for their child. The City of Antwerp and the Public Prosecutor’s Office argued that the claim should be dismissed, citing a potential “pull effect” and alleged abuse of the nationality rules.

The Court of First Instance annulled the revocation holding that under Article 10§3 of the Belgian Nationality Code (WBN) nationality may only be withdrawn if it is established beyond doubt that the child possesses another nationality. Hence, given the absence of formal Palestinian nationality legislation and the impossibility for refugees to register remotely, the child could not realistically acquire another nationality. The court further held that any alleged abuse of Belgian nationality rules by the parents could not justify the deprivation of the child’s nationality, highlighting that the best interests of the child (Article 22bis of the Constitution) must prevail.

According to the Court’s press release, five similar decisions from the city register were annulled by the Court on the same grounds.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 5 March 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in the case C-150/34 (Aroja). The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Supreme Court of Finland (Korkein oikeus) regarding the calculation of detention periods for the purpose of removal of illegally staying third-country nationals under the Directive 2008/115/EC (the Return Directive).

The Court clarified that Article 15(5) and (6) of the Return Directive must be interpreted as meaning that to determine whether the maximum detention period of an illegally staying third-country national has been reached, all periods of detention completed in the same Member State under Article 15 for the purpose of enforcing the same return decision must be taken to account. To reach this conclusion, the Court noted the serious interference with the right to liberty protected by Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the fact that detention under the Return Directive does not have punitive aims but seeks to secure the Directive's return-related objectives within strictly defined time limits. This requirement applies even where the detention periods are separated by intervals during which the person concerned was not detained, otherwise the authorities could circumvent those limits by releasing and subsequently re-detaining the individual based on the same return decision, likely resulting in a breach of the principle of proportionality.

The Court also recalled its previous case law and held that, under the second sentence of Article 15(3) of the Return Directive, any prolonged detention exceeding the initial maximum period of detention must, in all cases, be subject to review by a judicial authority, regardless of whether the detained person has requested it.  The Court further clarified that, in the absence of EU rules on the procedure of detention reviews in the event of prolonged detention periods, the review of an administrative decision extending detention beyond the initial maximum six-month period does not have to take place before that period is reached. However, it must be carried out as speedily as possible after the adoption of that decision.

Finally, the Court held that, in the event of a late judicial review of a decision extending detention beyond the initial six-month period, EU law does not automatically require, on that ground alone, the release of the detained person. Where the substantive conditions for detention remain satisfied and the maximum period of detention under Article 15(6) of the directive has not been reached, detention may continue.

On 5 March 2026, the Court of Justice of the European  Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in the case C-489/24 (Safita). The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Council of the State of The Netherlands (Raad van State) concerning the interpretation of Directive 2013/32/EU (the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (rAPD)), in particular about the possibility for Member States to adopt several successive decisions extending the time limit for examining applications for international protection where a large number of applications are lodged within a short period.

The Court clarified that, under point (b) of the third subparagraph of Article 31(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU, a Member State may decide on several occasions and consecutively to extend the time limit for the examination procedure. However, the Court emphasised that the application of that provision is subject to three cumulative conditions: (i) applications for international protection must be lodged simultaneously, (ii) they must be lodged by a large number of applicants, and (iii) the situation must make it very difficult in practice to conclude the examination within the initial six-month period. Referring to its previous case law, the Court recalled that such extensions are justified only in the event of a significant increase in applications occurring within a short period, compared with the normal and foreseeable trend in the Member State concerned, and not in situations characterised by a gradual increase of applications over an extended period.

Furthermore, the Court held that under Article 4(1) rAPD, where the number of applications for international protection remains continuously high over an extended period, Member States are obliged to allocate appropriate and sufficient means to the determining authority to enable it to process those applications. A Member State may therefore rely on consecutive extensions only if it demonstrates, with sufficient reasons and evidence, that despite the efforts to address the simultaneous lodging of applications, it did not have sufficient time to allocate the necessary resources. In any case, the duration of successive extensions must not exceed either the time necessary to comply with that obligation or a maximum overall period of 21 months from the lodging of the application.

On 10 February 2026, the Fifth Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) communicated the application of C.I. v. Cyprus (Application no. 12347/25). The case concerns the alleged unlawfulness of the applicant’s detention pending deportation and the risk of death or ill-treatment if returned to Burundi.

The applicant, a Burundian national, lodged an asylum application in Cyprus on the grounds that he would face serious threats to his life and a real risk of ill-treatment upon return to Burundi. His claim was rejected, and he was detained as a “prohibited immigrant” on 22 February 2025. His deportation was suspended following interim measures by the Court, and he remained in detention until 15 December 2025, when he was released after successful habeas corpus proceedings. He complains under Articles 2 and 3 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) concerning the risk of ill-treatment upon return, under Article 13 in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3 for the lack of an effective domestic remedy, and under Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 ECHR regarding the lawfulness of his detention and access to legal aid.

The Court asked the parties to clarify, inter alia, whether the applicant had exhausted all effective domestic remedies, whether he faced a real risk of ill-treatment upon return to Burundi, and whether he had access to effective remedies to challenge his deportation and detention.

On 26 February 2026, the Belgian Constitutional Court delivered its judgments nos. 23/2026 and 24/2026, suspending, respectively, provisions of two Laws of 14 July 2025 reforming the reception regime for asylum applicants, and provisions of the Act of 18 of July 2025 introducing stricter conditions for family reunification between beneficiaries of subsidiary protection and their family members. In both cases, the Court considered that the immediate application of the contested measures was likely to cause an irreparable harm and raised doubts as to their compatibility with EU law and fundamental rights. It therefore referred several preliminary questions to the CJEU and ordered the suspension of the provisions pending the CJEU judgment.

In judgment No. 23/2026, the Court suspended provisions of two Laws of 14 July 2025 which allow Fedasil (Belgian Federal Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers) to refuse material assistance to asylum applicants  who already enjoy international protection in another EU Member State, and which cancel  the possibility of granting reception support in the form of financial assistance in special circumstances. The Court considered that the immediate application of these provisions could cause serious and irreparable harm, and referred to the CJEU the question on whether EU law allows an application by a person already granted protection in another Member State, to be treated as a “subsequent application” under Directive 2013/32/EU, thereby permitting refusal of material assistance under Directive 2013/33/EU.

In judgment No. 24/2026, the Court examined provisions of the Act of 18 July 2025 introducing stricter requirements for family reunification between beneficiaries of subsidiary protection and their family members, departing from the more favourable regime applicable to refugees. The Court considered that the immediate application of these provisions was likely to cause serious and irreparable harm.

It therefore suspended them and referred five preliminary questions to the CJEU, asking in particular: (1) whether the Directive 2003/86/EC is valid insofar as it excludes beneficiaries of subsidiary protection from its more favourable family reunification regime; (2) if so, whether the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights precludes national measures subjecting beneficiaries of subsidiary protection to less favourable conditions than refugees; (3) whether the Directive 2011/95/EU is valid insofar as it limits the concept of “family members” to those present in the same Member State; and (4-5) whether the Charter precludes national measures imposing stricter family reunification conditions on beneficiaries of subsidiary protection if their  family members are not present in Belgium, in light of the right to respect for family life and the best interests of the child.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

Belgium: Council for Aliens' Law Litigation annuls inadmissibility decisions for beneficiaries of international protection in Greece

On 20 February 2026, the United Chambers of the Council for Aliens’ Law Litigation (RvV-CCE) (CALL) annulled three inadmissibility decisions of the Commissioner-General for Refugees and Stateless Persons (CGRS) concerning applications for international protection lodged by Palestinians who had been granted international protection in Greece. The three cases were examined together in the same proceedings (Nos. 341 503, 341 504, and 341 505 CR).

The cases concerned beneficiaries of international protection whose Greek residence permits had expired. During the waiting period for the renewal of these permits, the applicants lacked access to the rights and benefits associated with their status, including employment, housing, healthcare, and social assistance. The CALL  found that, in the absence of these benefits to meet their basic needs during the waiting  period, the applicants risked falling into extreme material deprivation incompatible with human dignity under Article 4 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Therefore, the Council annulled the three inadmissibility decisions on the ground that the CGRS had failed to sufficiently examine whether the applicants would be able to remain in Greece and meet their basic needs pending the renewal of their residence permits. In doing so, the CALL confirmed its previous case law on the precarious situation of beneficiaries of international protection in Greece (RvV‑CCE 22 January 2024, No. 300 342 CR).

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 5 March 2026, the Advocate General Rimvydas Norkus issued his opinion in the case C-819/25 (PPU) [Gonrieh]. The case related to the preliminary reference by the French-speaking Brussels Court of First Instance (Tribunal de première instance francophone de Bruxelles) regarding the scope of the Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification (the FRD), concerning the granting of a visa for family reunification which requires the beneficiary to appear in person for its issuance, while the person is unable to leave the third country where they reside and is facing life-threatening conditions. The questions referred enquired whether EU law applies only to the decision to grant the visa, or also to ensure that the person can effectively receive it and, whether Member States are obliged to provide assistance to enable the beneficiary to obtain the visa under such circumstances, including where their physical departure from the third country is impossible due to imminent danger.

The Advocate General considers that the implementation of EU law does not conclude with the decision of granting the visa. Relying on Article 13(1) of the FRD, which requires Member States to authorise entry and to grant “every facility for obtaining the required visas”, he concludes that the obligation extends until the issuance of the visa. That provision, read in light of the objective of the Directive to ensure the effectiveness of family reunification and recital 13 requiring efficient procedures, imposes a duty of active and continuous administrative cooperation. Accordingly, where a Member State requires the beneficiary’s personal appearance to verify identity, EU law and therefore the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, pursuant to Article 51(1) thereof, applies until the administrative formalities necessary for issuing the visa are completed. Limiting EU law to the mere approval of the visa would undermine the effectiveness of the right to family reunification.

However, the Advocate General makes a distinction between administrative facilitation and diplomatic or consular intervention. He considers that Article 13(1) does not require a Member State which has granted visas to nationals of a third country in the context of family reunification to include them in an evacuation process put in place by that Member State or to inform the authorities of any third country preventing these beneficiaries from travelling to the Union that the latter have a visa to stay in the Member State in question.  Accordingly, while Article 13(1) of Directive 2003/86 requires Member States to grant every facility for obtaining the required visas and to ensure through effective administrative measures that the visa is actually issued, it does not impose an obligation to adopt external, diplomatic or evacuation measures to secure the beneficiaries’ departure from a third country.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 16 February 2026, the Second Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) published the communicated cases of M.R. v. Türkiye (Application no. 12965/21), and M.S. v. Türkiye (Application no. 20148/25), concerning the removal of Syrian nationals from Türkiye.

The case of M.R. v. Türkiye concerns a Syrian national who arrived in Türkiye in 2011 and was granted temporary protection. In August 2019, he was apprehended and placed in police custody and later in immigration detention. On 24 August 2019, he was returned to Syria under the voluntary repatriation scheme. The applicant alleges that his removal was a de facto deportation disguised as voluntary return and that it exposed him to a real risk of ill-treatment. He further complains of unlawful deprivation of liberty, lack of procedural safeguards, the absence of an effective remedy to challenge his detention and removal, and impact on his private and family life, invoking articles 2,3,5,8,13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No.7 thereof. 

The Court asked the parties to clarify the applicant’s alleged minor status, the voluntariness of his return and the prior assessment of the risk under Articles 2 and 3 ECHR, as well as the lawfulness of his detention and the availability of effective remedies.

The case of M.S. v. Türkiye concerns three Syrian nationals who fled to Türkiye in 2013–2014 and were granted temporary protection. The applicants were issued deportation orders to designated safe third countries or to return voluntarily to Syria. Two of the applicants were subject to security restrictions, and one was alleged to have links with terrorist organisations. Following these orders, all applicants were placed in administrative detention. The applicants challenge the deportation orders, arguing that the domestic authorities failed to conduct an adequate “safe third country” assessment, particularly regarding the risk of chain refoulement to Syria, and claim that removal would disproportionately interfere with their established family and private life in Türkiye. The first applicant also raises concerns about the lack of effective remedies to challenge the lack of assessment of his alleged risk of ill-treatment and the interference with his family life.

The Court asked the parties to clarify, inter alia, whether the planned expulsions would expose the applicants to a real risk of treatment contrary to Articles 2 and 3 ECHR.

On 30 January 2026, the Second Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) communicatedthe application of D.J. v Türkiye (Application no. 37547/22). The case concerns the alleged unlawfulness of the applicant’s deprivation of liberty and his removal to Uzbekistan.

The applicant, an Uzbek national of Turkmen ethnic origin who identifies as an activist for the independence of Karakalpakstan, was arrested during a demonstration in Istanbul in 2020. Removal orders were issued after that but later annulled due to the lack of a proper risk assessment. He subsequently lodged an application for international protection and, in December 2021, informed the authorities that he had been subjected to harassment, surveillance and death threats, prompting a criminal investigation. In January 2022, he was allegedly apprehended by undercover police officers, held without access to his lawyer or relatives and without being informed of the reasons for his apprehension, before being placed in immigration detention and deported to Uzbekistan on the same day. The Constitutional Court later declared his complaints inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies.

The applicant submitted complaints under  Articles 2, 3, 5 and 13 of the Convention, as well as Article 1 of Protocol No. 7. The Court asked the parties to clarify whether the domestic authorities conducted an adequate assessment of the alleged risk of death or ill-treatment prior to the applicant’s removal, whether he had access to an effective remedy capable of preventing his deportation, and whether his apprehension and deprivation of liberty complied with the requirements of Article 5 of the Convention.

On 20 November 2025, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court published its judgment on the case 2C_64/2025, and ruled that requiring Eritrean nationals to sign a ‘declaration of repentance’ at the Eritrean consulate in order to obtain a residence permit on the grounds of hardship (conversion from an F permit to a B permit) is unlawful.

The Federal Supreme Court found that, although de presentation of an identity document is in principle required, this obligation does not apply where such procurement is unreasonable. The Court further observed that the issuance of an Eritrean passport is conditional upon signing a ‘declaration of repentance’, which entails admitting to unlawful conduct. It held that such requirement amounts to a form of self-incrimination and is incompatible with fundamental principles of Swiss and international law.
It therefore found that the authorities could not lawfully refuse the residence permit solely on the ground of the absence of a passport. Since the applicant’s identity was not in doubt and he met the other statutory requirements, making the grant of the permit conditional on the production of such a document was found by the Court disproportionate to the legitimate aim of identity verification.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 30 December 2025, the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania published its judgment on the case No eA-820-552/2025 ,  ruling that the denial of the right to seek for international protection violates international and EU Law.

On 23 October 2023, the applicant was forcibly returned to the Belarus border by the Lithuanian authorities, denying him the right to seek asylum. The applicant was provided with water, food, warm clothes, footwear, and hygiene products, but he was not allowed to enter the territory of the Republic of Lithuania.

The Supreme Administrative Court held that ambiguities regarding the request for asylum must be interpreted in favour of the applicant and shifted the burden of proof to the authorities. Furthermore, having regard to the jurisprudence of the CJEU, the Supreme Court held that the officials acted unlawfully by forcibly removing the applicant from Lithuanian territory and denying him an opportunity to apply for international protection. The Court also recognised that there was a causal link between the suffering of the applicant and the actions of the Lithuanian authorities and found Lithuanian authorities responsible for this. However, it considered that there is no evidence that the violation of the applicant’s rights resulted in non-pecuniary damage within the meaning of Article 3 ECHR, leaving the question of the compensation to be decided. Finally, the Court held that national border regulations, including measures designed to prevent ‘instrumentalisation’, cannot legitimize state conduct that breach international obligations. It reaffirmed that duties under both international and EU law prevail over national law.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team.

On 23 January 2026, the Committee Against Torture of the United Nations (CAT) published its decision in the Communication No. 1079/2021 submitted by A.A. against Australia. The communication concerns the lawfulness of prolonged detention in Australia and at the Manus Regional Processing Centre in Papua New Guinea, and the possible accountability of Australia for alleged violations of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (hereinafter, the Convention).

The complainant, an Iranian national, arrived in Australia in July 2013 and was transferred under a migration cooperation agreement to the Manus Detention Centre in Papua New Guinea, where he was subjected to harsh detention conditions and torture. He was temporarily returned to Australia in 2019 for medical treatment but remained detained administratively until 2022. The applicant claimed that his detention in both Australia and Papua New Guinea was inhuman and degrading and caused him severe physical and mental suffering.

The Committee found that the complainant suffered torture and inhuman treatment while detained at the Manus Regional Processing Centre in Papua New Guinea. Although these acts occurred outside Australian territory, the Committee noted that Australia exercised effective control over the detention system through its central role in designing the migration arrangements, providing full funding, and establishing the overall framework and operational structure of the centre. Even if direct operational control by Australian agents was absent, the Committee held that Australia remained responsible, reflecting both the principle of effective control and the doctrine of joint responsibility under international law. It further observed that Australia failed to take measures to prevent acts of torture, to investigate and punish abuses, and to ensure adequate medical care during his detention, hence constituting a violation of Article 2(1), read in conjunction with Article 1(1) of the Convention.

The Committee also found that the complainant’s administrative detention in Australia was not justified, necessary, or proportionate, and lacked adequate review, thereby amounting to inhuman and degrading treatment, in violation of Article 16(1) of the Convention.
Finally, the Committee recommended that Australia provide the complainant with redress, including compensation, rehabilitation, and guarantees of non-repetition, and take measures to prevent similar violations in the future.

On 29 January 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in the case C-431/24 (Multan). The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the District Court of The Hague, Netherlands (Rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats Roermond) regarding the scope of access to information in an asylum applicant’s file under Article 23 (1) Directive 2013/32 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (rAPD)).

The Court of Justice clarified that Article 23 (1) rAPD, read in conjunction with Article 46 thereof and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, requires that both the applicant and the national court must be able to access information in the applicant’s file that is likely to be relevant for the proceedings. This includes supporting documents such as investigation reports prepared by the authorities of the host Member State concerning the applicant’s country of origin on which the rejection of international protection and the return decision are based, when they are relevant for: (i) the applicant to exercise his or her rights of defence, (ii) for the court to review compliance with Article 30 rAPD and, ultimately, (iii) to assess whether the principle of non-refoulement has been respected.

The Court recalled its case law and reiterated that, under Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU, national courts must conduct a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law, including the manner in which investigations were carried out and the evidence considered by the determining authority, to ensure effective judicial review of decisions rejecting international protection. At the same time, the Court confirmed that the applicant’s right to a fair trial, as guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter, reinforces this requirement. Access to the file is therefore essential for both the court’s assessment and the applicant’s rights of defence, although it may be limited in specific cases in line with Article 52(1) of the Charter.

On 22 January 2026, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) communicated the application of D.A. v. Türkiye (Application no. 5393/25). The case concerns the alleged failure of the domestic authorities to duly assess the risk of death or ill-treatment in the event of the removal of a Turkmenistan national, who claimed that she had been persecuted in Turkmenistan on account of her political opinions and professional activities as a journalist.

The applicant challenged the removal order issued by the Trabzon Provincial Directorate of Migration Management in May 2023, but the removal was subsequently upheld by the Trabzon Administrative Court in September 2023. The Constitutional Court later examined her complaints under the prohibition of ill-treatment and declared them inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. The applicant invokes Articles 2, 3, and 13 of ECHR.

The Court asked the parties to clarify, inter alia, whether the applicant faces a real risk of treatment contrary to Articles 2 and 3 ECHR if removed to Turkmenistan.

On 3 February 2026, the Third Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) published its judgment on the case of O.H. and Others v. Serbia (Application no. 57185/17). The case concerned the removal of Afghan applicants to Bulgaria after they had expressed their intention to seek asylum in Serbia.

On the 3 February 2017, the applicants were arrested and detained at the Gradina Border Police Station on the grounds of illegal border crossing. However, the Pirot Misdemeanour Court discontinued the proceedings recognising the intention of the applicants to seek asylum and issued asylum-intention certificates to them, serving as temporary residence permits. Despite this, the police transported the applicants to the Bulgarian border, confiscated their documents, and forced them to collectively cross the border at night.

In relation to the complaints under Article 4 Protocol 4, the Court recalled the two-tier test established in N.D. and N.T. v. Spain for assessing collective expulsions following unauthorised border crossings. It emphasised, however, that the present case differed. The applicants’ arbitrary removal by the police was entirely unrelated to their initial unauthorised entry into Serbian territory. Moreover, the Constitutional Court already found that the domestic authorities had expelled the applicants without a prior examination of their removal on an individual basis, which had violated the prohibition of collective expulsion in respect of the applicants. The Court therefore agreed with this assessment and found a violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4.

Regarding the removal of the applicants from Serbia under Article 3, the Court recalled the principle of non-refoulement inherent in Article 3 ECHR and reiterated that, where an asylum seeker is removed to a third country without an examination of the asylum claim on the merits, the authorities must assess whether the person will have access to an adequate asylum procedure there. As the Serbian authorities expelled the applicants without such assessment, the Court found a violation of the procedural limb of Article 3. It further noted that the manner of their removal, including being taken to the border during freezing conditions, amounted to a violation of the substantive limb of Article 3. By contrast, it found that, although the applicants had been held in inadequate detention conditions, the short duration of their detention did not reach the threshold of severity required under Article 3 and found this complaint manifestly ill-founded.

Concerning the lawfulness of the their detention under Article 5(1) ECHR, the Court noted that the applicants’ initial detention during the misdemeanour proceedings was lawful. However, their continued detention from the end of those proceedings until their expulsion from Serbia had no legal basis, as the applicants should have been taken to an asylum reception facility, but were instead driven to the border and expelled in an arbitrary manner. Hence, the Court found a violation of Article 5(1) of the Convention. Finally, the Court found a violation of Article 5(4) of the Convention, since the police failed to provide them with legal assistance effectively, hence, deprived them of the possibility to challenge the lawfulness of their detention.

The Court also decided not to examine the admissibility and merits of the complaints under Article 13, in conjunction with Articles 3 and Article 4 Protocol 4 of the Convention.

On 22 January 2026, the Advocate General Spielmann issues his opinion in the case C-877/24 (Shamsi). The case related to the preliminary reference by the  Council of State of the Netherlands regarding the scope of Directive 2008/115/EC (Returns Directive (RD) concerning third-country nationals who have been sentenced to life or long-term sentences in prison, for crimes which are not related to the illegal nature of their stay. The questions enquired under what conditions, a Member State remains obliged to adopt a return decision against them when, owing to the execution of those sentences, neither voluntary departure nor forced removal will be possible in the near future.

The Advocate General Spielmann examined whether Member States may issue return decisions under the Returns Directive to third-country nationals who are serving long prison sentences and cannot be removed in the foreseeable future. The Opinion concludes that the Returns Directive does not preclude the adoption of a return decision against an illegally staying third-country national whose removal will take place only after the completion of the imprisonment. However, in such cases, national authorities must periodically assess whether removal remains feasible. By contrast, when illegally staying third-country nationals are serving a life sentence and removal is permanently impossible in practice, the adoption of a return decision is incompatible with the Directive. Finally, the Advocate General found that Directive 2008/115 does not require Member States to grant a temporary residence permit to illegally staying third-country nationals during the execution of a prison sentence.

On 5th of February 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in case C-718/24 (Aleb). The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Administrative Court of Sofia, Bulgaria (Administrativen sad Sofia-grad) regarding the application of the concept ‘safe third country’ under the Directive 2013/32 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (rAPD)).

The Court of Justice clarified that the ‘safe third country’ concept under Article 33(2)(c) rAPD does not necessarily have to be applied when examining the merits of an application for international protection. An application under substantive examination may be rejected as inadmissible on the grounds that a third country is considered to be a safe third country for the applicant, even when the competent authority has found that the applicant meets the conditions for granting international protection laid down in recast Qualification Directive. By contrast, such an application may be rejected as unfounded, or even manifestly unfounded, only under the conditions set out in Article 32 rAPD and may not, in any event, be rejected as unfounded on the grounds of inadmissibility.

The Court further reiterated that, while national authorities may rely on publicly available information and on executive decisions designating certain countries as safe, the application of the “safe third country” must be based on an individual assessment. Member States must ensure that national law provides clear methods to assess, in light of the applicant’s personal circumstances, whether the third country can be considered safe for that applicant.
In addition, Member States are required to lay down, in their national law, criteria for establishing a sufficient connection between the applicant and the third country. That connection must be strong enough to make it reasonable to expect the applicant to travel to that country and cannot be presumed.

Finally, the Court emphasised the requirement of effective judicial protection. National courts must be able to review whether a genuine connection exists between the applicant and the third country relied upon, even where national law does not expressly grant courts the power to carry out such an examination. 
 

On the 1st of December 2025, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) communicated the application of O.M. v. Greece (Application no. 14354/21), concerning the lawfulness of the detention of an Afghan national who arrived on Lesvos on 30 August 2019 and was detained with a view to his readmission to Türkiye .

The applicant alleged that he was subjected to unlawful and arbitrary detention under the Greek authorities, that he was not promptly informed of the reasons for his detention in a language he could understand, and that the judicial revision of his detention was ineffective. The applicant also raised concerns under Article 8 regarding the prolonged uncertainty and vulnerability caused by the delays in processing his international protection request, which he argued had significant negative consequences on his mental health and well-being.

The Court asked the parties to clarify whether the applicant’s detention complied with the requirements of the Convention and domestic law, including the availability of effective judicial review (Arts. 5(1) and 5(4)). It also raised questions as to whether the length of detention and delays in examining the asylum claim affected the applicant’s private life (Art. 8), and whether an effective remedy was available to challenge the situation (Art. 13). The parties were further invited to provide information on the handling of the asylum procedure during and after the period of detention.
 

On 22 January 2026, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) published  its judgment in the case of A.N. and Others v. Greece (Applications nos. 65267/19 and two others) finding that Greece violated Article 3 of the Convention due to inadequate living conditions at the Samos Reception and Identification Centre (RIC).

The case concerned seven unaccompanied children accommodated at the Samos RIC for four to ten months, facing severe overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, inadequate medical and psychosocial support, an insufficient "safe zone" for minors, and an ineffective guardianship system (§§72-79).

The Court emphasised that unaccompanied minors constituted a particularly vulnerable group and that credible allegations of poor conditions can shift the burden of proof to the State (§120). The ECtHR further highlighted that the situation of vulnerable persons, and particularly unaccompanied minors, requires special protection (§124).

Recalling its case-law on the vulnerability of  asylum seeking children and reception conditions in Samos RIC, the ECtHR concluded that, considering their age and their particular vulnerability as unaccompanied minors,  the reception conditions to which they were subjected in and around the Samos RIC amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. (§134). The Court also decided that there is no need to examine the admissibility and merits of the complaints under Article 13, in conjunction with Articles 3 and 8 as well as the complaint under Article 8 of the Convention.

On 15 January 2026, the Court of Justice of the EU ruled in case C-742/24 [Havvitt] concerning the reasons to refuse access to labour market for an applicant for international protection. 

The case concerned an asylum applicant’s delay in submitting the required international protection questionnaire to the competent Irish authorities despite receiving several extensions due to COVID-19 related disruptions. Due to this delay, the authorities rejected his request to access the labour market on the grounds of his alleged non-cooperation. Following domestic litigation, the Supreme Court of Ireland decided to ask the CJEU whether “delay” under Article 15(1) of Directive 2013/33/EU (RCD) must be a delay caused solely by the asylum applicant, or whether any material delay that can be partly attributed to the applicant, such as a ninemonth failure to answer an international protection questionnaire, counts as “noncooperation” even when the Member State or external factors (e.g., COVID19) also contribute. The national court also sought to determine whether the wording “attributed in part” in Ireland’s Reception Conditions Regulations 2018 is compatible with the RCD’s transposition requirements, given the discretion Member States have in implementing the rules. 

The Court recalled that access to the labour market must be granted if no first-instance decision is taken within nine months from the lodging of the application, unless the delay is attributable to the applicant. Drawing on Directive 2013/32 (APD) and the relationship between attribution of delay and obligation to cooperate under Articles 31 (3) and 13 APD, as well as its own case-law, the Court held that delays are attributable to the applicant where they result from a failure to cooperate with the authorities, including the obligation to provide information and documents necessary to examine the application. A total lack of cooperation throughout the relevant period may prevent the nine-month period from running at all, whereas partial failures to cooperate should result in the nine-month period being extended only by the time corresponding to the applicant’s failure to cooperate; any delays attributable solely to other causes should be excluded from that extension. 

Where delays have mixed causes, attributable both to the applicant and to the Member State or external factors such as a pandemic, these delay may be attributed to the applicant only where a causal link is established between the applicant’s conduct and the delay, and only to the extent of the applicant’s share of responsibility. Where it is possible to determine that share, the competent authorities may extend the nine-month period only by the fraction of time corresponding to the applicant’s contribution to the delay, not by the entire period affected by mixed causes.  

Finally, the Court found that Article 15(1) RCD allows a Member State to refuse labour market access where the application has been pending for at least nine months and the delay is partly attributable to the applicant, provided the refusal is based only on the period or proportion of delay causally linked to the applicant’s conduct. 

On 18 December, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) published its judgment in the case C-560/23 Tang regarding a preliminary question submitted by the Danish Refugee Board (Copenhagen) on the interpretation of the time limits for carrying out a Dublin transfer under Article 29 (1) and (2) of the Dublin III Regulation. 

The case concerns situations where a national judicial body makes a final decision on the substantive legality of a second transfer decision, adopted after a first transfer decision has been annulled, and remits the case to the competent administrative authority for re-examination. The Board asked the CJEU whether the six-month transfer time limit starts to run on the date of the final decision on the legality of the second transfer or on the date on which the first transfer decision was annulled. 

The Court first noted that under Article 29 (1) DRIII, the time limit starts to run from the acceptance of the take charge or take back request by the other Member State or, where an appeal with suspensive effect has been lodged against the transfer decision, from the moment the judicial decision on the appeal has become final. According to its previous case law, the second situation in the provision ensures equality of arms and the effectiveness of the appeal procedures. The Court referred to the Opinion of Advocate General Richard de la Tour and his observation that the provision gives no specific rule for calculating the time limit when a court annuls a first transfer decision, sends the case back for reexamination due to a decisive change in circumstances, and then decides on a second transfer decision for the same person.

However, it’s clear that Article 27 (1) confers a right to an effective remedy against a transfer decision and earlier jurisprudence confirmed that the starting point of the transfer time limit is the final judicial decision on the merits that can no longer block implementation and not the provisional decision suspending the implementation of the transfer. Where national legislation allows annulment of a transfer decision and remittal for re-examination following new decisive circumstances, it is possible to have two transfer decisions and two separate appeals. In such cases, because both decisions relate to the same applicant’s transfer after the responsible Member State accepted the take-back or take-charge request, they belong to a single procedural process. Therefore, the decision that annuls the first transfer decision must be understood as an interim decision that allows the authorities to examine the new circumstances but does not terminate the transfer procedure in a final manner.  

Finally, the Court stressed that, in the absence of specific EU rules, Member States can organise their national laws in line with the principle of procedural autonomy, but Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU must be observed in every case. Therefore, Member States are required to provide rapid and effective remedies, respecting both the purpose of swift processing of the Regulation and Article 47 of the Charter. While the deadline promotes speedy transfers, it cannot override the necessity of a thorough, timely appeal process. Consequently, the Court found that the sixmonth period begins on the date of the final decision on the substantive legality of the second transfer decision, and both the second decision and the subsequent annulment must be rendered promptly to avoid unnecessary delays in the overall transfer procedure. 

On 18 December 2025, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) delivered its judgment in case C-417/23 (Slagelse Almennyttige Boligselskab, Afdeling Schackenborgvænge).  
 

The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Østre Landsret (High Court of Eastern Denmark) on whether Danish legislation requiring development plans to reduce the proportion of public family housing in designated “transformation areas” is compatible with the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin under Directive 2000/43. The request stemmed from five sets of proceedings relating to housing estates in Ringparken (Slagelse) and Mjølnerparken (Copenhagen), in which tenants contested lease terminations and development plans based, inter alia, on the fact that more than 50% of residents were classified as “immigrants from non-Western countries and their descendants”. The referring court asked whether that classification falls within the concept of “ethnic origin” and whether the national scheme constitutes direct or indirect discrimination within the meaning of Article 2(2) of the Directive.  

The CJEU held that Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2000/43 must be interpreted as meaning that national legislation requiring the adoption of development plans to reduce the proportion of public family housing in residential areas where more than 50% of residents are “immigrants from non-Western countries and their descendants” may constitute direct discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin. Although nationality and country of birth are neutral criteria taken in isolation, the Court found that the Danish criterion is based on a complex combination of such factors which may, in context, amount to a distinction based on ethnic origin. The decisive role played by that criterion in classifying areas as “transformation areas” can result in less favourable treatment, since all residents of such areas are exposed to an increased risk of lease termination and loss of home compared with residents of similarly disadvantaged areas not meeting the 50% threshold. The Court underlined that it is for the referring court to verify whether the legislation was in fact adopted on the basis of ethnic origin, in which case the burden shifts to the authorities to demonstrate that the scheme is justified by objective factors unrelated to discrimination. 

As regards indirect discrimination under Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/43, the CJEU held that, even in the absence of direct discrimination, Danish legislation may still constitute indirect discrimination if an apparently neutral criterion places persons of certain ethnic origins at a particular disadvantage compared with others. The Court clarified that indirect discrimination may arise even where several ethnic groups are affected, unless the measure is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and complies with the principle of proportionality. While objectives such as social cohesion, integration and public housing policy may, in principle, constitute overriding reasons in the public interest, the measures adopted must be appropriate, necessary and proportionate, and must strike a fair balance with the fundamental right to respect for the home under Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. The Court held that it is for the referring court to verify, in particular, whether the obligation to adopt development plans genuinely and consistently contributes to those objectives, whether less restrictive alternatives exist, and whether the increased risk of lease termination and loss of housing for residents of “transformation areas” leads to disproportionate disadvantages. 

On 18 December the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in Case C‑184/24 (Sidi Bouzid). The case concerns AF and his minor child BF, applicants for international protection in Milan, who challenge the withdrawal of their material reception conditions following AF’s refusal to be transferred to another accommodation centre. The national authorities justified the withdrawal under Article 23(1)(a) of Legislative Decree No 142 as an administrative measure related to the organization of reception centres, while AF argues it violates his and his child’s rights to basic needs and protection as vulnerable persons under Directive 2013/33 (the recast RCD). The regional administrative court for Lombardia has referred a preliminary question to the Court of Justice asking whether EU law precludes withdrawal of reception conditions, not as a sanction but because of a refusal to transfer, where this leaves applicants unable to meet basic needs, provided the authority ensures equivalent conditions at another centre. 

While referring to the relevant case-law (Haqbin, Ministero dell’Interno), the Court emphasized that “material reception conditions” include housing, food, clothing, and daily expenses allowances. These conditions must guarantee a dignified standard of living, particularly for vulnerable persons such as minors or single parents, in accordance with Articles 17 and 21 of the recast RCD. While Article 20 permits withdrawal or reduction of reception conditions in cases of abuse, including when an applicant abandons the designated place of residence without informing the authorities, a refusal to transfer to another accommodation centre does not constitute “abandonment,” as the applicant remains present and traceable, and therefore the withdrawal of all material reception conditions is not allowed under Article 20(1)(a).  

The Court confirmed that repeated refusal to comply with a transfer decision may constitute a serious breach of the rules of an accommodation centre under Article 20(4), which can justify the imposition of proportionate sanctions, including partial reduction of material reception conditions, provided that the applicant’s dignity and fundamental rights are respected. In assessing such breaches, Member States must consider the nature and persistence of the conduct, its impact on the management of reception centres, and the applicant’s particular circumstances. The Court stressed that the competent authorities retain the power to implement necessary transfers to ensure the effective management of reception facilities, while upholding the applicant’s fundamental rights and maintaining equivalent reception conditions in the new centre. 

On that basis, the Court concluded that the national legislation at issue precludes the competent authority from withdrawing all material reception conditions from an applicant who refuses transfer to another accommodation centre, while confirming that partial sanctions may be imposed if the conditions of Article 20(4) and (5) are met.  

On 19 January 2026, the Fifth Section of the European Court of Human Rights (the “Court”) published the communicated case of  K.A. v. Türkiye (Application no. 13754/25) and the case of  A.H. v. Türkiye (Application no. 20237/25). The case of K.A. concerns a Syrian national facing expulsion from Türkiye on national-security grounds, either to Ecuador as a designated safe third country or through ‘voluntary return’ to Syria. The applicant challenges the deportation order and the imposition of a security code, arguing that he faces a real risk of death or ill-treatment if removed and that the authorities failed to conduct an adequate safe third country assessment, particularly regarding the risk of chain refoulement to Syria.  

The applicant complains under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention that he would be subjected to death or inhumane and degrading treatment, if deported and that the domestic authorities failed to conduct an adequate “safe third country” assessment, particularly with regard to the risk of chain refoulement to Syria. 

The case of A.H. concerns a Syrian national under temporary protection in Türkiye who faces expulsion to Malaysia as a designated safe third country or ‘voluntary return’ to Syria following his release from prison after a conviction for membership of a terrorist organisation. The removal order was upheld by the administrative courts and the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s individual application as manifestly ill-founded. 

The applicant complains under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention that the domestic authorities failed to conduct an adequate “safe third country” assessment, particularly concerning the risk of chain refoulement to Syria. He further alleges a violation of Article 8 of the Convention on the basis that his removal to Malaysia, a country with which he has no established ties, would disproportionately interfere with his established family and private life in Türkiye. 

On 19 January 2026, the Fifth Section of the European Court of Human Rights (the “Court”) published the communicated case of H.K.T. and I.T. v. Türkiye (Application no. 36370/21). The case concerns an Iranian couple who claim a risk of persecution in Iran due to their political activities. Although previously recognised as refugees by UNHCR and granted international protection applicant status in Türkiye, their protection was withdrawn in 2016 for leaving their assigned city without authorisation. The applicants’ appeal against this decision was dismissed by the administrative courts. 

The applicants later lodged a request for an interim measure with the Constitutional Court, which was dismissed on the ground that the applicants’ removal had not yet been ordered by the domestic authorities. 

In April 2017, the first applicant was deported to Iran without prior notification of any official decision ordering his removal. The applicants’ representative filed an additional unsuccessful submission with the Constitutional Court. The applicants allege violations of Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention, arguing that the authorities failed to assess the risk of ill-treatment and to provide an effective remedy. 

The Court has requested clarification on the legal basis and lawfulness of the first applicant’s removal, the adequacy of risk assessments and remedies, and the second applicant’s current status and potential risk of refoulement.