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On 26 March 2026, the First Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) published its judgment in the case of D.M. v. Sweden (Application no. 32694/23). The case concerned the removal of an Afghan national of Hazara ethnicity from Sweden to Afghanistan following the rejection of his applications for asylum.

The applicant applied for asylum in Sweden in 2015 relying on several grounds, including risks arising from his conversion to Christianity, his Hazara ethnicity, and his alleged “westernisation” after a prolonged stay in Sweden. His claims were examined in two separate sets of asylum proceedings, which were ultimately rejected by the Swedish authorities. Following the final rejection of his application, the applicant lodged a complaint before the ECtHR under Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) taken alone or in conjunction with Article 13 ECHR. An interim measure was applied to prevent his removal, and the Court considered that the applicant’s complaints should be examined only under Article 3 of the Convention.

In relation to the complaint under Article 3, the Court emphasised that the assessment must be rigorous and focus on the foreseeable consequences of removal, taking into account both the general situation in the country of destination and the applicant’s personal circumstances. The Court found that the domestic authorities’ assessment of the general situation in Afghanistan was insufficiently reasoned and therefore carried out its own ex nunc examination. It observed that, although the security and human rights situation remained serious and fragile, with widespread abuses and strict social control under the Taliban regime, the level of indiscriminate violence did not reach the threshold necessary to breach Article 3 of the Convention. However, it emphasised that this general situation must be taken into account in the assessment of individual risk. As regards the situation of Hazaras, while acknowledging that Hazaras face discrimination, targeted attacks and a lack of effective protection, the Court did not consider that they are systematically exposed to ill-treatment reaching the threshold of Article 3 ECHR. Nevertheless, it held that Hazara ethnicity constitutes a relevant risk-enhancing factor in relation to other risks.

In assessing the applicant’s individual circumstances, the Court found that the domestic authorities had failed to adequately substantiate their conclusions and, in particular, had not carried out a cumulative assessment of all relevant risk factors. It observed that the applicant’s Hazara ethnicity, combined with his area of origin and intended return (Mazar-e Sharif, Balkh province), exposed him to heightened risks. As regards his alleged conversion, the Court considered that a genuine conversion had not been established but recognised the risk extended to individuals perceived as apostates or as having abandoned Islam. Domestic authorities had also underestimated the risks associated with the applicant’s “westernisation’’. In the context of the current repressive regime in Afghanistan, the Court was not convinced that the applicant would be able to conceal these aspects of his identity having to comply with the extensive rules and restrictions governing almost every aspect of daily life, the active monitoring of compliance by the Taliban and members of Afghan communities, and the arbitrary and unpredictable nature of the authorities’ enforcement.

Thus, having regard to the cumulative effect of the applicant’s personal circumstances assessed in the light of the general human rights situation in Afghanistan, the Court concluded that there are substantial grounds for believing that the applicant would face a real risk of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR upon return to Afghanistan.

On 28 November 2025, the High Court of Justice of Andalusia, Ceuta and Melilla – Málaga Administrative Chamber (Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Andalucía, Ceuta y Melilla - Sala de lo Contencioso Administrativo de Málaga) issued the judgment No. 2434/2025, annulling the return of applicants who had attempted to access the Spanish territory via the Chafarinas Islands.

The applicants, Syrian nationals, arrived at Isla del Congreso on 3 January 2022 and expressed their intention to apply for international protection. The authorities nevertheless proceeded with their immediate return to the Moroccan authorities without initiating an individual administrative procedure or allowing them to apply for asylum. The lower court upheld the authorities’ actions, considering that the applicants’ conduct constituted an abuse of law and justified their immediate return.

The High Court found that the special border regime established in the tenth additional provision of the Spanish Immigration Law (LOEX 4/2000) allowing summary expulsions at the borders of Ceuta and Melilla, does not apply to the Chafarinas Islands and cannot be extended by analogy. The Court further held that the applicants’ conduct did not constitute an abuse of law and emphasised that access to the asylum procedure must be guaranteed in accordance with Directive 2013/32/EU on asylum procedures, Article 18 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the principle of non-refoulement under Article 3 ECHR, and Article 33 of the Refugee Convention. It therefore concluded that the repatriation measures had been adopted in breach of the applicable procedural guarantees and it annulled the contested decision.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 27 February 2026, the Court of First Instance of Antwerp, Family Court Section (Rechtbank van eerste aanleg Antwerpen, familierechtbank) annulled a decision of the civil registrar of the City of Antwerp revoking the Belgian nationality of a child born in Belgium of Palestinian parents recognised as refugees.

The child had initially been granted Belgian nationality pursuant to Article 10§1 of the Belgian Nationality Code to prevent statelessness. On 5 March 2024, the registrar of Antwerp revoked the child’s nationality on the grounds that the child could acquire Palestinian nationality through the parents or via the Palestinian mission. As a result, the child’s Belgian passport and Kids-ID were annulled. The parents contested the revocation, maintaining that as recognised refugees it was not feasible for them to secure Palestinian nationality for their child. The City of Antwerp and the Public Prosecutor’s Office argued that the claim should be dismissed, citing a potential “pull effect” and alleged abuse of the nationality rules.

The Court of First Instance annulled the revocation holding that under Article 10§3 of the Belgian Nationality Code (WBN) nationality may only be withdrawn if it is established beyond doubt that the child possesses another nationality. Hence, given the absence of formal Palestinian nationality legislation and the impossibility for refugees to register remotely, the child could not realistically acquire another nationality. The court further held that any alleged abuse of Belgian nationality rules by the parents could not justify the deprivation of the child’s nationality, highlighting that the best interests of the child (Article 22bis of the Constitution) must prevail.

According to the Court’s press release, five similar decisions from the city register were annulled by the Court on the same grounds.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 5 March 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in the case C-150/34 (Aroja). The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Supreme Court of Finland (Korkein oikeus) regarding the calculation of detention periods for the purpose of removal of illegally staying third-country nationals under the Directive 2008/115/EC (the Return Directive).

The Court clarified that Article 15(5) and (6) of the Return Directive must be interpreted as meaning that to determine whether the maximum detention period of an illegally staying third-country national has been reached, all periods of detention completed in the same Member State under Article 15 for the purpose of enforcing the same return decision must be taken to account. To reach this conclusion, the Court noted the serious interference with the right to liberty protected by Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the fact that detention under the Return Directive does not have punitive aims but seeks to secure the Directive's return-related objectives within strictly defined time limits. This requirement applies even where the detention periods are separated by intervals during which the person concerned was not detained, otherwise the authorities could circumvent those limits by releasing and subsequently re-detaining the individual based on the same return decision, likely resulting in a breach of the principle of proportionality.

The Court also recalled its previous case law and held that, under the second sentence of Article 15(3) of the Return Directive, any prolonged detention exceeding the initial maximum period of detention must, in all cases, be subject to review by a judicial authority, regardless of whether the detained person has requested it.  The Court further clarified that, in the absence of EU rules on the procedure of detention reviews in the event of prolonged detention periods, the review of an administrative decision extending detention beyond the initial maximum six-month period does not have to take place before that period is reached. However, it must be carried out as speedily as possible after the adoption of that decision.

Finally, the Court held that, in the event of a late judicial review of a decision extending detention beyond the initial six-month period, EU law does not automatically require, on that ground alone, the release of the detained person. Where the substantive conditions for detention remain satisfied and the maximum period of detention under Article 15(6) of the directive has not been reached, detention may continue.

Belgium: Council for Aliens' Law Litigation annuls inadmissibility decisions for beneficiaries of international protection in Greece

On 20 February 2026, the United Chambers of the Council for Aliens’ Law Litigation (RvV-CCE) (CALL) annulled three inadmissibility decisions of the Commissioner-General for Refugees and Stateless Persons (CGRS) concerning applications for international protection lodged by Palestinians who had been granted international protection in Greece. The three cases were examined together in the same proceedings (Nos. 341 503, 341 504, and 341 505 CR).

The cases concerned beneficiaries of international protection whose Greek residence permits had expired. During the waiting period for the renewal of these permits, the applicants lacked access to the rights and benefits associated with their status, including employment, housing, healthcare, and social assistance. The CALL  found that, in the absence of these benefits to meet their basic needs during the waiting  period, the applicants risked falling into extreme material deprivation incompatible with human dignity under Article 4 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Therefore, the Council annulled the three inadmissibility decisions on the ground that the CGRS had failed to sufficiently examine whether the applicants would be able to remain in Greece and meet their basic needs pending the renewal of their residence permits. In doing so, the CALL confirmed its previous case law on the precarious situation of beneficiaries of international protection in Greece (RvV‑CCE 22 January 2024, No. 300 342 CR).

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 5th of February 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in case C-718/24 (Aleb). The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Administrative Court of Sofia, Bulgaria (Administrativen sad Sofia-grad) regarding the application of the concept ‘safe third country’ under the Directive 2013/32 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (rAPD)).

The Court of Justice clarified that the ‘safe third country’ concept under Article 33(2)(c) rAPD does not necessarily have to be applied when examining the merits of an application for international protection. An application under substantive examination may be rejected as inadmissible on the grounds that a third country is considered to be a safe third country for the applicant, even when the competent authority has found that the applicant meets the conditions for granting international protection laid down in recast Qualification Directive. By contrast, such an application may be rejected as unfounded, or even manifestly unfounded, only under the conditions set out in Article 32 rAPD and may not, in any event, be rejected as unfounded on the grounds of inadmissibility.

The Court further reiterated that, while national authorities may rely on publicly available information and on executive decisions designating certain countries as safe, the application of the “safe third country” must be based on an individual assessment. Member States must ensure that national law provides clear methods to assess, in light of the applicant’s personal circumstances, whether the third country can be considered safe for that applicant.
In addition, Member States are required to lay down, in their national law, criteria for establishing a sufficient connection between the applicant and the third country. That connection must be strong enough to make it reasonable to expect the applicant to travel to that country and cannot be presumed.

Finally, the Court emphasised the requirement of effective judicial protection. National courts must be able to review whether a genuine connection exists between the applicant and the third country relied upon, even where national law does not expressly grant courts the power to carry out such an examination.