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On 1 October 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in Case C-249/25 (Jilin), following a request for a preliminary ruling from the Netherlands Council of State (Raad van State). The case concerned the interpretation of Article 17(2) of Directive 2001/55/EC (the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD)) and Article 31 of Directive 2013/32/EU (the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (rAPD)), and whether Member States may automatically suspend the examination of applications for international protection lodged by beneficiaries of temporary protection until that protection expires.

The Court clarified that Article 17(2) TPD provides that the examination of any asylum application not processed before the end of the period of temporary protection shall be completed after the end of that period. However, that provision does not confer on Member States the power to automatically suspend the examination of applications for international protection during the period of temporary protection.

It further held that beneficiaries of temporary protection are not excluded from the scope of Directive 2011/95/EU (the recast Qualification Directive) and Directive 2013/32/EU (rAPD).  The general rules for examining applications for international protection, including the time limits under Article 31 rAPD apply, in principle, regardless of whether the applicant enjoys temporary protection. Furthermore, Article 31 rAPD already allows Member States, under certain circumstances, to extend the time limit for examining applications where their international protection systems face increased pressure. Therefore, the EU legislature already took account of the administrative difficulties arising from a large number of applications lodged simultaneously.

The Court further rejected the argument that a generalised and automatic suspension is necessary to achieve the TPD’s objectives. Temporary protection provides immediate, more limited protection while preserving access to international protection following an individual examination. Its implementation does not necessarily mean that national asylum systems face more applications than they can handle, while automatic suspension could leave authorities having to examine numerous applications simultaneously when temporary protection ends.

Finally, it accepted that exceptionally, the lodging of a considerable number of applications over a short period may make it objectively impossible for the Member States to comply with the time limits of Article 31 rAPD. In such circumstances, authorities may temporarily defer the examination of some applications, even if the applicable time limits cannot always be met. It is for the national courts to verify that any failure to meet the time limits does not result from a generalised and automatic suspension, but only from measures necessary to deal with such an impossibility while avoiding the congestion of the national international protection system.

On 16 April 2026, the Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona delivered his opinion in Case C-249/25 (Jilin) following a request for a preliminary reference by the Council of State, Netherlands (Raad van State). The case concerned the interpretation of Article 17(2) of Directive 2001/55/EC (Temporary Protection Directive (TPD)) and Article 31 of Directive 2013/32/EU (recast Asylum Procedures Directive (rAPD)). The questions involved a situation where a third-country national benefiting from temporary protection had also applied for international protection and enquired whether Member States may suspend the examination of such an application for the duration of temporary protection.

The Advocate General considered that EU law does not permit Member States to suspend automatically and indefinitely the examination of applications for international protection solely on the ground that the applicant enjoys temporary protection. Referring to the Court of Justice’s judgment in Framholm, he emphasised that the system of temporary protection is not intended to replace the system of international protection, ensuring that beneficiaries of temporary protection still have a real opportunity to obtain refugee or subsidiary protection status. An automatic suspension of the asylum procedures for the entire duration of temporary protection would be, in practice, equivalent to a refusal to examine the application.

He further noted that the TPD contains no provision allowing for such a suspension and that the preparatory documents of that directive indicate that the possibility of suspending the examination of asylum applications had been deliberately excluded for reasons of compliance with the 1951 Geneva Convention. Although Member States may, in situations involving the simultaneous lodging of a large number of applications, adjust the pace of their examination in order to preserve the functioning of their asylum systems, such flexibility cannot justify a general, automatic and indefinite suspension. He emphasized that a suspension which is not subject to any time limit and is detached from any specific impact which it may have on the operation of the asylum system in each Member State is incompatible with the Temporary Protection Directive.

Finally, the Advocate General highlighted that the rAPD allows for limited extensions of the time limit for examining applications, including in situations involving a large number of applicants, but sets a maximum overall duration of 21 months. It does not allow Member States to suspend procedures indefinitely. In addition, he stressed that such a suspension would be incompatible with Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which guarantees the right to seek asylum. A prolonged delay of several years before the examination of an application would deprive its effectiveness and would not meet the requirements for lawful limitations under Article 52(1) of the Charter.