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On 24 September 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in Case C‑511/25 (Prokoda) following a request for a preliminary ruling from the Czech Supreme Administrative Court (Nejvyšší správní soud). The case concerned the interpretation of Article 17(1) Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 (the ''Dublin III Regulation'') and whether a Member State may decide to examine an application for international protection where another Member State has been designated as responsible under the residual criterion of Article 3(2).

The Court noted that Article 17(1) refers to a derogation from Article 3(1), which could suggest that the discretionary clause applies only where responsibility is determined under the Chapter III criteria. However, the provision also refers more broadly to applications for which a Member State is not responsible under the criteria laid down in the Regulation. The Court therefore examined the context of the provision and found that Article 3(1) and (2) form part of the same system for determining the responsible Member State. While Article 3(1) refers to the Chapter III criteria, Article 3(2) provides a residual criterion where those criteria do not identify a responsible Member State. It would therefore be inconsistent to allow Member States to derogate from responsibility determined under Article 3(1), but not where responsibility is established under Article 3(2).

The Court further referred to its case law and reiterated that Article 17(1) grants Member States absolute discretion to examine an application for international protection for which they are not responsible under the Dublin III Regulation, on the basis of political, humanitarian or practical considerations.

It therefore concluded that this discretion may also be exercised where another Member State has been designated as responsible under the residual criterion in Article 3(2).

On 4 June 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in Case C-621/24 (Landkreis Schweinfurt v FB), following a request for a preliminary ruling from the German Federal Social Court (Bundessozialgericht). The case concerned the interpretation of Article 17(2) and (5) and Article 20(1)(c) of Directive 2013/33/EU (Reception Conditions Directive), regarding the reduction of material reception conditions for an applicant whose application for international protection had been declared inadmissible and who was awaiting transfer to a Member State responsible for examining the application.

The Court held that Article 17(2), read in conjunction with Article 2(g) of Directive 2013/33, requires Member States to ensure material reception conditions that provide an adequate standard of living, guaranteeing applicants’ subsistence and protecting their physical and mental health. It clarified that this requirement establishes a minimum threshold which must include, at least, housing, food, clothing and a daily expenses allowance, whether provided in kind, through financial allowances or vouchers, or a combination thereof. It further stated that an adequate standard of living cannot be ensured where support for clothing or the daily expenses allowance is excluded. It also held that the Reception Conditions Directive continues to apply until the applicant has actually been transferred to the responsible Member State. Article 17(2) does not allow Member States to distinguish between applicants subject to a Dublin transfer decision and other applicants as regards access to material reception conditions. Article 20 of Directive 2013/33 exhaustively lists the circumstances in which material reception conditions may be reduced or withdrawn, and a Dublin transfer situation is not among them.

The Court therefore concluded that Article 17(2), read in conjunction with Article 2(g) of Directive 2013/33, precludes national legislation which reduces material reception conditions to an applicant following the rejection of his or her application as inadmissible and pending transfer to another Member State.

Furthermore, the Court recalled that a “subsequent application” under Article 2(q) of Directive 2013/32/EU (rAPD) refers to a further application for international protection made after a final decision on a previous application, which may be declared inadmissible under Article 33(2)(d) rAPD where no new elements are presented. This concept applies where the previous application has been finally decided in another Member State. That situation is distinguished from cases governed by the Dublin III Regulation, where responsibility for examining the application lies with another Member State and the Member State concerned only applies the responsibility criteria without examining the substance of the claim. It therefore held that an application rejected as inadmissible solely on the ground that another Member State is responsible to examine the application and accompanied by a transfer decision does not constitute a “subsequent application”, thus, it does not fall within the scope of Article 20(1)(c) of Directive 2013/33.

On 5 March 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in the Case C-458/24 (Daraa). The case arose from a request for a preliminary ruling by the Administrative Court of Sigmaringen, Germany (Verwaltungsgericht Sigmaringen) concerning the interpretation of the Dublin III Regulation and Directive 2013/32 in a situation where the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application unilaterally suspends transfers.

The Court held that the second and third subparagraphs of Article 3(2) of the Dublin Regulation should be interpreted as meaning that a unilateral suspension by the Member State responsible of take-charge or take-back procedures does not require the determining Member State to continue applying the Charter III criteria, nor to assume responsibility itself. Article 3(2) applies only where two cumulative conditions are met: (i) the existence of systemic flaws in the asylum procedure or reception conditions and (ii) a resulting risk of inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. A unilateral suspension does not, in itself, satisfy those conditions and cannot be treated as evidence of such flaws. Consequently, no additional or implicit condition relating to the willingness of the responsible Member State may be inferred from that provision.

As regards Article 29(1) and (2) of the Dublin Regulation, the Court held that the six-month time limit for carrying out a transfer continues to apply irrespective of the reasons preventing the transfer. Under Article 29(2), where the transfer is not carried out within that period, responsibility automatically passes to the requesting Member State. That transfer of responsibility is unconditional and does not depend on the conduct of the Member State initially responsible, including situations where the failure to transfer results from that State’s unilateral suspension of cooperation. The Regulation does not provide for suspension or interruption of that time limit, and extensions are limited to the situations expressly provided for in Article 29(2). The Court further clarified that, during the running of the transfer period, the Member State initially designated as responsible remains bound by its obligations under the Regulation, and Member States must cooperate to carry out the transfer. However, a failure by one Member State to comply with its obligations cannot justify non-compliance by another; remedies lie in infringement proceedings under Articles 258 and 259 TFEU.

Finally, the Court interpreted Article 33(1) and (2) of Directive 2013/32 as precluding a Member State from rejecting an application for international protection as inadmissible on the ground that the Member State responsible is unwilling to take charge or take back the applicant. The grounds for inadmissibility listed in Article 33(2) are exhaustive and must be interpreted strictly, and such a situation is not included among them.

On 18 December, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) published its judgment in the case C-560/23 Tang regarding a preliminary question submitted by the Danish Refugee Board (Copenhagen) on the interpretation of the time limits for carrying out a Dublin transfer under Article 29 (1) and (2) of the Dublin III Regulation. 

The case concerns situations where a national judicial body makes a final decision on the substantive legality of a second transfer decision, adopted after a first transfer decision has been annulled, and remits the case to the competent administrative authority for re-examination. The Board asked the CJEU whether the six-month transfer time limit starts to run on the date of the final decision on the legality of the second transfer or on the date on which the first transfer decision was annulled. 

The Court first noted that under Article 29 (1) DRIII, the time limit starts to run from the acceptance of the take charge or take back request by the other Member State or, where an appeal with suspensive effect has been lodged against the transfer decision, from the moment the judicial decision on the appeal has become final. According to its previous case law, the second situation in the provision ensures equality of arms and the effectiveness of the appeal procedures. The Court referred to the Opinion of Advocate General Richard de la Tour and his observation that the provision gives no specific rule for calculating the time limit when a court annuls a first transfer decision, sends the case back for reexamination due to a decisive change in circumstances, and then decides on a second transfer decision for the same person.

However, it’s clear that Article 27 (1) confers a right to an effective remedy against a transfer decision and earlier jurisprudence confirmed that the starting point of the transfer time limit is the final judicial decision on the merits that can no longer block implementation and not the provisional decision suspending the implementation of the transfer. Where national legislation allows annulment of a transfer decision and remittal for re-examination following new decisive circumstances, it is possible to have two transfer decisions and two separate appeals. In such cases, because both decisions relate to the same applicant’s transfer after the responsible Member State accepted the take-back or take-charge request, they belong to a single procedural process. Therefore, the decision that annuls the first transfer decision must be understood as an interim decision that allows the authorities to examine the new circumstances but does not terminate the transfer procedure in a final manner.  

Finally, the Court stressed that, in the absence of specific EU rules, Member States can organise their national laws in line with the principle of procedural autonomy, but Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU must be observed in every case. Therefore, Member States are required to provide rapid and effective remedies, respecting both the purpose of swift processing of the Regulation and Article 47 of the Charter. While the deadline promotes speedy transfers, it cannot override the necessity of a thorough, timely appeal process. Consequently, the Court found that the sixmonth period begins on the date of the final decision on the substantive legality of the second transfer decision, and both the second decision and the subsequent annulment must be rendered promptly to avoid unnecessary delays in the overall transfer procedure.