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On 4 June 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union delivered its judgment in Case C‑198/25  (Quotal), originating from a request for a preliminary ruling by the District Court of The Hague, sitting in Zwolle (rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats Zwolle). The case concerned the interpretation of Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU (the recast ‘Asylum Procedures Directive’ (rAPD)), read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union on whether a first-instance court hearing an appeal against a rejection of an application for international protection is able to fully reassess the merits of the application, or whether that assessment may be reserved to the determining authority.

The Court recalled that Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32 requires Member States to ensure that a first-instance court or tribunal before which a decision relating to an application for international protection is contested, carries out a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law. The review must allow an up-to-date assessment of the case, taking into account all necessary factual and legal elements, including any evidence arising after the adoption of the decision under appeal. The Court clarified that such an examination allows the application to be dealt exhaustively at judicial level, without the need to refer the case back to the determining authority.

It further held that Article 46(3) confers on the first-instance court or tribunal, where it has all necessary elements of fact and law, the power to give a binding ruling on whether the applicant satisfies the conditions for international protection. Under EU law Member States may not restrict the scope of that judicial review. 

Finally, the Court held that national courts must set aside any national legislative provisions that prevent EU rules from producing their full effect. It therefore clarified that Article 46(3) requires a system of judicial protection in which first-instance courts or tribunals are empowered to carry out a full and up-to-date factual reassessment of the application for international protection and, where they have all necessary elements, to give a binding ruling on the merits of the claim, including the grant of international protection, thereby ensuring the effectiveness of EU law.

On 26 May 2026, the Third Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in J.B. v. Greece (Application no. 54796/16). The case concerns the potential return of the applicant from Greece to Türkiye under the EU-Türkiye Statement of 18 March 2016.

The applicant left Syria in April 2015 due to the armed conflict and alleged risks of persecution on account of his ethnic and religious background. He travelled to Türkiye, where he remained for approximately one year under temporary protection. In May 2016 he arrived in Greece, where he was arrested on grounds of unlawful entry. He applied for international protection claiming that he faced a risk of ill-treatment in Türkiye due to his Armenian origin and his Christian faith. His application for international protection was declared inadmissible on the basis that Türkiye constituted a “first country of asylum” or a “safe third country”, a decision upheld on appeal by the domestic authorities. The applicant complained before the ECtHR about deficiencies on the examination of his asylum application by the Greek authorities, as well as the risk he entailed if returned to Türkiye, including the chain refoulement to Syria, and about the conditions of his detention in Greece.

In regard to the complaint under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights concerning the risk of ill-treatment upon removal, the Court found that since the applicant had in the meantime obtained refugee status in France, the risk of ill-treatment if returned to Türkiye and subsequently to Syria has ceased to exist. Therefore, it considered unjustified to continue the examination of that complaint.

In relation to Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3, the Court found that the applicant’s asylum claim had been examined through a multi-layered procedure before the asylum authorities and domestic courts, during which he was interviewed with interpretation, able to present his individual circumstances and challenge the application of the ‘’safe third country’’ concept. It also held that the authorities assessed both his personal situation and relevant country information concerning Türkiye through reports, statistics and objective material, including the alleged risk of onward refoulement to Syria and the assurances provided within the framework of the EU-Türkiye Statement. Therefore, the Court concluded that the Greek authorities could reasonably rely on those assurances and supporting material and that the applicant had been afforded effective safeguards against arbitrary removal contrary to Article 3, finding no violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3.

Finally, regarding to the complaint under Article 3 ECHR concerning the conditions of detention pending removal, the Court reiterated that Greek police stations are facilities designed only for short periods of confinement and that detention therein for periods ranging from one to three months have consistently been found contrary to Article 3, particularly in view of deficiencies such as overcrowding, poor sanitary conditions and lack of outdoor exercise. Since the applicant had been detained in Mytilene police station for one month and nineteen days, the Court found that the conditions of his detention amounted to degrading treatment contrary to Article 3

On 26 February 2026, the Belgian Constitutional Court delivered its judgments nos. 23/2026 and 24/2026, suspending, respectively, provisions of two Laws of 14 July 2025 reforming the reception regime for asylum applicants, and provisions of the Act of 18 of July 2025 introducing stricter conditions for family reunification between beneficiaries of subsidiary protection and their family members. In both cases, the Court considered that the immediate application of the contested measures was likely to cause an irreparable harm and raised doubts as to their compatibility with EU law and fundamental rights. It therefore referred several preliminary questions to the CJEU and ordered the suspension of the provisions pending the CJEU judgment.

In judgment No. 23/2026, the Court suspended provisions of two Laws of 14 July 2025 which allow Fedasil (Belgian Federal Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers) to refuse material assistance to asylum applicants  who already enjoy international protection in another EU Member State, and which cancel  the possibility of granting reception support in the form of financial assistance in special circumstances. The Court considered that the immediate application of these provisions could cause serious and irreparable harm, and referred to the CJEU the question on whether EU law allows an application by a person already granted protection in another Member State, to be treated as a “subsequent application” under Directive 2013/32/EU, thereby permitting refusal of material assistance under Directive 2013/33/EU.

In judgment No. 24/2026, the Court examined provisions of the Act of 18 July 2025 introducing stricter requirements for family reunification between beneficiaries of subsidiary protection and their family members, departing from the more favourable regime applicable to refugees. The Court considered that the immediate application of these provisions was likely to cause serious and irreparable harm.

It therefore suspended them and referred five preliminary questions to the CJEU, asking in particular: (1) whether the Directive 2003/86/EC is valid insofar as it excludes beneficiaries of subsidiary protection from its more favourable family reunification regime; (2) if so, whether the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights precludes national measures subjecting beneficiaries of subsidiary protection to less favourable conditions than refugees; (3) whether the Directive 2011/95/EU is valid insofar as it limits the concept of “family members” to those present in the same Member State; and (4-5) whether the Charter precludes national measures imposing stricter family reunification conditions on beneficiaries of subsidiary protection if their  family members are not present in Belgium, in light of the right to respect for family life and the best interests of the child.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team