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On 15 May 2026, the Administrative Court of Hanover (Verwaltungsgericht Hannover) delivered its judgment in case 3 A 739/24, concerning the recognition of refugee status based on ‘’Westernised’’ identity and gender-based persecution in Iraq.

The first applicant, an Iraqi national, left Iraq in 2022 and applied for asylum in Germany in 2023 together with her two minor children. The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees rejected the application, finding that the requirements for international protection were not met. The applicant claimed that she had adopted “Western” values during her time abroad, had distanced herself from the Yazidi faith and converted to Christianity, and that, as a result, she and her children would face a risk of persecution on grounds of gender and religion if returned to Iraq.

The Court held that Iraqi women whose identity is shaped by “Western’’ values may constitute a social group within the meaning of asylum law where their identity is characterised by a self-determined lifestyle and a commitment to gender equality that is incompatible with prevailing Iraqi patriarchal norms. It found that such women are perceived as distinct in Iraqi society and may face a considerable risk of persecution, including serious forms of gender-based violence in a context where effective state protection is not available. It further held that the assessment of “Westernisation” depends on whether this identity is so deeply rooted that the person cannot reasonably be expected to abandon it or adapt their conduct upon return.

The Court considered that the applicant’s account of her personal development was credible and found that her “Westernised” identity had become an essential part of her personality, which she could not reasonably be required to renounce. It held that reliance on family protection could not be required where this would entail subordination to male authority or the abandonment of her autonomous way of life. Internal protection alternative is not a viable as the risks for women with such an identity exist throughout Iraq and effective state protection is lacking.

The Court therefore annulled the contested decisions of the Federal Office and ordered the defendant to grant refugee status to the applicant as well as to her children.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 12 May 2026, the National Court of Asylum (CNDA) delivered its decision N°26006334 concerning the protection status to be granted to a Sudanese national of Fur ethnic origin from North Darfur, in light of the situation of persecution affecting that ethnic group.

The applicant challenged the decision of the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA) which granted him subsidiary protection, arguing that he should be recognised as a refugee under the 1951 Geneva Convention. The CNDA was required to assess whether the situation in North Darfur amounted to persecution of the Fur ethnic group and whether this justified refugee status rather than subsidiary protection.

The Court found that the Fur ethnic group is subject to systematic and targeted persecution in North Darfur by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and allied forces, who control the region without effective protection from the Sudanese authorities. Relying on the EUAA Guidance Note on Sudan (23 June 2025) and the UN Fact-Finding Mission report of 19 February 2026, the Court highlighted serious ethnically motivated abuses, including massacres, summary executions, torture, forced displacement, and destruction of communities, with acts described as having “hallmarks of genocide”.

The CNDA held that the existence of indiscriminate violence in North Darfur does not exclude the recognition of targeted persecution where a specific ethnic group is individually and systematically affected. It therefore found that the applicant had a well-founded fear of being persecuted on grounds of ethnicity within the meaning of the 1951 Geneva Convention and recognised refugee status accordingly.

On 4 July 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union delivered its judgment in Case C‑440/25 (Ebilum), following a request for a preliminary ruling by the District Court of The Hague, sitting in Zwolle (rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats Zwolle). The case concerned the interpretation of Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU (the recast ‘Asylum Procedures Directive’ (rAPD) and Article 2(d) of Directive 2011/95/EU regarding the scope of judicial review in asylum appeals and the meaning of “well-founded fear of persecution’’.

The Court reiterated that Article 46(3) require Member States to ensure that a first-instance court or tribunal before which a decision relating to an application for international protection is contested, carries out a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law. This requires an up-to-date assessment of the case based on all relevant factual and legal elements, including evidence arising after the adoption of the decision under appeal, insofar as the parties are given the opportunity to submit observations in accordance with the principle of audi alteram partem and Article 47 of the EU Charter. Such an examination must allow the court to assess the application exhaustively at judicial level, without any need to refer the case back to the determining authority.  It further held that the judicial review required under Article 46(3) entails a full factual and legal reassessment of the applicant’s international protection needs. This includes, where necessary, the assessment of facts and credibility and the possibility for the court or tribunal to reach its own findings on the merits of the application.

The Court recalled that while Article 46(3) rAPD only concerns the judicial appeal stage and not what happens after any annulment, where a court has carried out a full assessment and found that international protection must be granted, the administrative authority is bound to comply when the case is referred back, unless new circumstances require assessment. If the administration subsequently adopts a contrary decision without such new elements, the court must be able to replace that decision with its own ruling and disapply any national rules preventing it from doing so, thereby ensuring the effectiveness of EU law. It also clarified that Member States may provide for additional appeal or cassation levels beyond the first-instance judicial remedy required by Article 46(3), but such review cannot alter the characteristics of the full and ex nunc examination required at first instance.

Finally, the Court interpreted Article 2(d) of Directive 2011/95 as meaning that a “well-founded fear of being persecuted” exists where there is a reasonable likelihood that the applicant will be persecuted upon return to his or her country of origin. It held that the competent authorities must carry out an individual, specific and objective assessment of the applicant’s personal situation, the facts and circumstances relating to the application, and the facts and circumstances relating to the situation in the country of origin. That assessment must include the general context of the country of origin, cannot rely solely on the applicant’s subjective fear of being persecuted but must be based on both subjective and objective elements.

On 26 May 2026, the Third Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in J.B. v. Greece (Application no. 54796/16). The case concerns the potential return of the applicant from Greece to Türkiye under the EU-Türkiye Statement of 18 March 2016.

The applicant left Syria in April 2015 due to the armed conflict and alleged risks of persecution on account of his ethnic and religious background. He travelled to Türkiye, where he remained for approximately one year under temporary protection. In May 2016 he arrived in Greece, where he was arrested on grounds of unlawful entry. He applied for international protection claiming that he faced a risk of ill-treatment in Türkiye due to his Armenian origin and his Christian faith. His application for international protection was declared inadmissible on the basis that Türkiye constituted a “first country of asylum” or a “safe third country”, a decision upheld on appeal by the domestic authorities. The applicant complained before the ECtHR about deficiencies on the examination of his asylum application by the Greek authorities, as well as the risk he entailed if returned to Türkiye, including the chain refoulement to Syria, and about the conditions of his detention in Greece.

In regard to the complaint under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights concerning the risk of ill-treatment upon removal, the Court found that since the applicant had in the meantime obtained refugee status in France, the risk of ill-treatment if returned to Türkiye and subsequently to Syria has ceased to exist. Therefore, it considered unjustified to continue the examination of that complaint.

In relation to Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3, the Court found that the applicant’s asylum claim had been examined through a multi-layered procedure before the asylum authorities and domestic courts, during which he was interviewed with interpretation, able to present his individual circumstances and challenge the application of the ‘’safe third country’’ concept. It also held that the authorities assessed both his personal situation and relevant country information concerning Türkiye through reports, statistics and objective material, including the alleged risk of onward refoulement to Syria and the assurances provided within the framework of the EU-Türkiye Statement. Therefore, the Court concluded that the Greek authorities could reasonably rely on those assurances and supporting material and that the applicant had been afforded effective safeguards against arbitrary removal contrary to Article 3, finding no violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3.

Finally, regarding to the complaint under Article 3 ECHR concerning the conditions of detention pending removal, the Court reiterated that Greek police stations are facilities designed only for short periods of confinement and that detention therein for periods ranging from one to three months have consistently been found contrary to Article 3, particularly in view of deficiencies such as overcrowding, poor sanitary conditions and lack of outdoor exercise. Since the applicant had been detained in Mytilene police station for one month and nineteen days, the Court found that the conditions of his detention amounted to degrading treatment contrary to Article 3

On 26 March 2026, the First Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) published its judgment in the case of D.M. v. Sweden (Application no. 32694/23). The case concerned the removal of an Afghan national of Hazara ethnicity from Sweden to Afghanistan following the rejection of his applications for asylum.

The applicant applied for asylum in Sweden in 2015 relying on several grounds, including risks arising from his conversion to Christianity, his Hazara ethnicity, and his alleged “westernisation” after a prolonged stay in Sweden. His claims were examined in two separate sets of asylum proceedings, which were ultimately rejected by the Swedish authorities. Following the final rejection of his application, the applicant lodged a complaint before the ECtHR under Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) taken alone or in conjunction with Article 13 ECHR. An interim measure was applied to prevent his removal, and the Court considered that the applicant’s complaints should be examined only under Article 3 of the Convention.

In relation to the complaint under Article 3, the Court emphasised that the assessment must be rigorous and focus on the foreseeable consequences of removal, taking into account both the general situation in the country of destination and the applicant’s personal circumstances. The Court found that the domestic authorities’ assessment of the general situation in Afghanistan was insufficiently reasoned and therefore carried out its own ex nunc examination. It observed that, although the security and human rights situation remained serious and fragile, with widespread abuses and strict social control under the Taliban regime, the level of indiscriminate violence did not reach the threshold necessary to breach Article 3 of the Convention. However, it emphasised that this general situation must be taken into account in the assessment of individual risk. As regards the situation of Hazaras, while acknowledging that Hazaras face discrimination, targeted attacks and a lack of effective protection, the Court did not consider that they are systematically exposed to ill-treatment reaching the threshold of Article 3 ECHR. Nevertheless, it held that Hazara ethnicity constitutes a relevant risk-enhancing factor in relation to other risks.

In assessing the applicant’s individual circumstances, the Court found that the domestic authorities had failed to adequately substantiate their conclusions and, in particular, had not carried out a cumulative assessment of all relevant risk factors. It observed that the applicant’s Hazara ethnicity, combined with his area of origin and intended return (Mazar-e Sharif, Balkh province), exposed him to heightened risks. As regards his alleged conversion, the Court considered that a genuine conversion had not been established but recognised the risk extended to individuals perceived as apostates or as having abandoned Islam. Domestic authorities had also underestimated the risks associated with the applicant’s “westernisation’’. In the context of the current repressive regime in Afghanistan, the Court was not convinced that the applicant would be able to conceal these aspects of his identity having to comply with the extensive rules and restrictions governing almost every aspect of daily life, the active monitoring of compliance by the Taliban and members of Afghan communities, and the arbitrary and unpredictable nature of the authorities’ enforcement.

Thus, having regard to the cumulative effect of the applicant’s personal circumstances assessed in the light of the general human rights situation in Afghanistan, the Court concluded that there are substantial grounds for believing that the applicant would face a real risk of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR upon return to Afghanistan.

On 22 January 2026, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) communicated the application of D.A. v. Türkiye (Application no. 5393/25). The case concerns the alleged failure of the domestic authorities to duly assess the risk of death or ill-treatment in the event of the removal of a Turkmenistan national, who claimed that she had been persecuted in Turkmenistan on account of her political opinions and professional activities as a journalist.

The applicant challenged the removal order issued by the Trabzon Provincial Directorate of Migration Management in May 2023, but the removal was subsequently upheld by the Trabzon Administrative Court in September 2023. The Constitutional Court later examined her complaints under the prohibition of ill-treatment and declared them inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. The applicant invokes Articles 2, 3, and 13 of ECHR.

The Court asked the parties to clarify, inter alia, whether the applicant faces a real risk of treatment contrary to Articles 2 and 3 ECHR if removed to Turkmenistan.