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On 4 July 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union delivered its judgment in Case C‑440/25 (Ebilum), following a request for a preliminary ruling by the District Court of The Hague, sitting in Zwolle (rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats Zwolle). The case concerned the interpretation of Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU (the recast ‘Asylum Procedures Directive’ (rAPD) and Article 2(d) of Directive 2011/95/EU regarding the scope of judicial review in asylum appeals and the meaning of “well-founded fear of persecution’’.

The Court reiterated that Article 46(3) require Member States to ensure that a first-instance court or tribunal before which a decision relating to an application for international protection is contested, carries out a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law. This requires an up-to-date assessment of the case based on all relevant factual and legal elements, including evidence arising after the adoption of the decision under appeal, insofar as the parties are given the opportunity to submit observations in accordance with the principle of audi alteram partem and Article 47 of the EU Charter. Such an examination must allow the court to assess the application exhaustively at judicial level, without any need to refer the case back to the determining authority.  It further held that the judicial review required under Article 46(3) entails a full factual and legal reassessment of the applicant’s international protection needs. This includes, where necessary, the assessment of facts and credibility and the possibility for the court or tribunal to reach its own findings on the merits of the application.

The Court recalled that while Article 46(3) rAPD only concerns the judicial appeal stage and not what happens after any annulment, where a court has carried out a full assessment and found that international protection must be granted, the administrative authority is bound to comply when the case is referred back, unless new circumstances require assessment. If the administration subsequently adopts a contrary decision without such new elements, the court must be able to replace that decision with its own ruling and disapply any national rules preventing it from doing so, thereby ensuring the effectiveness of EU law. It also clarified that Member States may provide for additional appeal or cassation levels beyond the first-instance judicial remedy required by Article 46(3), but such review cannot alter the characteristics of the full and ex nunc examination required at first instance.

Finally, the Court interpreted Article 2(d) of Directive 2011/95 as meaning that a “well-founded fear of being persecuted” exists where there is a reasonable likelihood that the applicant will be persecuted upon return to his or her country of origin. It held that the competent authorities must carry out an individual, specific and objective assessment of the applicant’s personal situation, the facts and circumstances relating to the application, and the facts and circumstances relating to the situation in the country of origin. That assessment must include the general context of the country of origin, cannot rely solely on the applicant’s subjective fear of being persecuted but must be based on both subjective and objective elements.

On 26 May 2026, the Third Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in J.B. v. Greece (Application no. 54796/16). The case concerns the potential return of the applicant from Greece to Türkiye under the EU-Türkiye Statement of 18 March 2016.

The applicant left Syria in April 2015 due to the armed conflict and alleged risks of persecution on account of his ethnic and religious background. He travelled to Türkiye, where he remained for approximately one year under temporary protection. In May 2016 he arrived in Greece, where he was arrested on grounds of unlawful entry. He applied for international protection claiming that he faced a risk of ill-treatment in Türkiye due to his Armenian origin and his Christian faith. His application for international protection was declared inadmissible on the basis that Türkiye constituted a “first country of asylum” or a “safe third country”, a decision upheld on appeal by the domestic authorities. The applicant complained before the ECtHR about deficiencies on the examination of his asylum application by the Greek authorities, as well as the risk he entailed if returned to Türkiye, including the chain refoulement to Syria, and about the conditions of his detention in Greece.

In regard to the complaint under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights concerning the risk of ill-treatment upon removal, the Court found that since the applicant had in the meantime obtained refugee status in France, the risk of ill-treatment if returned to Türkiye and subsequently to Syria has ceased to exist. Therefore, it considered unjustified to continue the examination of that complaint.

In relation to Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3, the Court found that the applicant’s asylum claim had been examined through a multi-layered procedure before the asylum authorities and domestic courts, during which he was interviewed with interpretation, able to present his individual circumstances and challenge the application of the ‘’safe third country’’ concept. It also held that the authorities assessed both his personal situation and relevant country information concerning Türkiye through reports, statistics and objective material, including the alleged risk of onward refoulement to Syria and the assurances provided within the framework of the EU-Türkiye Statement. Therefore, the Court concluded that the Greek authorities could reasonably rely on those assurances and supporting material and that the applicant had been afforded effective safeguards against arbitrary removal contrary to Article 3, finding no violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3.

Finally, regarding to the complaint under Article 3 ECHR concerning the conditions of detention pending removal, the Court reiterated that Greek police stations are facilities designed only for short periods of confinement and that detention therein for periods ranging from one to three months have consistently been found contrary to Article 3, particularly in view of deficiencies such as overcrowding, poor sanitary conditions and lack of outdoor exercise. Since the applicant had been detained in Mytilene police station for one month and nineteen days, the Court found that the conditions of his detention amounted to degrading treatment contrary to Article 3