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On 8 September 2026, the Fourth Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in A.A. v. the Netherlands (Application no. 7481/23), concerning the refusal of family reunification with five of the applicant’s minor children born of his second and third polygamous marriages.

The applicant, a Yemeni national with refugee status in the Netherlands, had contracted three polygamous marriages in Yemen and had thirteen children. The Dutch authorities granted family reunification with his first wife and their eight children, but refused it in respect of the five children born of his second and third marriages on the grounds that polygamy was contrary to public order in the Netherlands. The authorities found that the children lived with their mothers in Türkiye where they had access to housing, education and healthcare. The applicant complained that the refusal violated his right to respect for his family life under Article 8 ECHR.

 In its assessment, the Court reiterated that the protection of family life applies to both “legitimate” and “illegitimate” families, and that the concept of family is not limited to marriage-based relationships. It therefore accepted that family life existed between the applicant and his five children, irrespective of the fact that his second and third polygamous marriages were not recognised in the Netherlands.

The Court then considered whether the Netherlands had complied with its positive obligation to allow the requested family reunification, rather than whether there had been an interference with the applicant’s family life. It noted the strong European consensus prohibiting polygamy and that the applicant had chosen to maintain all three marriages despite having been given the possibility of regularising his situation under Dutch law. It therefore considered that Member States enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation in deciding whether to allow family reunification between fathers and children born of polygamous marriages.

Within that margin of appreciation, the Court found that the Dutch authorities had carried out an individual assessment of the applicant’s circumstances and balanced his right to family life against the interests of immigration control and public order. Although there were ''insurmountable obstacles'' to the family living together in Yemen, the children lived with their mothers in Türkiye where they had access to education and healthcare, and there was no evidence that they faced violence there. They had no ties to the Netherlands other than their relationship with the applicant, who could maintain contact with and visit them, and no particular dependence on him beyond financial support. It further held that, while the best interests of the children must be given significant weight, they do not in themselves require their admission to a Contracting State.

The Court therefore concluded that the domestic authorities had struck a fair balance between the applicant’s right to respect his family life and the State’s interests in enforcing immigration controls and upholding public order, and found no violation of Article 8 ECHR.
 

On 23 June 2026, the Third Section of the European Court of Human Rights delivered three judgments concerning the prolonged failure by the Greek authorities to decide on family reunification applications lodged by recognised refugees in Greece: T.N. v. Greece (Application no. 41855/23), Dotani v. Greece (Application no. 31077/23) and Suji v. Greece (Application no. 13250/23).

In T.N., the applicant, a Burundian refugee, sought reunification with his wife and two minor children residing in South Africa, but the Greek Asylum Service failed to issue a decision for more than five years. In Dotani, the applicant, an Afghan refugee, applied for reunification with his wife and five children in Afghanistan, yet no decision was taken for over seven years. In Suji, the applicant was a stateless Rohingya, whose reunification request with his wife and two minor children residing in Bangladesh was granted four years after it had been lodged.

The Court assessed the cases from the perspective of the respondent State’s positive obligations under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights as the applicant’s family members had never resided in Greece. It recalled that the assessment of family reunification requests must take into account both the (i) substantive requirements, including the existence of insurmountable or major obstacles to the family living together in the country of origin and the best interests of the children, and (ii) the procedural guarantees, requiring a decision-making process that is sufficiently flexible, prompt and effective and an individual assessment of the need to preserve family unity. The Court also emphasised that family unity constitutes an essential right of refugees and that they cannot be required to "do the impossible" in order to exercise that right.

It further stressed that, under Article 14 § 1 (b) of Presidential Decree No. 131/2006 and Article 11(2) of Directive 2003/86/EC (the ‘Family Reunification Directive’), where a recognised refugee is unable to produce official documents proving family ties, the authorities must consider other evidence and may not reject the application solely because such documents are unavailable. Although neither provision expressly provides the same flexibility in relation to travel documents, the Court found no reason to exclude an analogous approach, given that the Greek case-law draws no distinction between documents establishing family relationships and travel documents. Accordingly, the authorities were required to explore alternative means of establishing the family links and facilitating reunification rather than insisting on documentary requirements.

In T.N., the Court emphasised that the applicant had fully complied with his duty to cooperate by providing available evidence and explaining why neither additional civil-status documents nor travel documents could be obtained. Nevertheless, the authorities displayed a manifest lack of flexibility by refusing to consider the evidence already submitted, failing to investigate the claimed family links through other available means and disregarding possible alternatives for the issuance of travel documents.

In Dotani, the Court likewise found that the authorities failed to carry out a proper examination of the applicant’s request despite more than seven years of administrative inaction. Although it acknowledged the practical difficulties arising from the change of regime in Afghanistan, it clarified that Greece’s policy of non-recognition of the Taliban authorities could not, in itself, prevent the competent authorities from taking account of documents or information emanating from de facto authorities where necessary to protect Convention rights, nor could it relieve them of their obligation to seek alternative solutions.
In both cases, the Court concluded that the Greek authorities had failed to carry out the individualised and balanced assessment required under Article 8 ECHR. By insisting on documentary requirements despite the applicants' objective inability to comply and failing to consider alternative solutions, the authorities did not strike a fair balance between the applicants' interest in family reunification and the interests of the State. Consequently, the decision-making process lacked the flexibility, promptness and effectiveness required under Article 8. The Court also found a violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 8, as no effective domestic remedy existed to challenge the prolonged failure to decide on the applications.

By contrast, in Suji v. Greece, the Court noted that although the applicant’s request for family reunification was ultimately granted, this occurred only after more than four years of administrative delay. Applying the same principles under Article 8, it held that the authorities recognised from the outset that, as a stateless Rohingya refugee, the applicant was objectively unable to obtain the required civil-status and travel documents. Instead, they failed to carry out the individualised and flexible assessment required by Article 8 by not adequately considering alternative means of proof, the applicant's statelessness and the best interests of the children. In the absence of any convincing justification for the delay, the Court found violations of Article 8 and of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 8 due to the lack of an effective domestic remedy against the prolonged failure to decide on the application.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 26 March 2026, the CJEU delivered its judgment in the case  C-819/25 (PPU) [Gonrieh] originating from the preliminary reference by the French-speaking Brussels Court of First Instance (Tribunal de première instance francophone de Bruxelles) regarding the scope of the Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification (the FRD), concerning the Member States’ obligations in the context of issuing family reunification visas, in particular where the beneficiary is required to appear in person but is unable to leave a third country due to life-threatening situation.

The Court clarified that Article 13(1) FRD, read in conjunction with Articles 2, 4, 7 and 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, requires Member States, after accepting an application for family reunification, to authorise the entry of the family member and to grant “every facility for obtaining the required visas.” This obligation entails removing unjustified administrative obstacles and applying rapid and efficient administrative procedures to enable the issuance of visas, including, inter alia, facilitating personal appearances through accessible consular services, issuing emergency travel documents, and minimizing the number of appearances required.

However, the Court held that Article 13(1) does not impose obligations extending to diplomatic or consular relations with third countries. In particular, a Member State is not required to organise or ensure the transfer of a third-country national to its consular post, nor to contact third countries to facilitate that transfer, in situations where the person is unable to travel. Such measures would fall outside the scope of the Directive and concern matters which are not covered by EU law under Article 51 of the Charter. It further clarified that provisions concerning diplomatic and consular protection, including Article 20(2)(c) and Article 23 TFEU and Article 46 of the Charter, apply only to Union citizens and, in certain cases, their family members, and not to third-country nationals seeking family reunification under Directive 2003/86.

The Court emphasised that this interpretation is consistent with the objective of Directive 2003/86, which is to promote family reunification and protect third-country nationals, including minors, while distinguishing between administrative facilitation and measures requiring external intervention. Therefore, the refusal to provide evacuation or diplomatic assistance does not constitute a failure to implement EU law, and the obligations under Article 13(1) are limited to the administrative sphere.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 26 February 2026, the Belgian Constitutional Court delivered its judgments nos. 23/2026 and 24/2026, suspending, respectively, provisions of two Laws of 14 July 2025 reforming the reception regime for asylum applicants, and provisions of the Act of 18 of July 2025 introducing stricter conditions for family reunification between beneficiaries of subsidiary protection and their family members. In both cases, the Court considered that the immediate application of the contested measures was likely to cause an irreparable harm and raised doubts as to their compatibility with EU law and fundamental rights. It therefore referred several preliminary questions to the CJEU and ordered the suspension of the provisions pending the CJEU judgment.

In judgment No. 23/2026, the Court suspended provisions of two Laws of 14 July 2025 which allow Fedasil (Belgian Federal Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers) to refuse material assistance to asylum applicants  who already enjoy international protection in another EU Member State, and which cancel  the possibility of granting reception support in the form of financial assistance in special circumstances. The Court considered that the immediate application of these provisions could cause serious and irreparable harm, and referred to the CJEU the question on whether EU law allows an application by a person already granted protection in another Member State, to be treated as a “subsequent application” under Directive 2013/32/EU, thereby permitting refusal of material assistance under Directive 2013/33/EU.

In judgment No. 24/2026, the Court examined provisions of the Act of 18 July 2025 introducing stricter requirements for family reunification between beneficiaries of subsidiary protection and their family members, departing from the more favourable regime applicable to refugees. The Court considered that the immediate application of these provisions was likely to cause serious and irreparable harm.

It therefore suspended them and referred five preliminary questions to the CJEU, asking in particular: (1) whether the Directive 2003/86/EC is valid insofar as it excludes beneficiaries of subsidiary protection from its more favourable family reunification regime; (2) if so, whether the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights precludes national measures subjecting beneficiaries of subsidiary protection to less favourable conditions than refugees; (3) whether the Directive 2011/95/EU is valid insofar as it limits the concept of “family members” to those present in the same Member State; and (4-5) whether the Charter precludes national measures imposing stricter family reunification conditions on beneficiaries of subsidiary protection if their  family members are not present in Belgium, in light of the right to respect for family life and the best interests of the child.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

On 5 March 2026, the Advocate General Rimvydas Norkus issued his opinion in the case C-819/25 (PPU) [Gonrieh]. The case related to the preliminary reference by the French-speaking Brussels Court of First Instance (Tribunal de première instance francophone de Bruxelles) regarding the scope of the Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification (the FRD), concerning the granting of a visa for family reunification which requires the beneficiary to appear in person for its issuance, while the person is unable to leave the third country where they reside and is facing life-threatening conditions. The questions referred enquired whether EU law applies only to the decision to grant the visa, or also to ensure that the person can effectively receive it and, whether Member States are obliged to provide assistance to enable the beneficiary to obtain the visa under such circumstances, including where their physical departure from the third country is impossible due to imminent danger.

The Advocate General considers that the implementation of EU law does not conclude with the decision of granting the visa. Relying on Article 13(1) of the FRD, which requires Member States to authorise entry and to grant “every facility for obtaining the required visas”, he concludes that the obligation extends until the issuance of the visa. That provision, read in light of the objective of the Directive to ensure the effectiveness of family reunification and recital 13 requiring efficient procedures, imposes a duty of active and continuous administrative cooperation. Accordingly, where a Member State requires the beneficiary’s personal appearance to verify identity, EU law and therefore the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, pursuant to Article 51(1) thereof, applies until the administrative formalities necessary for issuing the visa are completed. Limiting EU law to the mere approval of the visa would undermine the effectiveness of the right to family reunification.

However, the Advocate General makes a distinction between administrative facilitation and diplomatic or consular intervention. He considers that Article 13(1) does not require a Member State which has granted visas to nationals of a third country in the context of family reunification to include them in an evacuation process put in place by that Member State or to inform the authorities of any third country preventing these beneficiaries from travelling to the Union that the latter have a visa to stay in the Member State in question.  Accordingly, while Article 13(1) of Directive 2003/86 requires Member States to grant every facility for obtaining the required visas and to ensure through effective administrative measures that the visa is actually issued, it does not impose an obligation to adopt external, diplomatic or evacuation measures to secure the beneficiaries’ departure from a third country.

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team