Cjeu case summaries

Member States are required to take due account of the best interests of the child before adopting a return decision accompanied by an entry ban, even where the person to whom that decision is addressed is not a minor but his or her father.

The Return Directive does not prevent a Member State from placing in administrative detention a third-country national residing illegally on its territory, in order to carry out the forced transfer of that national to another Member State in which that national has refugee status, where that national has refused to comply with the order to go to that other Member State and it is not possible to issue a return decision to him or her.

In the context of cessation of refugee status under Article 11 (1)(e), the change in circumstances must remedy the reasons which led to the recognition of refugee status; a country of origin’s ability or inability to demonstrate that it can provide protection from acts of persecution constitutes ‘a crucial element’ in this assessment.

Mere social and financial support to the third country national is inherently incapable of either preventing acts of persecution or of detecting, prosecuting and punishing such acts and, therefore, cannot be regarded as providing the protection required by Article 11(1)(e). In order to determine whether the third-country national still has a well-founded fear of persecution, the existence of protection against acts of persecution should be considered when examining the change in circumstances.

When analysing if protection from UNRWA has ceased (Article 12(1)(a) Directive 2011/95), account must be taken of the possibility for the individual to concretely access effective protection in any of the other fields within UNRWA area of operations.

Assistance from the Agency must be considered as maintained when an individual has left UNRWA area of operations from a field where he couldn’t obtain effective protection, if the person had previously voluntarily left a field where he could access UNRWA’s assistance, even though he could reasonably foresee, according to the information available for him at the moment of departure, that he wouldn’t be able to receive effective protection from the Agency in the field he was travelling to, or return to the field of origin in the short term.

The Return Directive does not preclude Member States from introducing legislation that imposes a custodial sentence on individuals for whom the return procedure has been exahusted but still remain in the territory, where the criminal act consists in an unlawful stay with notice of an entry ban, issued in particular on account of that third-country national’s criminal record or the threat he represents to public policy or national security.

However, such a provision in national legislation is permitted if the criminal act is not defined as a breach of such an entry ban and the legislation itself is sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable in its application in order to avoid all risk of arbitrariness.

EU law does not preclude national legislation that allows an illegally staying third-country national to be detained in prison accommodation for removal, on the ground that he poses a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society or the internal or external security of the Member State concerned. The detainee should be kept separated from ordinary prisoners.

The CJEU found that the judge assigned to rule upon the applicant’s detention should have transmitted his request for international protection to the competent authority so it could be registered, and the applicant could enjoy his rights provided by Directive 2013/33. It also found that he should not have been detained since he was protected by his applicant for international protection’s status under Directives 2013/33 and 2013/32.

1. A change of the destination country in a return decision by an administrative authority should be regarded as a new return decision requiring an effective remedy in compliance with Article 47 CFREU.

2. The national legislation providing for a safe transit country ground applicable in the present case is contrary to EU law.

3. The obligation imposed on a third-country national to remain permanently in a closed and limited transit zone, within which their movement is limited and monitored, and which the latter cannot legally leave voluntarily, in any direction whatsoever, constitutes a deprivation of liberty, characterised as "detention" within the meaning of the Reception Conditions (RCD) and Returns Directives (RD).

4. Neither the RCD nor Article 43 of the Asylum Procedures Directive authorise detention in transit zones for a period exceeding four weeks.

5. Detention under the RCD and the RD must comply with the relevant guarantees under EU law including being based on a reasoned detention decision; consisting of a measure of last resort, following an individualised assessment of the case, its necessity and proportionality; and effective judicial review should be available. An applicant for international protection cannot be held in detention solely on the ground that they cannot support themselves. Where detention is found to contravene EU law, domestic courts may release the applicant and order the authorities to provide accommodation in line with the RCD provisions. They are empowered to do so, even if they have no clear jurisdiction under national law.

Member States cannot merely refer to the existence of public order and security concerns under Article 72 TFEU, in order to derogate from their obligations under Title V without proving that it was necessary to do so. Such a derogation cannot be made unilaterally without any control by the European institutions. As the assessment of whether an applicant constitutes a danger to national security or public order should be thorough and individualised, in accordance with previous findings in C‑369/17 (Ahmed), Member States cannot invoke this provision in the context of general prevention but have to directly link it with a specific case.

Lastly, the spirit of solidarity and the binding nature of the Relocation Decisions do not allow Member States to derogate on the basis of a Member State’s own assessment of the effectiveness of the mechanism without suggesting a sound legal basis

A Union citizen’s lack of sufficient resources for their family member, who is a third-country national, not to become a burden on the national social system, cannot sufficiently establish a reason to refuse a derived right of residence on the basis of article 20 TFEU, if that refusal would result in the national having to leave the territory of the EU.

Secondly, a relationship of dependency does not exist solely because the national law requires spouses to live together.