Case summaries

A Member State cannot rely on the rebuttable presumption under Articles 36 and 37 of the 2013 Asylum Procedures Directive (APD) in respect of the safe country of origin concept and subsequently find the application to be manifestly unfounded in accordance with Article 31(8)(b) without having fully implemented and complied with the procedures under the APD relating to the designation of countries as safe countries of origin.

Moreover, a Member State may not consider an application for asylum as manifestly unfounded under the APD due to the insufficiency of the applicant’s representations. 

The case concerns an application for the annulment of the decision of the Appeals Committee which rejected the applicant’s previous application to overturn the decision of the Regional Asylum Office of Samos whereby he was denied international protection. The Court determined that the case was inadmissible, accepted the relevant justifications given by the Appeals Committee and rejected the application. 

The applicant, a national from Sierra Leone who claimed asylum in Switzerland on the grounds of persecution owing to his homosexuality, is found not to be at risk of treatment prohibited under Article 3 of the Convention in case of return to his country of origin. In substance, the Court recalls that national authorities are in the best position to carry out this risk assessment and recalls the UNHCR Guiding Principles on asylum claims based on sexual orientation, which require the evaluation of the risk through individual assessment, in addition to the examination of the country’s general situation. 

The ECtHR declared inadmissible the complaints brought by a Senegalese national who had unsuccessfully applied for asylum in Spain due to his fear of being persecuted in his country of origin on the grounds of his sexual orientation. The complaints were considered premature since the Audiencia Nacional had annulled the administrative decision rejecting his asylum application and the asylum procedure had started afresh. 

If an application for protection has been heard at first instance and the applicant there had the opportunity of a full examination including a personal interview and was given a transcript or report of the interview; and if it was there determined that the application is manifestly unfounded; then EU asylum law in particular Directive 2013/32/EU allows the national court or tribunal to dismiss an appeal without allowing the applicant  a further opportunity to be heard.

However, a hearing may be conducted if the court hearing the appeal considers it necessary for the purpose of ensuring that there is a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law, as required under Article 46(3) of the Directive.

The application of S.C. and her minor children Z.C. and F.C. related to the cassation of an Appeal Court judgement regarding compensation for the harm they suffered as a result of an indisputably unjust decision to place the Applicants in a Guarded Detention Centre for Foreigners. The Supreme Court reversed the challenged judgement and passed the case to the Appeal Court for re-consideration. 

This case dealt with the issue of whether the Secretary of State’s certification of the asylum claims of the two independent applicants as “clearly unfounded” was flawed on public law grounds, and the important difference between a decision on refugee status itself and a decision on a claim being “clearly unfounded”.
 

The lower court had erred in law by judging that the administration need not justify having informed the applicant about the possibility to communicate with a  representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

The three cumulative prerequisites for an internal protection alternative are not fulfilled, as it cannot be reasonably expected of the refugee to settle in the proposed part of the country. The UNHCR’s reasonability test is comparable with the national legislation’s one and UNHCR defines the internal protection alternative as ‘unreasonable’.

The obligations imposed by Article 3 ECHR do not prevent contracting states from taking into account the possibility of relocation. Where appropriate, contracting states can expect an applicant to relocate to another part of his country of origin in order to avoid persecution.