Case summaries

The safe third country ground under Article 33(2)(c) of Directive 2013/32 is optional; an application may be declared inadmissible on that basis even if the applicant qualifies for international protection, but it cannot be rejected as unfounded on that ground.

Article 38 requires national law to define criteria establishing a sufficient connection between the applicant and the third country to make transfer reasonable.

Article 38(2)(b) and (c) of Directive 2013/32 permits reliance on publicly available sources and executive lists of safe third countries, provided that national law sets out a methodology for an individualised assessment of safety and allows the applicant to challenge the existence of the required connection.

Courts hearing appeals must verify the existence of such a connection, even if national law does not expressly grant that power.

Article 4(1) of Directive 2004/83 requires the determining authority, under its duty of cooperation, to obtain up-to-date country of origin information and, where relevant, a medico-legal report on the applicant’s mental health; a breach of that duty does not automatically lead to annulment unless it may have affected the outcome.

Under Directive 2005/85, delays in the asylum procedure cannot be justified by legislative changes and, on their own, do not warrant setting aside a decision absent an impact on the outcome.

Article 4(5)(e) of Directive 2004/83 means that a false statement later explained and withdrawn at the first opportunity does not, by itself, undermine the applicant’s general credibility.

The High Court found that the Tribunal failed to ask itself the correct legal questions when assessing the issue of state protection in the applicants’ country of origin.

In specific, the High Court found that the Tribunalfailed to apply the correct approach to the ‘state protection test’ found in section 31 of the International Protection Act, 2015, by not seeking to establish whether an effective system of protection is in place, which is non-temporary in nature and which involves the taking of reasonable steps to protect those who otherwise faced a real risk of persecution or serious harm.

In this case the Upper Tribunal provided that the Refugee Convention doesn’t offer protection from social conservatism and that there is no protected right to enjoy a socially liberal lifestyle. However, the Convention may be considered to apply where  ‘westernisation’ reflects a protected characteristic such as political opinion or religious belief, or if there is a real risk that the individual in question would be unable to mask his westernisation and persecutors would impute such protected characteristics to him. 

National legislation that grants the possibility of rejecting an application made by a third-country national or a stateless person for international protection, whose previous application seeking refugee status in another Member State implementing the Dublin III Regulation had been rejected, is precluded under Article 33(2)(d) of Directive 2013/32 read in conjunction with Article 2(q) thereof. 

The State Secretariat of Migration (SSM) is obliged to assess the proportionality of a cessation measure in a case of a granted temporary residence in Switzerland. It was concluded that the cessation of temporary residence is not proportionate, when the applicant showed considerable efforts to integrate in the host community such as learning languages and practicing several internships to obtain a job in that country. His return would hamper all those integration efforts.

A stateless person from Palestine who was registered by UNRWA  and received its assistance shall not be excluded from refugee status when it is established that his personal safety in Palestine is at serious risk and it is impossible for UNRWA to guarantee that the living conditions, which has forced the individual to leave Palestine, are compatible with its mission.

From the available evidence, the Court concludes that UNRWA is unable to provide protection and assistance to Palestinian refugees in Gaza.

An applicant that has received protection on behalf of UNRWA is not required to prove a fear of persecution to be recognised as a refugee; the asylum authorities have to examine whether the applicant was actually receiving UNRWA protection and whether that protection has ceased.

An individual examination of the case will reveal whether the cessation of UNRWA protection resulted from objective reasons that the agency could not rectify.

National authorities are best placed to assess the credibility of asylum claimants.

The ill-treatment of people of non-Arab ethnic origin in Sudan is not systematic. Therefore, when the personal circumstances of an applicant that may create a risk of persecution are insufficiently substantiated, the applicant’s removal to Sudan will not give rise to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.

In the case of an Afghan Shia Hazara applicant, the Belgian Council for Alien Litigation considered that the request for international protection was based on several sources of fear, which must be analysed in combination with each other, forming a cluster of concordant evidence.

The Council granted the applicant refugee status.