Cjeu case summaries

A member state cannot rely on the fact that there are no specialized detention facilities in a part of its territory to justify keeping non-citizens in prison pending their removal.

The CJEU ruled that it had no jurisdiction to answer the questions referred as they concerned the direct interpretation of the provisions of the 1951 Geneva Convention.

A member state cannot rely on the fact that there are no specialized detention facilities in a part of its territory to justify keeping non-citizens in prison pending their removal. The same rule applies even if the migration detainee has consented to being confined to prison.

A national law which requires the sponsor and his/her spouse to have reached the age of 21 by the date on which the application for family reunification is submitted (rather than by the date on which the decision on the application is made) is consistent with Art. 4 (5) of the Family Reunion Directive (Directive 2003/86/EC)

The case concerns the interpretation of Directive 2004/83 and clarifies that the Irish legislation requiring seekers of international protection to follow two separate procedural stages: application for refugee status, and in case of refusal, application for subsidiary protection, is not contrary to EU law if the two applications can be introduced at the same time and if the application for subsidiary protection is considered within a reasonable period of time.

The right to good administration includes the right of any person to have his or her affairs handled impartially and within a reasonable period of time.

The case concerns a family of asylum seekers who needed accommodation in Belgium while their asylum application was being considered. The CJEU declares that if a Member State chooses to provide material reception to asylum seekers in the form of a financial allowance rather than direct public services, the allowance must be enough to ensure a dignified standard of living. In addition, the allowance must be provided from the time at which the asylum application is made and should ensure that it is sufficient to enable minor children to be housed with their parents in order to maintain the family unity of the asylum seekers.

‘Internal armed conflict’ in the context of international protection means armed groups confronting each other or the State armed forces, and is defined independently of international humanitarian law. No special conditions apply regarding intensity, organisation or duration of conflict.

This ruling concerned the scope of judicial review when reviewing compliance with the criterion of Article 10(1) for determining responsibility for examining an asylum application under Regulation 343/2003. The Court held that Art. 19(2) of the Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that, in circumstances where a Member State has agreed to take charge of an applicant for asylum on the basis of the Art. 10(1) criterion the only way in which the applicant for asylum can call into question the choice of that criterion is by pleading systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the conditions for the reception of applicants for asylum in that Member State, which provide substantial grounds for believing that the applicant for asylum would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Art. 4 of the Charter.

This ruling concerned the determination of the Member State responsible when the Member State primarily designated as responsible according to the criteria in the Dublin II Regulation has systemic deficiencies leading to substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker facing transfer there would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter. It does not in itself mean that the determining Member State is required to examine the asylum application under Article 3(2) but must further examine the criteria under Chapter III of the Regulation. 

LGBTI asylum seekers (1) may be members of particular social group, (2) cannot be expected to conceal or restrain their expression of sexual orientation to reduce risk of persecution. (3) All criminalisation does not per se amount to persecution, but imprisonment actually applied does.