Case summaries
The application of provisions on preclusion must always be decided without discretionary error. If the lower court does not make any discretionary considerations at all for its decision to apply a provision on preclusion when rejecting evidence due to a missed time-limit, it infringes the petitioner’s right to be heard under Article 78(2) of the Saxon Constitution (SächsVerf).
Article 48 para. 3 sentence 2 and 3 AufenthG does not offer a suitable legal basis for the search of homes.
The issue of a search warrant according to police and public order law requires concrete evidence that certain documents could be detected. The violation of the obligation to cooperate according to § 48 para. 3 sentence 1 AufenthG (refusal of the applicant to obtain a passport or similar), as well as vaguely expressed doubts of the authorities about the passport loss, are not sufficient to issue a warrant for the search of homes. Such a search warrant is in any case not proportionate if the probability of detection is low.
A Guinean woman who has been forced into marriage at a young age and subsequently harassed into marrying her late husband’s brother, is a refugee under article 1, section A §2 of the Geneva Convention. She risks being persecuted by reason of her membership in the social group of women, and considering the regular violation of women’s rights occuring in Guinea.
The continuation of detention beyond the period of 90 days, while the appeal against the decision rejecting the asylum application was still pending, is a disproportionate measure of deprivation of liberty for the applicant. Alternative measures must be considered.
Withdrawal of detention due to the use of forged travel documents and subsequent obligation to appear before the competent authorities, given to the pending status of the application for asylum.
The case considered an appeal by the London Borough of Croydon (“Croydon”) to have Y’s claim for damages for wrongful detention stayed pending the resolution of Y’s challenge to the assessment of his age undertaken by Croydon.
The Appellant submitted that the judge erred in holding that the principles in Starr v National Coal Board [1977] 1 WLR 63 (“Starr”) did not apply to this case. The Respondent argued that the Starr principles could not apply to this case. The Court upheld Croydon’s appeal, holding that the order sought by Croydon was reasonably necessary to enable it to defend the challenge to its age assessment and that Y had unreasonably refused to give his consent to the different age assessments applied for by Croydon.
This case is concerned with whether the decision to deny the asylum application and the subsequently imposed entry ban were justified based on articles 1F(a)-(c). Under these provisions the Secretary of State can raise national security as a ‘serious ground’ for his decision if an element of ‘personal participation’ can be proven.
An asylum seeker, submitting his claim to a non-competent authority is considered to be staying illegally in the territory of Greece and falls within the scope of the provisions on detention of Directive 2008/115/EC and Law 3907/2011 for returning illegally staying third-country nationals for as long as his identity remains unconfirmed. The deadline for the referral of his application to the competent authorities begins when the applicant provides assistance, as dictated by his duty to cooperate, with regards to the verification of his identity.
The applicant’ s description of a situation which gives rise to a risk to his life or physical integrity, deriving from gender-based violence, social or religious group violence, family/domestic violence, which is accepted, tolerated or not tackled by the State, imposes an ex proprio motu further investigation upon the Judiciary. The latter entails an investigation into the control of violence described by the applicant in terms of whether it is widespread, whether there is impunity for the acts as well as the State’s response