Cjeu case summaries
An asylum applicant can be sent to a Safe Third Country by a Member State who has admitted responsibility under Dublin III in the context of a take back request, where the applicant has left the responsible Member State before a decision on the first asylum application has been taken on its merits.
The absence of information being provided to the sending Member State by the receiving Member State on the latter’s legislation and practice regarding STC does not prevent an asylum applicant being sent to a STC or breach an applicant’s right to an effective remedy
Where an applicant has been taken back by a responsible Member State there is no obligation on the State to re-open the examination of the application at the exact point where it was left.
Article 33 of the Qualification Directive, read in conjunction with the Geneva Convention, requires Member States to allow persons to whom they have granted subsidiary protection status not only to move freely within their territory but also to choose their place of residence within that territory. However, the Directive does not prevent beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status from being subject to a residence condition for the purpose of promoting their integration where said group of persons are not in a comparable situation as non-EU citizens.
Article 8(3)(e) of the recast Reception Conditions Directive fulfils the requirements of proportionality by virtue of the strictly circumscribed framework regulating its use. In light of Article 52(3) of the Charter, Article 8(3)(e) therefore complies with Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR.
The non-suspensive effect of a decision not to further examine a subsequent application under Article 32 of the 2005 Asylum Procedures Directive is not in violation of Articles 19(2) and 47 of the Charter since the decision’s enforcement will not lead to the applicant being removed and is therefore unlikely to expose the applicant to a risk of inhumane treatment.
The Returns Directive does not preclude domestic legislation which provides for a prison sentence as a criminal law penalty for non-EU citizens who unlawfully re-enter the country in breach of an entry ban.
Art. 19 of the Eurosur Regulation cannot be regarded as allowing Ireland and the UK to take part in provisions of the Schengen acquis in the area of crossing of the external borders. Therefore, the said article cannot constitute a circumvention of art. 4 of the Schengen Protocol.
Whilst the Long Term Residence Directive (LTRD) allows for the imposition of fees relating to the issuance of a residence permit such measures must adhere to the principles of proportionality and abide by the Directive’s effectiveness.
The frequent payment of a fee which is on top of a pre-existing fee creates an obstacle to the obtaining of the long-term resident status conferred by the LTRD.
The first subparagraph of Article 7(2) of the Family Reunification Directive allows the imposition of integration measures of Third Country Nationals in principle. However the general principle of proportionality requires integration measures to actually fulfil the objective of integrating TCNs and not delimiting the possibility of family reunion.
Member States must therefore consider the individual circumstances of the applicant which can lead to dispensing with the integration exam where family reunification would otherwise be excessively difficult.
The judgment concerns the scope of Article 21 of Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 with regards to derogation from protection from refoulement and the possibility to revoke a residence permit issued to a refugee pursuant to Article 24 of said Directive.
This case related to two third country nationals who were ordered to leave the Netherlands, without being granted a period for voluntary departure, on the basis that they constituted a risk to public policy.
The CJEU gave guidance on the meaning of Article 7(4) of the Returns Directive, stating that the concept of a ‘risk to public policy’ should be interpreted strictly with an individualised assessment of the personal conduct of the person. Suspicion or conviction for a criminal offence was a relevant consideration. However, it was unnecessary to conduct a new assessment solely relating to the period for voluntary departure where the person had already been found to constitute a risk to public policy.