Case summaries

Article 40(2) of the Asylum Procedures Directive does not distinguish between initial and subsequent applications for international protection. As such, Member States should not treat the assessment of evidence submitted in subsequent applications different from evidence submitted in a first application. Any document submitted by the applicant in support of his application for international protection must be considered, and the inability to authenticate that document cannot justify the exclusion of such a document from the examination.

The assessment of the existence of indiscriminate violence under Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive may not be based exclusively on a quantitative assessment of casualties and population ratios. A comprehensive appraisal of all the circumstances of the individual case, and in particular those which characterise the situation of the applicant’s country of origin, is required.

The fact that an asylum seeker has already been persecuted in the past or has been subject to direct threats of persecution, was considered as a well-founded argument to believe that the applicant would face the risk to be persecuted under Article 1, Section A §2 of the 1951 Refugee Convention.  

A Dublin transfer to Bulgaria is annulled due to the vulnerability of the applicant combined with the risk of inadequate psychological treatment in Bulgaria, the applicant’s first country of asylum, and the lack sufficient individual guarantees in case of Dublin transfer.

The applicant appealed the Migration Court’s decision to dismiss his application for asylum on grounds of the availability of an internal protection alternative in the applicants home country of Afghanistan.

The Migration Court of Appeal granted the appeal as it was held that the question of internal protection can only be assessed after the court has made an individual assessment of the original grounds for protection invoked by the applicant.
 

The Court found that due to the inexistence of the connection requirement between the applicant and the State of Ecuador, the latter cannot be considered a “safe third country” in light of Article 2 n.º1 point r) item i) of the Law 27/2008. Nonetheless, the international protection request should be rejected on the basis that Egypt is considered to be the first country of asylum, excluding the possibility of granting international protection under Article 19º-A n. º1 points c) and d) of the Law 26/14.

Following the appeal of the Children’s Rights Ombudsman, the Supreme Administrative Court set aside the order of the Regional Administrative Court, in relation to a challenge to the decision of the Polish Refugee Board, and set aside the aforementioned decision to refuse tolerated stay, dismissing the appeal in all other respects.

The court justified its decision with reference to the procedural errors of the Polish Refugee Board, which included failing to gather evidence in an appropriate manner and inappropriately establishing the facts relating to the Applicant’s children.