Case summaries
The case concerns the potential removal of a Syrian national of Armenian origin and Christian denomination from Greece to Türkiye under the EU-Türkiye Statement of 18 March 2026, following the rejection of his asylum claim on safe third country grounds. The Court struck out the Article 3 complaint concerning the risk of ill-treatment upon removal due to the cessation of risk. It found no violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3 having regard to the multi-layered examination of the asylum claim and the reliance on the EU–Türkiye framework, assurances and supporting material, and held that the conditions of the applicant’s detention in a Greek police station amounted to a violation of Article 3 ECHR.
The safe third country ground under Article 33(2)(c) of Directive 2013/32 is optional; an application may be declared inadmissible on that basis even if the applicant qualifies for international protection, but it cannot be rejected as unfounded on that ground.
Article 38 requires national law to define criteria establishing a sufficient connection between the applicant and the third country to make transfer reasonable.
Article 38(2)(b) and (c) of Directive 2013/32 permits reliance on publicly available sources and executive lists of safe third countries, provided that national law sets out a methodology for an individualised assessment of safety and allows the applicant to challenge the existence of the required connection.
Courts hearing appeals must verify the existence of such a connection, even if national law does not expressly grant that power.
The Court found Hungary in violation of procedural aspects of Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR, as well as a substantive violation of Article 2 in relation to the death of the applicant’s brother during a border control operation. The Court rejected the substantive violation of Article 3 due to a lack of conclusive evidence from an effective investigation.
The Federal Administrative Court found that Art. 3 of the Qualification Directive does not hinder Member States to allow parents and siblings, fulfilling the requirements for family members under Art. 2(j) of the Directive, to change their status of subsidiary protection into a refugee status which they derive from their minor sponsor.
To determine whether there is a violation of Articles 2 and 3 ECHR in the context of expulsion, the Court analyses if the Applicant has presented substantial grounds on (i) whether he faces a real risk of ill-treatment or death in the country of destination, and (ii)whether the national authorities carried out an adequate assessment of the evidence. States have an obligation to analyse the risk ex propio motu when they are aware of facts that could expose an individual to the risk of treatment prohibited by Articles 2 and 3 ECHR. If the domestic jurisdictions didn’t carry out a proper assessment, the Court analyses the risk on its own on the basis of the parties submissions, international reports and its own findings.
States have an obligation, under Article 5 § 1 ECHR, to act with due diligence and impose a reasonable period of detention pending expulsion. Article 5 § 4 ECHR is breached if detained individuals can’t obtain a revision of their detention before a domestic court.
Except for very limited exceptions, the statutory three-year waiting period for family reunification of persons granted ‘temporary protection’ does not allow for an individualised assessment of the interest of family unity in light of the concrete situation of the persons concerned. Eventually the Court finds a violation of Article 8 of the Convention since the measure (whose goal is not otherwise challenged) had a disproportionate impact in the case at hand.
When analysing if protection from UNRWA has ceased (Article 12(1)(a) Directive 2011/95), account must be taken of the possibility for the individual to concretely access effective protection in any of the other fields within UNRWA area of operations.
Assistance from the Agency must be considered as maintained when an individual has left UNRWA area of operations from a field where he couldn’t obtain effective protection, if the person had previously voluntarily left a field where he could access UNRWA’s assistance, even though he could reasonably foresee, according to the information available for him at the moment of departure, that he wouldn’t be able to receive effective protection from the Agency in the field he was travelling to, or return to the field of origin in the short term.
The reception conditions for beneficiaries of international protection in Bulgaria are such that they may face severe material deprivation due to “indifference” on the part of the authorities (cfr. CJEU, Ibrahim), potentially amounting to a violation of Article 3 ECHR / Article 4 CFREU.
When the State Secretary decides that a request for international protection is not admissible, because the applicants have refugee status in Bulgaria, it is not sufficient for him to refer to the principle of mutual trust between EU Member States and to the Council of State’s jurisprudence, but he is obliged to examine the applicant’ s individual circumstances and to obtain specific information and guarantees from the Bulgarian authorities.
Not all cases with an international element can establish jurisdiction under the Convention; an assessment of exceptional circumstances on the basis of the specific facts of each case is required.
The applicants do not have any connecting links with Belgium and their sole presence in the premises of the Belgian Embassy in Lebanon cannot establish jurisdiction, as they were never under the de facto control of Belgian diplomatic or consular agents. Jurisdiction under Article 1 ECHR cannot be established solely on the basis of an administrative procedure initiated by private individuals outside the territory of the chosen state, without them having any connection with that State, nor any treaty obligation compelling them to choose that state.
The parents and minor siblings of a Syrian national, who was recognised as a refugee, cannot claim refugee status in terms of international protection for family members, if the beneficiary, although a minor when he was registered as an asylum applicant, was no longer a minor at the time of the court hearing.