Case summaries
Rejection of the re-application of Lebanese nationals as inadmissible "subsequent applications" under Directive 2013/32/EU.
In a case concerning a foreign national who had a valid refugee status in Germany, the Dutch Secretary of State ordered them to leave the country and placed her in detention in view of returning her to Germany. The Council of State found that the first instance Court wrongfully declared that Article 59(2) of the Aliens Act of 2000 provided no basis for detaining the foreign national.
Given that the Secretary of State used the same materials in the first and in the review decisions, the High Court found that the Secretary of State did not comply with the standard of review in re-evaluating the case at hand.
New elements or findings which have arisen or have been presented by the applicant in subsequent applications can consist, on the one hand, of those which have arisen after the decision became final, and, on the other hand, of those which have not been presented by the applicant but have already existed during the first procedure.
Domestic provisions regarding the procedures of examining a subsequent application must be compliant with the provisions set out in the Asylum Procedures Directive and cannot foresee a limited period to file a subsequent application. Moreover, if Member States have no specific implementing provisions regarding the Asylum Procedures Directive, domestic legislation is not applicable to dismiss a subsequent application if new elements or findings already existed before the decision became final but where not presented by the applicant’s own fault.
Article 40(2) of the Asylum Procedures Directive does not distinguish between initial and subsequent applications for international protection. As such, Member States should not treat the assessment of evidence submitted in subsequent applications different from evidence submitted in a first application. Any document submitted by the applicant in support of his application for international protection must be considered, and the inability to authenticate that document cannot justify the exclusion of such a document from the examination.
The assessment of the existence of indiscriminate violence under Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive may not be based exclusively on a quantitative assessment of casualties and population ratios. A comprehensive appraisal of all the circumstances of the individual case, and in particular those which characterise the situation of the applicant’s country of origin, is required.
National legislation that grants the possibility of rejecting an application made by a third-country national or a stateless person for international protection, whose previous application seeking refugee status in another Member State implementing the Dublin III Regulation had been rejected, is precluded under Article 33(2)(d) of Directive 2013/32 read in conjunction with Article 2(q) thereof.
The Supreme Court of Ireland handed down a judgment concerning the question whether the Minister for Justice and Equality is obliged to revoke a deportation order or otherwise facilitate a person to enter the State, when that person has been granted consent to make a subsequent application for international protection under section 22 of the International Protection Act 2015, which requires the person's presence in the State to make the application. It was held that there is no express right to enter the State for the purposes of making an application, save where the person is at its frontiers.
1. A change of the destination country in a return decision by an administrative authority should be regarded as a new return decision requiring an effective remedy in compliance with Article 47 CFREU.
2. The national legislation providing for a safe transit country ground applicable in the present case is contrary to EU law.
3. The obligation imposed on a third-country national to remain permanently in a closed and limited transit zone, within which their movement is limited and monitored, and which the latter cannot legally leave voluntarily, in any direction whatsoever, constitutes a deprivation of liberty, characterised as "detention" within the meaning of the Reception Conditions (RCD) and Returns Directives (RD).
4. Neither the RCD nor Article 43 of the Asylum Procedures Directive authorise detention in transit zones for a period exceeding four weeks.
5. Detention under the RCD and the RD must comply with the relevant guarantees under EU law including being based on a reasoned detention decision; consisting of a measure of last resort, following an individualised assessment of the case, its necessity and proportionality; and effective judicial review should be available. An applicant for international protection cannot be held in detention solely on the ground that they cannot support themselves. Where detention is found to contravene EU law, domestic courts may release the applicant and order the authorities to provide accommodation in line with the RCD provisions. They are empowered to do so, even if they have no clear jurisdiction under national law.
The Spanish Supreme Court’s Administrative Chamber decides on the appeal of the State Attorney. He appealed the National Court’s judgement that accepted to consider an application for the re-examination of international protection that was denied in first instance, and was presented in a different place. The Supreme Court concludes that even if an application is not presented before the competent authority, are these authorities the ones who have to refer the case to the competent. Since this referral was not done, the petition for re-examination is valid.