Case summaries
1. A change of the destination country in a return decision by an administrative authority should be regarded as a new return decision requiring an effective remedy in compliance with Article 47 CFREU.
2. The national legislation providing for a safe transit country ground applicable in the present case is contrary to EU law.
3. The obligation imposed on a third-country national to remain permanently in a closed and limited transit zone, within which their movement is limited and monitored, and which the latter cannot legally leave voluntarily, in any direction whatsoever, constitutes a deprivation of liberty, characterised as "detention" within the meaning of the Reception Conditions (RCD) and Returns Directives (RD).
4. Neither the RCD nor Article 43 of the Asylum Procedures Directive authorise detention in transit zones for a period exceeding four weeks.
5. Detention under the RCD and the RD must comply with the relevant guarantees under EU law including being based on a reasoned detention decision; consisting of a measure of last resort, following an individualised assessment of the case, its necessity and proportionality; and effective judicial review should be available. An applicant for international protection cannot be held in detention solely on the ground that they cannot support themselves. Where detention is found to contravene EU law, domestic courts may release the applicant and order the authorities to provide accommodation in line with the RCD provisions. They are empowered to do so, even if they have no clear jurisdiction under national law.
The standardised nature of the questions to the applicants and similarities in the responses recorded do not necessarily indicate a lack of individualised assessment. The applicants were not deprived of an opportunity to submit arguments against their expulsion and did not make any claim of persecution risks in their country of origin. No collective expulsion under Article 4 Protocol 4 has been established.
Similarly, no violation of Article 4 Protocol 4 in conjunction with Article 13 has been established, as the claim cannot be considered arguable.
An application for a revision of a final court decision of the Swiss Federal Court is only admissible if the applicant presents new relevant facts or evidence which he was not able to provide in previous proceedings even if he had acted with due diligence.
If the new evidence relates to another person’s hearing files (in the case at hand a relative’s hearing protocol before the Swiss asylum authority) the fact that the files could not be retrieved during the proceedings cannot be attributed to the applicant if he lacked the required consent from the person concerned to access the files. By rule of principle, it is the asylum authority’s duty to consult relevant documents for the assessment of an application which is notably the case for statements made by family relatives if the factual circumstances on which the respective applications are based are closely related.
The Court found no violation of the Convention given that the applicants would have had access to a genuine and effective possibility of submitting arguments against their expulsion had they entered lawfully into Spain – they did not have any “cogent reasons” for not using the border procedures available at designated entry points. As such, the lack of an individualised procedure for their removal was the consequence of their own conduct.
The administrative detention of an Afghan national was imposed on the basis of a procedural error due to the lack of relevant documentation and unjustified information by the French authorities (Prefect and Prosecutor).
In order to guarantee that an applicant for international protection has an effective judicial remedy within the meaning of Article 47 of the Charter, a national court or tribunal is required to vary a decision of the first-instance determining body that does not comply with its previous judgment. The court or tribunal must substitute its own decision on the application for international protection by disapplying, if necessary, the national law that prohibits it from proceeding in that way.
There is a case of urgent necessity concerning interim measures according to § 123 VwGO obliging a Member State to accept a take charge request regarding the asylum applications of family members of a person entitled to subsidiary protection in that state when the decision on an asylum application of these family members is imminent in the requesting state.
Neither Austrian law nor the provisions of the Dublin III Regulation provide for legal remedies against a Member State’s rejection of a request for admission. The Dublin Regulation provides for a remonstration procedure between the Member States concerned in the event of a rejection, whereby after expiry of the remonstration period the requesting Member State is finally responsible for examining the application for international protection. A later agreement after the remonstration period has expired cannot establish any responsibility.
The notification about the intention of withdrawal from the EU by the Member-State responsible for the examination of the application for international protection does not trigger the determining Member-State’s obligation to make use of the discretionary clause of Article 17(1) 604/2013 EU. Similarly, Article 6 (1) cannot be interpreted as imposing an obligation on the Member State that is not responsible to take into account the best interests of the child and to examine the application itself under 17 (1)
Article 8 (1) of the Dublin III Regulation provides for a subjective right to family reunification, both for the applicant himself and for the family members present in the Member State responsible. This right is also justiciable to the extent that denial of transfer affects the rights to family unity and the best interest of an unaccompanied minor.
The expiry of the time limit for the submission of a take charge request pursuant to Article 21 (1) of the Dublin III Regulation, as well as for the submission of a request to review the rejection of a take charge request (so-called "remonstration") pursuant to Article 5 (2) of the Implementing Regulation to the Dublin II Regulation, does not reverse the responsibility back to the requesting Member State if the failure to comply with the time limit cannot be attributed to the applicant and family unity and the best interests of the child take precedence over the procedural rules on time limits.
Due to the paramount importance of the right to family unit and the best interests of the child, the discretion under Article 17(2) of the Dublin III Regulation translates into a legal obligation of the Member State to invoke the sovereignty clause where there are close family ties. Beyond such family ties, no further special relationship or interdependency is required.
Whether a minor is "unaccompanied" within the meaning of Article 2 lit. j of the Dublin III Regulation depends on the domestic law in the Member State where the minor is present.