Case summaries

A Member State cannot rely on the rebuttable presumption under Articles 36 and 37 of the 2013 Asylum Procedures Directive (APD) in respect of the safe country of origin concept and subsequently find the application to be manifestly unfounded in accordance with Article 31(8)(b) without having fully implemented and complied with the procedures under the APD relating to the designation of countries as safe countries of origin.

Moreover, a Member State may not consider an application for asylum as manifestly unfounded under the APD due to the insufficiency of the applicant’s representations. 

The Federal Administrative Court has to clarify whether the petition for action directed solely at the obligation to decide on the asylum application is admissible. The question if it is also possible to directly oblige the defendant to grant international protection or to establish prohibitions on deportation by means of an action is not the subject of the decision. As a result, the court comes to the conclusion that there was a delay by the respondent of providing the decision on the asylum application without sufficient reason and that the plaintiff has a need for legal protection for its action for failure to act.

The detention of an asylum-seeker who claimed he had been tortured because of his sexual orientation was unlawful in part.

The Appellant appealed to the Upper Tribunal on the ground that he qualified for subsidiary protection under Article 2(e) and (f) of the Qualification Directive and was therefore entitled to a residence permit under Article 24(2) of the Qualification Directive.

In dismissing the appeal, the Tribunal found that: (a) Article 24 of the Qualification Directive does not confer a substantive right of residence in the member state concerned but rather its function is to determine the modalities whereby a right of residence otherwise existing is to be documented, and (b) the Procedures Directive is a truly adjectival instrument of EU legislation which does not create any substantive rights in the realm of asylum or subsidiary protection.

The provisions of the Asylum Procedures Directive have been fully transposed into the CESEDA. A decision of the OFPRA based on all the documents/ evidence submitted by the applicant in support of his subsequent application without an interview does not infringe Article 41(2) of the Charter. When OFPRA considered the subsequent application, it was legitimate for it to have rejected the application without any interview since the new documents/ evidence provided were without merits. The Court found that M.A’s application must be rejected without any need to re-examine the facts he submitted, including those in his first application. The application of M.A was rejected.

The Applicant’s alleged risk of persecution due to his former employment with the Iranian Intelligence Services was found by the Court to be sufficiently credible to give rise to a violation of Article 3 if the Applicant were forcibly returned to Iran. The French authorities’ use of the priority procedure did not however violate Article 13 in the Applicant’s case.

A bad situation in the country of origin does not constitute a sufficient intrinsic reason to accord refugee status or other forms of protection.

One cannot question the credibility of an applicant solely on the basis of a discrepancy between the information stated in the application and the information provided in subsequent stages of the proceedings.

This case concerns a child asylum applicant who had his appeal against refusal of asylum considered after he had turned 18, and thus had become an adult. He complained that this breached Article 39 of the Procedures Directive (effective remedy).

The application cannot be rejected as manifestly unfounded on the grounds that the Applicant comes from a safe country of origin, if she demonstrably claims and proves, with documented evidence, facts that are relevant to international protection. Domestic violence is such a relevant fact if the Applicant is not provided with efficient protection against such actions.

The forced return of a Coptic Christian to Egypt would expose him to a risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR, but the processing of his asylum application through the fast-track procedure was not a violation Article 13 due to the almost 3 year delay in claiming asylum.