Case summaries

The Appellant appealed to the Upper Tribunal on the ground that he qualified for subsidiary protection under Article 2(e) and (f) of the Qualification Directive and was therefore entitled to a residence permit under Article 24(2) of the Qualification Directive.

In dismissing the appeal, the Tribunal found that: (a) Article 24 of the Qualification Directive does not confer a substantive right of residence in the member state concerned but rather its function is to determine the modalities whereby a right of residence otherwise existing is to be documented, and (b) the Procedures Directive is a truly adjectival instrument of EU legislation which does not create any substantive rights in the realm of asylum or subsidiary protection.

The appellant sought to have the decision of the Secretary General of the Ministry of Public Order annulled, under which her previous application for her and her son to be recognised as refugees had been rejected. The Hellenic Council of State rejected the current appeal, due to the fact that the appellant had invoked financial reasons for leaving Syria and as such, had no legal basis to be recognised as a refugee. 

The Asylum Court upheld the Federal Asylum Agency’s rejection of the mother and son’s application on the basis that Poland was responsible for the application under the Dublin II Regulation. The Court held that Austria was not obliged to apply Article 3(2) Dublin II Regulation due to a threatened violation of Article 3 or Article 8 ECHR. 

The Applicants' applications for asylum were rejected as they did not tell the truth about their former residence(s) before moving to Belgium, and it could therefore not be ruled out that they were also nationals of or enjoyed protection status in another country. However, they could not be deported to Afghanistan, even though it was at least established that they were Afghan nationals.

The fears of an Applicant originating from a refugee camp near Tindouf were considered with regard to the Self-Proclaimed Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), taken as a de facto authority. 

If an applicant for international protection has citizenship of one country and a place of last permanent residence in another country, the assessment of persecution or serious harm is considered primarily with regard to the country of nationality. The country of last permanent residence is examined in cases of stateless persons.

Refugee status was granted on the basis of a well-founded fear of persecution based on the applicant facing  a second act of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) on return to Somalia (persecution ground: membership of a particular social group). 

1. The denial of citizenship may represent a severe violation of basic human rights according to Art. 9.1 (a) of the Qualification Directive.
2. In assessing the severity of the violation of rights caused by the denial of citizenship, under Art. 4.3 of the Qualification Directive, the individual situation and personal circumstances of the person concerned have to be taken into account.
3. A person is stateless according to Section 3 (1) of the Asylum Procedure Act, if no state considers him/her as a national under its own law, i.e. a de jure stateless person. For de-facto stateless persons, therefore, a threat of persecution has to be established with reference to the state of their de jure nationality.
4. The habitual residence of a stateless person under Section 3 (1) of the Asylum Procedure Act does not need to be lawful. It is sufficient if the focus of the stateless person’s life is in the country, and therefore the stateless person did not merely spend a short time there, and the competent authorities did not initiate measures to terminate his/her residence.