Case summaries

Even after the introduction of Art. 3 (3) AsylG, the previous legal practice with regard to persons who justify their asylum application by refusing military service or desertion in their home country continues to be valid. Accordingly, a conscientious objection to military service or desertion cannot establish refugee status on its own, only if it is associated with persecution within the meaning of Art. 3 para. 1 AsylG.

LGBTI asylum seekers (1) may be members of particular social group, (2) cannot be expected to conceal or restrain their expression of sexual orientation to reduce risk of persecution. (3) All criminalisation does not per se amount to persecution, but imprisonment actually applied does.

In the case of a Palestinian stateless asylum-seeker from Lebanon, the Court found the objection of the OIN (that was otherwise unverified by documents and based on which the decision to reject was made) to be unfounded, and recognised the Applicant as refugee. The Court emphasized that any procedure where the contents of the objection concerning a matter of national security are not subject to review, is arbitrary and seriously contradicts the principles of the rule of law as it makes the right to an effective remedy meaningless.

It must be noted that the Applicant’s occupation as a pharmacist meant that according to the country of origin information, he could be a target group for the country`s security forces if they suspected that assistance was being provided to the insurgents. This was considered to constitute the Applicant`s imputed political opinion to be taken into consideration in light of the right to asylum, in other words, circumstances to be considered pursuant to the Geneva Convention.

Ahmadis, for whom the practise and possibly also the promotion of their faith in public are elements which define their identity and as such are essential, are very likely to be at risk of political persecution in Pakistan. The “relationship consideration” demanded by the Federal Administrative Court, whereby the number of members of a particular group is compared with the number of actual threatening acts of persecution, seems virtually impossible in this case.

Transferring the major part of the investigations into the facts of an asylum application to the Court of Second Instance impedes the purpose of an appeal stage. As a specialist authority, the Federal Asylum Agency is obliged to keep up to date with relevant developments under asylum law. Both the departure clause reasons and previous acts of persecution are to be taken into consideration in a decision. With regard to Pakistani members of the Ahmadiyya religious community, the decision by the CJEU in C-71/11 and C-99/11, Federal Republic of Germany v. Y and Z and the right to practise religion in public are to be taken into account.

Conclusions on exclusion from protection are to be supported by factual findings and cannot be presumed, especially with an applicant, who through the credibility assessment, is deemed to be untrustworthy by an administrative body. Belonging to the army under Saddam Hussein might, together with the Sunni religion of the applicant, be understood as a reason for well-founded fear of persecution because of membership of a particular social group.

The Syrian Kurdish Applicant has been persecuted and tortured for his nationality and imputed political opinion.

Tibetans in China are not at risk of “group persecution” based on their ethnicity. However, individual acts of persecution (the rape of a Tibetan woman by security forces in the present case) do constitute past persecution since they have to be regarded as being connected to the persecution ground “race”.

The applicant claimed that he would face persecution if returned to Bangladesh due to his Ahmadi (Ahmadiyya) religion. Both the applicant’s father and brother were attacked because of their religion. The Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN) rejected the application stating that effective protection is accessible within Bangladesh. The Court accepted the OIN’s reasoning. The prohibition of refoulement did not apply.