Case summaries

Since there is a high risk of exposure to inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3 ECHR and Article 4 CFREU, Portugal should not allow the applicant’s transfer to Italy. The Court also found that there had been a violation of his right to a prior hearing, and that there is no obligation under EU Law of asylum seekers’ transfer once the DRIII is applied.

The extension of the transfer period in accordance with Art. 29 para. 2 sentence 2 Dublin Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 (Dublin III Regulation) requires that the asylum applicant absconds, which has to be proven by the transferring authority.

Absconding is only the case, if the asylum applicant cannot be reached by the competent authorities for an (undefined) longer period of time. The intention to evade the authorities does not have to be proven. The circumstances of the individual case are decisive.

The applicant, a national from Sierra Leone who claimed asylum in Switzerland on the grounds of persecution owing to his homosexuality, is found not to be at risk of treatment prohibited under Article 3 of the Convention in case of return to his country of origin. In substance, the Court recalls that national authorities are in the best position to carry out this risk assessment and recalls the UNHCR Guiding Principles on asylum claims based on sexual orientation, which require the evaluation of the risk through individual assessment, in addition to the examination of the country’s general situation. 

This case primarily dealt with the lawfulness of a prolonged period of detention in the context of whether there was a reasonable prospect of deportation and also of evidence of both current mental illness and previous torture and trafficking.

Examining the applicant’s complaints of unlawful detention, absence of information on the specific reasons of his detention and lack of access to effective remedies, the Court found a violation of Article 5 para 1 and Article 5 para 4 of the Convention. 

LGBTI asylum seekers (1) may be members of particular social group, (2) cannot be expected to conceal or restrain their expression of sexual orientation to reduce risk of persecution. (3) All criminalisation does not per se amount to persecution, but imprisonment actually applied does.

This was a decision on an injunction application in the course of judicial review proceedings challenging a subsidiary protection decision and deportation order on the basis of a failure by the Minister to cooperate with the applicant in processing the subsidiary protection application and that the failure to provide a mechanism of appeal against a refusal of subsidiary protection  breaches the principal of equivalence in European Union law in that the procedure under the (Irish) 2006 Regulations is inferior to that provided for in national law (the Refugee Act 1996 as amended) in respect of decisions on claims for asylum.

The (injunction) application was rejected on the basis that it was only since the requirements of the Procedures Directive, and, in particular, the deeming provision of its Annex 1, became effective in Irish law (in 2007) that the recommendation of the Commissioner fell to be considered as the first instance determination by a “determining authority” with an appeal to the Refugee Appeals Tribunal. Thus, insofar as the provisions of the 1996 Act can now be pointed to as providing a two-stage determination for an asylum application including a right to an effective remedy by way of appeal, it is only because of the manner in which the State has adapted the arrangements of the 1996 Act in order to comply with the requirements of the Procedures Directive for asylum (refugee) applications pursuant to Article 3.1. Furthermore, without a unified system for both applications the minimum procedural standards provide for in the Procedures Directive do not apply to a separate and discrete subsidiary protection application.

In relation to the ‘co-operation’ point the Court found that a claim of non-compliance with such a duty of “co-operation” or the principle audi alteram partem cannot be made as a purely academic point divorced from specific facts. The applicant in this case eschewed the need to identify any particular finding in the Subsidiary Protection determination which might have been corrected or altered had the applicant been consulted upon it.

Unlike the Procedures Directive, Article 4.1 of the Qualifications Directive refers to the duty of co-operation in respect of the “application for international protection,” that is, the claim to asylum and the claim to subsidiary protection. Article 14.2 of the Procedures Directive recognises, however, that the report of the personal interview with the applicant on which the decision of the determining authority on an asylum application is based, may be communicated to the asylum seeker after the decision has been adopted. The Court found that it would be inconsistent with these arrangements that the duty of cooperation in Article 4.1 should be construed as imposing on a determining authority a mandatory obligation to submit either the report or a draft decision in relation to a subsidiary protection application to an applicant for prior comment. Furthermore, the duty to co-operate provided for in Article 4.1only applies to those elements of the claim described in Article 4.2. These are, in effect, the basic facts and documents relating to the applicant’s personal history and to the basis of the claim and they are primarily considered and assessed in the asylum process including any appeal.

 This case concerned the assessment of the option of internal relocation within Sierra Leone in the context of a threat from a family member. The Court found that, provided that regard has been had to relevant country of origin information, there is no obligation on the decision-maker under Article 8.2 of the Qualification Directive to seek out specific information on general economic and social conditions in a proposed site of re-location in the absence of any specific objection on that basis being put forward by the asylum seeker.

This case concerned the insufficient sourcing of evidence relied upon by the decision maker in dismissing the applicant’s claim for protection. It was found to be a violation of Art 16.1 of the Asylum Procedures Directive where the decision was insufficiently sourced in the applicant’s file. Further that this violation is not remedied by making specific references to those sources before the court. 

The case concerned a woman who feared return to Sierra Leone because she would face gender specific persecution in the form of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM).  The issue was whether she was entitled to recognition as a refugee because she feared persecution on account of her membership of a particular social group.  Her appeal was allowed on the basis that women in Sierra Leone and, alternatively, uninitiated women who had not been subjected to FGM in Sierra Leone, were particular social groups.