Case summaries

The fact that a person has been the subject, in the past, of a decision excluding him from refugee status cannot automatically permit the finding that the mere presence of that person in the territory of the host Member State constitutes a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society. A case-by-case assessment is necessary before a measure based on grounds of public policy or public security is adopted. This assessment includes weighing the threat against the protection of the rights of EU citizens and their family members.

Similarly, in order to adopt an expulsion decision with due regard to the principle of proportionality, account must be taken of, inter alia, the nature and gravity of the alleged conduct of the individual concerned, the duration and, when appropriate, the legality of his residence in the host Member State, the period of time that has elapsed since that conduct, the individual’s behaviour during that period, the extent to which he currently poses a danger to society, and the solidity of social, cultural and family links with the host Member State.

The applicant’s asylum claim has been rejected on the grounds of Article 1F(c) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The act he committed would amount to being contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN. However, the Council of State hereby decided that in failing to seek and qualify the severity of this act in the light of its effects internationally, the lower court made an error of law.

The CJEU in this case expanded on its previous ruling of B & D. Whereas previously the scope of the exclusion clause for those engaging in terrorist acts was limited to engaging in, conspiring to or planning an actual act of terrorism with an international dimension, the CJEU has now widened the scope to include those who provide logistical support even where no act of terrorism takes place. 

This case is concerned with whether the decision to deny the asylum application and the subsequently imposed entry ban were justified based on articles 1F(a)-(c). Under these provisions the Secretary of State can raise national security as a ‘serious ground’ for his decision if an element of ‘personal participation’ can be proven.

The assigned political belief of an individual, his desertion or avoiding being drafted in the army are sufficient to grant a refugee status to an individual, if there is a connection between the reasons for persecution and the acts of persecution in line with Article 1.A of the Geneva Convention 1951 in a situation of an armed conflict. 

A case may be re-examined in substance by the CNDA, if the facts referred to by the Applicant took place after the last decision of the CNDA or if it is proven that the Applicant could not have been aware of them prior to the previous court decision.

A person who has been a member of an armed unit which has committed systematic violence, and who has not attempted to prevent it or be dissociated from the other members is personally guilty and therefore cannot be granted the refugee status.

The CALL required specific facts to be attributable to the Applicant and the existence of a high threshold of seriousness in order to make a finding of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. In this case the CALL refused to exclude the refugee status of an Applicant who had a criminal conviction for participating in the activities of a terrorist group.

These joint cases concern Article 1F(c) of the Refugee Convention. The Court considered what acts fall within the exclusion and what is meant by "serious reasons for considering" a person to be guilty of acts contrary to the purposes of the United Nations (“UN”). 

1. The issue as to whether an asylum-seeker was already protected against political persecution in a third country is only relevant in terms of  the asylum application for recognition of refugee status in the context of the concept of the first country of asylum as defined in EU law in Article 29 of the Asylum Procedures Act (Articles 25 and 26 of the Asylum Procedures Directive).  

2. If the Federal Office has reached a decision on the asylum application in this case, the substantive question of the subsidiarity of refugee protection in the assessment of refugee status is no longer applicable.

Conclusions on exclusion from protection are to be supported by factual findings and cannot be presumed, especially with an applicant, who through the credibility assessment, is deemed to be untrustworthy by an administrative body. Belonging to the army under Saddam Hussein might, together with the Sunni religion of the applicant, be understood as a reason for well-founded fear of persecution because of membership of a particular social group.