Case summaries
The Applicant was a homosexual male from Iran who had renounced Islam and was studying the catechism of the Roman Catholic doctrine. It was held that the Applicant had no well-founded (objective) fear of persecution on the grounds of changing his religious beliefs.
Regarding the risks associated with his sexual orientation, the fear that the Applicant expressed was deemed to be well-founded, and it was held that not externalising his sexual orientation to avoid danger would, in and of itself, constitute serious harm to his right to respect for his private life and his right to not be discriminated against. Therefore, his refugee status was recognised and he was granted the international protection in the form of refugee status.
This case involved recognition of refugee status under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention on grounds of religious beliefs.
More specifically, it was held that the arrest and torture the Applicant suffered at the hands of his father and the State authorities because of his Christian faith, the risk of being executed for apostasy because he was baptised in Greece, and the risk of being arrested and maltreated again should he return to Iran, constituted persecution under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention, the actor of persecution being the State. Furthermore, being forced to conceal one's religious beliefs and/or proclaim belief in another religionin order to avoid persecution and/or deprivation of basic rights constitutes a breach of religious freedom under Article 9 of the ECHR and also the related case law of the ECtHR.
Article L. 712(1) (b) of the CESEDA requires the asylum judge to examine whether the circumstances allow the risks referred to in this provision to be regarded as proven. The protection provided for in this Article is only granted where there is a real, rather than possible, risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in the event of a return to the Applicant’s country of origin.
Where national authorities responsible for examining asylum applications breach the duty of confidentiality, this can of itself create conditions exposing an asylum seeker to persecution within the meaning of the 1951 Refugee Convention.
The Applicants' applications for asylum were rejected as they did not tell the truth about their former residence(s) before moving to Belgium, and it could therefore not be ruled out that they were also nationals of or enjoyed protection status in another country. However, they could not be deported to Afghanistan, even though it was at least established that they were Afghan nationals.
The exclusion of a person who had belonged to a terrorist organisation depended on a personal examination to see whether there were genuine grounds to attribute to him a personal responsibility as organiser, author or accomplice to serious crimes under ordinary law or actions contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
The case refers to an appeal to the Supreme Court brought by the appellant against the High National Court’s decision to deny asylum.
The appellant is a Nigerian national and claims to have left her country because of armed confrontations between the group she belonged to (the Massob) and other armed groups.After a demonstration organised by the Massob to demand freedom and independence for the group, the government retaliated against the demonstrators, killing several people.Therefore, she decided to flee the country with her husband and one year old daughter.During the crossing in a small boat from Morocco to Spain, her daughter died.On these grounds the Supreme Court recognised the appellant’s right to remain in Spain on grounds of humanitarian considerations.
The fears of an Applicant originating from a refugee camp near Tindouf were considered with regard to the Self-Proclaimed Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), taken as a de facto authority.
The judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in R.C. v. Sweden (Application no. 41827/07) has a definitive impact on how protection needs are assessed and the scope of the duty of Swedish courts and authorities to investigate claims of torture.
The Applicant’s objective fear was not considered well-founded as persecution was not considered reasonably likely. It was held that there was a reasonable likelihood that, should he return, the Applicant would be forced to live as an internally displaced person in degrading conditions because he lacked the family network that would be required in order to reintegrate him into his homeland socially and financially. Exposure to extreme living conditions constitutes degrading treatment and deporting a person to a country where he would be subject to such conditions violates Article 3 of the ECHR. Subsidiary protection status was therefore granted.