Case summaries
The safe third country ground under Article 33(2)(c) of Directive 2013/32 is optional; an application may be declared inadmissible on that basis even if the applicant qualifies for international protection, but it cannot be rejected as unfounded on that ground.
Article 38 requires national law to define criteria establishing a sufficient connection between the applicant and the third country to make transfer reasonable.
Article 38(2)(b) and (c) of Directive 2013/32 permits reliance on publicly available sources and executive lists of safe third countries, provided that national law sets out a methodology for an individualised assessment of safety and allows the applicant to challenge the existence of the required connection.
Courts hearing appeals must verify the existence of such a connection, even if national law does not expressly grant that power.
Account must be taken of the evolution of the circumstances in the country of origin, from the moment of the application for international protection, until the moment when the Court has to take a decision.
In this instance, relying on the change of circumstances that has taken place in Ukraine since the Applicants introduced the demand, the Court grants subsidiary protection status to a Ukrainian family. The current international conflict taking place in Ukraine exposes them to a risk of serious harm.
Article 40(2) of the Asylum Procedures Directive does not distinguish between initial and subsequent applications for international protection. As such, Member States should not treat the assessment of evidence submitted in subsequent applications different from evidence submitted in a first application. Any document submitted by the applicant in support of his application for international protection must be considered, and the inability to authenticate that document cannot justify the exclusion of such a document from the examination.
The application of provisions on preclusion must always be decided without discretionary error. If the lower court does not make any discretionary considerations at all for its decision to apply a provision on preclusion when rejecting evidence due to a missed time-limit, it infringes the petitioner’s right to be heard under Article 78(2) of the Saxon Constitution (SächsVerf).
An application for a revision of a final court decision of the Swiss Federal Court is only admissible if the applicant presents new relevant facts or evidence which he was not able to provide in previous proceedings even if he had acted with due diligence.
If the new evidence relates to another person’s hearing files (in the case at hand a relative’s hearing protocol before the Swiss asylum authority) the fact that the files could not be retrieved during the proceedings cannot be attributed to the applicant if he lacked the required consent from the person concerned to access the files. By rule of principle, it is the asylum authority’s duty to consult relevant documents for the assessment of an application which is notably the case for statements made by family relatives if the factual circumstances on which the respective applications are based are closely related.
The Court found no violation of the Convention given that the applicants would have had access to a genuine and effective possibility of submitting arguments against their expulsion had they entered lawfully into Spain – they did not have any “cogent reasons” for not using the border procedures available at designated entry points. As such, the lack of an individualised procedure for their removal was the consequence of their own conduct.
The difficulties in access to the regional telephone operating centers set up by the French Office for Immigration and Integration (OFII) in order to obtain an appointment to register asylum applications leads to legal uncertainty for asylum seekers. This legal uncertainty violates their constitutional right to asylum, and therefore creates an emergency situation on which the Urgent Applications Judge can adjudicate.
The CJEU ruled on whether an individual could appeal a decision which refused refugee status but granted subsidiary protection status, even if the rights and benefits afforded by each international protection status are identical in national law.
Where a person is registered with UNRWA and then later applies for international protection in a European Union Member State such persons are in principle excluded from refugee status in the European Union unless it becomes evident, on the basis of an individualised assessment of all relevant evidence, that their personal safety is at serious risk and it is impossible for UNRWA to guarantee that the living conditions are compatible with its mission and that due to these circumstances the individual has been forced to leave the UNRWA area of operations.
In the assessment of a real risk of inhuman treatment or a serious threat to life or physical integrity in a situation of indiscriminate violence within an armed conflict, not only the general security and supply situation has to be considered, but also the “specific distinguishing features” of the applicant, which expose him/her to a higher risk than the average population.
In the present case, the Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht, BVwG) did not assess the individual circumstances of the applicant, disregarding the binding force of a previous ruling of the Supreme Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof, VwGH).