Case summaries
The Court suspended domestic proceedings and referred the case for preliminary ruling procedure to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The Court asked the CJEU to clarify the substance of its ban on exposing applicants for international protection to ‘tests’ to substantiate their sexual orientation.
The decision of denying asylum is disproportionate, as the fact that the acts of persecution are indiscriminate and affect a large majority of the population do not exclude the application of the 1951 Convention when the necessary elements of the provision are present. The reports of UNHCR were also noted in the Court’s assessment, particularly regarding the risk groups that the organisation has characterised.
The degree of indiscriminate violence in certain parts of Iraq was such as to expose persons to a real risk of serious harm within the meaning of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive merely due to their presence there.
However, other areas of the country (including Baghdad City) did not meet this threshold, and as such, Iraqi nationals could be forcibly returned to these areas as it would not generally be unreasonable or unduly harsh for them to internally relocate there.
The Appellant appealed to the Upper Tribunal on the ground that he qualified for subsidiary protection under Article 2(e) and (f) of the Qualification Directive and was therefore entitled to a residence permit under Article 24(2) of the Qualification Directive.
In dismissing the appeal, the Tribunal found that: (a) Article 24 of the Qualification Directive does not confer a substantive right of residence in the member state concerned but rather its function is to determine the modalities whereby a right of residence otherwise existing is to be documented, and (b) the Procedures Directive is a truly adjectival instrument of EU legislation which does not create any substantive rights in the realm of asylum or subsidiary protection.
The case is a referral back to the CNDA from the Council of State in no. 350661 where the Council had found the CNDA to have erred in law in a previous appeal (no. 10012810) by finding that Nigerian women, who were victims of human trafficking networks and who had actively sought to escape the network, constituted a social group within the meaning of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The CNDA found that victims of trafficking from the Edo State do, indeed, share a common background and distinct identity which falls within the definition of a particular social group. The applicant was given refugee status.
The judgment concerns the status of military deserters under the Qualification Directive (2004/83/EC) and the definition to be accorded to persecutory acts following on from a refusal to perform military service. Whilst the definition of military service is to include support staff the CJEU has held that there must be a sufficient link between the asylum seeker’s actions and the preparation or eventual commission of war crimes.
The individual must establish with sufficient plausibility that his unit is highly likely to commit war crimes and that there exists a body of evidence capable of credibly establishing that the specific military service will commit war crimes. Moreover, desertion is the only way to avoid participation in war crimes and disproportionate and discriminatory acts should be assessed in light of a State’s domestic prerogatives.
The CJEU ruling concerned the scope of protection available under EU law to third country nationals suffering from serious illness whose removal would amount to inhuman or degrading treatment. The CJEU surmisedthat the removal of a person suffering a serious illness to a country where appropriate treatment was not available could in exceptional circumstances be contrary to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and in such circumstances their removal had to be suspended pursuant to Directive 2008/115/EC on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals. The Directive 2008/115/EC required the provision of emergency health care and essential treatment of illness to be made available to such persons during the period in which the Member State is required to postpone their removal.
When verifying an asylum seeker’s claimed sexual orientation, Member States’ freedom of action is constrained by the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
The evaluation of an asylum application should not be based on stereotyped notions and should include an individualised assessment taking into account the applicant’s personal circumstances, vulnerability in particular.
Not declaring homosexuality at the outset to the relevant authorities can not result in a conclusion that the individual’s declaration lacks credibility.
The case concerns the interpretation of Directive 2004/83 and clarifies that the Irish legislation requiring seekers of international protection to follow two separate procedural stages: application for refugee status, and in case of refusal, application for subsidiary protection, is not contrary to EU law if the two applications can be introduced at the same time and if the application for subsidiary protection is considered within a reasonable period of time.
The right to good administration includes the right of any person to have his or her affairs handled impartially and within a reasonable period of time.
‘Internal armed conflict’ in the context of international protection means armed groups confronting each other or the State armed forces, and is defined independently of international humanitarian law. No special conditions apply regarding intensity, organisation or duration of conflict.