Case summaries

When a Member State accepts a request by Germany to take charge of an applicant in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 (the “Dublin II Regulation”), the applicant may be transferred to that Member State even if he/she limits his/her application to subsidiary protection after the request to take charge has been accepted.

A member state may derogate from Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 (the “Dublin-III-Regulation“), by examining an application for international protection despite the fact that the members state is not responsible for the examination according to the criteria laid down in the Dublin-III-Regulation.

When assessing Article 17 (1) of the Dublin-III-Regulation (the discretionary clause), the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (the “Federal Office”) must give priority to the best interest of the child and the right to respect of family life. Furthermore, the Federal Office must take due account of the possibility of family reunification in accordance with Article 6 (3) (a) of the Dublin-III-Regulation.

In the event that an application for international protection allows for family reunification and also safeguards the best interests of the child, there is no room for discretion by the Federal Office in making an assessment under Article 17 (1) of the Dublin-III-Regulation.

Although Article 17 (1) Dublin-III-Regulation determines the responsibility of the Member States to examine applications for international protection, it governs not only the relationship between the Member States but also serves to protect fundamental rights. Thus, it also aims at the protection of the individual and provides for a subjective right, which can be enforced in a court of law. 

The case concerns three unconnected Iranian nationals who unsuccessfully claimed asylum in the Republic of Cyprus then came to the UK where they made asylum claims.  A further right to appeal remained with the Cypriot Supreme Court.  The case is a challenge by the applicants to the SSHD’s refusal to decide their asylum claims substantively; certification of their asylum claims on safe third country grounds; and certification of their human rights claims as clearly unfounded.

The Court concluded that there was no real risk that the applicants, if returned to Iran from Cyprus, would be refouled there and the inclusion of Cyprus on the list of safe third countries involves no incompatibility with the ECHR.  The Court was wholly unpersuaded that there was any flagrant breach of Article 5 in Cyprus for Dublin returnees who have had a final decision on their claim.

The Council of State (the “Council”) overturned an order of the National Court of Asylum (the “NCA”) rejecting a request for annulment of a decision of the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (the “OFPRA”) rejecting the Applicant’s request for refugee status or subsidiary protection. The reasoning for the rejection by the NCA was that no new elements had been presented since the previous decision that had been given.

The Council considered that the disclosure by the prefecture to the Sri Lankan Embassy in France (the “Embassy”) of information on the French asylum request of the Applicant constituted a new circumstance which justified a review of the Applicant’s asylum request. 

The Court found a violation of Article 3 in relation to a subsequent application for asylum, which had been rejected on the basis that it contained no new elements indicating that the Applicants ran a real risk of being subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment on deportation to Russia. Because new information had in fact been provided, the national authorities were under an obligation to thoroughly review the information in order to assure themselves that the Applicants’ rights under Article 3 would be safeguarded.

A subsequent application is not admissible unless the interested party presents new facts or elements relating to his personnel situation or to the situation in his country of origin, out of which he could not have had knowledge of previously, and likely, if they have probative value, to modify the appreciation of the legitimacy or the credibility of the application of the interested party.

The director general of OFPRA was right to find that the elements that the applicants presented before him did not significantly increase the probability that they would meet the qualifying conditions to claim protection and that their subsequent applications were inadmissible, without having undertaken a hearing before making the decision on inadmissibility.

The non-suspensive effect of a decision not to further examine a subsequent application under Article 32 of the 2005 Asylum Procedures Directive is not in violation of Articles 19(2) and 47 of the Charter since the decision’s enforcement will not lead to the applicant being removed and is therefore unlikely to expose the applicant to a risk of inhumane treatment.

The provisions on responsibility for unaccompanied minors in Article 6 of the Dublin II Regulation are protective of the individual, as they not only govern relationships between Member States but (also) serve to protect fundamental rights.

Where there has been an unlawful rejection of an asylum application as inadmissible on grounds that another Member State is responsible under Section 27a of the German Asylum Act, this cannot be reinterpreted as a (negative) decision on a subsequent application under Section 71a of the Asylum Act, because of the different adverse legal consequences attached.

The transfer of an applicant for asylum to Malta violates the Regulation (EU) no 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 (“Dublin III Regulation”) because Malta’s asylum procedures and system show systemic deficiencies with the inherent risk of subjecting an applicant for asylum to inhuman or degrading treatment.  

The Court ruled that when deciding whether the subsequent application is admissible, new facts regarding the individual situation of the applicant or her situation in the country of origin as well as change in the situation of the country of origin alone are significant. When examining whether the grounds of the first and the subsequent application are the same, the essence of the facts is important, not the manner in which they are presented.

With regard to the applicant’s argument that in the present case the legal grounds for granting subsidiary protection were not examined, the Court stated that in the decision on discontinuing the procedure because of inadmissibility of the application, the authorities do not rule on refusal of refugee status, therefore there is no self-standing legal basis to examine the grounds for granting subsidiary protection. The present application, as the inadmissible one, could not have led to the in-merit examination of the grounds for granting refugee status and therefore could not have included the examination of the subsidiary protection grounds.