CJEU - Case C-239/14, Abdoulaye Amadou Tall
| Country of Domestic Proceedings: | Belgium |
| Country of applicant: | Senegal |
| Court name: | Fourth Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union |
| Date of decision: | 17-12-2015 |
| Citation: | Case C‑239/14 |
Keywords:
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Effective remedy (right to)
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Description
A general principle of EU law now set out in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights: "Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article.” “[It] is based on Article 13 of the ECHR: ‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.’ However, in Community law the protection is more extensive since it guarantees the right to an effective remedy before a court. The Court of Justice enshrined the principle in its judgment of 15 May 1986 (Case 222/84 Johnston [1986] ECR 1651; see also judgment of 15 October 1987, Case 222/86 Heylens [1987] ECR 4097 and judgment of 3 December 1992, Case C-97/91 Borelli [1992] ECR I-6313. According to the Court, this principle also applies to the Member States when they are implementing Community law. The inclusion of this precedent in the Charter is not intended to change the appeal system laid down by the Treaties, and particularly the rules relating to admissibility. This principle is therefore to be implemented according to the procedures laid down in the Treaties. It applies to the institutions of the Union and of Member States when they are implementing Union law and does so for all rights guaranteed by Union law.” |
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Inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
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Description
A form of serious harm for the purposes of the granting of subsidiary protection. The Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in Celibici defined cruel or inhuman treatment as ‘an intentional act or omission, that is an act which, judged objectively, is deliberate and not accidental, that causes serious mental or physical suffering or injury or constitutes a serious attack on human dignity.’ “Ill-treatment means all forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, including corporal punishment, which deprives the individual of its physical and mental integrity." |
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Right to remain pending a decision (Suspensive effect)
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Description
According to Asylum Procedures Directive, Article 7 "Applicants shall be allowed to remain in the Member State, for the sole purpose of the procedure, until the determining authority has made a decision in accordance with the procedures at first instance set out in Chapter III. This right to remain shall not constitute an entitlement to a residence permit. Member States can make an exception only where, in accordance with Articles 32 and 34, a subsequent application will not be further examined or where they will surrender or extradite, as appropriate, a person either to another Member State pursuant to obligations in accordance with a European arrest warrant or otherwise, or to a third country, or to international criminal courts or tribunals." Art 39 APD requires applicants for asylum to have the right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal, against a number of listed decisions. Member States must, where appropriate, provide for rules in accordance with their international obligations dealing with the question of whether the remedy shall have the effect of allowing applicants to remain in the Member State concerned pending its outcome. |
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Subsequent application
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Description
Where a person who has applied for refugee status in a Member State makes further representations or a subsequent application in the same Member State. Member States may apply a specific procedure involving a preliminary examination where a decision has been taken on the previous application or where a previous application has been withdrawn or abandoned. As with all aspects of the procedures directive, the same provisions will apply to applicants for subsidiary protection where a single procedure applies to both applications for asylum and subsidiary protection. |
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Return
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Description
"In the context of the Return Directive (2008/115/EC), the process of going back - whether in voluntary compliance with an obligation to return, or enforced - to: - one's country of origin; or - a country of transit in accordance with EU or bilateral readmission agreements or other arrangements; or - another third country, to which the third-country national concerned voluntarily decides to return and in which he/she will be accepted. There are subcategories of return which can describe the way the return is implemented, e.g. voluntary, forced, assisted and spontaneous return; as well as sub-categories which describe who is participating in the return, e.g. repatriation (for refugees)." |
Headnote:
The non-suspensive effect of a decision not to further examine a subsequent application under Article 32 of the 2005 Asylum Procedures Directive is not in violation of Articles 19(2) and 47 of the Charter since the decision’s enforcement will not lead to the applicant being removed and is therefore unlikely to expose the applicant to a risk of inhumane treatment.
Facts:
This case relates to a national of Senegal, Mr Tall, who made a subsequent application for asylum following the rejection of his first claim by the Belgian authorities and courts. The Commissariat-General for Refugees and Stateless Persons refused to take this second application into account. This led to CPAS withdrawing social assistance to Mr Tall. He was later served with an order to leave the territory.
He appealed to CALL against the decision refusing to consider his second application for asylum. At the same time he challenged the decision of CPAS (public social service centre) to withdraw his social assistance before the Labour Court of Liege. The Labour Court found that the only remedy under national law against a decision refusing to take into account a subsequent application was an appeal seeking annulment and suspension under the extreme urgency procedure. It stayed proceedings and requested a preliminary ruling from the CJEU with the following questions:
‘According to Article 39/1 of the Law of 15 December 1980, read in conjunction with [the third subparagraph of Article 39/2(1), Article 39/76, point (d) of the second subparagraph of Article 39/82(4) and Article 57/6/2] of the same law, only appeals seeking annulment and suspension due to extreme urgency may be brought against a decision refusing to consider a multiple asylum claim. Given that in such an appeal the court does not have full jurisdiction to determine issues of fact and law, the appeal does not have suspensory effect and the applicant does not have the right of residence nor to material assistance while it is under consideration, are such appeals compatible with the requirements of Article 47 of the [Charter] and Article 39 of [Directive 2005/85] which lay down the right to an effective remedy?’
Decision & reasoning:
The CJEU first considered the admissibility of the question referred, as since the referral, there had been amendments to domestic law (The Law of 10 April 2014 laying down various provisions concerning the procedure before the Conseil du contentieux des étrangers and before the Conseil d’État), with transitional provisions which meant that Mr Tall’s appeal had suspensory effect and he was entitled to material assistance during its examination. It considered that it was bound to give a ruling in Article 267 TFEU proceedings and that the matter was admissible as the interpretation of EU law sought was still relevant to resolving the dispute, especially as the CJEU had no jurisdiction to give a ruling in relation to the effect of the new domestic provisions.
The CJEU then went onto its analysis as to whether the non-suspensory effect of an appeal against a rejected subsequent application decision was compatible with Article 39 of the Asylum Procedures Directive (APD) 2005 and Article 47 of the Charter. It firstly underlined that Article 39(1)c) obliged Member States to ensure that asylum applicants have the right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal against a decision not to further examine a subsequent application. However, the Chamber does note that Article 24 of the APD allows for specific procedures derogating from basic guarantees under Chapter II of the Directive, one of which is the decision not to further examine a subsequent application after a preliminary examination. In such a case Article 7(2) sets out an exception to the obligation to permit asylum applicants to remain in the Member State pending examination of the application. As such it was open to Member States to provide that an appeal against such a decision is devoid of suspensory effect.
However, a remedy under Article 39 of the Directive must be determined in a manner consistent with Article 47 of the Charter (Abdida, C‑562/13), which is derived from Article 13 of the ECHR. Moreover, in light of Article 19(2) of the Charter, who has its counterpart Article 3 ECHR, an effective remedy requires that “a remedy enabling suspension of enforcement of the measure authorising removal should, ipso jure, be available to the applicant”. Nonetheless a decision taken under Article 32 of the APD and its enforcement does not lead to the applicant’s removal and so the lack of suspensive effect does not breach Article 19(2) and 47 of the Charter. In contrast, an appeal must have suspensory effect if brought against a return decision which if enforced, could expose the person concerned to a serious risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment, in view of the requirements of Article 19(2) CFEU, Article 47 CFEU, Article 13 ECHR, and case law from the European courts.
Outcome:
Article 39 of Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, read in the light of Articles 19(2) and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which does not confer suspensory effect on an appeal brought against a decision, such as the one at issue in the main proceedings, not to further examine a subsequent application for asylum.
Observations/comments:
The CJEU judgment was preceded by an Opinion from AG Cruz Villalón who considered that by virtue of the new appeal regime in Belgium, the preliminary reference procedure was rendered hypothetical and devoid of purpose and proposed that the Court consider it inadmissible with no need to rule on the merits.
Relevant International and European Legislation:
Cited National Legislation:
Cited Cases:
Follower Cases:
| Follower Cases |
| CJEU - C‑348/16, Moussa Sacko |
| CJEU - Case C-403/16, El Hassani |