Case summaries

When assessing an asylum application, a judge shall consider as relevant both the applicant’s homosexuality as well as the fact that homosexuality is considered a crime in the country of origin of the applicant. Moreover, the judge shall base its reasoning not only on the assessment of credibility of the applicant, but also on the actual situation in the country of origin, which has to be verified through its own power of investigation.

The judgment concerns the status of military deserters under the Qualification Directive (2004/83/EC) and the definition to be accorded to persecutory acts following on from a refusal to perform military service. Whilst the definition of military service is to include support staff the CJEU has held that there must be a sufficient link between the asylum seeker’s actions and the preparation or eventual commission of war crimes.  

The individual must establish with sufficient plausibility that his unit is highly likely to commit war crimes and that there exists a body of evidence capable of credibly establishing that the specific military service will commit war crimes. Moreover, desertion is the only way to avoid participation in war crimes and disproportionate and discriminatory acts should be assessed in light of a State’s domestic prerogatives.  

The case concerns an appeal of an Algerian woman to the Council of State, against a decision taken on the 17 June 2013 by the National Court of Asylum (CNDA), who rejected the appeal against the Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Person’s (OFPRA) decision concerning the applicant’s application for asylum.  

The Council of State annulled the decision of the CNDA, stating that before finding the existence of a reasonable possibility for the applicant to find internal protection in another region of her country of origin, the Court should have looked into which part of the Algerian territory the applicant could, in all safety, access, settle, exist and lead a normal family life without the fear of being persecuted or being exposed to the risk of serious violence from her ex-husband.

The applicant’ s description of a situation which gives rise to a risk to his life or physical integrity, deriving from gender-based violence, social or religious group violence, family/domestic violence, which is accepted, tolerated or not tackled by the State, imposes an ex proprio motu further investigation upon the Judiciary. The latter entails an investigation into the control of  violence described by the applicant in terms of whether it is widespread, whether there is impunity for the acts as well as the State’s response

The case examines the risk to an Iranian national if expelled to Iran in light of his political activities against the country’s regime. The Court confirmed that such a return would give rise to a violation of Article 3 ECHR and whilst finding an Article 13 read in conjunction with Article 3 violation as admissible it raised no separate issue in the case.

A claim challenging the refusal to grant a visa -in order to claim asylum on French territory- qualifies as being urgent. The consular authority is not qualified to assess the asylum claim. 

ECtHR majority rules that the temporary return of a homosexual man from Sweden to Libya would not violate Article 3 as short term concealment of sexual orientation would be tolerable in order to reduce risk of persecution. 

Two things are required for recognition of refugee status: the existence of a ground for persecution (whether actual or threatened) and the breakdown of the social bonds between the country of origin and its citizen to the extent that the State is no longer able to guarantee protection.

The return of a Pakistani national of the Ahmadiyya religion to Pakistan would violate Article 3. The French authorities had wrongly rejected the Ahmadiyya Applicant’s credibility, which is supported by evidence of prosecution by the Pakistani authorities for blasphemy.

An application for international protection lodged by an Afghan who illegally entered Austria was rejected. The Court found that the applicant had no well-founded fear of persecution in his country of origin nor was he to be granted the subsidiary protection status.