Case summaries

The Upper Tribunal ordered the Secretary of State for the Home Department to immediately admit four vulnerable Syrians from an unofficial migrant camp in France to the United Kingdom in order to be reunited with refugee family members during the examination their asylum applications. Although they had not applied for asylum in France or been subject to Dublin procedures, the particular circumstances meant that failing to do so would lead to a disproportionate interference with their right to respect for family life. 

When addressing asylum claims, refugee status must be recognised when there is a well-founded fear of persecution for any of the reasons foreseen in the 1951 Refugee Convention. Assessment of an asylum request fundamentally needs careful consideration of the facts and personal circumstances of the asylum seeker, as well as an analysis of the nature of the risk. The criteria of this test does not have to be restrictive, it is sufficient that the competent authority has a rational belief that the requirements are met for the purpose of receiving refugee status.

This case is concerned with whether the decision to deny the asylum application and the subsequently imposed entry ban were justified based on articles 1F(a)-(c). Under these provisions the Secretary of State can raise national security as a ‘serious ground’ for his decision if an element of ‘personal participation’ can be proven.

The applicants, a stateless Palestinian from Syria and two Syrian nationals, had been ordered to be expelled to Syria by the Russian authorities, and were detained in a detention centre in Russia pending this. The Court found that their expulsion to Syria would breach Articles 2 and 3, that Articles 5(4) and 5(1)(f) had been violated with regards to their detention, and that the restrictions on their contact with their representatives had breached Article 34.

The assigned political belief of an individual, his desertion or avoiding being drafted in the army are sufficient to grant a refugee status to an individual, if there is a connection between the reasons for persecution and the acts of persecution in line with Article 1.A of the Geneva Convention 1951 in a situation of an armed conflict. 

An Applicant with Syrian citizenship applied for asylum in Sweden. The Migration Court of Appeal found that (i) Armenia was considered a safe third country, and (ii) that the Applicant had such a connection to Armenia that it was reasonable for the Applicant to go there, given that the Applicant’s mother was from Armenia, Armenian was the Applicant’s native language, the Applicant was born and spent his first years in Armenia, and the Applicant had voluntarily returned to Armenia as an adult to study. The Applicant’s asylum application was rejected.

In this case, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) analysed:

1) whether the conditions that the applicant faced when he was detained in Latvia violated Article 5(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR); and

2) whether the appellate proceedings violated Article 5(4) of the ECHR. 

Although the ECtHR held that the conditions in Latvia’s detention centre complied with Article 5(1) and that the appellate courts provided an effective review of the applicant’s detention under Article 5(4), the ECtHR nevertheless found that the appellate proceedings failed to provide the applicant with a speedy decision under Article 5(4). 

The case follows on from litigation presented in M.A. v Cyprus and focuses in on the legal grounds for detention in Cyprus for an applicant who is subject to removal as well as an individual’s right to speedy judicial review of the lawfulness of detention. 

The European Court of Human Rights held that the removal of a Syrian national of Kurdish origin to Italy would not give rise to a violation of Article 3 and 8 of the Convention.

The Appellant appealed to the Upper Tribunal on the ground that he qualified for subsidiary protection under Article 2(e) and (f) of the Qualification Directive and was therefore entitled to a residence permit under Article 24(2) of the Qualification Directive.

In dismissing the appeal, the Tribunal found that: (a) Article 24 of the Qualification Directive does not confer a substantive right of residence in the member state concerned but rather its function is to determine the modalities whereby a right of residence otherwise existing is to be documented, and (b) the Procedures Directive is a truly adjectival instrument of EU legislation which does not create any substantive rights in the realm of asylum or subsidiary protection.