Case summaries

The principle of material continuity applies to the transition from one form of aid to another. A family who has been granted international protection should be accomodated in reception centers for refugees until they benefit from financial assistance and a stable private housing, even if it means extending the deadline to fins accommodation that had been given to them following their recognition as refugees.

The Council of State requested a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the compatibility of Belgian Law with Article 5 of Directive 2008/115/EC (the “Directive”). The Directive requires Member States to respect the principle of non-refoulement, as well as ensure that there is a right to an effective remedy.

Under Belgian Law, the Commissioner-General for Refugees and Stateless Persons (the “Commissioner”) can dismiss an asylum application and issue an order to leave the territory (“Return Order”), before any judicial appeals or other asylum procedures have been exhausted.

The question in the current case was whether the relevant Belgian legislative provisions were contrary to the Directive. The proceedings were suspended pending a preliminary ruling by the CJEU (C-77/17 and C-78/17). 

A member state may derogate from Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 (the “Dublin-III-Regulation“), by examining an application for international protection despite the fact that the members state is not responsible for the examination according to the criteria laid down in the Dublin-III-Regulation.

When assessing Article 17 (1) of the Dublin-III-Regulation (the discretionary clause), the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (the “Federal Office”) must give priority to the best interest of the child and the right to respect of family life. Furthermore, the Federal Office must take due account of the possibility of family reunification in accordance with Article 6 (3) (a) of the Dublin-III-Regulation.

In the event that an application for international protection allows for family reunification and also safeguards the best interests of the child, there is no room for discretion by the Federal Office in making an assessment under Article 17 (1) of the Dublin-III-Regulation.

Although Article 17 (1) Dublin-III-Regulation determines the responsibility of the Member States to examine applications for international protection, it governs not only the relationship between the Member States but also serves to protect fundamental rights. Thus, it also aims at the protection of the individual and provides for a subjective right, which can be enforced in a court of law. 

The case concerns three unconnected Iranian nationals who unsuccessfully claimed asylum in the Republic of Cyprus then came to the UK where they made asylum claims.  A further right to appeal remained with the Cypriot Supreme Court.  The case is a challenge by the applicants to the SSHD’s refusal to decide their asylum claims substantively; certification of their asylum claims on safe third country grounds; and certification of their human rights claims as clearly unfounded.

The Court concluded that there was no real risk that the applicants, if returned to Iran from Cyprus, would be refouled there and the inclusion of Cyprus on the list of safe third countries involves no incompatibility with the ECHR.  The Court was wholly unpersuaded that there was any flagrant breach of Article 5 in Cyprus for Dublin returnees who have had a final decision on their claim.

A refusal to permit re-unification of family members with a child granted asylum in the United Kingdom can constitute a disproportionate breach of the right to respect for family life enjoyed by all family members under Article 8 ECHR despite the Immigration Rules not providing for family reunification where a child has been granted asylum in the UK.

According to § 42 f of the Eighth Book of the Social Security Code, the assessment of whether an applicant is a minor is determined by inspecting  identification papers.  If conclusive identification papers are not available, then the disclosure of information by the person concerned may be taken into account. When in doubt, the determination of age can take the form of a qualified inspection in accordance with § 42 f (1) of the Eighth Book of the Social Security Code. In this respect, one should take into account not only the visual appearance of a person, but also the information obtained during the conversation, which shows the mental age of the person.

The considerable delays of receiving an appointment at the Prefect in order to register an asylum application means that applicants are deprived of legally entitled guarantees, notably material ones. Consequentially such delays constitute a serious and manifestly illegal infringement upon the fundamental right to asylum.

The Police Prefect must register the asylum application within 10 days of the notification of this decision. 

It is an appeal against the decision handed down by the Administrative Court of Lisboa that granted asylum to a Syrian citizen.

The recursive claim was declared unfounded by the Central Court, inter alia because the applicant’s mere transit from Brazil could not be considered as a connecting link that could render Brazil a safe third country.

The Council of State (the “Council”) overturned an order of the National Court of Asylum (the “NCA”) rejecting a request for annulment of a decision of the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (the “OFPRA”) rejecting the Applicant’s request for refugee status or subsidiary protection. The reasoning for the rejection by the NCA was that no new elements had been presented since the previous decision that had been given.

The Council considered that the disclosure by the prefecture to the Sri Lankan Embassy in France (the “Embassy”) of information on the French asylum request of the Applicant constituted a new circumstance which justified a review of the Applicant’s asylum request. 

A court’s decision on a request for suspensive effect of an appeal against a deportation order does not affect the expiration of the 6-month period set out in Art. 29(2) of the Dublin III Regulation. According to German law, a deportation order ceases to be effective upon expiration of this 6-month period.