Case summaries

Member States can issue a return decision together with, or right after, a negative decision on an asylum application at first instance, as long as they ensure that all judicial effects of the return decision are suspended during the time allowed to appeal and pending that appeal.

During that period, and despite being subjected to a return decision, an asylum applicant must enjoy all the rights under the Reception Conditions Directive. The applicant can rely upon any changes in circumstances affecting his claim that came up after the return decision, before the appeals authority.

The Council of State requested a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the compatibility of Belgian Law with Article 5 of Directive 2008/115/EC (the “Directive”). The Directive requires Member States to respect the principle of non-refoulement, as well as ensure that there is a right to an effective remedy.

Under Belgian Law, the Commissioner-General for Refugees and Stateless Persons (the “Commissioner”) can dismiss an asylum application and issue an order to leave the territory (“Return Order”), before any judicial appeals or other asylum procedures have been exhausted.

The question in the current case was whether the relevant Belgian legislative provisions were contrary to the Directive. The proceedings were suspended pending a preliminary ruling by the CJEU (C-77/17 and C-78/17). 

1. Changes in the home country are only considered to be sufficiently significant and non-temporary if the refugee’s fear of persecution can no longer be regarded as well-founded.
2. Based on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) which applies to the concept of “real risk” according to Article 3 ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights), a uniform standardof probability is applied to assessing the likelihood of persecution in the context of refugee protection; this corresponds to the standard of substantial probability. 

The applicant lodged an appeal before the High National Court against the decision to reject his asylum application in the preliminary examination phase. The application was rejected based on the fact that the persecution occurred in the past, the applicant had no current need for protection, and that the circumstances in the country of origin had changed. The applicant appealed stating that he had been granted “prima facie” refugee status by the UNHCR in Benin upon fleeing Togo. The High National Court stated that UNHCR certification did not amount to sufficient evidence of individualised persecution.

This case concerned the procedure for considering new evidence in subsequent asylum applications. The CALL found that the Immigration Department had not assessed whether a submitted document constituted a new element or not, but had instead decided that the document would not result in a determination of the existence of serious indications of a well-founded fear of persecution. In doing so, it was found that the Immigration Department had acted unlawfully (Art 51/8 of the Belgian Aliens Law).

The Secretary of State for Justice does not have to give an applicant who submitted copies of documents of which he had the possibility of acquiring the originals before he left his country, an opportunity to submit these originals during the asylum process, regardless of the State’s duty to conduct research and cooperate with the applicant as determined in Art 8 of the Procedures Directive and Art 4 of the Qualification Directive.