Case summaries

The Appellant appealed to the Upper Tribunal on the ground that he qualified for subsidiary protection under Article 2(e) and (f) of the Qualification Directive and was therefore entitled to a residence permit under Article 24(2) of the Qualification Directive.

In dismissing the appeal, the Tribunal found that: (a) Article 24 of the Qualification Directive does not confer a substantive right of residence in the member state concerned but rather its function is to determine the modalities whereby a right of residence otherwise existing is to be documented, and (b) the Procedures Directive is a truly adjectival instrument of EU legislation which does not create any substantive rights in the realm of asylum or subsidiary protection.

According to the jurisprudence of the Supreme Administrative Court an oral hearing can only be waived if the complaint does not claim any facts relevant to the assessment which are in contradiction or go beyond the result of the administrative investigation procedures.

On the contrary, it constitutes a substantiated denial of the consideration of evidence by the relevant authority if a complaint questions the credibility of different sources which formed the basis of such consideration. The lack of an oral proceeding in such cases leads to a violation of the obligation to hold a trial.

With regards to a possible exclusion from asylum its severe consequences for the individual do not only require that the exclusion clauses of the 1951 Refugee Convention are interpreted narrowly but also that the facts are sufficiently established in order to determine which conduct the exclusion is based on and to weigh the reprehensibility of the offense against the need of protection of the applicant.

Considerations of the competent authority, which are limited to the assumption that the individual in question has participated in hostilities and has caused the death of opposing soldiers and civilians without further clarifying when,  on which occasion and under which circumstances such participation has taken place, do not meet the requirements for determining whether the criteria for exclusion are fulfilled.  

The court found that the removal of a Somali applicant to Italy under the Dublin Regulation would not result in a violation of article 3of the Convention and would not entail any violation of the rights set in article 1, 2, 5, 6 and 13.

‘Internal armed conflict’ in the context of international protection means armed groups confronting each other or the State armed forces, and is defined independently of international humanitarian law. No special conditions apply regarding intensity, organisation or duration of conflict.

The seven year time lapse since the Sunni Muslim Applicant’s former service in the Iraqi army, no evidence of future risk arising from previous injuries, and no medical reasons preventing return, led the majority to find that return to Iraq would not violate the applicants rights under Articles 2 or 3.

Internal contradictions in the Sunni Muslim Applicant’s account, coupled with the time lapse since the relevant acts of persecution, led the majority to conclude that his return to Iraq, despite former employment with US-backed security companies, would not violate Articles 2 or 3.

The reasonable possibility of relocation to the Anbar governorate rendered a Sunni Muslim’s return to Iraq Article 3 compliant in spite of the personal risk he faced in Baghdad from a blood feud. His former membership of the Ba’ath party and military service was no longer regarded as a threat by the Court.

Instead of non-refoulement, the Court granted the Applicant subsidiary protection status because he would be at risk of serious harm upon returning to his home country (torture, cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment).

Rather than dismissing the application, the Court recognised the subsidiary protection status of the Applicant, as his/her return to the country of origin would lead to the risk of serious harm (inhuman, degrading treatment or indiscriminate violence).

The Court granted permission to the Applicants to seek judicial review of the negative decision made in a written appeal (rather than an oral appeal) in an application for refugee status made by a South African one-parent family. The decision to allow a written appeal was based on the status of South Africa as a ‘safe country,’ and the appeal decision was based on personal credibility and the absence of a nexus to Convention grounds. The Applicants failed in their argument that the absence of an oral hearing may render the appeal decision unlawful by reference to the right to an effective remedy as guaranteed by the Asylum Procedures Directive, because the Applicants had in fact availed of the appeal rather than challenge the fact that it was confined to a written appeal. Leave to seek judicial review was granted on the basis that an aspect of the claim which was disclosed after the first instance decision was not properly considered; that the decision maker made exaggerated credibility findings to the potential detriment of a subsequent subsidiary protection application; and erred in the consideration of country of origin information and evidence of the availability of internal protection.