Case summaries

The provisions of the Asylum Procedures Directive have been fully transposed into the CESEDA. A decision of the OFPRA based on all the documents/ evidence submitted by the applicant in support of his subsequent application without an interview does not infringe Article 41(2) of the Charter. When OFPRA considered the subsequent application, it was legitimate for it to have rejected the application without any interview since the new documents/ evidence provided were without merits. The Court found that M.A’s application must be rejected without any need to re-examine the facts he submitted, including those in his first application. The application of M.A was rejected.

The Supreme Court held that a person who is resisting a Dublin  transfer to the Member State responsible for processing the applicant's asylum claim need not show that there is a “systemic deficiency” in that Member State’s asylum system, rather that the conditions in that Member State would expose the person to inhumane and degrading treatment as prohibited by Article 3 ECHR. 

An action for annulment before the Council for Alien Law Litigation was not an effective remedy. The Law of 15 March 2012 limiting the remedy against a decision rejecting an asylum application to an action for annulment when the Applicant came from a safe country of origin, whereas other applicants were able to seek a ‘full-remedy action’, breached the principle of equality and non-discrimination enshrined in Articles 10 and 11 of the Belgian Constitution. The said Law was therefore repealed by the Constitutional Court.

The case appeals a decision of the Ministry of Interior to deny asylum and subsidiary protection considering the alleged crimes against humanity committed by the appellant, national of Iran. He was a member of a declared criminal organization. The Court analyses his adherence to the organisation following a proportionality approach. It addresses the need to examine the existence of substantial proof of the commission of crimes against humanity when applying the exclusion clauses to deny international protection. 

The Migration Court committed serious breaches of procedure in an asylum case (in which grounds arising sur place were cited), as the Court failed to respond to all requests, state its assessment of political activity sur place, or communicate important written documents.

The contested judgment is unconstitutional as it does not provide a clear way of assessing the jurisdiction of the third country when dealing with the application. It also reveals that the situation of the Applicant for international protection is unclear in the event that the application is rejected by the third country and the Applicant is not allowed to enter its territory, and shows that it is unclear as to what the Applicant can contest in this procedure.

An efficient legal system that would stop the extradition to a country in which the Applicant could be exposed to inhuman treatment has to have suspensive effect.

This ruling concerned the scope of judicial review when reviewing compliance with the criterion of Article 10(1) for determining responsibility for examining an asylum application under Regulation 343/2003. The Court held that Art. 19(2) of the Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that, in circumstances where a Member State has agreed to take charge of an applicant for asylum on the basis of the Art. 10(1) criterion the only way in which the applicant for asylum can call into question the choice of that criterion is by pleading systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the conditions for the reception of applicants for asylum in that Member State, which provide substantial grounds for believing that the applicant for asylum would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Art. 4 of the Charter.

An application for international protection lodged by an Afghan who illegally entered Austria was rejected. The Court found that the applicant had no well-founded fear of persecution in his country of origin nor was he to be granted the subsidiary protection status.  

Interventions from third parties to proceedings initiated before the National Asylum Court may be admitted.

A person with refugee status in one European Union state who applies for refugee status in a second European Union state is presumed to have unfounded fears relating to lack of protection. However, that presumption may be rebutted by evidence to the contrary. 

The Applicant's claims that he would be in danger in Syria because of the civil war there were accepted, because he was a Christian and is considered an enemy by both sides and because he left his country illegally and applied for international protection. The Applicant's fear of being killed as a non-combatant in the civil war was considered to be well-founded. It was considered that there was a reasonable chance that he would be arrested and mistreated since the Syrian state would perceive him to have political beliefs since he had lived abroad and would be considered to be opposed to the regime. Internal relocation of the Applicant was not possible because if the Applicant were to return to any region of Syria he would be at risk of suffering serious harm because of the indiscriminate violence and also because the actor of persecution was national/governmental. The Applicant was recognised as a refugee.